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Introduction: the delicate balancing act of West German Middle 
Eastern policy 
However, the Arab policy has to be seen in 
conjunction with our Eastern and German policy.  
West German foreign minister Walter Scheel, 19701 
 
1. Introduction: between the stools of Middle Eastern geopolitics 
In their portrayals of West Germany’s Middle Eastern policy during the 1970s, cartoonists 
repeatedly chose to play upon ‘sitting between the stools’, an idiom which describes a situation 
of one facing a difficult, if not impossible choice between various alternatives. In those 
cartoons, one stool would stand for Israel, the other for the Arab states. In the middle, trying 
more or less successfully to bridge the gap, was West German foreign minister Walter Scheel 
(see Picture 1).  
Picture 1: Three caricatures from the summer of 1972 depicting West German foreign minister Scheel 
and the FRG’s Middle Eastern policy.2 
It is telling that West German Middle Eastern policy evoked comparisons with this idiom. After 
all, during the 1970s the social-liberal coalition under Scheel and chancellor Willy Brandt 
embarked on a reorientation of Bonn’s Middle Eastern policy. In 1969, Brandt publicly 
declared that the FRG’s relations to both Israel and the Arab states would from now on be 
 
1 AAPD 11.02.1970. Document 48. Notes by Gehlhoff. 
2 The subtitle of the caricature on the left reads: “Scheel: ‘Let me briefly demonstrate the position we are 
striving for in the Near East...’” (Norddeutsche Volksszeitung, Bremen (14.07.1972)); the subtitle of the 
caricature in the middle reads: “Scheel in the Near East, or the art of taking a firm standpoint whilst sitting 
between the stools.” (Kölnische Rundschau (24.05.1972)); the caricature on the right is entitled: “A happy soul 






guided by a “principle of even-handedness”.3 Brandt and Scheel themselves had understood 
the Middle East as consisting of an Arab and an Israeli stool; now, their government would 
have to work towards sitting on both simultaneously.   
Unsurprisingly in view of the Holocaust’s historical legacy, scholars researching post-
war Germany in the Middle East have usually focused on relations to Israel.4 Far less attention 
has been paid to West German foreign policy towards the Arab states. But Brandt’s ‘policy of 
even-handedness’ was not just the first and to date only time that the FRG has engaged in a 
specific and publicly stated Middle Eastern policy. It also represented a considerable increase 
in the attention Bonn paid to the Arab states. This dissertation therefore has two main aims: it 
studies the emergence of the ‘policy of even-handedness’ in 1969 and its implementation 
throughout the following years. In addition, it focuses on the ‘Arab world’ and provides a 
comprehensive study of West German foreign policy towards the Arab states throughout the 
1970s. In 1965, all but three of them – Morocco, Tunisia and Libya – had cut diplomatic 
relations with Bonn in response to the exchange of ambassadors between the FRG and Israel. 
Between 1967 and 1977, Bonn worked hard to re-establish diplomatic ties to the Arab states. 
This thesis is the study of these efforts. 
Its main argument is that throughout the 1970s Bonn pursued a specific “Arab policy”.5 
In the aftermath of the 1967 June War, the West German government felt the need to strengthen 
its ties to the Arab states in order to respond to Cold War developments; Bonn feared that a 
stronger Soviet role in the Middle East threatened security in Europe and opened the door for 
an advance of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Arab states. In the following 
decade, the FRG’s ‘Arab policy’ evolved around five dimensions, which correspond to the 
chapter structure of this thesis: the dynamics of the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
terrorism and the emergence of the Palestinian question, the geopolitics of oil, as well as 
common European foreign policy making towards the Middle East.  
Methodologically, the dissertation lies at the interface between international relations 
and diplomatic history. I draw upon original documents from both public and private archives. 
This is complemented by material from published editions and secondary sources such as 
memoirs and newspaper articles. Loosely following the approach of political psychology, I 
 
3 Buettner, Friedemann. Germany's Middle East Policy: The Dilemmas of a ‘Policy of Even-Handedness’ 
(Politik der Ausgewogenheit). In: Goren, Haim (ed.). Germany and the Middle East: Past, Present and Future. 
(Jerusalem, 2003): 115-59. 
4 See, for example, Fink, Carole. West Germany and Israel. Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics, and the Cold 
War, 1965-1974. (Cambridge, 2019); or Weingardt, Markus. Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik. (Frankfurt/New 
York, 2002). 





focus on perspectives and interests as they were perceived by foreign policy elites at the time, 
rather than on writing history ‘as it was’.6  
In what follows, I will outline the existing scholarly literature on Germany in the Middle 
East in order to situate this dissertation within it. I shall then explain the research questions of 
this thesis in detail, before describing the methodology and data used in order to answer them. 
Finally, I will present the structure of the thesis, point out its key contributions and will briefly 
present the main findings about West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’. When the latter was launched, 
it was a project which policymakers in Bonn and the Arab states had put high hopes in. But as 
the cartoons presented above illustrate only too well, sitting on two stools is not easy. Indeed, 
the efforts by the West German government ultimately fell short of its own expectations, 
making disappointment a recurring theme of this West German ‘Arab policy’.  
 
2. Literature review: the lack of research on post-war German-Arab political relations 
Over the past ten years, a growing body of English-language research has engaged with 
Germany’s role in and policy towards the Middle East throughout the 20th century. This starts 
with McMeekin’s 2010 study of German-Ottoman relations in World War I.7 Nicosia and 
Motadel built upon this with monographs on German-Arab relations and the role of Islam 
therein before and during World War II, respectively.8 In these works it becomes apparent that, 
while the Middle East was not a strategic priority for either Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, 
Berlin in both World Wars at least attempted to increase its strategic footprint in that region.9 
In 2018, von Bülow shifted the focus towards the post-war period through her analysis of West 
German links to the Algerian war of independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s.10 The 
following year, Fink published a monograph on West German-Israeli relations around 1970, 
while in 2020 De Vita added a study of East and West German policy towards Israel during 
the 1950s and 1960s to the scholarly literature on Germany in the Middle East.11 Less well 
 
6 On political psychology and foreign policy analysis, see, for example, Rapport, Aaron. Cognitive approaches 
to foreign policy analysis” In: Thies, Cameron. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis. (Oxford, 
2018). 
7 McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power. 
(London, 2010). 
8 Nicosia, Francis. Nazi Germany and the Arab World. (Cambridge, 2015); Motadel, David. Islam and Nazi 
Germany’s war. (Cambridge/London, 2014). See also Rubin, Barry, and Wolfgang Schwanitz. Nazis, Islamists 
and the making of the modern Middle East. (New Haven, 2014). 
9 On this analysis, see also Reuth, Ralf Georg, Entscheidung im Mittelmeer: Die südliche Peripherie Europas in 
der deutschen Strategie des Zweiten Weltkriegs, 1940-1942. (Koblenz, 1985). 
10 Von Bülow, Mathilde. West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War. (Cambridge, 2016). 
11 De Vita, Lorena. Israelpolitik. German-Israeli relations, 1949-1969. (Manchester, 2020); Fink, West Germany 
and Israel (2019); see also Fink, Carole. Ostpolitik and West German-Israeli relations. In: Fink, Carole, and 





covered in this plethora of recent studies is the exclusive and comprehensive study of West 
German-Arab political relations in the second half of the 20th century.  
Some less recent research on German-Arab relations in the post-war period already 
exists. A first strand consists of political science analyses from the 1980s. Foremost amongst 
them is Hünseler’s monograph, which is the only one which specifically addresses the 
historical outline of West German-Arab relations.12 He sees a clear link between European 
geopolitics and Brandt’s attempts at an ‘even-handed’ Middle Eastern policy, as the latter had 
to be understood in connection with the social-liberal coalition’s New Eastern Policy 
(Ostpolitik).13 Hünseler provides an excellent overview of West German foreign policy towards 
the Arab states in the immediate post-war period, but he lacks access to archival material to 
back up his research. As he writes himself: “Once access to these documents is available, 
certainly some analyses will have to be rewritten.”14 Moreover, his work focuses heavily on 
the 1950s and early 1960s, only marginally addressing the post-1969 West German approach 
to the Arab world. Nor does it cover important issues such as oil politics or Bonn’s developing 
stance to the Palestinian question. Kaiser and Steinbach’s handbook offers more of an overview 
of the ‘Arab world’ and its relations to the FRG, rather than providing a thorough analysis of 
West German-Arab relations. Apart from one chapter on political questions, it largely deals 
with cultural or economic relations.15 Steinbach’s 1992 chapter on “Germany and the Arabs” 
is a stimulating, yet brief ten-page essay on the topic.16 These sources help us to understand 
German perspectives on the Arab states during the 1980s and 1990s. However, these works do 
not provide a comprehensive study of West German-Arab relations and are also quite dated. 
Secondly, there is some research on bilateral relations between the FRG and individual 
Arab states. Engler and Abu Samra deal with Bonn’s 1960s’ political relations to Jordan and 
Egypt, respectively.17 At the core of their analyses are West German efforts to prevent East 
German recognition by these Arab third countries. While they are well-researched and helpful 
 
 
12 Hünseler, Peter. Die außenpolitischen Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu den arabischen 
Staaten von 1949-1990. (Frankfurt, 1990). 
13 See, for example, Gilbert, Mark. Cold War Europe. (London, 2015); Trachtenberg, Marc. The structure of 
great power politics, 1963-1975. In: Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of 
the Cold War. Vol. 2. (Cambridge, 2010): 482-502. 
14 Hünseler, Außenpolitische Beziehungen der BRD zu arabischen Staaten (1990): 11.  
15 Kaiser, Karl, and Udo Steinbach. Deutsch-arabische Beziehungen. Bestimmungsfaktoren und Probleme einer 
Neuorientierung. (Munich/Vienna, 1982). 
16 Steinbach, Udo. Freundschaft und Frustration – die deutsch-arabischen Beziehungen. In: Steinbach, Udo 
(ed.). Arabien: Mehr als Erdöl und Konflikte. (Berlin, 1992): 221-32. 
17 Engler, Katja. Die Deutsche Frage im Nahen Osten. (Berlin, 2007); Abu Samra, Dalia. Deutschlands 
Außenpolitik gegenüber Ägypten. (Berlin (PhD thesis), 2002). See also Atiq, Wagih, and Abd As-Sadiq. 





contributions, the authors do not attempt to provide a more comprehensive narrative of West 
German-Arab relations during the Cold War. An excellent example of the value of analysing 
West German-Arab relations specifically, and of not neglecting the Maghreb therein, is von 
Bülow’s recent monograph on West Germany’s role in the Algerian war of independence.18 As 
she argues convincingly, the FRG represented an important sanctuary for the Algerian Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN), which posed a challenge to the Adenauer government in 
Bonn’s attempts to forge a close relationship with France. As a result, von Bülow shows how 
the Algerian war of independence – an event not usually associated with the FRG – had a direct 
and significant impact on West German policy making. However, the period of study for her 
book ends before 1969. Moreover, even though her work makes many important contributions 
to the study of Germany in the Greater Middle East, it once again rather looks at relations to 
one individual Arab country, rather than at the Arab states as a whole.  
The final element in previous studies of West German-Arab relations consists of 
research on the Palestinian question. Slobodian and Prestel deal with the links between the 
Palestinian movement and the West German left.19 Their studies connect the social movements 
of the Middle East with those of the FRG, but largely leave out their impact on foreign policy 
making in Bonn. Terrorism is another dimension of the Palestinian question, as from 1970 
onwards Palestinian Fedayeen were active in West Germany. Several papers cover individual 
attacks. For instance, a book by Dahlke analyses the 1972 attack on the Munich Olympics.20 
Riegler engages with the activities of ‘Black September’ in Austria and West Germany 
throughout 1973,21 while Geiger researches events around the 1977 hijacking of the Lufthansa 
airplane Landshut during the FRG’s ‘German Autumn’.22 Two works engage with the 
diplomatic dimensions of counterterrorism: Dahlke, this time in an article, illustrates secret 
negotiations between the West German government and the PLO to curb further terrorism in 
the aftermath of the Landshut hijacking,23 while Blumenau’s monograph illustrates West 
 
18 Von Bülow, West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War of Independence (2016); see also Cahn, 
Jean Paul, and Klaus-Jürgen Müller. Le rôle de l'Allemagne dans la guerre d'Algérie. (Paris, 2003). 
19 Prestel, Joseph Ben. Palästina-Solidarität. Bruchstelle einer globalen Linken. Merkur 73:839 (2019): 61-7; 
Slobodian, Quinn. Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany. (Durham (NC), 2012). 
20 Dahlke, Matthias. Der Anschlag auf Olympia '72: die politischen Reaktionen auf den internationalen 
Terrorismus in Deutschland. (Munich, 2006). 
21 Riegler, Thomas. Das ‘Spinnennetz’ des internationalen Terrorismus: Der ‘Schwarze September’ und die 
gescheiterte Geiselnahme von Schönau 1973. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 60:4 (2012): 579–601. 
22 Geiger, Tim. Die ‘Landshut’ in Mogadischu: Das außenpolitische Krisenmanagement der Bundesregierung 
angesichts der terroristischen Herausforderung 1977. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57:3 (2009): 413-45. 
23 Dahlke, Matthias. Das Wischnewski Protokoll: Zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen westeuropäischen Regierungen 
und transnationalen Terroristen 1977. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57:2 (2009): 201-15; see also Hürter, 





German efforts to find a multilateral response to terrorism at the UN throughout the 1970s.24 
None of these papers, however, provides a coherent analysis of West Germany’s political 
stance to the Palestinian question throughout the 1970s. Moreover, there is to date no study 
connecting the issue of Palestinian terrorism with Bonn’s foreign policy towards the question 
of Palestine.25  
The FRG’s relationship with the Arab world is also covered through research on West 
German policy towards the Middle East as a whole. A very general introduction is provided by 
Steininger, who mostly focuses on particular episodes such as the FRG’s reaction to the 1967 
June War.26 A 1993 handbook by Chubin analyses the elements of Bonn’s Middle Eastern 
policy in isolation.27 His own chapter stresses the importance of international factors, such as 
the Cold War.28 Similarly, Hubel mentions the connection between West German-Israeli 
relations and Bonn’s participation in the Western alliance (Westbindung).29 Risse-Kappen sees 
the domestic arena as crucial for West German foreign policy attitudes towards the Middle 
East. The key variable for him is the moral obligation that the Holocaust places on Germans.30 
Only Joffe attempts to provide a more general model to explain German Middle Eastern 
policy.31 For him, Bonn was caught in a triangle of moral obligation to Israel and real-political 
interests towards the Arab states, moderated by the dynamics of the Cold War. However, as De 
Vita shows, the reduction of West German-Israeli relations to the issue of morality is too 
simplistic and limiting. It was just as much shaped by self-interest, German-German 
antagonism and the geopolitical context of the Cold War.32 Buettner concludes that the slogan 
of ‘even-handedness’ was just a fig-leaf for a non-existent policy towards the Middle East by 
Bonn.33 But as I will show in the following, this conclusion seems to confuse lack of success 
with lack of intention. All these articles highlight various dimensions of West German Middle 
 
24 Blumenau, Bernard. The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts 
in the 1970s. (Houndsmill/New York, 2014). 
25 An excellent study on this question from a Swiss perspective with a strong focus on intelligence sharing has 
recently been provided Guttmann (Guttmann, Aviva. The origins of counterterrorism. Switzerland at the 
forefront of crisis negotiations, multilateral diplomacy, and intelligence cooperation (1969-1977). 
(Leiden/Boston, 2017).  
26 Steininger, Rolf. Germany and the Middle East: from Kaiser Wilhelm II to Angela Merkel. (New York, 2018). 
27 Chubin, Shahram (ed.). Germany and the Middle East. Patterns and Prospects. (London, 1992). 
28 Chubin, Sharham. Introduction. In: Chubin, Germany and the Middle East (1992): 1-11. 
29 Hubel, Helmut. Germany and the Middle East conflict. In: Chubin, Germany and the Middle East (1992): 41-
54. 
30 Risse-Kappen, Thomas. Muddling through mined territory: German foreign policy-making and the Middle 
East. In: Chubin, Germany and the Middle East (1992): 177-94. 
31 Joffe, Josef. Reflections on German policy in the Middle East. In: Chubin, Germany and the Middle East 
(1992): 195-209. 
32 De Vita, Israelpolitik (2020). 





Eastern policy extremely well but only deal with the Arab dimensions of West German foreign 
policy in passing. They also lack empirical application and consideration of primary source 
material. 
Weingardt’s monograph is possibly the most exhaustive and detailed work on West 
German engagement in the region, which also draws upon primary source material for its 
analysis.34 However, as the author himself states, his book primarily deals with the relationship 
between West Germany and Israel. Gerlach provides a very detailed study based on archival 
material about the German attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1967 to 1973.35 
Again, however, the account mostly circles around Germany (both West and East) and Israel. 
In both Weingardt’s and Gerlach’s books, Bonn’s policy towards the Arab states is engaged 
with through the lens of West German-Israeli relations, only analysing the former to the extent 
that they were related to the latter. 
Of course, within German Middle Eastern policy the study of relations to Israel has 
been a particular focus area. A whole range of publications deals with this foreign political 
dimension of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (‘coming to terms with the past’) in the aftermath of 
the Holocaust.36 Reconciliation, recompensation and morality are recurring and dominant 
themes of these works. Most books focus on West Germany, although some research on East 
Germany in this respect exists as well.37 Unsurprisingly, the Arab states are only touched upon 
marginally in such works. 
Another theme repeatedly addressed in studies of post-war Germany’s foreign policy is 
the global competition between East and West Germany.38 How did “Germany’s Cold War” 
play out in the Middle East?39 The most comprehensive account of this story is provided by De 
 
34 Weingardt, Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik (2002). 
35 Gerlach, Daniel. Die doppelte Front. (Berlin, 2006). 
36 Bachleitner, Kathrin. Diplomacy with Memory: How the Past Is Employed for Future Foreign Policy. Foreign 
Policy Analysis 15:4 (2019): 492-508; Borchard, Michael. Eine unmögliche Freundschaft. David Ben-Gurion 
und Konrad Adenauer. (Freiburg, 2019); Hestermann, Jenny. Inszenierte Versöhnung: Reisediplomatie und die 
deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen von 1957 bis 1984. (Frankfurt, 2016); Lavy, George. Germany and Israel: 
moral debt and national interest. (Abingdon, 2013); Jelinek, Yeshayahu. Deutschland und Israel 1945-1965. Ein 
neurotisches Verhältnis. (Munich, 2004); Hansen, Niels. Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe. (Düsseldorf, 2002). 
37 Herf, Jeffrey. Undeclared Wars with Israel. East Germany and the West German Far Left, 1967-1989. (New 
York, 2016); Tim, Angelika. Hammer, Zirkel, Davidstern. Das gestörte Verhältnis der DDR zu Zionismus und 
Staat Israel. (Bonn, 1997).  
38 On an engagement with this question beyond the Middle East, see, for example, Roberts, George. Politics, 
decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam 1965-72. (Warwick (PhD thesis), 2016); Hong, Young-sun. 
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Vita in her recent monograph, which illustrates the interplay of the Cold War and German-
German antagonism in Bonn’s and East-Berlin’s relations to Israel from 1949 to 1969.40 
Trentin compares relations of both GDR and FRG to two Arab states: Syria and Iraq. His study 
goes up to 1974 and therefore into the period of rapprochement between the two Germanies.41 
Both De Vita and Trentin follow Kleßmann’s approach of “entangled history” by engaging 
with GDR and FRG simultaneously.42 Maeke and Sittmann focus more exclusively on East 
German relations to the Arab world.43 More and more light is shed upon the question of how 
the Cold War’s ‘German question’ played out in and was perceived by third countries, although 
much of it still focuses on the early days of this episode, rather than on the period after 
Ostpolitik. 
The 1970s were also the decade in which a common European foreign policy started to 
take shape through the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Finding common 
positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict amongst the EEC members was one of the EPC’s main 
tasks. This European dimension therefore has to be taken into account when analysing West 
German Middle Eastern policy from 1970 onwards. Moeckli’s excellent monograph covers the 
formative years of the EPC.44 Jacobs provides insights into the process of the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue (EAD), another, yet more temporary tool of early European foreign policy towards 
the Middle East.45 But these contributions focus exclusively on the European dimension, rather 
than analysing it in conjunction with the European member states’ Middle Eastern policies 
more generally. The only exception is Neustadt’s 1983 book on the European element of West 
German-Israeli relations, which, however, lacks the incorporation of primary source material.46  
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Oil is another factor shaping the international relations of the Middle East over the past 
century. This applies to the 1970s in particular, when not only one, but two oil crises occurred. 
Still, the role of energy security in Bonn’s foreign policy has so far largely been ignored. A 
chapter by Maull engages with the economic relations between FRG and the Arab states.47 On 
the one hand, they had the potential to be lucrative export markets; on the other hand, they were 
the main provider of West German oil supplies, which caused a significant energy dependence. 
Other than that, literature on energy security mostly analyses the FRG’s domestic politics of 
oil.48 
Finally, to look at the topic from a different angle, in the extensive literature on the 
engagement of outside powers within the Middle East, Germany has traditionally not received 
a lot of attention.49 Instead, this strand of literature focuses on the USA,50 the UK,51 France,52 
or, more recently, the Soviet Union.53 
Overall, a wide range of literature covers Germany’s political relationship to the Middle 
East throughout the 20th century. However, as far as the post-war period is concerned, much of 
this research circles around Bonn’s relationship to Tel Aviv and the foreign policy of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Bonn’s political engagement with the ‘Arab world’ is often 
studied only in as much as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned. Other themes which the 
literature points to in this regard are the context of the Cold War, German-German antagonism, 
terrorism and debates about Palestine, the role of energy security and the emergence of 
European policy making towards the Middle East. But a comprehensive study of West German-
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Arab relations bringing together these factors is lacking. West German foreign policy towards 
the Arab states generally remains under-researched. In the following section, I will explain why 
this research gap merits our attention, outlining the questions which underlie my dissertation. 
 
3. Research question: the neglected side of West German Middle Eastern policy 
In an intentional oversimplification, one can understand West German Middle Eastern policy 
as a coin, whose obverse represents relations to Israel and whose reverse stands for relations to 
the Arab states. As the literature review has shown, a significant amount of research over the 
past few years has shed light on the former side of the coin. Even much of the literature on the 
Arab states ultimately evolves around Israel. Less attention, however, has been given to the 
latter side of the coin: the relations of the FRG to the Arab states. But if we view the coin as a 
whole and want to understand West German Middle Eastern policy more generally, we need 
to know more about both of its sides. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the side which so far 
has been studied less by analysing the FRG’s foreign policy towards the Arab states.  
But can there even be study of Bonn’s policy towards the Arabs states 
comprehensively? Or would that rather just have to be a study of bilateral relations with more 
than a dozen individual Arab countries? After all, there never has been a united ‘Arab state’. 
However, of course on the Arab side the vision of ‘Arabism’ and thus a sense of commonality, 
despite its contested nature, certainly existed in particular in the years and decades following 
the period of de-colonisation.54 Moreover, there are several indicators that in the minds of 
foreign policy makers in Bonn there truly was the understanding of the Arab states as a 
somehow coherent political arena. To begin with, on numerous occasions West German 
diplomats and politicians referred to an “Arab world”, using the phrasing of a “tradition of 
amicable relations between Germany and the Arabs”.55 Secondly, chancellor Willy Brandt 
himself gave testimony to a perceived dichotomous separation of the Middle East in Bonn, 
when in 1969 he publicly announced an ‘even-handed’ policy to Israel on the one and the Arab 
states on the other hand. Thirdly, after the collapse of West German-Arab relations in 1965, 
between 1967 and 1977 the FRG opened or re-opened embassies in thirteen Arab states, mostly 
in the years 1971-74. This is a clear sign that the re-establishing of diplomatic relations to the 
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Arabs states was a concerted policy effort throughout this time span. Last but not least, West 
German foreign minister Walter Scheel himself talked of a West German “Arab policy” 
(arabische Politik) in a 1970 government meeting.56 Overall, it becomes clear that amongst the 
FRG’s foreign policy elites the impression of a coherent Arab political unit existed. The 1970s 
in particular seem to have been a decade in which the Arab states carried greater importance 
for West German foreign policy making. Thus, an analysis of West German foreign policy 
towards the Arab states is possible and can be carried out comprehensively. It is not just the 
stringing together of eighteen separate chapters covering Bonn’s policy to eighteen individual 
states.57 Throughout the 1970s, studying the whole of West German-Arab relations is more 
than studying the sum of its bilateral parts. 




Jordan 1967  
North Yemen 1968 
Algeria, Sudan 1971 
Lebanon, Egypt 1972 
Saudi Arabia 1973 
Syria, Iraq, United Arab Emirates 1974 
Oman 1975 
Kuwait, Qatar 1977 
Bahrain 1991 
Bold: Diplomatic relations broken up in 1965; embassy re-opened 
Italics: No diplomatic relations with FRG by 1965; embassy newly opened 
Figure 1: Years in which a West German embassy was opened or re-opened in the Arab states after 
1965. The first three countries did not break up diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1965. The period 
covered in this thesis are shaded in grey.  
In order to shed further light on West German-Arab relations during the Cold War, this 
dissertation will be guided by the following questions: 
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• Why did Brandt and Scheel engage in a new, ‘even-handed’ Middle Eastern policy from 
1969 onwards? 
• What was the role of the Arab states in this new policy? 
• Was there indeed a comprehensive West German ‘Arab policy’ during the 1970s? 
• What were the key dimensions and determinants of West German-Arab relations in this 
period? 
• Which actors drove West German-Arab relations forward in this period? 
• What happened to West German-Arab relations by the end of the 1970s, and why do 
we no longer talk of a German ‘Arab policy’? 
Finally, it is worthwhile to reflect on the importance of having diplomatic relations with third 
countries, as much of this thesis circles around this question. After all, the absence of 
diplomatic relations with the Arab states certainly did not mean that the West German state was 
completely absent from those countries in this period. So-called ‘protective powers’ took on 
the task of directly representing West German interests in the Arab states and they usually 
hosted West German diplomats as staff. To give just one example, throughout the period of 
1965 to 1972 there was a West German delegation working within the Italian embassy in Cairo, 
as Italy had agreed to serve as West German protective power in Egypt. In many cases, trade, 
too, remained mostly unaffected by the 1965 break-up of diplomatic relations.58 But for two 
reasons, there is an added benefit to having formal diplomatic relations with third countries. 
Firstly, on a practical level, full diplomatic representation offers more access and greater 
freedom to operate abroad. Although transnational politics are just as much conducted above 
or below the level of official diplomatic channels, states will have it easier to find a solution 
for any concrete problem if they can resort to a fully staffed embassy abroad. As Berridge 
states: “Resident embassies are the normal means of conducting diplomacy between any two 
states.”59 Secondly, on a superficial level, diplomatic relations, or rather the absence thereof, 
carry an important symbolic weight. The unwillingness to exchange ambassadors signals a lack 
of recognition and political distance. It is for that very reason that East Germany fought so hard 
to have embassies abroad in the post-war period, as otherwise the GDR’s sovereignty and 
independence was in question. The absence of diplomatic relations between two countries is in 
and of itself a statement about the quality of their relationship. 
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I will now turn to outlining the methodology, data and analytical framework underlying the 
research pursued in order to answer the above questions. 
 
4. Methodology and data: the interplay of international relations and diplomatic history  
This dissertation is a study of the FRG’s foreign policy towards the Arab states through a West 
German perspective. Methodologically, it lies at the interface of the study of international 
relations and of contemporary, diplomatic history.60 Ultimately, it is closer to the latter 
approach, because it represents a study of foreign policy in the post-war period based on 
archival sources. The closest the description of a political science method comes to this is 
process tracing, whereby a broad array of sources is used in order to redraw the chronology of 
a particular event and establish a certain causal narrative.61 Since this thesis is an explorative 
research project, it does not rely on a dense and formal theoretical framework. Many of its 
aspects – such as the engagement with West German policy towards the Maghreb, Bonn’s 
stances to the Palestinian question and the Lebanese civil war or the FRG’s emerging oil policy 
– are, to my knowledge, entirely novel contributions to scholarship. Therefore, the less rigid 
recourse to ‘thin’ theoretical inspirations and a broad analytical framework, which will be laid 
out in the next subchapter, represent the more appropriate choice for the research design of this 
thesis.  
As this project retraces the emergence and implementation of a past foreign policy, it 
was clear from the start that the data used for this thesis would mainly consist of primary, 
archival sources. The starting point for finding this material consisted in the redacted editions 
called Akten der Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), which are 
accessible in print and online. They contain key documents from the German foreign office 
archive, which are selected to be published annually by a group of German historians. In a first 
stage, I went through all documents between 1967 and 1980 containing any reference to the 
Middle East or North Africa, which already provided a good outline of the main themes and 
issues that seemed to matter for West German Middle Eastern policy in this period. For 
example, the link between West Germany’s Arab policy and the Mediterranean already 
emerged at this stage.  
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This initial mapping also helped to plan further archival visits. The archive which 
provided most of the new, previously unused material of this thesis was the Political Archive 
of the German Federal Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts – PA/AA), 
where the focus lay on materials from the Middle Eastern and North African desks as well as 
those units in the Auswärtiges Amt dealing with EPC, trade and energy security. In view of my 
initial findings in the AAPD-documents, I also expanded my research to materials from the 
Mediterranean desk. Most of the material used – coming from boxes starting with B130 – was 
still classified; in all approximately 70 cases, requests for the declassification of and access to 
this material was granted by the PA/AA. The archival research conducted in the PA/AA was 
the most extensive and fruitful of all the archival visits carried out for this project.  
In addition, I visited three further archives for very specific research. In order to access 
to personal papers of key politicians of the period covered in this thesis such as Willy Brandt 
or Hans-Dietrich Genscher, I visited the Archive of Social Democracy (Archiv der sozialen 
Demokratie – AdsD) in Bonn – and the Free Liberal Party – the Archive of Liberalism (Archiv 
des Liberalísmus – ADL) in Gummersbach. In both, I also studied notes from party committees 
on foreign policy. However, no documents of note relating to the Middle East or the Arab states 
could be found there.  
Some documents in the fourth chapter on the economic dimension of West German-
Arab relations come from the Historical Archive (Historisches Archiv) of the Federation of 
German Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie – BDI) in Berlin. I also examined 
the minutes of the select committee for foreign affairs in German parliament (Auswärtiger 
Ausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages), which are accessible in published editions up to 
1983.62 In addition, memoirs, autobiographies and newspaper articles have been used where 
they filled a particular gap or helped to shed light on the thinking and memories of actors 
involved at the time. 
Of course, these materials come with several limitations. Autobiographies and personal 
papers carry the most obvious problem of subjectivity with themselves. However, to an extent 
government documents, official minutes or newspaper articles are just as much “ego-
documents” which are written through a certain lens by a particular group to a specific 
audience.63 To remedy this, I focused on contextualising and interpreting these documents in 
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view of the debates and events they relate to. Moreover, as I will show in the following section, 
this thesis acknowledges such subjectivities by focusing on the political psychology of 
diplomacy, engaging with the perceptions of threats and interests by key policymakers. As a 
result, the subjectivity incorporated into ego-documents represents less of a methodological 
obstacle, as it becomes itself subject of the research. A final caveat is that the material selected 
mostly follows a top-down perspective. However, where possible material from diplomats 
acting ‘on the ground’ was incorporated. In addition, government foreign policy making 
ultimately is a top-down process, of which the use of sources here therefore is a reflection. 
The above list of archives also shows both what this thesis does and what it does not 
deal with. It focuses on the FRG’s perspective on the Arab states. While a study taking into 
account Arab viewpoints is highly desirable, the engagement with both German and Arabic 
sources would have gone beyond the limits of this PhD project. The dissertation is also not a 
social or cultural history of German-Arab relations, which is why the archives listed above 
mostly deal with political topics. In addition, East Germany is only engaged with through West 
German sources. De Vita has shown the value of simultaneously taking material from both 
Germanies into account in her recent book on Bonn’s and East Berlin’s foreign policy towards 
Israel.64 However, she has done so after the foreign policies of both Germanies towards Tel 
Aviv had been studied separately in detail. As much as I hope to read a similar German-German 
history of relations to the Arab states at some point, I argue that first it was necessary to focus 
on either one of the two Germanies in their policy towards the Arab ‘world’. Finally, and as 
already explained above, it is worthwhile to reiterate that this is first and foremost an empirical 
rather than a theoretical contribution to the study of Germany in the Middle East. 
The period covered in this thesis stretches from 1967 to 1979. This relates to the above-
mentioned fact that it was in this period that the (re-)opening of West German embassies in the 
Arab states took place. If we ever want to understand the FRG’s relations towards the Arab 
states more comprehensively, those years of Bonn’s ‘Arab policy’ are suited best. Moreover, 
the period of research lies between two pivotal years for the Middle East: in Segev’s words, 
1967 with the Six-Day War was “the year that transformed the Middle East”,65 while for Lesch 
1979 with the invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, the second oil crisis, the Siege 
of Mecca and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was “the year that shaped the Modern Middle 
East”.66 In between fall several key events in the recent history of the region, such as the 1969 
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Libyan coup, the 1973 October War, the oil shock, the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975 
or Anwar al-Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem in 1977. These all represent situations in which West 
German decision-makers had to consider their position in the Arab world, allowing for an 
analysis of the written records of their debates, conversations and deliberation processes.  
 
5. Analytical framework: political psychology and the structures shaping West German 
post-war foreign policy 
As Elman and Elman put it, diplomatic history and international relations could be understood 
as separated between a “narrative-theory divide”.67 The former focuses on rich, nuanced detail 
and the latter on rigid, generalised explanations. But as the authors themselves go on to argue, 
this is probably a too simplistic distinction.68 As Levy or Schroeder put it, the difference is 
rather that the historical approach is less explicit in its use of formal theory, whilst still relying 
on theoretical assumptions.69 Combining the perspectives of political science and history is 
therefore maybe less difficult than one would intuitively expect. After all, as Wohlforth argues, 
international relations is already a historical science.70   
In the context of this thesis, two aspects need to be taken into consideration. On one 
hand, this research is based on the analysis with original government and policy documents. 
Thus, any research design has to permit the reader of these primary sources to study them with 
a certain openness to interpretation. On the other, one has to acknowledge the context in which 
decision-makers were operating at the time in order to navigate and understand the relevant 
primary source material. 
The following analytical framework is therefore supposed to provide broad guidance 
on the context in which West German foreign policy towards the Arab states developed, without 
being too restrictive. It starts with the interplay of agency and structure and the assumption that 
decision-makers move within certain structures that shape, direct and constrain their actions. 
In turn, these actors also affect and influence these structures themselves. Consequently, the 
analytical framework attempts to outline the “political, economic, and ideational structures 
through the prism of the perception of the agents, assuming that what is essential for 
 
67 Elman, Colin, and Miriam Elman. Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting 
Difference and Crossing Boundaries. International Security 22:1 (1997): 5-21. 
68 Ibid.: 7. 
69 Levy, Jack. Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International 
Relations. International Security 22:1 (1997): 22-33; Schroeder, Paul. History and International Relations 
Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit. International Security 22:1 (1997): 64-74. 






understanding an individual’s behaviour is how he or she interprets these forces and 
constraints” – what Moeckli terms the political psychology of foreign policy making.71 It 
relates closely to Leffler’s argument about the need to understand threats and opportunities as 
decision-makers perceived them through the lens of perspective, ideology and context. 72  
I will now briefly outline key elements of the structures which generally shaped West 
German foreign policy in the post-war period. Then, I will turn to agency and introduce key 
foreign policy makers of the 1960s and 1970s. This will not be an exhaustive list but will give 
helpful context for the main research of this thesis. It also provides space to introduce and 
define central concepts, which come up repeatedly throughout this dissertation. 
 
Structures: 
The Cold War 
The second half of the 20th century is marked more than anything by the Cold War: the 
ideological and geopolitical struggle between East and West, between capitalism and 
communism, and, at least within Europe, democracy and autocracy.73 Its key battleground state 
was Germany. “Throughout the forty-five-year history of the Cold War, [it] remained the 
principal prize of the conflict.”74 The FRG was therefore fundamentally affected by this contest 
and was both subject and object in the struggle of superpowers. The Cold War was also a main 
reference point in understanding Bonn’s relations to its most important international ally after 
World War II: the United States.75 The Cold War therefore is the key framework around which 
all of West German foreign policy, including that towards the Middle East, evolved throughout 
the second half of the 20th century.  
Rather than rigid bipolarity, however, recent scholarship has stressed what Smith has 
termed the “pericentric” nature of the Cold War.76 He highlights the agency available to “junior 
members in the international system […] in expanding, intensifying, and prolonging the 
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struggle between East and West”77. The framework of pericentrism draws our attention to the 
mid-levels of global political hierarchies at the time.78 It also corresponds to a view which 
detects an interplay between a global, systemic Cold Wars and several regional Cold War that 
mutually impacted and shaped each other.79  
West German Middle Eastern policy represents an excellent case study for pericentrism 
and the interaction of regional Cold Wars.  After all, a particular manifestation of this conflict 
was what Gray has termed “Germany’s Cold War”: the competition between FRG and GDR 
about the global claim to sole representation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch).80 From 1955 to 
1969, Bonn’s foreign policy was officially guided by the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, named 
after a West German State Secretary in the West German foreign office, the Auswärtiges Amt, 
Walter Hallstein.81 It stipulated that the recognition of East Germany by a third country would 
be interpreted as a hostile act by West Germany. Indeed, it was the Hallstein Doctrine which 
had contributed significantly to the break-up of diplomatic relations between the Arab states 
and the FRG in 1965. Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser had invited East German leader 
Walter Ulbricht to Egypt for a visit in order to pressure Bonn into ending weapons deliveries 
to Israel. Nasser’s decision in turn had been motivated by developments of the so-called “Arab 
Cold War”, at the time characterised by a struggle within the Arab World between revolutionary 
republics led by Egypt and conservative monarchies headed by Saudi Arabia.82 Responding to 
several setbacks, Nasser had hoped to reinforce his position amongst the Arab states by 
challenging the FRG over weapons deliveries to Israel. In turn, the West German government 
openly discussed to cut economic aid to Cairo and established diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Only then did most of the Arab states call back their ambassadors from Bonn. The Hallstein 
Doctrine had not in and of itself caused the breakdown of West German-Arab relations in 1965, 
but it had set the FRG on collision course with the Arab states.83  
The Arab and the German Cold War had collided and caused embarrassment for the 
West German government. A few years later, changes and relaxation of both German and Arab 
Cold Wars opened the space in which Bonn attempted to formulate its Arab policy. The re-
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intensification of the Arab Cold War from 1977 onwards then made an impact on West German 
Middle Eastern policy, too. Orkaby rightly warns us from an inflationary use of the ‘Cold War’-
term to preserve its analytical value and meaning.84 Yet, without a doubt the interplay of Arab, 
German and systemic Cold War represented a crucial backdrop against which West German 
Middle Eastern policy unfolded throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
European integration 
A key component of the FRG’s post-war foreign policy identity is the commitment to the 
project of a united Europe. Together, Bonn’s membership in the EEC (later EU) and NATO 
formed the cornerstone of West Germany’s alignment with the West (Westbindung). Moreover, 
its bilateral relations to key West European states such as France, Italy or Britain were 
increasingly managed through the European arena.  
During the 1970s, the European project took on another dimension. The EEC had faced 
significant crises throughout the 1960s, for example through de Gaulle’s ‘policy of the empty 
seat’ and his vetoes against British EEC-membership.85 But at the 1969 Hague summit, the 
EEC leaders chose to push European integration forward by a significant margin. One element 
of this decision was the closer coordination and integration of foreign policy on a European 
level. For this, in 1970 the new institutional format of EPC – precursor of the EU’s 1993 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – was established. Ultimately, Brandt, Heath and 
Pompidou might have been unable to achieve what Moekli called their “dream of political 
unity”.86 Nevertheless, West German regard for the European project was greater than ever in 
this period and was one of the main influences on the FRG’s foreign policy making.   
 
The shadow of the past 
The Third Reich is the fulcrum of modern German history. Its impact on the FRG’s politics – 
both domestic and external – has been profound and lasts to this day. Firstly, this relates to the 
crimes of the Holocaust. Today, the German government openly accepts an obligation which 
the murder of millions of Jewish people has created for its policy. The process by which 
German politics arrived at this point has been contested, but certainly debates about 
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Vergangenheitsbewältigung, about ‘coming to terms with the past’, have been a continuous 
feature of politics in both Bonn and Berlin since 1945.87 As far as foreign policy is concerned, 
nowhere was and is this more the case than in the Middle East, where with Israel a Jewish state 
is located whose creation is directly linked to the Holocaust. 
Secondly, the cataclysmic failure of Germany’s bid for world power not only once, but 
twice in the time span of thirty years has left traces in German perceptions of power and the 
principles of foreign policy. Bonn only gradually reasserted the hold over its own external 
relations. In this process, the conduct of its foreign policy was shaped by a commitment to 
multilateralism and a rejection of military power, which Maull or Risse call “civil power”.88 
While this term might be an over-idealisation of Bonn’s foreign policy, it is certainly true that 
throughout the Cold War the FRG operated under a number of self-imposed constraints, such 
as an exclusion of military means from foreign policy making. 
 
Foreign trade 
‘Economic miracle’ (Wirtschaftswunder) is another term closely related to West Germany’s 
post-war history. It had a profound impact on the area of foreign policy.89 The expansion of 
trade was one of the nascent tasks of the Auswärtiges Amt. From its re-establishment in 1951, 
one of its seven (now eleven) units was focused exclusively on the promotion of West German 
exports. But the significance of trade went beyond monetary value, only. Growing economic 
strength increased Bonn’s political weight. Geo-economics is the term used by Luttwack or 
Kundnani to describe this phenomenon.90 Bonn’s policy makers were well aware of that. As 
State Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt, Rolf-Otto Lahr, stated in 1968: “On the economy as 
instrument of foreign policy: We have had significant success in the area of economic policy; 
[…] In the European Community we have largely paid the bill. It has not been to our 
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The domestic arena 
Foreign policy making is traditionally considered more bipartisan than domestic politics. But, 
of course, the former still cannot be analysed in isolation from the latter.92 Different parties 
have different preferences. Between 1966 and 1982, West Germany was governed by coalition 
governments under participation of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD): from 1966 
to 1969, Brandt’s party was junior partner to the centre-right Christian democrats (CDU/CSU), 
while from 1969 to 1982 it was the significantly larger party within the social-liberal coalition 
between SPD and the Free Liberal Party (FDP). The leading role of the SPD in West German 
foreign policy making throughout the 1960s certainly affected the FRG’s policy towards the 
Arab states, too. After all, the social democrats had a greater inclination to pay attention to the 
‘Global South’. However, the great debates between West German parties at the time were 
about Ostpolitik or armaments policy, not about the Middle East. The latter is not mentioned in 
any SPD party programme throughout the 1970s.93  
Public opinion, too, can have significant impact on foreign policy making, expressing 
itself through polling data or media activity. However, public opinion only sporadically paid 
attention to West German Middle Eastern policy. In general, polling shows that the Middle East 
played an important role in the public arena only in times of severe crisis such as in 1967 or 
1973.94 The domestic elements of foreign policy making will be considered where they made 
themselves felt. However, I have not included a systematic analysis of newspaper articles or 
polling data into the research design of this thesis. 
 
Agency: 
In the following, I will introduce some of the key actors of West German foreign policy making 
from 1967 to 1979. The politicians mentioned below were in office throughout the period of 
analysis of this thesis. All of them served in the FRG’s executive. Of course, other people 
played vital roles in the events discussed in this thesis. Several diplomats such as State 
Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt Paul Frank (1970-74) or Helmut Redies, who was in charge 
of the ministry’s Middle Eastern unit (1969-74), come up repeatedly. However, their role was 
more limited to individual episodes or decisions. While it therefore would go too far to 
introduce every individual mentioned in this thesis in depth, the Appendix includes short 
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biographies of the main characters to provide further orientation on the actors involved in West 
Germany’s ‘Arab policy’.  
 
Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (1904-88) 
Kiesinger was the last of West Germany’s early conservative chancellors. In 1966, he followed 
Ludwig Erhard, who had stepped down in part due to his hapless handling of the 1965 crisis 
around East Germany, the Arab states and Israel. Kiesinger took charge of West Germany’s 
first Grand Coalition (“Große Koalition”), combining the two by far largest parties in West 
German parliament: CDU/CSU and SPD.95 The Grand Coalition held until 1969.  
Kiesinger did not have a particular interest in the Middle East, maybe because of his 
predecessor’s difficulties in dealing with the region. In addition, Kiesinger was the first West 
German chancellor with a significant Nazi past: he had joined the NSDAP in 1933 and worked 
within the Auswärtiges Amt on international propaganda from 1940 onwards. In view of this 
he could not deal as easily with Israel as his predecessors Erhard and Adenauer – both without 
direct affiliation to the NSDAP – had been able to. The foreign policy of the Grand Coalition 
focused on a reorientation of the FRG’s policy towards the GDR and the Eastern bloc, laying 
the groundwork for Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Following electoral defeat in 1969, Kiesinger first tried 
to shape opposition policy against the social-liberal coalition. But within two years, he stepped 
away from the front line of West German politics.96 
 
Willy Brandt (1913-92) 
Unlike his predecessor, Brandt has become one of most iconic political figures of the FRG’s 
history, even though he acted as chancellor for just five years from 1969 to 1974. His was West 
Germany’s first left-wing government, led by the SPD together with the much smaller FDP. 
Brandt aimed to profoundly reform West Germany economically and socially, responding to 
the political climate of the 1968-movement.97 
Unlike Kiesinger, Brandt had actively opposed the NSDAP. He had spent most of the 
Nazi-years in exile, first in Norway, then in Sweden, remaining politically active against the 
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Third Reich throughout this time. Upon his return to West Germany, he soon rose to the top of 
the SPD in West Berlin, before in 1966 he became Kiesinger’s junior partner in the Grand 
Coalition and took charge of the Auswärtiges Amt. This experience helped him to take on a 
dominant role in shaping the social-liberal coalition’s foreign policy. Losing office due to a 
political scandal in 1974, he remained party leader of the SPD until 1987 and headed the 
Socialist International from 1976 to 1992. He used these posts to remain active politically and 
to gain international attention, for example through his 1979 meeting with his friend Bruno 
Kreisky, the chancellor of Austria, and PLO-chairman Yasser Arafat.98 
 
Walter Scheel (1919-2016) 
Scheel was a leading member of the liberal party in the post-war years. Under Adenauer and 
then Erhard, he served as minister for international development (1961-66). He was one of the 
driving forces behind the formation of the social-liberal coalition in 1969, taking over the post 
of foreign minister. While he initially struggled to find his place in the shadow of Brandt and 
the latter’s close advisor Egon Bahr, he ultimately managed to assert his role in West German 
foreign policy making. In May 1974 – the same month Brandt was forced to step down as 
chancellor – he left the Auswärtiges Amt to take over the position of Federal President 
(Bundespräsident) – the more ceremonial post of West German head of state.99 He remained in 
this position until 1979 and then mostly stepped back from the political stage.100 Despite his 
key role in the Brandt years of the social-liberal coalition, his legacy is somewhat eclipsed by 
his successor as foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who served in this post for 18 years. 
 
Helmut Schmidt (1918-2015) 
Schmidt became chancellor after Brandt’s resignation in 1974. He led the social-liberal 
coalition until 1982. Born in Hamburg, Schmidt served in the Wehrmacht during World War II, 
earning himself a promotion to the rank of Captain (Hauptmann) and being awarded an Iron 
Cross. For a short while, he had been posted to the Eastern front. No other German chancellor 
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has been involved as directly in the German war effort. However, Schmidt never joined the 
Nazi party and remained distanced from it. But his Wehrmacht past and pictures of him in a 
German officer’s uniform would represent a burden for his later dealings with Israel.101  
After the war, he joined the SPD and became the party’s political all-purpose weapon. 
In Bonn, he led the parliamentary party group of the SPD during the Grand Coalition. When 
Brandt became chancellor in 1969, he first made Schmidt minister of defence, then minister of 
finance. Characteristic for Schmidt were his soberness and sense for pragmatism. His years as 
chancellor were shaped by Bonn’s response to global economic crisis abroad and left-wing 
terrorism at home. After losing office in 1982, Schmidt soon took on the role of ‘elder 
statesman’ and as editor of the German newspaper Die Zeit became a leading commentator of 
both German and international politics.102 
 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1927-2016) 
No other politician shaped West German foreign policy for as long as Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 
For 18 years, he served as foreign minister and vice-chancellor: first from 1974 to 1982 in the 
social-liberal coalition together with the SPD’s Helmut Schmidt, then from 1982 until 1992 as 
partner of chancellor Helmuth Kohl and the CDU/CSU. His stress on multilateralism in the 
UN, EEC/EU and CSCE/OSCE has been termed by later German political observers as 
‘Genscherism’ (Genscherismus).103  
Genscher had joined the Wehrmacht in 1945, experiencing the fighting of World War II 
only in its latest stages. After the war, he entered the FDP and in 1965 became a member of 
parliament in Bonn. His first executive post was that of West German minister of the interior 
in 1969, making him a key minister throughout the years of the social-liberal coalition.104 
 
6. Outline and key findings of the thesis: the importance of the Cold War and the five 
dimensions of West German ‘Arab policy’ during the 1970s 
The main finding of this thesis is that, as Scheel himself stated, a West German ‘Arab policy’ 
existed throughout the 1970s. It resulted from Bonn’s reaction to the 1967 June War, as in the 
view of Bonn’s foreign policy makers Cold War dynamics brought together the geopolitics of 
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Central Europe and the Middle East. The protraction of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the emergence 
of Palestinian terrorism and the oil crisis made relations to the Arab states ever more important 
for Bonn from 1970 onwards. Ultimately, this West German ‘Arab policy’ was structured along 
five main dimensions: the role of the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism and the 
Palestinian question, energy security and relations to the Gulf, as well as the early days of a 
common European Middle Eastern policy.  
The Cold War shaped West German perceptions of interest towards the Arab states. As 
Chapter I shows, Cold War dynamics resulting from the 1967 June War caused a West German 
shift of focus towards the Arab states. Brandt’s New Eastern Policy and his government’s new 
Middle Eastern policy were intricately linked. Similarly, in 1979 the intensification of the Cold 
War in Europe as part of what has been called the “Second Cold War” was in a large part 
responsible for removing the strategic necessity for Bonn to engage in the Middle East.105 This 
chapter also engages with German-German antagonism in the Arab states. As I will show, 
détente between the two Germanies could be observed in third countries. After the 1972 Basic 
Treaty between GDR and FRG, the competition between the two Germanies in the Arab states 
turned into a managed co-existence of cooperation with elements of competition. The first 
chapter also includes the study of the re-establishment of relations between West Germany and 
most of the Arab states. Moreover, it argues that instead of a ‘policy of dual-evenhandedness’ 
Bonn was in fact forced – and ultimately failed – to pursue a ‘policy of dual-evenhandedness’, 
contending with Israel and two split Arab camps. I argue that this framework is suitable more 
generally for the study of external powers in the Middle East during this period. 
The second chapter covers West German-Arab relations through the lens of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. As I argue, the latter did not bring about the ‘policy of even-handedness’ but 
made its implementation a near-impossible task. The chapter illustrates how Brandt 
increasingly turned his attention to the Middle East conflict once Ostpolitik started to succeed. 
As the chapter will show in a new argument, in 1973 the West German chancellor even 
considered a more direct engagement in peace efforts within the region, which were thwarted 
by the 1973 October War. In its aftermath, Bonn put its hopes into Kissinger’s ability to broker 
a comprehensive peace deal for the Middle East. But not only did the US Secretary of State 
have to abort his efforts in this direction; Schmidt and Genscher were also deeply sceptical of 
the Camp David accords, leading Genscher to undertake a grand yet unsuccessful summer tour 
of seven Arabs states in 1979 to promote a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 





The chapter also engages with West German reactions to the civil war in Lebanon, which Bonn 
hoped would be settled through Syrian intervention. Overall, by 1980 the conviction had grown 
in Bonn that the FRG should avoid a too direct engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
The 1967 June War also had a major impact on the development of the Palestinian 
question through the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip by Israel. Before 1970, 
the West German government had paid little attention to this topic. As I argue, Bonn even saw 
a benefit to the presence of Palestinian refugees, as the FRG hoped that aid to them would 
improve its standing in the Arab states on the whole. However, in 1970, Palestinian terrorism 
came to West Germany. As the chapter will show, throughout the next ten years the FRG was 
compelled to formulate a stance on the Palestinian question. This started in 1973 with a vague 
acknowledgment of legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and ended in 1979 with the 
recognition of both a two-state solution and the PLO’s role as representative of the Palestinians. 
Simultaneously, I present new evidence showing how the FRG responded to Palestinian terror 
attacks by establishing an intricate network of communication with both violent and non-
violent elements of the Palestinian movement.  
Another issue which hardly mattered in Bonn’s 1967 political perception of the Arab 
states was energy security. The FRG acknowledged its dependence on Arab oil, but limited its 
response to this to the economic arena by promoting the establishment of a West German oil 
company called DEMINEX. However, from 1971 onwards, the power in the oil market moved 
from large oil companies to the oil-producing states. Only then did Bonn include the oil topic 
on the agenda of foreign policy, for instance by starting to intensify efforts for strengthening 
its diplomatic networks in the Gulf. Nonetheless, West Germany was caught unprepared by the 
1973 oil crisis. Now, Saudi Arabia became a hinge of West German ‘Arab policy’, until the 
triple crisis of 1979 – Iranian revolution, second oil crisis and Siege of Mecca – led Bonn to 
question the value of this relationship. Chapter IV therefore represents the first analysis to date 
of West Germany’s foreign policy of oil and its links to relations with the Gulf. 
The fifth chapter covers the interrelation between West German and European Middle 
Eastern policy after the establishment of the EPC in 1970. As I demonstrate, Bonn soon viewed 
the EPC through a functionalist lens, hoping that success there and later in the EAD would 
benefit European integration as a whole. In effect, this mostly led to a West German 
unwillingness to recognise insufficiencies of these European instruments. I argue that, 
ironically, the less successful EPC and EAD were, the more Bonn pushed for a stronger role of 





stronger than ever. This chapter is slightly shorter than the others, as the EPC was only 
established in 1971 and thus cannot be dealt with for the full period of analysis of this thesis. 
Finally, in a brief concluding chapter, I summarise the main results of the thesis, 
extrapolate from them implications for the study of the FRG’s Middle Eastern policy as well 
as German history more generally, and discuss some theoretical implications. I will also point 
to future research agendas in regard to Germany in the Middle East.   
Because of Cold War dynamics the FRG started to pay more attention to the Arab states 
in 1967. As a result, Bonn got involved more directly in the Arab-Israeli conflict than ever 
before. It was challenged to position itself towards the question of Palestine and to confront its 
oil dependence. To add a new instrument to its foreign policy, it supported a European approach 
to the Middle East. However, Bonn never achieved a routinised relationship to the Arab states 
as such and by 1979 an ‘Arab policy’ no longer existed. It certainly had yielded some 
significant results. By the end of the 1970s, there were West German embassies in all Arab 
states and the FRG had become much more of a politically engaged actor in the region than it 
had been in 1965. Relations to states such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia resembled close political 
partnerships. The FRG had moved closer to the Arab world and had built up stronger bilateral 
ties to several Arab states.  
However, for three reasons the concept of an ‘Arab policy’ ran out of steam by the end 
of the 1970s. To begin with, the sense of strategic necessity which had made the FRG focus on 
the Middle East was subsiding. Increasing tensions between East and West in Europe as part 
of the Second Cold War no longer made a strong engagement in the Middle East necessary for 
Bonn. Moreover, in the 1980s, the pertinence of Palestinian politics for the FRG reduced. As 
for energy security, the FRG now looked to exploration in the North Sea to remedy its 
dependence on Arab oil.  
Secondly, the notion of “German-Arab friendship” remained illusionary.106 Relations 
with several Arab states such as Libya, Iraq or Syria remained strained. Schmidt and Genscher 
also lost appetite for repeatedly burning their fingers on mediation efforts in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Moreover, despite closer relations to Egypt or Saudi Arabia, an underlying distance 
remained between Bonn and its Arab partners. Therefore, regardless of the above-mentioned 
successes, the attempts to reach out to the Arab states repeatedly failed to meet West German 
 






expectations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the source material on several occasions contains 
references to the notion of “disappointment” in regard to West German-Arab relations.107 
The greatest misunderstanding pertained to a fundamental component of West 
Germany’s ‘Arab policy’: its addressee. After the break-up of the Arab League in 1977/78, the 
illusion of a politically coherent ‘Arab world’ could no longer be maintained. Without a doubt, 
by 1980 the FRG was in a better place to solve problems in its relations to the Arab states on a 
case-by-case basis. However, throughout the 1970s, the grand design of an ‘Arab policy’ 
encountered setbacks and difficulties, making it the history of a disappointment which today is 
largely forgotten in German political discourse.  
 
107 See, for example, PA/AA (B36 104844, unfoliated) 09.09.1974. Werner (Tripoli) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA 
(B36 438, p. 21) 21.12.1970. Moltmann (Tunis) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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Chapter I: Cold War dynamics and Bonn’s efforts towards a 
West German Arab policy 
 
It appears unlikely that a policy of détente in the centre of Europe 
can be successful in the long run, as long as in a region 
immediately neighbouring Europe the confrontation between East 
and West continues [and] the Cold War with a struggle for 
influence between the great powers goes on […].1 
 Walter Redies, head of the Middle Eastern unit in the 
Auswärtiges Amt, 1972 
 
Since Camp David there is a new situation. To paraphrase 
Bismarck, we now no longer have to juggle two balls (Israel and 
the Arabs) but three balls (Israel and two split Arab camps).2 
Ministerial director Meyer-Landrut in conversation with the 
Israeli ambassador to the FRG, 1979  
 
1. Introduction: the Cold War at the centre of West German Arab policy  
In August 1969, the Parliamentary State Secretary in the Auswärtige Amt, Gerald Jahn, prepared 
a speech on the Middle East. Its first draft started on a reflective note:  
Some might wonder whether for German foreign policy there are not more severe 
issues than the Middle East. Are not problems such as European unification, détente 
in Europe, our relations with the states of Eastern Europe tasks to which we should 
devote all our energy? […] [But] she [the Federal Republic] simply cannot afford to 
stay on the margins and ignore the pressing problems of world politics.3 
Reading the draft of Jahn’s speech, Joffe’s assessment of German Middle Eastern policy after 
1945 comes to mind: “Ideally, the Federal Republic would have preferred to have no policy in 
the Middle East.”4 Yet, starting with June 1967, West Germany had markedly increased its 
political engagement in the region and shifted its focus on the Arab states in particular. In 1969, 
chancellor Willy Brandt declared his policy of even-handedness’ in 1969, the first and to date 
only time after 1945 that the FRG formulated a specific Middle Eastern policy. Foreign minister 
Scheel had begun to talk about a specific “Arab policy” by February 1970.5 What explains this 
apparent contradiction between an expressed desire for inaction and factual action? Why did 
this shift in approach occur? 
 
* Some of the research of this chapter is also the basis of a separately published journal paper (Hirsch, Philipp. 
The Arab world, the Cold War and West Germany’s ‘Mediterranean moment’. Cold War History 20:2 (2020): 
161-78). 
1 PA/AA (B36 493, pp. 213ff.) 11.04.1972. Speech by Redies to senior staff in the Auswärtiges Amt. 
2 AAPD 12.07.1979. Document 208. Conversation of Meyer-Landrut with Meroz. 
3 PA/AA (B36 376, pp. 467ff.) 18.08.1969. Draft speech for Parliamentary State Secretary. 
4 Joffe Reflections on German policy in the Middle East (1992): 205. 
5 AAPD 11.02.1970. Document 48. Memorandum by Gehlhoff. 
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Above all else, it was the dynamics of the Cold War that caused and shaped West 
Germany’s engagement with the Arab World after the Six-Day War. Brandt was worried that 
tensions created by the Cold War in the Middle East would spill over to its neighboring regions 
and would endanger détente in Europe. Linked to this were concerns about a stronger East 
German position in the Arab states, at a time when German-German relations were still marked 
by antagonism and a struggle for sole recognition (Alleinvertretung). The Cold War had 
strategically connected Central Europe with the Middle East. As this chapter will show, fears 
and perceptions about this link were the main drivers of West German foreign policy towards 
the Arab states.6 Contrary to later assertions by West German SPD politicians about the 
“divisibility of détente”, during the 1970s the social-liberal coalition very much considered 
détente in Europe to be strongly interconnected with developments in the Mediterranean.7 This 
chapter will therefore engage with the Cold War as central framework shaping West German 
Arab policy from 1967 onwards. It will also cover the key manifestation of Bonn’s turn to the 
Arab world: the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Arab 
states during the 1970s. 
The chapter places a somewhat different emphasis on explaining the underlying factors 
motivating West German relations to the Arab states than previous scholarship. Authors such 
as Buettner or Gerlach have put the Arab-Israeli conflict at the heart of their analysis of West 
German Middle Eastern policy.8 But as this and the following chapter show, conflict in the 
Middle East only became a concern to the FRG as long as it related back to broader Cold War 
trends. Another factor cited very often as determining West German relations to the Arab states 
is oil.9 Energy security certainly mattered, but West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’ was formulated 
before concerns over an Arab oil weapon emerged in the aftermath of the 1971 Tehran 
conference, as Chapter IV will illustrate.10  
I also challenge previous accounts about German-German antagonism in the Middle 
East, which have been the subject of much research on the region.11 Certainly, at the high time 
of the Hallstein Doctrine there can be no doubt that West Germany identified blocking any East 
 
6 See also Fink’s views the link between Brandt’s policy of détente and his stance on the Middle East conflict 
(Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019)). 
7 Hansen, Jan. Abschied vom Kalten Krieg? Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungsstreit (1977-1987). 
(Berlin/Boston, 2016): 71. 
8 Gerlach, Doppelte Front (2006); Buettner, Germany’s Middle East Policy (2003). 
9 Joffe, Reflections on German policy in the Middle East (1992); Maull, Economic relations with the Middle East 
(1992). 
10 This issue will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter IV on oil politics. 
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German advance in the Arab world as one of its key aims. But the normalisation of German-
German relations in 1972 changed much of that. Of course, if one, like Trentin does, only 
analyses more left-leaning republics such as Iraq or Syria, one will find that the GDR still tried 
to push for a stronger role there at the cost of the FRG in the late 1970s.12 But looking at the 
Arab world as a whole, this chapter presents new evidence which shows that in most states of 
the region the FRG was not worried by GDR competition. In fact, by the end of the decade 
Bonn even started a process of coordination with East Berlin which, despite elements of 
continued competition, culminated in regular exchanges about the Middle East on a working 
level between the two German foreign ministries by the late 1970s. I argue that relations 
between FRG and GDR were increasingly marked by a managed co-existence of cooperation 
with elements of competition. 
Finally, this chapter proposes that the FRG struggled in its pursuit of a coherent Arab 
policy, as a ‘policy of even-handedness’ was not sufficient to engage in the Middle East; in the 
end, West Germany failed in this endeavor. In fact, splits in the Arab world had made it 
necessary to practice a ‘policy of dual-even-handedness’. As a senior West German diplomat 
put it in conversation with the Israeli ambassador to Bonn in the aftermath of Camp David in 
1979: “To paraphrase Bismarck, we now no longer have to juggle two balls (Israel and the 
Arabs) but three balls (Israel and two split Arab camps).”13 But such a juggling act proved far 
too difficult for Bonn. In that way, its ‘Arab policy’ also failed because – contrary to 
expectations in the 1960s – the ‘Arab world’ did not evolve into a strong political unit in the 
post-colonial era, a fact which became clear during the 1970s.14 As for research on the 
international relations of the Middle East, I argue that this challenge of ‘dual even-handedness’ 
is one which more generally pertains to external power engagement in the Middle East during 
the Cold War.15 
Cold War dynamics drove Bonn’s ‘Arab policy’ and linked the various interests which 
Bonn identified in the Arab states. As such, it is not surprising that it was at the end of the 1970s 
that the FRG started to reduce efforts towards a coherent Arab policy. By then, considerations 
about the Cold War no longer made an engagement in the Arab world seem as pressing as 
before. Moscow had failed to establish a strong foothold in the region, and with the placement 
 
12 Trentin, Tough negotiations (2008); see also Maeke, DDR und PLO (2017). 
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14 Henry, Clement, and Robert Springborg, Globalisation and the Politics of Development in the Middle East. 
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of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe during the so-called euro-missile crisis the Cold 
War manifested itself strongly once again in Europe. The second draft of Gerald Jahn’s 1969 
speech outlined in great detail the threat that a Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean 
represented to the FRG in Europe.16 Ten years later, Bonn no longer needed to look to the Arab 
world to worry about threats to détente; they had returned to West Germany’s doorstep. 
 
2. The impact of the June War on West German Middle Eastern policy, 1967 
The Six-Day War of 1967 is a turning point of modern Middle Eastern politics.17 It 
demonstrated that the state of Israel would remain a permanent addition to the region’s political 
order, underlined Tel Aviv’s military superiority, brought the Palestinian question to the fore 
and dealt a death blow to the Nasserist brand of Arab nationalism. Crucially for the FRG, it also 
further embedded the Arab-Israeli conflict into the landscape of the Cold War.18 Bonn worried 
that a protracted conflict opened opportunities for the Soviet Union to advance in the 
Mediterranean as a whole and feared that East Germany would follow in Moscow’s wake. In 
response to the Six-Day War, the Auswärtiges Amt initiated a fundamental reconceptualisation 
of West German Middle Eastern policy, focusing more on the Arab states and those in the 
Western Mediterranean such as Algeria or Libya. For a short while, Bonn went through a 
“Mediterranean moment”.19 
 
The FRG followed a restrained Middle Eastern policy before 1967. It focused mostly on 
‘coming to terms with its past’ in foreign policy terms, through its relationship with Israel.20 Its 
official position on the Arab-Israeli conflict was that the FRG would neither intervene in the 
Middle East nor send weapons to any conflict party.21 There was no specific ‘Arab policy’. 
Bonn’s interests in the Arab states were mostly limited to trade and the competition with the 
GDR over sole recognition. The 1965 severance of diplomatic ties between all but three Arab 
states and Bonn had not affected either – trade went on at existing levels and the GDR had still 
not been recognised by any Arab state.22 The FRG took the stance that as it had been the Arab 
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19 Hirsch, Arab world, Cold War and West Germany’s ‘Mediterranean moment’ (2020). 
20 De Vita, Israelpolitik (2020); Lavy, Germany and Israel (2013); Hansen, Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe 
(2002). 
21 AAPD 27.07.1967. Document 283. Memorandum by Meyer-Lindenberg. 
22 Abu Samra, Deutschlands Außenpolitik gegenüber Ägypten (2002): 176.  
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states who had cut diplomatic ties, it was also up to them to initiate a return of relations to the 
status quo ante.23 Overall, in Bonn’s view, it was mostly a matter of time until the West German 
embassies in the Arab world would open again; the issue did not cause major headaches in 
Bonn. Already in late 1966 Brandt as foreign minister had stated his optimism that the FRG 
would soon reopen its embassies in the Arab states.24 This view seemed to find justification 
when the West German representative in Amman cabled Bonn on 20 February 1967, stating 
that the Jordanian government was ready to “immediately resume relations”.25 On 24 February, 
the two countries exchanged ambassadors.26 Bonn’s plans regarding the Arab states, it might 
have seemed to anyone in spring 1967, were unfolding well, and the 1965 debacle in the Arab 
world was about to turn into an odd yet brief footnote to the history of West German-Arab 
relations. 
Under the surface, however, cracks were already appearing. In view of the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Romania in early 1967, Bonn felt the need to warn its envoys in 
the Arab states. After all, Bucharest as Warsaw Pact member obviously already had an embassy 
in East Berlin. Thus, the Arab states could easily make the argument that they, too, should be 
allowed to have diplomatic relations with both Germanies. Bonn’s insistence that this would be 
a non-negotiable obstacle to a mutual reopening of embassies made the FRG open to criticism 
for double-standards.27 Moreover, the long-expected visit to Bonn by Abdul Khaled Hassouna, 
Secretary General of the Arab League (LAS – League of Arab States) in May 1967 
disappointingly ended in controversy and argument.28 
Then, the June War of 1967 brought the Middle East conflict right into the centre of the 
Cold War. What had previously been largely considered a regional conflict had now more than 
ever become part of the global East-West confrontation and thereby created a link which 
directly affected the FRG.  
To begin with, there was now a worry that superpower tensions in the Middle East could 
spill over into Europe. As such, the FRG as key battleground of the Cold War had to reconsider 
its role in the Middle East as well.29 West German chancellor Kiesinger himself connected the 
geopolitics of the Middle East with those of Europe. In a conversation with the US ambassador, 
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27 AAPD 13.01.1967. Document 18. Circular by Schütz. 
28 AAPD 16.05.1967. Document 169. Embassy counsellor (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 




he expressed his worries about a Soviet reaction to the defeat of its allies Egypt and Syria, 
musing about potential consequences for Cold War battlefields such as Berlin.30  
Moreover, somewhat counterintuitively the outcome of the war was perceived in Bonn 
to have strengthened the Soviet Union’s hold over key Arab states. While today its position in 
the Middle East following the Six-Day War is seen as overestimated, at the time most Western 
powers assumed Moscow would carve out a bigger role for itself in places like Egypt, Syria 
and Algeria.31 Moscow’s Arab allies may have lost the war, but they were now more than ever 
in need of, and therefore dependent on, Soviet support.32  Moscow was happy to oblige and did 
not even limit its military aid to the states that had fought Israel directly. Algeria, too, was on 
the list of major Soviet weapons recipients, which was cause for worries in NATO circles.33 
In addition, this alleged Soviet advance increased the likelihood – at least in the eyes of 
the Auswärtiges Amt – that the GDR might follow in Moscow’s wake at a time of German-
German competition over Alleinvertretung. In fact, the Auswärtiges Amt was convinced that 
the GDR was behind what it viewed as an anti-West German campaign in the Arab states, 
accusing the FRG of direct military support for Israel during the war.34 It therefore came as 
little surprise to the Auswärtige Amt that the GDR pushed for a declaration by the LAS at the 
latter’s August 1967 Khartoum conference to welcome the recognition of East Berlin by all 
Arab states. A hectic but well-coordinated attempt by the West German government followed, 
which succeeded in staving off this initiative. Through allies that were considered sympathetic, 
it worked hard to prevent the Arab governments from such a move. For example, Ankara was 
employed to work on Baghdad, Cairo and Algiers; Iran was asked to sway Saudi Arabia.35 In 
the case of Somalia, Bonn was even willing to speed up a transfer of financial aid if Mogadishu 
were to lean on Sudan.36 Similarly, Egypt was incentivised by the offer of a debt restructuring.37 
Ultimately, West German efforts were rewarded and the issue of GDR recognition did not make 
it to the floor of the LAS meeting. Still, the threat remained.  
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The Bonn government now looked at the Middle East in a different way and could no 
longer afford to maintain its restrained attitude towards the Arab states. The latter had united 
behind a common stance against Israel at Khartoum summit, mitigating the divisions of the 
Arab Cold War in the previous decade. Only two weeks after fighting had ended in the Middle 
East, a Hausbesprechung was convened at the Auswärtiges Amt. These are rather informal 
meetings at operational level between different units within a ministry on topics concerning 
several working areas. But this Hausbesprechung was chaired at high level by a State Secretary, 
the ministry’s most senior civil servant, which is a clear sign of the importance attached to the 
meeting. Out of the subsequent discussion a memorandum was produced which redefined the 
West German position in the Middle East, named Bonn’s resulting interests and outlined a 
strategy to achieve them. This June Memorandum represents a significant upgrade of the FRG’s 
political focus on the Middle East, which puts the Cold War in the centre of Bonn’s Middle 
Eastern policy.  
The memo first outlines key issues such as superpower tensions and the advance of the 
Soviet Union in the region. Under the header ‘our policy’ it then states the FRG’s interests in 
the Middle East: “Protection of the south-eastern flank of Europe from increasing Soviet 
penetration; our own political presence including resumption of diplomatic relations with nine 
Arab states; prevention of the legal recognition of East Germany; protection of our economic 
interests.”38 After reading the document, foreign minister Willy Brandt moved the last point 
(economic interests) to the beginning of the paragraph. 
Maybe at this time he was less pessimistic than his key diplomats about the destabilising 
potential the Middle East carried for Europe. But nonetheless, Cold War themes dominate the 
document.  Not just in relation to Israel and the Arab states, but again West German officials 
established a clear link between the Middle East and European geopolitics. For the Auswärtiges 
Amt, the danger lay in Soviet and East German encroachment in the entire Mediterranean. 
Interestingly, however, oil is not mentioned once. Considerations clearly circled around 
political topics.  
What were the main conclusions of the memorandum? First, the familiar principle of 
non-intervention in the MENA region was mentioned. But this is then criticised somewhat, as 
it was invalidated by disproportionate financial support to Israel in particular. Ultimately, the 
memorandum contains the following conclusion: “We have to make an effort to make the Arab 
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peoples more aware of our even-handed Middle Eastern policy.”39 It is the first mention of the 
‘principle of even-handedness’ which Brandt would turn into official West German policy two 
years later upon becoming chancellor.  
 
From June 1967 onwards, Bonn started to view the Arab states more through a political lens. 
The nature of the global, systemic Cold War seemed to make the Middle East more relevant to 
Bonn, while the relaxation of the Arab Cold War made the Arab states appear to be a more 
coherent political unit. Also, rather than seeing the Middle East in isolation, Bonn defined its 
interests in the wider space of the Mediterranean in its entirety. It is this view which would 
recalibrate the practice of West German Middle Eastern policy in the years to come. 
 
3. West Germany’s ‘Mediterranean Moment’ and East Germany’s diplomatic coming-
of-age in the Middle East, 1968-1970 
Following the 1967 June War, the FRG faced a dilemma in the Middle East. Cold War dynamics 
necessitated a stronger West German engagement in the Arab states. At the same time, closer 
alignment to Moscow by many of them, in particular those in the Mashreq such as Egypt or 
Syria, as well as an anti-West German mood therein meant that these countries were closed off 
to West German advances. Thus, a combination of strategic necessity and opportunity led Bonn 
to shift its focus to a region which has not usually been considered a traditional priority for 
German foreign policy: the Maghreb and the Western Mediterranean.40 
 
NATO and its members were deeply worried about Moscow’s advances in North Africa. A 
significant fear was that Algeria might become a permanent base for the Soviet ‘Eskadra’, the 
counterpart to the US 6th fleet in the region.41 France had only just agreed to turn the military 
port of Mers El Kébir over to the Algerians and soon after Soviet ships had appeared in the 
harbour.42 Interestingly, Bonn – not usually understood as a Mediterranean power - was worried 
by this development and started to shift its focus towards North Africa. A memo that the 
Auswärtige Amt compiled in late 1967 showed how much Bonn connected its engagement in 
the Maghreb with the Cold War: 
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In the past years the Soviet Union has succeeded in establishing itself firmly in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. It is clearly intending to extend its dominant role into the 
Western Mediterranean as well, where Algeria offers the best point of entry. It is in 
the political and strategic interest of the Federal Republic, as well as of the entire 
West, to close this gap and prevent that North Africa, too, becomes subject to Soviet 
domination.43 
The FRG’s fixation on a Soviet advance in the Mediterranean also becomes clear through the 
reaction of the Auswärtiges Amt to the Libyan coup a few years later. In September 1969, a 
group of officers around colonel Muammar al-Ghaddafi staged a successful coup in Libya. As 
the Free Officers Movement behind the coup was ideologically centred around socialism and 
pan-Arabism, one immediate fear for Bonn could therefore have been that the country might 
move closer to its neighbour Egypt under Nasser’s leadership. But the event was rather linked 
to the advance of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean. As senior diplomat Paul Frank 
concluded: “The case of Libya once again shows the extent to which the unsolved Middle 
Eastern crisis affects the domestic situation in the Arab states, opens new channels of influence 
to the Soviet Union and endangers the position of the [Western] alliance.”44 
On top of the Soviet threat, the Auswärtiges Amt was well aware that the Mashreq was 
closed off to West German advances. As has been mentioned above, key Arab states there such 
as Egypt or Syria were aligning themselves closer than ever to Moscow in the years following 
the June War. If anything, the opening of East German embassies in those states was likely to 
happen. Moreover, Algeria was considered a leading member of the non-aligned movement at 
a time when the ‘Third World’ formed as a political unit.45 Thus, on top of the strategic 
necessity to challenge the Soviets in the Maghreb came the strategic opportunity North Africa 
offered to the FRG. A detour via the region seemed like the obvious Plan B for the Auswärtiges 
Amt. 
For this, Bonn employed a backchannel. In autumn 1967, Brandt sent Hans-Jürgen 
Wischnewski to meet Algerian foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika in New York. 
Wischnewski, albeit of senior rank within the SPD, was only a simple parliamentarian. But he 
was extremely well connected in the Arab world. In the early 1960s, he had shored up public 
support for the FLN in the Algerian war of independence.46 Due to his standing in the MENA 
region, he became something of a West German secret weapon in dealing with the Arab states 
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over the next few years. Wischnewski met Bouteflika in New York in late November 1967. In 
their conversation, Bouteflika threw up the idea that Algeria could become Bonn’s bridgehead 
in the Arab world for the project of re-establishing diplomatic relations. Clearly, he was hoping 
for financial aid and economic benefits in return. Wischnewski was responsive to this 
suggestion. In particular, he tried to push Algeria into quickly engaging in diplomatic relations 
with Bonn again. “After the taking up of relations”, Wischnewski said, “the German 
government would be ready to give Algeria new capital support, in a dimension which would 
correspond to the political and economic significance of Algeria.”47 It was exactly the sort of 
quid pro quo that the Auswärtiges Amt had instructed its envoy in Beirut not to engage in only 
weeks earlier and would continue to do so over the next years, as Bonn did not want to look 
susceptible to blackmail.48 But clearly Algeria was important enough for the West German 
government to deviate from this principle.  
The second prong of Bonn’s approach to the Maghreb involved Libya, at the time a pro-
Western kingdom. Libya was one of only three countries that had not cut diplomatic ties with 
Bonn in 1965. But the West German embassy in Tripoli was worried about the monarchy’s 
stability.49 Thus, while the FRG was generally always keen to stress its unwillingness to deliver 
weapons into the Middle East, Brandt was quick to push through a sale of armoured vehicles to 
Libya in late 1967 as they were considered important for the internal stability of the country.50 
While focusing on the Maghreb, West Germany suffered a severe setback in the 
Mashreq. In May 1969, the GDR had finally won diplomatic recognition in the Middle East for 
the first time and announced the opening of an embassy in Baghdad.51  It was a major 
breakthrough for the GDR. As has been shown before, the East Germans had worked towards 
it for years and had been blocked by the FRG on several occasions. But in April 1969, in the 
aftermath of the Baathist coup the previous year, it became apparent that there was a strong 
mood for establishing relations with the GDR in Iraq.52 Bonn was unable to turn the tide this 
time.53 Soon, Cambodia and Sudan followed Iraq’s decision.54 Despite Bonn’s best efforts, East 
Berlin had celebrated its diplomatic coming-of-age.  
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50 AAPD 24.07.1967. Document 279. Brandt to Kiesinger. 
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Today, this case is mostly seen as one of the turning points in the Hallstein doctrine due 
to the West German reaction against Cambodia. Bonn called back its ambassador permanently, 
but the embassy remained open in principle and no immediate economic sanctions were 
imposed. In the German media, this freeze of relations went down in history as kambodschieren. 
But debates on how to react to Iraq’s actions show how seriously Bonn still took the 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch. A memo by the Middle Eastern unit in the Auswärtige Amt even 
included the proposition to resume weapons deliveries to Israel as punishment for Baghdad. 
Even though this idea did not become policy due to Brandt’s personal misgivings, it illustrates 
the lengths that some in the West German administration were willing to go to countering East 
Germany.55  
It did, however, also point to something else entirely: Bonn was increasingly losing 
control over the German question in the Middle Eastern arena. While confident that no 
“landslide of recognition” would follow Baghdad’s and Khartoum’s decisions, the opposite 
really was the case.56 Within months, Cairo and Damascus followed suit.57 Soon, the West 
German representative in Damascus observed that “the habits and customs of the diplomatic 
missions in Damascus are growing increasingly lax in their relationship to the embassy of the 
‘GDR’”,58 and he complained that East German diplomats attended embassy parties that even 
he had not been invited to.59 The FRG’s success in re-establishing relations with North Yemen 
soon after did little to improve the mood in Bonn.60 By the end of 1969, a scenario West 
Germany had tried to prevent for years had played out: in four Arab capitals, the only German 
embassy in town was East-German. Bonn knew that by sanctioning these countries it would 
only hurt itself and further weaken its own position.61 Just like in 1965, it became clear that 
pressure would not suffice to fight the ‘other’ Germany in the Middle East.  
 
Forced by the outcome of the June War of 1967, Bonn had fundamentally reconceptualised its 
Middle Eastern policy. Putting Cold War considerations in the center of its strategic interest, it 
attempted to strengthen links to the Arab states to avert both Soviet and East German advances 
therein. A particular focus lay on the Maghreb. But East Berlin’s ability to establish itself 
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diplomatically in several Arab states in 1969 challenged the viability of Bonn’s new approach 
to the region. 
 
4. Ost- and Nahostpolitik, 1970-72 
In September 1969, the West Germans went to the polls and for the first time in the young 
republic’s history voted a social-democratic politician into office.62 Willy Brandt became 
chancellor and Walter Scheel, leader of his junior coalition partner, the liberal FDP, followed 
him in his position at the Auswärtiges Amt. In the following years, the two would establish a 
close link between Eastern and Middle Eastern policy, between Ost- and Nahostpolitik. 
However, their prioritisation of Ostpolitik ultimately meant that relations to the Arab states 
would remain severed until late 1971.  
 
The social-liberal coalition’s lasting legacy in foreign affairs was the New Eastern Policy 
(Ostpolitik). It heralded the end of the Hallstein Doctrine in favour of a more forthcoming policy 
towards the communist East under the slogan of ‘change through rapprochement’ (Wandel 
durch Annäherung). Ostpolitik can be understood in two ways. In a narrow sense, it represented 
a change of course, a novel policy approach to the Warsaw Pact and Bonn’s 
Deutschlandpolitik.63 In a broader sense, it stands for a more general widening and deepening 
of West German foreign policy. The latter’s scope widened, as now the FRG engaged more 
than before on the global sphere, taking account of regions such as Asia, Latin America or 
Africa beyond their relevance for German-German relations only.64 Simoultanously, Bonn’s 
foreign policy deepened, as its reservoir of policy instruments was extended, for example 
through an expansion of aid or stronger multilateralism such as West German UN membership. 
It is in this broader sense that one needs to understand the new approach to the Middle East by 
Willy Brandt’s government after 1969: not merely as a new West German Middle Eastern 
policy, but as fundamentally linked and intertwined with Ostpolitik.65 
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After all, conflict in the Middle East had the potential to spill over into Europe and derail 
détente. This was not only an abstract, hypothetical fear in Bonn, caused by the memory of the 
1967 June War. After all, by 1970, Egypt and Israel were fighting a ‘war of attrition’, marked 
by regular skirmishes around the Sinai border.66 In addition, at that time the first attacks by 
Palestinian terror groups had reached West German soil, which will be covered in detail in 
Chapter IV of this thesis. Consequently, Bonn felt the need to flank Ostpolitik by simultaneous 
efforts in the Mediterranean, as stated in the draft for a speech by Scheel from early 1970: “The 
Mediterranean, too, has to become part of the concept of a European peace policy. Progress of 
this policy will help to reduce tensions there as well.”67 Minister of Defence Helmut Schmidt 
was even more pronounced in linking détente to the Arab-Israeli conflict later that year. 
Discussing the Treaty of Moscow, a key component of Ostpolitik, he told the Select Committee 
on Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiger Ausschuss) in the West German parliament: “The Treaty [of 
Moscow] does not have to fail because the [opposition] wants to stop it. [...] But it could fail 
because, for example, SALT fails dramatically, it could fail because a new war starts in the 
Middle East.”68 
The social-liberal coalition soon outlined a new approach to the latter region. In his first 
official speech in parliament as chancellor, Brandt stressed West Germany’s desire to have 
good relations with all states in the Middle East, without mentioning or underlining the special 
role of Israel for Bonn’s foreign policy.69 Simultaneously, in interviews Scheel relativised the 
special character  of West German-Israeli relations by talking about normalising them without 
being corrected by Brandt.70 Soon this was followed up by an interview by Brandt to the 
Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, mentioning what his government had by then managed to wrap 
into a new formula – a ‘policy of even-handedness’.71 
The ‘policy of even-handedness’ was not conceived of as a narrow mathematical game 
in which Brandt wanted to equate perfectly any political gesture or favour to Israel with one to 
the Arabs or vice versa. Instead, it needs to be understood as a signalling move to the Arab 
states. The Auswärtiges Amt had been confronted with Arab demands for such a gesture for 
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quite some time.72 In November 1969, its head of the Middle Eastern unit, Helmut Redies, had 
noted that “through smaller friendly gestures here and there we could now already achieve an 
improved [political] climate, which would […] prepare the ground for a later normalisation of 
political relations.”73 Thus, the ‘policy of even-handedness’ was a broad political formula. 
Partially, it had been designed for presentation rather than substance and therefore remained 
open to constant re-interpretation regarding its case-by-case implementation.   
Given the complicated nature of this formula, it should come as no surprise that there 
has been some debate about the extent of Bonn’s even-handedness. Judging Brandt and Scheel 
by their actions, Buettner claims that there was not in fact any even-handedness in this new 
policy, as ultimately Israel remained the focal point of West German foreign policy in the 
Middle East.74 Hünseler is more favourable and at least acknowledges a “more balanced” 
foreign policy.75 Both of them, however, overlook that the FRG’s approach to the Middle East 
was not a yardstick for micro-level policy subtraction but contained an important symbolic 
signalling element. 
Interestingly, there is another dimension to the ‘policy of even-handedness’ which has 
gone un-noted by other authors. Bonn not only had to balance relations between Israel and the 
Arabs. It also had to juggle tensions within the Arab camp, between the ‘moderates’ such as 
Saudi Arabia or Jordan and the ‘radicals’ like Egypt and Iraq. This becomes apparent in a 
memorandum from Redies in 1972:  
Having re-established diplomatic relations with the leading representatives of the 
‘progressive’ Arab camp […], in the interest of the even-handedness of our policy 
we should now strive for the normalisation of relations with Saudi Arabia, which is 
the most important representative of the conservative camp.76  
In this sense, there was a subliminal dual nature of even-handedness in West German Middle 
Eastern policy under Brandt, mirroring the internal ruptures and fault lines in the Arab world.  
How did the social-liberal coalition intend to implement its new ‘policy of even-
handedness’? In a first memo outlining foreign policy issues for the next four years, the head 
of the political division in the Auswärtiges Amt (soon to be promoted to State Secretary) Paul 
Frank argued that the FRG needed to “regain territory in the Middle East area” by the 
“activation of our relations to all Arab states”.77 His view was echoed by Scheel, who in a 
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meeting of the new coalition on the Middle East in February 1970 complained that “diplomatic 
relations to five out of fourteen Arab states were too little. Currently there was a vacuum in the 
Middle East for us and maybe the West in its entirety, which would only favour the Soviet 
Union”.78 It was in this meeting that Scheel talked about a West German “Arab policy” 
(arabische Politik).79  Without a doubt, therefore, Brandt’s new administration was intent on 
taking “a region as important as the Middle East” more into consideration than previous West 
German governments.80 “However”, as Frank warned in his memorandum, “the path to re-
establishing our position in the Arab states will be a very arduous one.”81  
At the time, Frank’s warning might well have been considered too pessimistic. 
Reactions from a number of Arab states to Brandt’s governmental declaration had been largely 
positive. In November, Egypt signalled interest in entering talks about a resumption of relations, 
and in February 1970 the Moroccan Prime Minister Ahmed Laraki told the West German 
ambassador in Rabat that Algeria might be willing to re-open its embassy in Bonn.82 Ultimately, 
however, the FRG would not open an embassy in any Arab state until late 1971. What is the 
reason for this contradiction between internal West German talk on activating its relations to 
the Arab states and a complete lack of immediate results in that very endeavour? 
The answer lies in the prioritisation of improved German-German over better West 
German-Arab relations. To begin with, the focus of the new administration lay, unsurprisingly, 
close to home and therefore on its policy towards the Warsaw Pact states. The Hallstein doctrine 
was officially declared “dead” by Scheel in 1969 himself to enable rapprochement with the 
East.83 However, the West German foreign minister felt that East Berlin’s desire for diplomatic 
representation could still serve as a potent negotiating instrument. Thus, in came the Scheel 
Doctrine: Bonn was willing to accept the recognition of the GDR by third countries as soon as 
both Germanies had found a modus vivendi. As long as East Berlin, however, was unwilling to 
enter negotiations with the FRG to reach a deal, West Germany would still look unfavourably 
on any newly opened GDR embassy abroad.84 In essence, Bonn asked states to put an opening 
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of relations with East Germany on hold for the moment and therefore still tried to prevent a 
recognition of the GDR – for the moment.  
This was the case in the Middle East in particular, where a number of left-leaning Arab 
states had hoped that Brandt’s New Eastern Policy was an invitation to engage in diplomatic 
relations with both East and West Germany simultaneously.85 But in the February 1970 
coalition meeting on the Middle East, Scheel stated that “the [West German] Arab policy would 
have to be seen in conjunction with our German- and Eastern policy. In the five countries that 
have recognised the GDR we can therefore, for the moment, only improve the general climate. 
The resumption of diplomatic relations should, if possible, first be attempted with the other 
Arab states.”86 As a result, a general resumption of diplomatic relations with all Arab states was 
off the table by Bonn’s choosing. Ironically, while Ostpolitik increased the priority of the Arab 
states for West German foreign policy, it simultaneously also made the resumption of 
diplomatic relations with most of them harder. As to where diplomatic relations were still an 
option, the route for a West German Arab policy was limited and self-explanatory. Four Arab 
states that had no relations with either West or East Germany remained.  
One of those states was Algeria, which fitted well with the existing West German focus 
on the Mediterranean. After all, already in the two previous years Bonn had increasingly started 
to worry about the Soviet push into the Western Mediterranean. Just as much as Bonn had 
identified Algeria as the main Soviet target in this area, the North African country became more 
and more a West German point of focus. “Algeria holds a key position for the establishment of 
the closest possible bond between Europe and the North African region that we are envisaging 
together with the other European countries in order to counter Soviet influence”, Frank noted.87 
This Soviet dimension was the strategic aspect of West Germany’s focus on the Western 
Mediterranean. Then, there was also the previously mentioned practical dimension, that 
Algeria, unlike Egypt, Syria or Iraq, had not recognised the GDR. As Brandt stated: “in any 
case, our relationship to the Arabs can probably be strengthened in the Maghreb first”.88 West 
Germany’s ‘Mediterranean moment’, having started already in late 1967, intensified. 
While the FRG had communicated to Algiers through Wischnewski as a backchannel 
during the years of the Grand Coalition, now a more direct style was employed. In January 
1970, Brandt himself, on holiday in Tunis, met Algerian foreign minister Bouteflika for a short, 
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40-minute conversation.89 It was mostly an exchange of pleasantries, but it set the stage for a 
flurry of meetings between Bonn and Algiers. In February, Scheel personally met with 
Bouteflika in Brussels. A meeting between senior West German and Algerian diplomats in 
Rome shortly thereafter lasted almost seven hours!90 But negotiations soon reached a dead end. 
Both sides were clearly interested in re-establishing diplomatic relations, but at what cost? First, 
there would be the obvious price tag, which the West Germans accepted in principle. They were 
considering a sum of 400 million Deutsche Mark (DM) over five years, a significant 
commitment in West German eyes.91 The Algerians demanded the same amount, but on a yearly 
basis.92 The Auswärtiges Amt complained about “in part entirely unrealistic [Algerian] 
demands” and an increasingly unsympathetic negotiating atmosphere.93 The second stumbling 
block turned out to be the issue of GDR recognition. Algeria had not yet recognised East 
Germany, but certainly wanted to do so. Ultimately it became clear that the Algerians would 
only agree to diplomatic relations with West Germany if simultaneously an East German 
embassy could open in Algiers as well.94 But this went against the social-liberal coalition’s 
stance on East Germany. In line with the Scheel Doctrine, Brandt and Scheel decided to put 
negotiations with Algeria on hold in April 1970.95 Only one month later Algiers recognised the 
GDR and exchanged ambassadors with East Berlin. As a report by the Auswärtiges Amt judged: 
This decision [by Algiers] will have been motivated by disappointed hopes for 
massive West German economic aid despite broken-off relations, considerations of 
Arab-progressive solidarity and undisturbed economic relations to the Eastern bloc 
[…], but also the ambition to engage actively in European détente.96 
Similarly, relations with Libya proved to be increasingly difficult after Ghaddafi’s rise to 
power. On the one hand, he had neither led Libya into the Soviet camp nor recognised the 
GDR.97 On the other hand, his anti-imperialist rhetoric was certainly anti-Western, too, leading 
the West German ambassador in Tripoli to inform Bonn about his “sense of pessimism”.98 In 
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substance, little changed in the relations between the two countries, but the atmosphere 
increasingly turned frosty.99 
 
Ultimately, Bonn had miscalculated. It had stopped itself from discussing the opening of 
embassies in states such as Syria or Iraq due to the Scheel Doctrine. The alternative approach, 
its Mediterranean strategy, led nowhere. The Auswärtige Amt had confused Algerian interest in 
West German capital aid with hopes for a strong political bond. On top of that, it was 
increasingly unable to manage its relations to Libya in the Ghaddafi era. When Bonn ultimately 
succeeded in opening an embassy in Algiers in late 1971, it did so more or less at the same time 
as in Sudan and Lebanon.100 Even then, relations with Algiers would remain cool under the 
surface: Algeria did not send an ambassador to Bonn until 1974 and delayed political 
consultations for several years.101 In addition, by 1972 Egypt, closed off to West German 
advances in 1967 and considered by the Auswärtiges Amt to be the “key” to the Arab world, 
now seemed to open up to the West.102 Bonn’s ‘Mediterranean moment’ was coming to an end.  
 
5. A breakthrough of diplomatic recognition, 1972-1973 
After the disappointing turn of events in mid 1970, when Algeria had chosen East over West 
Germany, the Auswärtiges Amt decided to put its ‘Arab policy’ on hold for the moment in order 
to focus on Ostpolitik.103 The German-German transit agreement of 1971 meant that the path 
was cleared to abandon the Scheel doctrine and open embassies in Arab states which also 
disposed of diplomatic relations to the GDR. West German relations were re-established with 
Sudan and Algeria in December 1971, Lebanon in March and, most importantly in view of the 
Auswärtiges Amt, with Egypt in June 1972. German-German détente spilled over to the 
engagement of both Germanies ‘on the ground’ in the Middle East, leading their bilateral 
relations within third countries to relax significantly.  
 
A key factor in efforts towards re-establishing relations to the Arab states was the LAS.  In 
1965, it had recommended its members to cut diplomatic relations with the West Germans. 
 
99 See also AAPD 08.03.1971. Document 83. Conversation of Moersch with Libyan ministers Jalloud and el-
Mabruk in Tripoli. 
100 PA/AA (B36 378, p. 79) 23.12.1971. Notes by Redies; PA/AA (B36 104824, unfoliated) 08.10.1973. Lankes 
(Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
101 PA/AA (B36 104702, unfoliated) 05.03.1974. Interministerial meeting in preparation of Brandt’s visit to 
Algeria. 
102 AAPD 01.12.1969. Document 384. Notes by Duckwitz. 
103 PA/AA (B130 10084A, unfoliated) 05.01.1971. Notes by Frank and Scheel. 
 
 54 
Now, Egypt, for example, was only willing to consider sending an ambassador to Bonn if the 
LAS collectively agreed to take back that decision.104 Some states like Tunisia and Lebanon 
supported such a move, but more radical ones like Iraq opposed it.105 While the LAS was 
blocked, negotiations with two countries about immediately re-establishing relations picked up 
speed. Algeria, wishing to demonstrate its independence from Cairo, intended to re-establish 
relations with West Germany either before an LAS decision or half a year after it.106 Sudan, 
too, was keen to establish ties again. The latter case illustrates particularly well how political 
relations and economic gifts went hand in hand. The Auswärtiges Amt was able to attach a 
veritable list of “Sudanese wishes” should diplomatic relations be re-established, including 
points as specific as the extension of the television network in Sudan with West German help.107 
In November, the LAS was unable to even discuss the West German question due to “intra-
Arab jealousies”.108 But neither Algiers nor Khartoum were willing to wait anymore. In 
December, Sudanese president Jaafar Nimeiry mentioned in a public speech his desire to 
establish diplomatic relations with the West Germans.109 Similar signals were sent out by 
Algiers.110  
Then, on 17 December 1971, West and East Germans signed a transit agreement, 
Brandt’s first substantial accomplishment in German-German relations. The path was cleared 
to discard the Hallstein doctrine internationally for good. Bonn accepted the sending of 
ambassadors to two capitals in which there already was an East-German ambassador. On 21 
December, the West Germans announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Algiers, on 23 December with Khartoum.111 It was the first big success in Brandt’s and Scheel’s 
Arab policy. 
Now, the LAS was itself put under pressure. Its inability to decide on an official stance 
towards West Germany had cost it its unity. Further inaction threatened to highlight its 
irrelevance even more.112 On 12 March 1972, the LAS officially decided that every member 
state was individually responsible for its relations to the FRG.113 The 1965 resolution had 
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effectively been overturned. Shortly afterwards, Bonn was able to announce the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations with Lebanon.114  
The LAS decision cleared the way for the Egyptians as well. There was a final push for 
negotiations, in which Cairo tried to gain the most from re-establishing relations with the West 
Germans. “From experience, the Egyptian appetite grows particularly strong whilst eating”, 
diplomat Walter Jesser in Cairo complained to his superiors in Bonn.115 But, as in previous 
years, the FRG was quite willing to pay a price to make a return to the Nile. While, officially, 
the West Germans kept up the appearance that relations with Egypt were re-established 
“without preconditions”, internally Jesser was allowed to give assurances to Cairo that a 
satisfactory solution would be found.116 “New negotiations about debt should only be planned 
for the time after re-establishing relations. But we should already now inform the Egyptians 
that we would be ready to then start talks at any moment. The Auswärtiges Amt will advocate 
a generous debt regulation to the other ministries.”117 After minor debates about protocol and a 
backchannel meeting in Paris in late May, the next month finally saw the re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations between West Germany and Egypt. Jesser cabled to Bonn:  
Exchange of verbal notes on agreement about the re-establishment of German-
Egyptian diplomatic relations has taken place today (7 June) 12.00 o’clock between 
acting Egyptian foreign minister Hassan Al-Zajjat and ambassador Plaia of the 
Italian protective power in my presence. […] Communiqué can therefore be 
published as agreed tomorrow (8 June) 15.00 GMT; simultaneously, at our office 
building the Italian flag will be brought down and the German flag hoisted.118  
Bonn was jubilant. As stated in a directive from the Auswärtiges Amt to Jesser: “The re-
establishment [of relations] with Cairo without a doubt represents the decisive step in the whole 
process of normalising the German-Arab relationship. The missing states (Saudi-Arabia, Syria, 
Kuwait, Iraq, Aden) will surely follow predominantly in the course of next year.”119 
Shortly after the opening of the West German embassy in Cairo, Egyptian president 
Sadat announced that 5.000 Soviet military advisors would have to leave Egypt.120 
Unsurprisingly, this news was received positively in Bonn and the Auswärtiges Amt urged to 
pull Egypt into the orbit of Western influence by economic aid.121 It seemed as if Bonn had 
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returned to the Arab states at just the right moment.  In November 1972, electoral victory by 
the social-liberal coalition consolidated previous progress in the area of Ostpolitik. By February 
1973, the FRG followed up Jesser’s promise to Cairo about a “generous debt regulation” and 
an economic agreement with Egypt for almost 300 million DM was concluded.122 It rounded 
up the political rapprochement of the previous year and “created the foundation for a full 
normalisation of relations and long-term cooperation with Egypt”.123  
Picture 2: Impressions from Scheel’s 1972 trip to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon: In conversation with 
Jordan’s King Hussein (top left) and Egypt’s president Sadat (bottom left); passing a guard of honour at 
Amman airport (top right) and taking a tour through downtown Beirut (bottom right). It was the first 
ever official visit of a West German foreign minister to an Arab state.124 
Moreover, by the summer of 1973 relations were also resumed with Saudi-Arabia, which in 
view of the growing importance of the oil question was considered almost as important as “the 
re-establishment of the German-Egyptian relations in the past year”.125 This “rounding off” of 
the “lengthy normalisation process of the West German-Arab relationship”, as State Secretary 
in the Auswärtiges Amt Hans-Georg Sachs put it, had been publicly demonstrated by two long-
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anticipated trips.126 In June 1973, Brandt had been the first West German chancellor to visit 
Israel, while shortly beforehand Scheel became the first West German foreign minister to travel 
to Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.127. 
This parallelism was supposed to signal the even-handedness of West German foreign 
policy towards both Israel and the Arabs.128 Six years after the June War, following which Bonn 
had for the first time considered the need to politically engage with the Arab states, this process 
seemed to have come to its completion, and the FRG appeared to have arrived in the Middle 
East as political actor for good. 
The normalisation of German-German relations had not only paved the way for the 
reopening of West German embassies in the Arab states. From 1972, a marked reduction of 
antagonism between Bonn and East Berlin could be observed in third countries, too. 
Unfortunately, while a lot of research focuses on German-German competition before this 
moment, little attention has been paid to the international consequences of its relaxation.129In 
1972 it was anything but certain that détente between the two Germanies would spill over into 
the international arena. As the head of the Middle Eastern unit in the Auswärtiges Amt, Helmut 
Redies, put it: “It remains to be seen whether, after a potential entry of both Germanies into the 
UN, confrontation [in the Middle East] will continue or not.”130 But Redies’s worries were 
mostly unfounded, as an episode from Egypt illustrates well.  
 In January 1973, two Germans met in Cairo for a chat, exchanging views over sweets 
and cigars. What sounds innocent and unspectacular was anything but, as Hans-Georg Steltzer 
and Martin Bierbach were not just two citizens of the same nationality, who paid each other a 
“courtesy call”.131 The former was the West German, the latter the East German ambassador to 
Egypt. Bierbach had invited Steltzer to his embassy for a conversation in a “friendly 
atmosphere” and received him over “a few plates of sweets and tobacco products”.132 A few 
years earlier, such a meeting would have been unthinkable.  
Clearly, the worst days of FRG-GDR antagonism abroad were over. While in 1969 the 
Auswärtiges Amt dedicated entire workshops to the challenge of the GDR in the Middle East, 
in a 1973 ambassadors’ colloquium (Botschafterkonferenz) “the presentation called ‘GDR and 
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FRG in the Arab world’ is only conceived off as short introduction”.133 A year later, a senior 
West German diplomat – while warning against a “false sense of security” - noted an “obvious 
easing in the rivalry in respective host countries”.134 Relations between the two Germanies 
abroad largely depended on the attitude of the individual ambassadors, as some GDR 
representatives – as the West German ambassador to Sudan noted – were still trying to decouple 
themselves from their FRG colleagues.135 Also, the GDR seemed more confident in its approach 
to the FRG in countries it considered ideologically closer to itself, such as Libya or, again, 
Sudan.136 But, in reverse, this meant that in those Arab countries less sympathetic to socialism, 
East Berlin had a much harder time, not least since of all the Warsaw Pact states it was often 
considered closest in its alignment to Moscow’s foreign policy.137 In the Arab states, too, a 
relaxation of German tensions in their region was noted, which a newspaper in Beirut welcomed 
with the comment that “for the Lebanese, they are both Germans and belong to each other like 
a jacket to trousers (bonnet blanc, blanc bonnet)”.138 
It remained a complex and problematic relationship of both Germanies in third 
countries. But, at least in the Middle East, the Basic Treaty of 1972 certainly heralded a 
reduction of conflict and tensions between the diplomats of both countries. As Steltzer noted in 
the report about his meeting with Bierbach, the East German ambassador had constantly used 
the word “juxtaposition” (Nebeneinander) and at times even “togetherness” (Miteinander) to 
describe their relationship in Egypt.139 Therefore, as Steltzer pointed out, the East German 
diplomat might have avoided the word “cooperation”; but his choice of alternatives certainly 
represented a change from the previous omnipresence of ‘confrontation’.140 
 
By 1973, Brandt and Scheel could look upon their Middle Eastern policy with some 
satisfaction. Once Ostpolitik had been secured, relations to key Arab states were resumed and 
West Germany’s diplomatic return to the Arab world was finalised. Brandt’s and Scheel’s 
journey to the Middle East underlined Bonn’s return to the region. Moreover, Ostpolitik once 
again emanated to the Middle East, though now through a significant improvement of German-
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German relations on a working level. Bonn might well have felt that its ‘Arab policy’ was about 
to take off for good.  
 
6. Shattering of illusions: the impact of the October War on West German ‘Arab policy’, 
1973-1977 
By 1973, the Brandt administration could look upon its Arab policy as having come to full 
fruition. Bonn was about to be diplomatically represented in all Arab states. The perceived 
advance of the Soviet Union seemed to halt by the early 1970s and relations with the GDR had 
normalised. But the October War of 1973 shattered both the illusion that the Middle East as 
risk factor for European détente was contained and that re-established relations would remove 
Bonn’s difficulties in dealing with the Arab states. While Bonn’s detailed reaction to the war 
shall be addressed in the next chapter, here those aspects concerning Cold War dynamics shall 
be discussed. 
 
The Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel on 6 October 1973, the Jewish Yom-Kippur holiday, 
came as a total surprise for the FRG.141 Only two months earlier, the Auswärtiges Amt had been 
convinced that “no one in Cairo was thinking about war as a possible alternative anymore”.142 
From the beginning, a Cold War lens was visible in West German reactions, although Brandt 
and Scheel did not formulate their interests through it exclusively. A day after the outbreak of 
hostilities, Brandt was at a meeting with British prime minister Heath; both “agreed that the 
escalating events implied dangers for East-West relations and Western energy policy”.143 
Scheel, too, feared that the new war carried the “risk of explosion beyond the region”.144 But 
overall, the West German government realised that in this situation the superpowers were the 
key actors, and hoped that neutrality would negate the political consequences West German 
involvement might otherwise bring.145  
Despite outward neutrality, in the first weeks of the war both support for Israel and the 
Western alliance in a Cold War setting dominated the West German reaction to the October 
War. Brandt’s administration recognised the possibility of an Arab victory over Israel, which 
would end up being interpreted as a success for the Soviet Union. As a result, when ten days 
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after the war’s outbreak US ambassador Hillenbrandt informed Scheel that the US would airlift 
weapons to Israel via the FRG, the West German foreign minister indirectly gave his agreement 
to the mission.146 And while after the war FRG officials were quick to criticise US threats to 
stop elements of détente in Europe in a bid to sanction Soviet aggression in the Middle East, in 
mid-October the West German ambassador to NATO supported his US colleague Donald 
Rumsfeld on that very point in the NATO council.147 He “underlined that for the federal 
government, too, détente was an inseparable entity, so that the Soviet actions in the Middle East 





















Map 1: The successful Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in October 1973, before the later Israeli 
counteroffensive.149 
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Only towards the end of the war did this initial support for US actions wane. When it became 
public that US weapons deliveries to Israel were sent via the FRG on 24 October, Bonn publicly 
and privately demanded that Washington end its operation. The details of this controversy will 
be dealt with in Chapter II of this thesis. Here, it will be sufficient to point out that even though 
Bonn was worried about an Arab oil boycott, it turned a blind eye to the weapons deliveries 
until by late October there was a clear trend towards victory by Israel. Looking at the issue 
through the lens of Middle Eastern politics, the Auswärtiges Amt felt it had good grounds for 
its change of position on US weapons deliveries to Tel Aviv. But Washington, viewing the 
matter from the angle of East-West confrontation, was livid. It considered the delayed West 
German objections to weapons deliveries as a betrayal as well as an unnecessary break in 
Western unity against their Soviet antagonists.150 As Kissinger told Bernd von Staden, Bonn’s 
ambassador to DC, the “alliance had displayed a ‘blatant show of disunity’.”151 
On its end, Bonn was unsettled when by the end of the war Washington put its nuclear 
weapons on standby in response to Soviet threats of direct military intervention in Egypt.152 It 
was less an argument about substance than about style between the US and its European 
partners, but it certainly was a bitter one. As a “disenchanted” Kissinger told von Staden in late 
October, he was “so bored” by the developments in NATO, as “a confrontation of documents 
was staged. One argued about terms like ‘partnership’ or ‘consultation’. He [Kissinger] did not 
see how in these circumstances the Western alliance could survive 50 or even another five 
years.”153  
Despite these tensions, however, Bonn never questioned the Western alliance in 
principle. There was unhappiness about a perceived lack of coordination with and information 
from Washington, but the principal support for the US becomes clear when looking at Brandt’s 
reactions to messages from Moscow. Throughout the October War, Bonn had been in contact 
with the Soviets, mostly to impress upon them the need for de-escalation in the Middle East.154 
However, as minutes from the archive of the Auswärtiges Amt show, by the end of the war 
Brezhnev also sent Brandt a personal message via his ambassador to Bonn, Valentin Falin, 
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indicating how “cooperation in this area [of the Middle East] could also have an indirect, 
positive impact on our bilateral relations”.155 It is very conceivable that the Soviet leader hoped 
to capitalise on splits in the Western alliance by breaking out individual members for separate 
talks on the Middle East, but Brandt remained impassive to Falin’s message.156 Also, previous 
conversations with other Communist leaders such as Romania’s Ceausescu on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict ceased during and after the crisis.157  On the issue of the October War and energy crisis, 
there might have been a partial lack of specific support for US actions by the FRG. But that 
never led to a questioning of its general support for the Western alliance and Westbindung.  
In fact, as far as US engagement in the Middle East was concerned, Bonn had little to 
complain about. After all, the US now took the more active role in brokering peace agreements 
between Israel and the Arab states that the FRG had been missing in previous years.158  
Moreover, Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy had succeeded in excluding the Soviet Union from 
Middle Eastern politics, another one of Bonn’s key policy interests. The FRG was therefore 
willing to step into second rank in the Middle East and “follow in the wake of a balanced 
American Middle Eastern policy”, as West German ambassador to Cairo, Steltzer, put it in mid-
1974.159  
In summer 1974, the FRG underwent an internal changing of the guard. Scheel moved 
to the more symbolic position of Federal President, followed in the Auswärtiges Amt by another 
liberal politician, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Shortly thereafter, Brandt had to step down from his 
post due to a political scandal at home and was replaced by Minister of Finance Helmut 
Schmidt.160  
Under its new leadership, Bonn was still intent on keeping its focus on the Middle East. 
If anything, the October War with its potential to escalate into global superpower conflict and 
the ensuing energy crisis had illustrated that the MENA region as a whole still mattered. As a 
1975 memorandum in the Auswärtiges Amt put it: “It is obvious that our interests in the Near 
and Middle East region are particularly strong for political and economic reasons.”161 In 1975, 
Genscher travelled to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a journey which he considered “the most 
important of this year”.162  
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Picture 3: Changing of the guard: from the summer of 1974 onwards, West German foreign policy would 
be dominated by Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the Auswärtiges Amt and new chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
(background). 163 
But the October War had changed the West German outlook on the Arab states. The optimism 
of the early 1970s was gone, and with it the assumption that upon completion of its ‘Arab 
policy’ some sort of immediate or automatic political dividend would reward the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states. Maybe what had in fact happened 
was that between 1965 and 1975 any political problem between Bonn and the Arab states could 
be explained away by the absence of diplomatic relations, thus pointing to a symptom of 
problems instead of their cause. While in December 1974 Genscher noted his “satisfaction 
[about] the normalisation of relations to all 20 Arab states, which has been completed in this 
year”, Bonn still struggled with the ruptures of the Arab world.164 In particular in regard to 
Syria, Iraq and Libya, Bonn’s diplomats complained about difficult relations.165 The FRG still 
proved unable to overcome the challenge of ‘dual-even-handedness’. Moreover, in view of the 
oil weapon the Arab states were now more assertive in dealing with Western counterparts. On 
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top of that, Schmidt was a more careful politician than Brandt in many ways and certainly 
lacked his predecessor’s tendency to formulate grand political visions. 166  
All of these factors led to a temporarily more restrained West German attitude to the 
Arab states. Instead of a grand, comprehensive ‘Arab policy’, after 1973 Bonn focused on few 
key states. Egypt remained the most important for the moment, not least because it was in a 
“key position” in the Middle East and “still a leading power in the Arab world”.167 Significant 
economic aid for Cairo is testimony that Egypt was now a “focal point” in West Germany’s 
Arab policy.168 In the aftermath of the oil crisis, strengthening relations to the Gulf and Saudi 
Arabia in particular became a new focus of West German Middle Eastern policy, which will be 
described in detail in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
 
All in all, the immediate years after the October War are characterised by a more passive, wait-
and-see attitude in the West German government’s stance toward the Arab states. The political 
enthusiasm of the early 1970s was gone, and Bonn stepped into the shadow of the US, hoping 
that Washington would ease political tensions in the region. The weakening of the Soviet 
Union’s position in the Middle East reduced the strategic necessity for the FRG to engage 
directly in the region. Despite difficult relations with some Arab countries, it hoped that 
economic aid and good bilateral relations to key countries such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia would, 
in the long-term, strengthen its leverage on the Arab states. By late 1976, Bonn even noted a 
more sympathetic tendency in Syria and Libya towards political consultations, which it 
interpreted as a first sign that it could escape the need of the ultra-complex ‘policy of dual-
even-handedness’.169 However, by the end of the decade this illusion would be shattered, too.  
 
7. Camp David and the breaking of the Arab world, 1977-1979 
In November 1977, Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat undertook his momentous journey to 
Jerusalem. This event and the subsequent initiation of direct peace talks with Israel, resulting 
in the Camp David Accords a year later, shook Bonn out of its passive attitude towards the 
Middle East. Sadat’s journey made manifest a previously latent split in the Arab world, as Egypt 
was now suspended from the LAS. Two immediate challenges now arose for Bonn’s Middle 
Eastern policy. Firstly, the FRG feared that the fault lines within the Arab camp created an 
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opening for the Soviet Union to return to Middle Eastern politics. Secondly, Egypt’s ostracism 
within the Arab camp greatly diminished the value of the much-improved West German-
Egyptian relations, in which Bonn had invested so much energy based on the assumption that 
the path to the Arab states led through Egypt.170 Related to this, a coherent ‘Arab policy’ was 
no longer possible for Bonn, as the political compound of an ‘Arab world’ no longer existed. 
 
The Soviet dimension was mostly used by Schmidt and Genscher to impress the need for a 
comprehensive “global” solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than a separate Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty, on their international partners.171 As Genscher told his Japanese colleague 
Sonoda in April 1978: “Sadat’s initiative [is] of the highest importance. [There is a] danger that 
after a failure the Soviet Union would go on the offensive in the region.”172 Unsurprisingly, the 
Soviet component in the Middle East also related to détente in Europe, as Schmidt pointed out 
to Polish leader Edward Gierek in August 1979.173 Genscher himself expressed his worries to 
Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua two months later: “Peace in the Middle East increases 
security in Europe, insecurity on the other hand [increases] opportunities for interventions by 
the Soviet Union.”174 An invasion of South into North Yemen, behind which NATO suspected 
Soviet encouragement, rumours about a stronger Soviet engagement in the Lebanese Civil War 
as well as the turmoil in Iran by 1978 further fuelled West German anxieties about a possible 
return of the Soviet Union into the Middle East.175 Cold War dynamics therefore played a key 
role for Bonn’s largely sceptical outlook on the Camp David process. However, ultimately these 
were mostly diffuse fears and by late 1979 Schmidt and Genscher realised that the Soviet Union 
was not advancing into the strategic gap opened up by Camp David. In any case, their arguments 
had not managed to bring about a comprehensive peace deal in the Middle East, as the March 
1979 peace treaty coming out of the Camp David Accords was limited to Israel and Egypt. If 
anything, the threat of the Soviet Union was now no longer visible in the Middle East, but in 
Europe itself, where by 1979 the Euro-Missile Crisis triggered the ‘Second Cold War’.176 
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Interestingly, however, the sceptical outlook on the potential re-emergence of the Soviet 
Union as key player in Middle Eastern politics had little negative impact on German-German 
relations in the region. Bonn was without a doubt acknowledging and addressing “GDR 
activities directed against us in Africa”.177 The Auswärtige Amt also noted an increase in GDR 
engagement in the ‘radical’ Arab states such as Syria or Libya in the aftermath of Sadat’s 
Jerusalem trip.178 But these did not yield much success for East Berlin. Bonn’s diplomats on 
the ground enjoyed depicting fruitless East German travel activity in the region, such as 
Honecker’s “welcome by Ghaddafi, [which] looked embarrassingly uptight on television”.179  
If anything, the Auswärtiges Amt now increased its coordination with East Berlin. As of March 
1978, it initiated consultations on a working level with GDR diplomats about the Middle East, 
in which the latter quite openly laid out their activities in the region.180 At least on the issue of 
the GDR in the Middle East, Bonn felt on top of things. After 1972, German-German relations 
in the Arab states remained characterised by a managed co-existence of cooperation mixed with 
elements of competition. 
Apart from the Soviet threat, Bonn’s major issue with Camp David was that an ‘Arab 
policy’ was no longer possible, as the latter’s addressee had vanished; Sadat’s action had 
cemented the division of the Arab world. Bonn now also silently dropped the concept of ‘even-
handedness’; after all, as a senior West German diplomat told the Israeli ambassador in Bonn 
in July 1979, the FRG now had to balance its relations to Israel and two Arab camps.181 This 
was too great a challenge for Bonn to accomplish. Bonn’s ‘Arab policy’ was running out of 
steam, which is also exemplified by a conversation between Genscher and the ambassadors of 
Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and Jordan by the end of the year. The four openly rejected Genscher’s 
restrained attitude and urged him to a stronger engagement and commitment on certain issues. 
As the Jordanian ambassador stated: “One now expects after the re-activation of our [the West 
German] Middle Eastern policy in the past summer a clear follow-up.”182 But Genscher merely 
pointed to a possible later conversation on the topic, turning instead to events in Iran. Both sides 
were talking at cross purposes. 
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Despite more than ten years of attempts for a more active engagement, West Germany had time 
and again failed to move from a bystander to an influential player in Arab politics. Its inability 
to influence the processes surrounding Camp David illustrates how by late 1979 it once again 
found itself bereft of the leverage to become a significant political player in the Middle East. 
Moreover, any Arab policy by now faced the ever more obvious challenge that after 1977 a 
politically united Arab world did not exist.183 The slogan of ‘even-handedness’ slowly 
disappeared from West German discourses on the Middle East. In addition, by the end of the 
1970s the context for West Germany’s Middle Eastern policy was undergoing a profound 
transformation, as the underlying factors which had after the Six-Day War convinced Bonn that 
it needed to engage politically with the Arab world were changing. The focus of the Cold War 
was now shifting to Central Asia, where the Soviet Union had only just invaded Afghanistan 
and had thereby triggered fears in the West of a Soviet advance into Central Asia in its 
entirety.184 Afghanistan’s neighbour Iran was in turmoil, too, and Bonn had not yet completely 
excluded the possibility of Soviet meddling there either.185 Moreover, the crucial link between 
peace in Europe and conflict in the Middle East was now disappearing. The social-liberal 
coalition no longer had to look to the Middle East to worry about threats to détente: the 
stationing of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe and the NATO double-track decision of 
December 1979 in response to that meant that détente was being threatened right in the centre 
of Europe. 
 
8. Conclusion: West German Middle Eastern policy and its link to the geopolitics of 
Central Europe  
In the aftermath of the 1967 June War, the FRG had felt obliged to focus more on the Arab 
world, fearing that a Soviet advance there and superpower competition in the Middle East 
would threaten détente in Europe. Linked to this, but a contentious issue on its own, was the 
German-German antagonism between GDR and FRG. But by the end of the 1970s, both the 
threat of the Soviet Union and the GDR were deemed less pressing by Bonn when it came to 
the Middle East. Its Arab policy, fraught with the inability to respond to splits in the Arab world, 
increasingly subsided. Brandt’s ‘policy of even-handedness’ had turned into a ‘policy of dual-
even-handedness’, which proved too complex to handle in a coherent way.  
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By 1979, Europe witnessed an intensification of the Cold War through debates about 
Soviet and American intermediate range missiles.186 Moreover, if there was one region where 
the West now worried about global Soviet encroachment, it was Central Asia. There, the West 
was on the back foot due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, 
whose outcome was still uncertain but sure to be unfavourable to the West. North Africa had 
long vanished as a priority for Bonn, and despite all disappointment about Camp David the 
Arab-Israeli conflict seemed contained for the moment; all in all, the Arab world no longer 
carried a sense of urgency for Bonn. A conversation between Genscher and the Moroccan 
ambassador from 7 December 1979 is telling in this regard. The ambassador illustrated Soviet 
support for the Sahrawi rebel movement of Polisario, repeatedly warned of a Soviet bridgehead 
in North Africa, demanded stronger Western support and complained about a recent SPD party 
conference decision to recognise Polisario. Genscher replied:  
He [Genscher] was not yet familiar with the decision of the SPD party conference, 
which the ambassador mentioned. This should not be interpreted as lack of interest; 
it could simply be explained by the fact that all of our attention was currently focused 
on questions of priority within the alliance and developments about nuclear 
energy.187 
Only ten years earlier, Genscher’s own ministry had defined as a key West German “political 
and strategic interest […] [to] prevent that North Africa, too, becomes subject to Soviet 
domination.”188 Now, he was not even embarrassed by openly admitting that he simply did not 
pay enough attention to affairs in North Africa to be kept up to date about events there. 
This chapter has put the Cold War in the centre of interpreting West German policy 
towards the Arab states during the 1970s. It thereby expands on similar work by Joffe, while 
challenging the fixation on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which, for example, can be found with 
Gerlach or Buettner.189 As a result, the chapter uncovers new nuances such as the temporary 
importance of the Maghreb during West Germany’s ‘Mediterranean moment’.  
For the social-liberal coalition, a clear link between  Ost- and Nahostpolitik existed, both 
before and after the German-German rapprochement of the 1970s, underlining the ability of 
both Germanies to soothe tensions and even engage in a rudimentary form of cooperation more 
than previous work would let on.190 As I argue, German-German relations in the Middle East 
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from 1972 onwards can be described best as managed co-existence of cooperation mixed with 
elements of competition. 
This chapter also sheds new lights on the assessment of intra-alliance relations around 
the oil crisis.191 I argue that the differences and arguments between Washington and Bonn were 
about US communication style as well as the appropriate response to the oil crisis, whereas on 
the Middle East the FRG willingly stepped back in anticipation of a US lead in that region. In 
addition, I contend that the depiction of a challenge of ‘dual-even-handedness’, which West 
Germany faced, describes a situation which external powers more generally were confronted 
with in the Middle East for most parts of the post-war era.  
What does this analysis of West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’ tell us about Bonn Middle 
Eastern policy more generally? In line with its ‘policy of even-handedness’, Bonn on individual 
topics indeed attempted to give more consideration to the interests and demands of the Arab 
states. However, when challenged, the social-liberal coalition would not waver in its support 
for Israel, for example during the October War or during debates about financial aid to Tel 
Aviv. Ultimately, the dynamic of West German Middle Eastern policy, which emerges from 
1967 onwards, resembles Easton’s distinction between diffuse and specific legitimacy. As 
Easton writes, legitimacy is not a dichotomous concept. Instead, it is multi-layered, relating 
either to a specific issue or a more general, diffuse sense of support. Therefore, a government 
can face opposition on a specific topic and thereby lack specific legitimacy, whilst not losing 
the overall, diffuse legitimacy to govern its people.192 Translating this concept to the area of 
foreign policy, I argue that it represents an adequate explanatory framework for West German 
Middle Eastern policy from 1967 to 1979. While on individual topics the FRG was ready to 
prioritise relations to the Arab states, the Bonn government never wavered in its underlying 
support of Israel. Specific support was given to the Arab states on occasion, whilst despite 
regular arguments with Tel Aviv diffuse support was reserved for Israel.   
After June 1967, Cold War dynamics had prompted Bonn to shift its glance to the Arab 
world. A decade later, the very same factors caused the inverse process to take place. 
Ultimately, this illustrates how an analysis of German Middle Eastern policy needs to be carried 
out through the lens of Central European politics, which during the 1960s and 1970s were 
dominated by the logic and processes of the Cold War. 
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Chapter II: The Arab-Israeli conflict as a factor in West 
Germany’s ‘Arab policy’ 
 
 
The federal government remains committed to its stated 
policy of non-interference in regional conflicts 1 
Talking notes for State Secretary Klaus Schütz with Eugene 
Rostow on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1967 
 
Sadat stated […] that the minister [Genscher] had shown 
real courage to promote the peace process at this point in 
time.2 
Conversation of Sadat with Genscher, 1979 
 
1. Introduction: a new perspective on the FRG’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
The West German stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict has mostly been analysed from a 
perspective of German-Israeli relations, as the FRG had to balance its position on Middle 
Eastern peace in the present with its historical obligation to Israel due to the past.3 But the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the issue which has shaped Middle Eastern politics more than anything 
since the end of World War II, also had a significant impact on Bonn’s attempts to re-define 
its relationship with the Arab states during the 1970s.4 First, the June War of 1967 had 
embedded the Arab-Israeli conflict within the Cold War more than ever and thereby caused 
West Germany’s subsequent turn to the Middle East. Then, during the 1970s, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict would make Brandt’s concept of an ‘even-handed’ Middle Eastern policy a circle 
which the FRG simply could not square, blocking Bonn’s attempts to achieve a clear 
equilibrium in West Germany’s relations to Israel and the Arab states.  
Previous works on the social-liberal coalition’s Middle Eastern policy have struggled 
with an apparent mismatch of the administration’s words and deeds. On one hand, the Brandt 
administration stressed the relevance of the Arab-Israeli conflict as of 1970, both due to the 
conflict’s threats to détente in abstract terms and more directly in the form of terrorist violence 
spilling over to Europe. On the other, statements by Brandt and Scheel on West Germany’s 
need to show restraint on the issue from the same period seem to contradict such sentiments. 
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2 AAPD 02.09.1979. Document 250. Behrends (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
3 Weingardt, Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik (2002); Schmidt, Wolfgang. Aus historischer Verantwortung, 
moralischer Verpflichtung und politischer Überzeugung. (Berlin, 2014); Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019). 




That leads Schmidt to argue that Brandt neither wanted nor could mediate in the conflict, 
Wolffsohn to claim that he could have mediated but did not want to, and Fink and Schöllgen 
to state that he wanted but could not mediate.5 By embedding West German Middle Eastern 
policy in the foreign policy of the social-liberal coalition in general, I show how prioritisation 
explains this apparent contradiction: Brandt focused on Ostpolitik first, but as soon as its 
successes became clear his focus shifted to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In that vein, this chapter 
also makes an entirely new argument, showing that Brandt considered a more active 
engagement in the search for peace in the Middle East during the summer of 1973. As to the 
October War, I show that Bonn knew in detail about American weapon’s deliveries to Israel. 
Contrary to what Wolffsohn claims, the FRG timed its stance on the issue so as to ensure 
Israel’s survival, allowing weapons deliveries to take place until Tel Aviv had gained an upper 
hand in the war.6  
West German attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1973 are generally less well 
covered in the literature.7 The FRG’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1975 to 1980 will 
therefore be analysed in the second part of this chapter. As the previous chapter has already 
outlined, Bonn stepped into second rank in the immediate aftermath of the October War and 
hoped for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict by the US. However, as I can show here, 
when the Camp David process did not result in a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace deal, 
West German foreign minister Genscher made a final push for a “global solution” of the Arab-
Israeli conflict with a trip through the Arab states in the summer of 1979.8 However, he was 
neither willing nor able to go to the lengths needed to achieve his aim.  
This chapter makes three key contributions. Firstly, it analyses West Germany’s stance 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 1970s through the lens of West German-Arab 
relations. Furthermore, this chapter clarifies existing debates in the literature on Brandt’s role 
in possible peace initiatives and adds new perspectives to them. Finally, it fills a research gap 
by studying Bonn’s policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict after the October War. In this context, 
it is worth mentioning that this chapter also contains the first analysis of West Germany’s 
reaction to the early stages of the civil war in Lebanon, another episode of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  
 
5 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019); Wolffsohn, Friedenskanzler (2018); Schmidt, Aus historischer 
Verantwortung (2014); Schöllgen, Willy Brandt (2003).  
6 Wolffsohn, Michael. Yom-Kippur Krieg. Für Erdöl setzte Bonn 1973 das Bündnis aufs Spiel. (21.10.2013). 
7 An exception is Neustadt (Deutsch-Israelische Beziehungen (1983)); however, his focus lies on the European 
elements of West German Middle Eastern policy during this period. 
8 PA/AA (B36 108834, unfoliated) 18.07.1975. Notes by 310. 
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Twice in the 1970s West Germany in one way or another attempted to actively promote 
a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, first pushed on by Brandt and then by Genscher. Both 
times the FRG failed, due to a mix of bad fortune, political realities or the burden of the past. 
‘You fool me once, shame on you; you fool me twice, shame on me’, a famous saying goes, 
and, in a way, it reflects well the attitude of West German policy makers on this matter. There 
would be no third time for the FRG to take on peace in the Middle East single-handedly. As of 
1980 and the EEC’s Venice Declaration of that year, Bonn would engage on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict through the European level only. 
 
2. One after another: prioritisation and West Germany’s restrained attitude to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, 1967-1970 
The Six-Day War in June 1967 shook the political kaleidoscope of the Middle East, ending in 
a resounding victory of Israel over Egypt, Jordan and Syria. But as the previous chapter has 
shown, Bonn’s reaction to this new situation only marginally focused on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict itself. The FRG lacked links to the Arab states, while the historical baggage of its 
relations to Israel complicated any direct engagement in the Middle East conflict. Keeping its 
initial focus on the Maghreb instead, the West German government chose to stay on the 
sidelines of conflict in the Middle East well into Willy Brandt’s tenure as chancellor.  
 
Israel’s victory in 1967 did little to remove the issue of the conflict itself from the political 
agenda of the Middle East. Tel Aviv might have proven its military superiority; but the hope 
that it might turn some of its territorial gains into a bargain for peace with the Arabs were soon 
squashed. At their Khartoum meeting in September that year, the same at which the GDR had 
lobbied for political recognition, the Arab League members agreed on three ‘No’s’ as their 
policy towards Israel: no peace, no recognition and no negotiations. Israel had won the war, 
but not a peace.9 
As Chapter I of this thesis has shown, the June War had a significant impact on Bonn’s 
Middle Eastern policy, but mostly because it was seen through the prism of the Cold War. The 
Auswärtiges Amt worried about a stronger position of both Moscow and East Berlin in the Arab 
states.10 The June Memorandum, analysed in detail in Chapter I, mentions the June War’s 
potential damage for German-Arab relations or NATO’s south-eastern flank. It does not, 
 
9 For a recent take on the legacy of the Six-Day War, see, Laron, Guy. The six-day war: the breaking of the 
Middle East. (New Haven, 2017). 
10 See Chapter I on the impact of Cold War dynamics on West German ‘Arab policy’.  
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however, contain a reference to a potentially more direct engagement by the FRG in the 
resolution of the conflict itself. West Germany’s policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict remained 
one of non-intervention and of an unwillingness to deliver weapons into conflict areas, 
expanded by support for security council resolution 242, which had been passed at the UN in 
the aftermath of the Six-Day War.11 Ultimately, the FRG continued to stay on the side-lines of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, as it was short of leverage on the issue due to being side-lined as a 
political actor in most of the Arab peninsula. Instead, it decided to focus on the Maghreb for 
the moment  
Chapter I has demonstrated in detail how, in 1969, the Middle East increased in importance for 
the FRG due to the perceived link between the region and Ostpolitik. This included a stronger 
West German focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as it was around this time, in March 1970, that 
the Auswärtiges Amt for the first time engaged in political consultations with the Americans 
on that topic.12  
But as with West Germany’s Arab policy more generally, the prioritisation of progress 
in Ostpolitik also meant that Brandt and his government, at least initially, shied away from 
engaging more actively in conflict resolution efforts. In a January 1970 meeting with 
Bouteflika Brandt had stated that “from the German side one has few possibilities to exert 
influence in this question [of the Arab-Israeli conflict]”.13 Moreover, Brandt put his hopes into 
greater European foreign policy coordination in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict in form of 
the EPC, which was about to launch in late 1970.14 Both these points come out very clearly in 
a conversation between Brandt and Jordan’s king Hussein in December 1970: “The 
normalisation of East-West-relations and the concrete political consultations amongst the 
Western European states will enable [us] to take a clearer stance towards Near East 
questions.”15  
There was another dimension to this restrained attitude, only half-related to the question 
of peace in the Middle East itself. When, in June 1971, Brandt was once more pushed to clarify 
his position by Moroccan Prime Minister Ahmed Laraki, he again pointed to West Germany’s 
limited influence, but then added that this was the case “not least as we do not have diplomatic 
 
11 AAPD. 27.07.1967. Document 283. Memorandum by ministerial director Meyer-Lindenberg. See also Lavy, 
Germany and Israel (2013). 
12 PA/AA (B36 281, p. 229f) 18.03.1970. Gehlhoff (Washington) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
13 AAPD 08.01.1970. Document 4. Conversation of Brandt with Bouteflika. See also AAPD 06.04.1971. 
Document 124. German-British government talks.  
14 PA/AA (B36 397, pp. 49ff.) 15.02.1970. I B 4 to Scheel. See also Moeckli, European foreign policy during 
the Cold War (2009): 72. The EPC and the Middle East are also dealt with in more detail in Chapter V of this 
thesis.  
15 AAPD 16.12.1970. Document 604. Conversation of Brandt with Hussein. 
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relations with a number of Arab states”.16 By implication, Brandt was saying that anyone who 
wanted the West Germans to engage more directly in the Arab-Israeli conflict would have to 
help Bonn in its effort to re-open its embassies in most of the Arab states. And such Arab 
requests for a stronger West German engagement were made, for example by Tunisian foreign 
minister Mahmoud Mestiri in late 1970.17 It is hard to judge whether this was a shrewd political 
manoeuvre by Brandt or an honest assessment of the situation, as how could Bonn be 
considered a serious mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict while being excluded politically from 
most of the Arab states? Whichever it was, Brandt had a point: the lack of political links into 
the Arab camp weakened Bonn’s political stature and fostered its momentary role as bystander 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Of course, another factor influencing the FRG’s stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was the special nature of its relationship with Israel. West German attempts to come to terms 
with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) were, after all, not limited to domestic politics, but 
included the FRG’s policy towards Tel Aviv as well.18 In view of this, could Brandt and Scheel 
even have considered themselves as potential actors in a Middle Eastern peace process? 
When the social-liberal coalition took up office, this question was actively addressed. 
Brandt and Scheel both felt that they would be able to square the past with the future. “Our 
Middle Eastern policy shall be balanced, which by no means, however, implies indifference 
towards the fate of Israel”, stated Brandt at the February 1970 Middle East workshop of his 
new government.19 At the same time, the West German chancellor demanded a “policy without 
complexes” towards Tel Aviv.20 Brandt, having himself been persecuted by the Nazis, might 
well have felt less bound personally by guilt or shame than his predecessors.21 
But in practice such balance was hard to find. A case in point was West German capital 
aid to Israel, at the time DM 140 million per year. That was almost as much as all of the Arab 
states in their entirety received, a West German diplomat in the Auswärtiges Amt, Walter 
Gehlhoff, noted critically in 1970.22 In his view, the FRG was risking “a loss of credibility for 
 
16 AAPD 21.06.1971. Document 217. Conversation of Brandt with Laraki. 
17 PA/AA (B36 438, p. 21) 21.12.1970. Moltmann (Tunis) to Auswärtiges Amt. See also a similar request by the 
Egyptians from 1973 (PA/AA (B130 9981A, unfoliated) 18.04.1973. Notes by Niemöller). 
18 On ‘coming to terms with the past’, see, for example, De Vita, Israelpolitik (2020); Frei, Norbert. 
Vergangenheitspolitik: die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit. (Munich, 2007); Reichel, 
Peter. Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland: die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur von 1945 bis 
heute. (Munich, 2001); Fulbrook, German national identity after the Holocaust. (Cambridge, 1999). 
19 AAPD 11.02.1970. Document 48. Notes by Gehlhoff.  
20 Ibid. 
21 See Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019); or Schmidt, Aus historischer Verantwortung (2014). 
22 AAPD 03.07.1970. Notes by Gehlhoff; PA/AA 19.01.1971 (B130 10084A, unfoliated). Notes by Gehlhoff. 
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the even-handedness of our Middle Eastern policy, which we have claimed repeatedly”.23 He 
proposed to reduce monetary support to Israel by DM 20 million annually. However, soon the 
West German cabinet decided to keep capital aid to Israel at DM 140 million a year, although 
DM 20 million of it would be project-related. Understandably, Tel Aviv was not overjoyed 
about the decision, but clearly could live with it. No significant counter-efforts were made by 
Israel’s ambassador in Bonn, Ben Horin.24 
A second example of the difficulty of balancing past and present in West German 
Middle Eastern policy is of rhetorical nature. Scheel publicly tested the formula of “normalised 
relations” between Israel and the FRG.25 As Chapter I has shown, this happened in part to 
placate the more radical Arab states when the Arab League was about to end its ban on the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations between its members and Bonn. But on this issue, Tel 
Aviv was unwilling to accept a change and pushed back on such phrasing, which ultimately 
largely disappeared from West German foreign policy discourse.26 
Previous works on West German foreign policy have usually portrayed the Auswärtiges 
Amt as more pro-Arab and Brandt as more pro-Israeli.27 The debate about financial aid for 
Israel broadly confirms that picture. However, it speaks less for a general pro- or anti-Arab 
attitude of West German diplomats but for the re-emerging West German confidence in the 
FRG’s ability to conduct international affairs. Paul Frank, State Secretary in the Auswärtiges 
Amt, wrote a longer memorandum on the topic. Israel, he noted, viewed its relations to West 
Germany mostly through the lens of the Holocaust and German obligation resulting from this. 
But “the Federal Republic cannot make the past the only foundation of its relations to Israel”.28 
The limits of past obligation, Frank concluded, was the Arab-Israeli conflict, which ultimately 
threatened world peace and opened the Soviet Union a path into Middle Eastern politics. In his 
view, West Germany was justified to pursue a policy against Israeli wishes as long as it served 
the higher aim of peace in the Middle East, which ultimately benefited Israel as well. Maybe 
this represented a presumptuous attitude, but hardly the anti-Semitism Jelinek considers 
prevalent in the Auswärtiges Amt during the 1960s.29  
 
23 AAPD 03.07.1970. Document 298. Notes by Gehlhoff. 
24 AAPD 04.08.1970. Document 361. Notes by Herbst. 
25 Weingardt, Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik (2002): 198. 
26 Der Spiegel Israel-Politik: Nicht normal (02.03.1970). 
27 See Gerlach, Doppelte Front (2006), or Weingardt, Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik (2002). 
28 AAPD 18.02.1970. Document 65. Notes by Frank. 
29 Jelinek, Deutschland und Israel (2004). See also Maulucci, Thomas. Adenauer's foreign office: West German 
diplomacy in the shadow of the Third Reich. (Chichester, 2012); or Wiegeshoff, Andrea. ‘Wir müssen alle etwas 




Also, one should note that demands for a decrease in West German aid to Israel were 
pushed forward by diplomats responsible for relations to the Arab states, such as Gehlhoff, 
Walter Jesser in Cairo or his colleague Friedrich Landau in Iraq.30 Their arguments all followed 
a similar line: large sums of aid to Israel stood in Bonn’s way of improving its relations to the 
Arabs. Rather than anti-Semitism this would point to a case of ‘agency capture’, in which West 
German diplomats dealing with the Arab world started to take on arguments from their Arab 
counterparts and increasingly represented them in the Auswärtiges Amt. This is not an unusual 
phenomenon in large, centralised, yet geographically dispersed organisations such as a foreign 
office.31 Ultimately, these debates might just confirm the occupational hazards of diplomacy.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 June War, Bonn had chosen to mostly stay away from 
the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. It lacked political representation in the Arab states, while history 
was the sword of Damocles hanging over West German-Israeli relations. Upon taking up 
office, Brandt and Scheel initially prioritised Ostpolitik over a stronger engagement in the 
Middle East. At the same time, under the social-liberal coalition there was a more active 
consideration about the link between the burden of the past and current policy. Brandt’s new 
government felt that it was less bound by crimes of Germany’s Nazi past than its predecessors 
had been. It nevertheless struggled in its attempts to practice this self-perceived freedom from 
the past when the issue crystallised around practical questions such as capital aid to Israel. But 
this feeling of being freer from the past, coupled with the resumption of diplomatic relations to 
key Arab states from 1971 onwards, paved the way to a gradual shift of focus towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict by Brandt and Scheel. 
 
3. A change of focus towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and Brandt’s role in mediation 
efforts, 1971-1973 
Shortly after taking up office, Brandt had stressed the need for the FRG to stay out of any 
efforts for a Middle East peace process. His administration faced the burden of the past in 
relations to Israel, lacked diplomatic links to almost all Arab states and, crucially, decided to 
devote its attention almost exclusively to Ostpolitik. But by the end of Brandt’s first term in 
office, the last two of these variables had started to change: Ostpolitik was unfolding 
 
30 PA/AA (B36 382, p. 88) 20.12.1970. Country briefing Egypt); PA/AA (B36 283, p. 286) August 1971 (exact 
day unknown). Country briefing Iraq. 
31 Rotation is supposed to decrease the risk that diplomats develop too strong emotional ties with their host 
countries. The standard work in ‘agency capture’ and organisational strategies to deal with it is Kaufmann’s The 
Forest Ranger. A study in administrative behavior (Baltimore, 1960). 
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successfully and diplomatic relations to most Arab states were re-established. As a result, his 
administration started to shift focus to the core topic of Middle Eastern politics: the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In principle, Brandt saw the key to a solution of the conflict in Washington and 
Moscow. For years, he had placed his hopes in the willingness of the superpowers to take on 
that responsibility. However, these hopes were disappointed time and again. Thus, by early 
1973, he and his government started to consider how they could get more involved in 
promoting a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As so far largely neglected material shows, 
Brandt did not see himself as a peace broker, but rather considered the role of mediator between 
the key actors of the conflict; not leading a peace process but catalysing it.  
 
The reasons why the social-liberal coalition turned its attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict by 
1973 were manifold. To begin with, as the previous chapter has shown, by June 1972 the FRG 
had re-opened embassies in Algeria, Sudan, Egypt and Lebanon. It was now only a matter of 
time until the other Arab states would follow suit. Bonn’s diplomatic exclusion from the 
Middle East started to come to an end.  
Moreover, Brandt and Scheel had made significant strides in their efforts towards 
détente with the East. In September 1971, the former allies from World War II concluded the 
Four-Power Agreement on Berlin. In December that year, East and West Germany signed a 
transit agreement and a year later the Basic Treaty. All of these were crucial steps towards a 
normalisation of relations between the FRG and both the GDR specifically and the Communist 
East more generally.32 When Brandt won the general election of 1972, Ostpolitik had proven 
to be a success.33 That gave him new room for manoeuvre regarding other foreign policy topics. 
It was even further enlarged when the West German chancellor was awarded the 1971 Nobel 
Peace Prize. His prestige increased globally, the Middle East included, as Bonn’s diplomats 
were increasingly able to observe. In April 1973, the embassy in Beirut reported that “the great 
number of articles dealing with the personality and the tasks of the German chancellor [were] 
noteworthy”.34 
At the same time, there was a growing dissatisfaction within Bonn in regard to US 
policy in the Middle East. Just like the West German government, Nixon and Kissinger mostly 
viewed the region through the lens of the Cold War. However, they drew an entirely different 
 
32 On the New Eastern Policy, see, for example, Schoenborn, Benedikt. Reconciliation road: Willy Brandt, 
Ostpolitik and the quest for European peace. (New York, 2020); Creuzberger, Stefan. Westintegration und Neue 
Ostpolitik. Die Außenpolitik der Bonner Republik. (Berlin, 2009); or Fink and Schaefer, Ostpolitik (2009).  
33 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019). 
34 PA/AA (B130 104824, unfoliated) 25.04.1973. Notes by Lankes. 
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conclusion from this. While Brandt and Scheel saw the need for de-escalation and broad peace 
efforts in the region, Washington was more interested in unilaterally supporting Israel than in 
brokering a deal between Tel Aviv and Soviet-supported Arab states such as Egypt and Syria.35 
“The Arabs had to realise that they might get weapons from the Soviet Union, but that only the 
United States were capable of effectively promoting a solution to territorial questions”, as 
Kissinger put it himself in 1973.36 Comments from West German diplomats on the ground 
show frustration with this American strategy.37 Washington was much further away from the 
Middle East than Western Europe, where the Arab-Israeli conflict made itself felt increasingly 
through Palestinian terrorism, most devastatingly in the form of the 1972 Munich Massacre. 
More than ever, the West Germans felt the impact of unsolved conflict in the Middle East, 
while erstwhile restrictions on Bonn’s stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict were reducing.  
By 1973, Brandt and Scheel clearly turned their attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
for good. One indicator for this is travel activity, as in the summer 1973 Brandt was the first 
West German chancellor to visit Israel. Simultaneously, Scheel travelled to Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon. Furthermore, internal government documents now more actively discussed potential 
West German contributions to a peace deal. In February 1973, Sadat’s security advisor Hafiz 
Ismael visited the FRG for talks with Brandt, Scheel and Frank. The latter reminded Ismael of 
the FRG’s need to follow “constructive neutrality” in the Middle East, but then went on:38 
It is correct that European governments can play a role in conflict resolution, but 
this has limits. Europe cannot take on its own a mediating position. However, it 
certainly can become active diplomatically and talk to those who have decisive 
influence such as the conflict parties and superpowers. Although the precondition 
is that we know their positions better than we do now.39  
Bonn attempted to find and test out a middle way between engagement and restraint. In April 
that year, Scheel mused about a European initiative to catalyse potential US talks over a Suez 
agreement.40 Not yet, recommended the Middle East expert in the Auswärtige Amt, Helmuth 
Redies. But he also did not challenge Scheel’s idea in principle.41 
 
35 Savaranskaya, Svetlana, and William Taubmann. Soviet foreign policy, 1962-1975. In: Loeffler and Westad, 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2. (Cambridge, 2010): 153f.; see also Quandt, Peace Process (2001); 
Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (1990). 
36 AAPD 02.11.1973. Document 365. Von Staden (Washington) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
37 One example is West German disappointment over the replacement of US envoy to Cairo Bergus by a 
different diplomat, as Bergus had been seen as working strongly towards some sort of negotiated solution to the 
conflict. For the Auswärtiges Amt, this once again indicated a lack of US interest in a solution to the Middle 
East conflict (PA/AA (B36 528, unfoliated) 12.01.1972. Jesser (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt.) 
38 PA/AA (B130 9981A, unfoliated) 08.03.1973. Notes by Redies. 
39 Ibid. 
40 PA/AA (B130 9981A, unfoliated) 19.04.1973. Redies to Frank. 
41 Ibid.  
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Another indicator for a West German shift of focus towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
1973 are government talks. Having made the Arab-Israeli conflict a topic of consultations with 
the Americans and British in 1970 already, in December 1972 for the first time the West 
German embassy in Moscow exchanged views on the region with a diplomat in the Soviet 
foreign office.42 Over a span of two years, the FRG had set up lines of communication on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to all four ‘great powers’. Moreover, in the first half of 1973 Brandt and 
Scheel raised the issue with the Americans, British, Soviets, Romanians, Yugoslavians, 
Jordanians, Egyptians and Israelis.43 In May 1973, the Arab-Israeli conflict took up significant 
space in conversations of Brandt and Scheel with Nixon and US Secretary of State Rogers in 
Washington, with Brezhnev in Moscow as well as with Heath in London.44 In these 
conversations, Brandt and Scheel mostly listened to the various standpoints of their 
interlocutors, gauging possible elements of a peace deal and comprehending key positions of 
the different sides. For example, in their conversations with Brezhnev both Brandt and Scheel 
asked about how negotiations between Arabs and Israelis could be started, how peace 
guarantees could look like and how the Suez Canal could be re-opened.45 Whether 
inadvertently or not, even before their journey to the region Brandt and Scheel had become 
intermediaries between the Great Powers in the search for a solution to the Middle East conflict. 
In fact, this may have even been promoted by the Americans. During a long conversation with 
Nixon and Rogers, Brandt and Scheel were told by the US envoy to the Middle East Joseph 
Sisco that “[the] Europeans, however, could be of help, if they made it clear to the Arabs that 
the Americans would happily play a role in the resolution of the conflict, although they could 
only do it, either through proposals or in another way, after negotiations had started”.46 And in 
a later conversation “the American side” stated: “Every peacemaker is welcome”.47 Sisco’s 
comments sound like an invitation, maybe even an encouragement for Brandt to engage more 
actively as mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
42 PA/AA (B36 494, p. 79f.) 05.12.1972. Sahm (Moscow) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
43 AAPD 02.05.1973. Document 128. Van Well (currently Washington) to Auswärtiges Amt; AAPD 19.05.1973. 
Document 147. Conversation of Brandt with Brezhnev; AAPD 02.03.1973. Document 69. German-British 
government talks; AAPD 29.06.1973. Document 209. Conversation of Brandt with Ceausescu; AAPD 
01.06.1973. Document 173. Schlegl (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt; AAPD 05.06.1973. Document 176. Steltzer 
(Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt; AAPD 07./08.06.1973. Document 184. German-Israeli government talks.  
44 AAPD 05.1973. Document 128. Van Well (currently Washington) to Auswärtiges Amt; AAPD 07.05.1973. 
Document 130. Notes by Bahr; AAPD 19.05.1973. Document 147. Conversation of Brandt with Brezhnev; 
AAPD 19.05.1973. Document 148. Conversation of Scheel with Brezhnev; AAPD 29.05.1973. Document 165. 
Conversation of Brandt with Heath. 
45 AAPD 19.05.1973. Document 147. Conversation of Brandt with Brezhnev. 
46 AAPD 02.05.1973. Document 128. Van Well (currently Washington) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
47 AAPD 07.05.1973. Document 130. Notes by Bahr. 
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Overall, it becomes clear that by the beginning of 1973 the West German government 
started to pay more attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both Brandt and Scheel had various 
conversations with other world leaders on the topic. What conclusions did they reach? The 
answer becomes clear when focusing on the summer of that year. On 7 June 1973, Brandt 
landed in Israel for the highly anticipated first visit of a West German chancellor in the country 
which had been founded in the aftermath of and – at least in part – in response to the 
Holocaust.48 Relations between Israel and West Germany had been difficult in the previous 
years, as Tel Aviv was sceptical of Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the new administration in Bonn 
openly toyed with a more relaxed interpretation of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. But with the 
exception of one incident – Brandt’s helicopter almost crashed at the historic site of Masada – 
the visit was considered a success by both sides.49 Topics discussed evolved around bilateral 
relations, but also the Arab-Israeli conflict.50 
Concerning the latter there is significant divergence of opinion and debate amongst 
historians. Wolffsohn and Tsoref claimed in a 2013 newspaper article that Willy Brandt missed 
the opportunity to broker a peace between Israel and Egypt. Based on documents from the 
German foreign policy editions and Israeli sources, they claim that Meir told Brandt about her 
willingness to make peace with Egypt. Brandt was supposed to convey Israel’s interest in secret 
negotiations to Sadat. Tsoref and Wolffsohn criticise Brandt harshly, as the West German 
chancellor, in their opinion, did not take the offer seriously enough and relegated it to a senior 
diplomat in the Auswärtiges Amt, only, to pass it on to Cairo. The two historians almost go as 
far as suspecting that Brandt was generally ill-disposed towards Israel.51 Their argument is 
vehemently rejected by Schmidt. Looking at a wider range of sources, he convincingly refutes 
the assertion that Brandt disposed of a principally anti-Israeli sentiment. In essence, Schmidt 
argues, Brandt did what little he could. Meir’s request for direct talk with Sadat had been little 
other than an offer for appearance’s sake only. But both Brandt and Meir would have known 
that such a request was not realistic at the time.52 Fink follows a similar line of argument, 
pointing to Brandt’s apparent and self-confessed limitations as peacemaker in the Middle East, 
as the FRG was at the time at best a middling power and certainly without much traditional 
clout in the Middle East.53 Yet another view is taken by Schöllgen. In his biography of Brandt, 
 
48 For travel dates, see Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung. Reisen 1967-74. 
49 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019): 219ff.  
50 AAPD 07./08.06.1973. Document 184. German-Israeli government talks. 
51 Tsoref, Hagai, and Michael Wolffsohn. Wie Willy Brandt den Nahost-Frieden verspielte. (Die Welt, 
09.06.2013) 
52 Schmidt, Aus historischer Verantwortung (2014). 
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he writes – unfortunately without reference to any archival evidence – about failed efforts by 
the West German chancellor to mediate peace in the Middle East in the summer of 1973.54 
What this debate with conflicting arguments on all sides lacks is clarification by 
primary source material. Luckily this exists, even though it has been largely neglected by 
previous scholars.55 A first piece in this puzzle can be found in Brandt’s personal papers. It is 
a short note in his own handwriting, dated 7 June 1973, with the location being Jerusalem. As 
Brandt notes in his memoirs, he prepared it himself as a preparation for the meeting with 
Meir.56 Looking like a mind map, at the top the US and Soviet Union are clearly marked as key 
actors, to whom one needed to “recommend or encourage a political solution”.57 From the two 
superpowers, arrows go to their respective allies such as Britain and the Europeans, or Tito and 
Egypt. This note is important for several reasons. To begin with, it once again illustrates the 
extent to which Brandt considered the two superpowers as crucial for any sort of peace solution 
in the Middle East. The focus on the proxy-element of the Arab-Israeli conflict comes out 
clearly, as the whole document evolves from the juxtaposition of “USA+SU”.58 Moreover, the 
note also points to the systematic and significant shift of Brandt’s focus to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as of the start of 1973. If one looks at the individual points mentioned on it, they all 
directly relate back to conversations which Brandt had held with world leaders about the 
Middle East in the run up to his and Scheel’s Middle East trip in May and June of that year. 
For example, next to ‘Heath’, the third underlined point on the left of the document, he noted 
‘oil’. This goes back to West German-British government talks in April 1973, in which the 
British prime minister had stressed the threat to Europe’s oil supplies through a renewed 
escalation of conflict in the Middle East.59 For Brezhnev, Brandt notes ‘steps, aims, guarantees, 
troops, UN-framework (4+?)’, which are exactly the points which came up in the conversation 
between the two on the Middle East in May 1973.60 And next to Tito, who shared his worries 
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Picture 4: Brandt’s handwritten note on the Arab-Israeli conflict62 
 
All in all, Brandt’s note is more than a mere mind map: it is the compilation of his concerted 
efforts to gain an understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to identify avenues towards its 
solution. This approach corresponds exactly to what Frank had told his Egyptian guest in 
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February 1973: in order to engage more in a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Bonn first 
needed to know the positions of the latter’s key actors better. The note shows that Brandt, in 
his opinion, had been doing his homework. It also confirms that 1973 is the year in which West 
Germany turned its focus to the Arab-Israeli conflict more purposefully than ever before in its 
history. 
Finally, the note is also important in order not to misunderstand Brandt’s cautious 
reaction towards Meir’s idea of West German mediation between Israel and Egypt, criticised 
so heavily by Wolffsohn and Tsoref. His own perception of the conflict relied on superpower 
engagement. Moreover, based on Scheel’s conversations in Cairo he already knew very well 
that the Egyptians would reject Meir’s idea in any case. When the West German foreign 
minister mentioned how useful direct talks had been for the success of Ostpolitik, Egyptian 
foreign minister Zayyat left no room for misinterpretation:  
Zayyat rejected negotiations [with Israel] ‘without preconditions’ vehemently. This 
formula, often used by the West, was an Israeli invention and meant that one would 
not use the point of legal ownership of the territories as starting point but instead 
the current situation of ownership.63 
The Egyptians had made clear that they expected some sort of public commitment by Israel 
about a return of the occupied territories before any sort of negotiation could start. But this was 
not in line with secret talks as envisioned by Meir. In the end, Tsoref and Wolffsohn do not 
contextualise their analysis of both Brandt’s and Meir’s behaviour sufficiently, and quite 
generally over-estimate the potential of Meir’s peace ideas.64 
In mid-June, a few weeks after Brandt’s return from Israel, Brezhnev visited Nixon in 
San Clemente, California, proposing that he and the US president should negotiate a 
comprehensive peace settlement for the Middle East. But Nixon declined.65 It now became 
clearer than ever that the superpowers were not ready to reach a Middle Eastern settlement. 
Only two weeks after this meeting in California, Romania’s leader Nicolae Ceaușescu 
was on visit in the Federal Republic. Romania was the only Warsaw Pact member with 
embassies in both Israel and the Arab states. When Ceaușescu repeatedly veered the 
conversation towards possible European contributions to peace in the Middle East, Brandt 
stated:  
We have defended ourselves strongly against attempts – in part friendly – to take 
up the role of some sort of broker. This would go beyond our powers. But I think, 
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just amongst us we should know that if there is any link or one of us believes the 
other could be of help, then we should get in contact with each other directly.66  
At the same time, Scheel had been told during a visit in Amman by his Jordanian interlocutors 
that “the Federal Republic should take over a more active role in the solution of the Near East 
conflict due to its international renown and its special position, in particular in the context of 
the [EPC]”.67 But as already stated, Brandt and Scheel did not view themselves as peace 
brokers, who would advertise to the region their own “magic formula”, as Scheel had put it in 
conversation with Jordanian ministers in June 1973.68 However, the second part of Brandt’s 
reply to Ceaușescu implies that the West German chancellor certainly was willing to play some 
role in facilitating an agreement in the Middle East, promoting efforts between the great 
powers.  
By July 1973, the attempt to follow up Meir’s initiative, which Wolffsohn and Tsoref 
describe, reached its expected dead. One of the senior diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt, 
Lothar Lahn, had travelled to Cairo and transmitted Meir’s idea to President Sadat’s national 
security advisor. The latter refused the idea of direct talks with Israel without preconditions 
immediately.69 Now, instead of becoming an active peace broker with his own peace solution, 
it seems that Brandt planned to be a sort of ‘mediator between the mediators’ and went about 
promoting this idea in a letter to UN secretary general Kurt Waldheim. 
In late August 1973, Waldheim was about to go on a journey to several Middle Eastern 
countries to gauge chances for a peace settlement. Brandt took the opportunity to send him a 
letter which was, as he stressed, of confidential nature. The start is inconspicuous enough: In 
view of Waldheim’s upcoming journey, Brandt points to his and Scheel’s recent journey to the 
Middle East. He describes well known Arab and Israeli positions, stating nothing 
fundamentally novel. However, in the final paragraph, the letter becomes more interesting; 
Brandt points to the idea of a conference under UN leadership, which Waldheim had floated 
the year before. This, he states, “still appears to be a suitable way to reduce the very different 
attitudes of the conflict parties to a common denominator”.70 The conference should have a 
broad and vague theme, to prevent the different sides from getting bogged down immediately 
in the controversial details of concrete negotiations. “Finally, a Near-East Peace Conference 
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might offer a suitable frame to include not only the superpowers, but maybe also some others, 
in particular European countries into specific peace efforts.”71 
Was this Brandt’s attempt to float his own idea of a peace initiative to Waldheim? This 
seems likely, as much of what he was writing about corresponds to the basic principles of both 
the note he had prepared in Israel and his conversation with Ceaușescu. The idea to 
“recommend or encourage a political solution”72 corresponds to the concept of a broad political 
dialogue to get the conflict parties talking. And in Israel Brandt had noted in regard to the 
Americans: “Main thing [is to] negotiate (talk).”73 This was exactly what Brandt was now 
recommending to Waldheim: just get the conflict parties talking somehow. Then, there is the 
question of the role of the middling powers and statemen such as Brandt, Heath or Tito. As 
discussed with Romania’s leader, they could be the ones getting the two superpowers at the 
negotiating table. Last but not least, timing also suggests that this letter might have been part 
of a broader scheme by Brandt. By August, Lahn’s mission to Cairo had ended in failure and 
it was clear that the direct talks between Israel and Egypt that Meir had envisioned would not 
be happening. If anything, the episode had confirmed Brandt’s understanding that this approach 
would not bring peace to the Middle East. It was time to try a different path – his path. The 
letter to Waldheim represents the West German chancellor’s attempt to float his own notion of 
what the Middle East would need – a global peace conference with the superpowers at the 
centre and Europe’s middling powers such as West Germany itself as intermediaries. This was 
the role that Brandt had identified for himself as peace contribution. It is also worthwhile to 
point out that Brandt and Scheel both once again drew a parallel between Eastern and Middle 
Eastern policy. Both repeatedly stressed the merit of talking directly to their previous conflict 
partners. Scheel more than once pointed to Ostpolitik as source for inspiration for solving 
conflict in the Middle East.74 Brandt made a similar comparison in his conversation with Meir, 
as Fink has already shown.75 But both the Arabs and the Israelis rejected this comparison.76  
 
Ultimately, the 1973 October War put an end to Brandt’s ideas. As the previous chapter has 
shown, the war came as a total surprise to the FRG as much as to anyone else. Before, in what 
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Bonn had considered a “neither-war-nor-peace” situation, a peace conference might have been 
a worthwhile initiative.77 Now, the attack by Egypt and Syria had changed the fundamentals of 
the conflict. However, even during the war there was an echo of Brandt’s peace idea. At its 
outset, a senior West German diplomat, Günther van Well, attended an EPC meeting which 
attempted to coordinate the EEC’s response to the war. Reporting to Bonn about the meeting, 
van Well notes the following: “As the frame for negotiations, which is mentioned in our 
declaration, I proposed the chancellor’s idea for a peace conference.”78 It was the final attempt 
to salvage an idea which Brandt had thought up over the summer, only a few months before 
the war. However, despite the failure of Brandt’s approach, it is clear that throughout the first 
half of 1973 the West German chancellor engaged more coherently and directly than previously 
known in efforts to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end. 
 
4. In Kissinger’s shadow: the October war and a nascent peace process, 1973-1977 
The October War shocked Bonn. All the steps Brandt and Scheel had taken in the years 
preceding it to avoid the dilemma of 1967 soon seemed without effect. Initially, the 
Auswärtiges Amt hoped to steer through the conflict with restraint neutrality. But when Israel 
suffered severe losses early on, the US launched an airlift of significant weapons supplies, 
which in part ran via the FRG.79 Bonn was very aware of the exact dimensions of the US airlift 
and supported it until a ceasefire favourable to Israel had been agreed upon – only then, a 
significant clash with Washington ensued over the continuation of these weapons deliveries. 
Still, from 1974 onwards, Bonn stepped back and welcomed a stronger American mediating 
role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, hoping that Kissinger would deliver a comprehensive peace 
deal. Only when the latter failed did the new West German leadership around Schmidt and 
Genscher re-consider a stronger West German engagement for peace in the Middle East. 
 
At the beginning of the 1973 October War, Scheel met both the Israeli and nine Arab 
ambassadors to appeal for an immediate cessation of the fighting. This sparked outrage with 
Tel Aviv’s ambassador Ben-Horin, who asked “whether that meant that the fighting should 
also stop if the Egyptians and Syrians […] could keep the territories that they occupied 
[now]”.80 Brandt himself mostly held back at this time, leaving the coordination of the crisis 
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mostly to Scheel and Frank in the Auswärtiges Amt and even abandoning Bonn for a holiday 
in late October.81 Maybe the contrast between his vision for peace and the reality of war in the 
Middle East was too much for him to handle. Whichever it was, his administration seemed to 
believe that given a possible dilemma between historical guilt and oil dependence the best 
policy was to duck away and hope that the storm passes. “As for ourselves, in this situation we 
should not get involved though judgemental statements, if only as to not disturb current 
diplomatic efforts between the superpowers,” a foreign office memorandum from 10 October 
1973 stated.82 Only two weeks after the war had broken out, on 19 October, the Auswärtiges 
Amt managed to put together a more concrete memorandum on “our position in the Middle 
East conflict”, stressing the need for an immediate ceasefire to be followed with a lasting peace 
along the lines of UN security council resolution 242.83 
In Chapter I, the impact of the October War on West German-US relations was 
discussed. Here, I will cover events surrounding US weapons deliveries to Israel via the FRG 
in detail. On 13 October, a bit more than a week into the war, the Egyptian foreign office started 
to ask questions as to whether the West Germans were involved in the US airlift.84 The 
Auswärtiges Amt followed up and on 15 October asked the US embassy whether “US war 
materials are being brought from the FRG to Israel”.85 The next day, US ambassador 
Hillenbrand arrived in the Auswärtiges Amt himself to inform Scheel in general terms about 
the operation, although “he could not give exact details about the extent of the deliveries”.86 
Scheel was not excited by this prospect and asked Hillenbrand some critical questions: how 
would the material within the FRG be replaced and “[h]ow should one explain these deliveries 
to the public and the Arab states”?87 The West German government was well aware of the 
political explosiveness of the US airlift via its own territory. Yet, despite his critical attitude 
Scheel did not actively speak out against it. Implicitly, he gave the US the nod.  
Soon, the West German government was well aware about the details of the US airlift 
to Israel. Only one day after Scheel’s conversation with Hillenbrand, the US embassy passed 
on to the Auswärtiges Amt very explicit information on the extent of the weapons deliveries, 
planning to ship “65 M60 tanks, 135mm howitzers and 75.000 rounds of 105mm ammunition” 
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to Israel via the port of Bremerhaven.88 But even though already by 21 October West German 
ambassador Steltzer in Cairo warned Bonn of “serious strain on our relations to the Arab states 
because of US material deliveries” and a West German inclusion in an Arab oil boycott, the 
Auswärtiges Amt held still.89  
Then, one week into the airlift, the US weapons deliveries turned into a calamitous 
affair which would put a strain on West German-American relations for years to come. By that 
time, the war was drawing to a close, as by 18 October Israeli forces had managed to turn the 
tables by crossing the Suez Canal themselves and thereby encircled the Egyptian army.90 On 
22 October, a ceasefire was brokered between the superpowers and on 24 October the fighting 
finally came to an end. 
Once again, the issue of timing is crucial to understand West German behaviour in the 
crisis. After all, when Scheel gave the unofficial nod to US airlifts into Israel – on 16 October 
– the situation still looked dangerous for Israel. A week later, Tel Aviv’s victory was clear to 
everyone. It was then, on 23 October, that State Secretary Frank told Hillenbrand the FRG now 
expected the US to no longer use West Germany for weapons deliveries to Israel.91 A day later, 
a West German newspaper learned about three Israeli ships, which were loaded with weapons 
by the US army in Bremerhaven.92 An infuriated Frank called deputy US ambassador Cash 
into the Auswärtiges Amt to reaffirm his earlier request to Hillenbrand, but now the whole affair 
was too public to be denied anymore.93 
Wolffsohn criticises this decision as an immoral betrayal by Brandt: he had put oil 
interests above West Germany’s historical responsibility to the Jewish state.94 However, the 
conversation between Frank and Hillenbrand on 23 October, when the former asked the latter 
to end the airlift from West German soil, outlines very clearly the West German motivation in 
the crisis. Yes, oil of course played a role, as, in Frank’s own words, “an inclusion of the FRG 
into the oil embargo was to be feared”.95 Chapter IV will show that there was a concrete Saudi 
threat for this. As Frank put it in a clear reference to the 1965 breaking of diplomatic relations 
 
88 PA/AA (B130 9982A, unfoliated) 17.10.1973. Notes by Pfeffer. 
89 PA/AA (B130 9982A, unfoliated) 21.10.1973. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
90 On the course of the October War, see Siniver, Asaf. The October War. Politics, diplomacy, legacy. (London, 
2013). 
91 PA/AA (B130 9982A, unfoliated) 23.10.1973. Notes by Pfeffer. 
92 Hoeres, Peter. Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit: Massenmedien, Meinungsforschung und Arkanpolitik in den 
deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen von Erhard bis Brandt. (Berlin/Boston, 2013): 493. 
93 AAPD 24.10.1973. Document 335. Conversation of Frank with Cash. 
94 Wolffsohn, Yom-Kippur Krieg (Die Welt, 21.10.2013). 
95 PA/AA (B130 9982A, unfoliated) 19.10.1973. Notes by Pfeffer. 
 
 89 
by the Arab states, “the worst is to be feared”96, meaning a renewed break-up of West German-
Arab diplomatic relations. Finally, and crucially, Frank started the conversation by the 
statement that “the ceasefire makes my task much easier”, as in the view of the Auswärtiges 
Amt US support to Israel was only necessary as long as Tel Aviv faced defeat.97 Now that 
Israel’s victory seemed secure, the FRG needed to focus once again on the broader risks 
involved with the October War for itself, such as an oil boycott. Wolffsohn is thus not quite 
fair in his criticism, as Bonn clearly put oil interests on hold while Israel was threatened. As 
Gerlach writes correctly, West Germany had waited with carrying out neutrality to the fullest 
until an Israeli victory was secured.98 
As has been laid out in the previous chapter, the FRG fell out with Washington over the 
handling of the October War and the energy crisis. But in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
Bonn stepped into second rank and left the field to the US. As Frank told US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph Sisco in November 1973, “the US had as 
world power global responsibility, whereas Europe’s focus was mostly regional. We do not 
consider this view discriminatory. […] Europe, however, lay nearer to the conflict, which 
meant that there were differences in ‘approach’ we needed to talk about.”99 In March 1974, 
Scheel applauded Kissinger for his travels to the Middle East and, as Kissinger writes in his 
memoirs, “spoke of Atlantic tensions as if they were a French disease, against which Germany 
was immune”.100 This was potentially too euphemistic by the West German foreign minister, 
but regarding Kissinger’s efforts towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict not entirely 
wrong. As Frank suggested to NATO Secretary General Luns in the same month, the West 
should play different roles in the Middle East.101  
In line with this, the West Germans focused on stronger bilateral relations with key 
Arab states, not least in the economic realm. Public evidence of this was the first visit ever of 
a German chancellor to the Arab world: in April 1974 Brandt travelled first to Algiers, then to 
Cairo. The focus of this journey lay on Egypt, for both political and economic reasons. Already 
in the immediate aftermath of the October War, Brandt had thanked Sadat in a personal letter, 
as the Egyptian president had argued amongst the Arab states against an inclusion of the FRG 
 
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Gerlach, Doppelte Front (2006): 192ff.  
99 PA/AA (B130 9982A, unfoliated) 13.11.1973. Notes by Redies. 
100 AAPD 03.03.1974. Document 67. Notes by Simon. See also Kissinger, Henry. Memoiren. (Munich, 1979): 
1083f. 
101 AAPD 06.03.1974. Document 71. Conversation of Frank with Luns. 
 
 90 
in the OPEC boycott.102 Moreover, Sadat was about to embark on economic liberalisation, 
which made the country attractive for West German investment. Egypt was “on the eve of an 
economic boom”, as West Germany’s ambassador in the country, Steltzer, remarked.103 
Simultaneously, Steltzer saw a strategic dimension to stronger economic engagement by the 
FRG in Egypt: Sadat, he mused, wanted peace but needed economic growth and domestic 
stability to achieve that. While the political power of the US could push the peace process 
forward, West Germany could flank the process economically.104 Even though in April 1974 
Brandt also met with President Houari Boumedienne in Algiers, it was clear that the visit to 
Egypt carried more importance for both sides. “He [Brandt] was delivering greetings from his 
countrymen, expressing the readiness, desire and will to deepen their relations to the peoples 
and the region, if possible with a new quality,” was the rather emotional opening line of Brandt 
at his first meeting with Sadat.105 Conversations in Cairo went into much further detail than 
those between the West Germans and Algerians, and concrete results such as an Egyptian-West 
German commission for economic cooperation were agreed upon.106 Sadat even invited Brandt 
to his private country house, signalling how he not only wanted to build up a political but also 
a personal relationship with the West German chancellor. Summing up the state visit, Steltzer 
happily noted that “a friendly relationship between our two states has by now become a matter 
of fact”.107 At times, he could not hide his astonishment as to the development of West German-
Egyptian relations after the October War: “One wonders where this staggering phenomenon of 
Germanophilie […] is coming from.”108 
Brandt’s ‘Arab journey’ happened in close coordination with the US. In March 1974, 
one month ahead of the trip, the West German chancellor and Kissinger discussed Brandt’s 
travel plans and agreed to stay in close contact about the issue.109 A stronger economic 
engagement by the West Germans was well in line with the US Secretary of State’s own 
schemes for the Middle East. Later, Kissinger informed Scheel that he would change his own 
travel plans to the region so that they would not collide with those of Brandt.110 Finally, already 
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on the day of his return to West Germany Brandt informed Kissinger by letter about the key 
results of his journey and his personal, very positive impression of Sadat.111 No similar 
exchange of information or coordination with Brandt’s European colleagues can be found in 
the archives. 
However, by the second half of the 1970s, Bonn’s expectations into US peace efforts 
were disappointed. In March 1975 Kissinger abruptly ended one of his trips through the Middle 
East, travelling between Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan and Saudi-Arabia.112 As the Americans 
informed their West German allies, there simply was not enough willingness for compromise 
amongst all actors concerned to make an agreement workable.113 Even though the American 
Secretary of State managed to broker the Sinai II agreement between Israeli and Egypt in 
September of that year, a comprehensive peace deal with all Arab states remained off the 
cards.114 For the West Germans, Kissinger seemed unable to transform ceasefires into long-
lasting peace. Scepticism in Bonn rose, but there was also no immediate alternative to playing 
the American card. As one of Genscher’s diplomats put it, a “substantial change of direction” 
did not seem necessary yet.115 As Chapter V will show, this led to an increasing West German 
focus on a European role in a Middle Eastern peace process, which, however, was a slow and 
cumbersome affair.  
Picture 5: Brandt meeting Boumedienne in Algiers (left) and Sadat in Cairo (right). He was the first West German 
chancellor to pay a visit to an Arab state.116 
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By 1977, hopes in Bonn for a “global solution” (Globallösung) of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as 
it had been termed by now, had mostly faded.117 “Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy has reached 
its limits”, the Auswärtiges Amt noted.118 Moreover, Bonn was disappointed by the electoral 
victory of hardliner Menachem Begin in the 1977 Israeli election. Finally, the FRG did not 
believe that a will to compromise amongst key Arab states, which Genscher observed in Egypt, 
Syria and Saudi-Arabia, would be enough to reach some sort of peace deal.119 
How did the 1974 change of leadership in West Germany make itself felt on Bonn’s 
stance towards the Middle East conflict? New chancellor Helmut Schmidt generally took a 
more detached view on the Middle East than his predecessor Brandt. In a conversation with 
Turkey’s prime minister Demirel he talked about the Arab-Israeli conflict almost en passant, 
as he saw the real challenges of his time in the realm of the global economy: “After the 
abatement of the Middle East conflict and, to an extent, the conflict over Cyprus, the most 
pertinent problem was the situation of the world economy in a worldwide recession […].”120 
Genscher, by contrast, engaged more directly in the Arab-Israeli conflict than Scheel before 
him in the Auswärtiges Amt. He attempted to work towards a “consolidation of the group of 
moderate Arab states”.121 But his engagement had limits, as he was not willing to directly 
confront Israel about its foreign policy. 
Ultimately, the FRG was still bound by the past when it came to Israel, under Schmidt 
much more than under Brandt: the latter had been forced into exile himself by the Nazis, whilst 
the former had fought on the Eastern front as officer in the German Wehrmacht. Schmidt, 
already much more sceptical towards visionary politics of world peace than his predecessor, 
felt the burden of history more than Brandt. Maybe that explains why in the second half of the 
1970s it was Genscher who pushed West German engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
rather than Schmidt, as the new foreign minister’s travel activity in the region clearly suggests. 
With Schmidt as chancellor, the Auswärtiges Amt also did not anymore try to fight the shadow 
of history, which still lay over the FRG’s Middle Eastern policy, but rather accepted difficulties 
arising from it. Israel “hands the Germans a beating when it disagrees with the Europeans. The 
Germans had to accept beatings from the Israelis because of the historic situation, but they had 
 
117 PA/AA (B36 108834, unfoliated) 18.07.1975. Notes by 310. 
118 PA/AA (B2 178382, unfoliated) 03.05.1976. Notes by Auswärtiges Amt planning unit (Planungsstab). 
119 AAPD 15.04.1977. Document 90. Conversation of Genscher with Swedish foreign minister Söder. 
120 AAPD 28.05.1976. Document 161. Conversation of Schmidt with Demirel.  
121 PA/AA (B36 135608, unfoliated) 31.01.1977. Notes by 310. 
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a strong back,” as Genscher told Assad in a private conversation.122 All the while, the FRG 
kept paying the same level of capital aid (DM 140 million) to Israel since 1968.123  
 
In the aftermath of the October War, Bonn had stepped into second rank and the left the 
political stage of the Middle East to the Americans. Schmidt in particular was more reluctant 
to get as involved as Brandt in debates about peace in the Middle East. But the failure of 
Kissinger’s step-by-step approach would challenge the West German chancellor and his 
foreign minister to re-evaluate their stance.  
 
5. To the side-lines: Bonn’s attitude to the civil war in Lebanon and to Camp David, 
1975-1979 
While Bonn had been waiting for the US to succeed in brokering a peace settlement and had 
mostly focused on Egypt as a steppingstone for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the latter had been moving on to Lebanon. So far, research has mostly neglected West 
Germany’s stance on this episode of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bonn did not ignore the 
escalation of fighting in Lebanon, but its unwillingness to acknowledge its link to the Arab-
Israeli conflict limited its engagement on the issue. Towards the end of the decade, it reacted 
with caution and scepticism to the Camp David process in the aftermath of Sadat’s trip to Israel. 
But despite a final effort by Genscher on behalf of a comprehensive peace process in the 
summer of 1979, Bonn had to acknowledge the limits of its leverage in the Middle East and 
accepted its role as bystander on the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
In the run-up to the Lebanese civil war, the Auswärtiges Amt had not been oblivious to 
increasing tensions and violent incidents in Lebanon, as the PLO and key Palestinian 
organisations had migrated there from Jordan in the aftermath of Black September.124 Then, in 
March 1975, the West German embassy in Beirut reported a wave of violence went through 
the country.125 With the Ayn al-Rummaneh bus massacre, the event which is considered the 
starting point of the Lebanese civil war happened shortly thereafter,  on 13 April.126 A few 
months later, the gravity of the situation was clear to Bonn, as the Auswärtiges Amt instructed 
 
122 AAPD 27.08.1979. Document 241. Conversation of Genscher with Assad in Damascus. 
123 AAPD 24.06.1976. Document 203. Conversation of Schmidt with Allon. 
124 Bonn’s awareness of how the PLO presence challenged the political balance within Lebanon is illustrated by 
an embassy report entitled “Relevance of the Palestinians and future of the country” (PA/AA (B36 104828, 
unfoliated) 23.04.1975. Lankes (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt).  
125 AAPD 21.01.1976. Document 13. Conversation of Genscher with Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal. 
126 Hirst, David. Beware of small states: Lebanon, battleground of the Middle East. (London, 2010): 99. 
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its diplomats in Beirut “to report by cable on a daily basis on the situation in Lebanon”.127 In 
January 1976, the Auswärtiges Amt spoke of “civil war-like confrontations [dominated by] 
right-wing forces under (Christian) Kataeb-leader Pierre Gemayel; left-wing, almost 
exclusively Muslim forces, whose temporary leader is Joumblatt (Druse); [and] the PLO”.128 
Further complicating the picture was “a complex involvement by third countries” such as Syria, 
Libya, Iraq or Saudi-Arabia.129 Interestingly, for the moment the Auswärtiges Amt omitted 
Israel from that list and would not acknowledge Tel Aviv’s role in Lebanon until 1978.130 
The above quoted documents show that the Auswärtiges Amt was well aware of the 
situation in Lebanon and of its gravity. From July 1976 onwards, it therefore had evacuated 
most of its staff from Beirut. This included its ambassador Rüdiger von Pachelbel, although 
despite his expressed wishes and a request for transfer to another post he was ultimately ordered 
back to the Lebanese capital.131 The Auswärtiges Amt also soon drew a clear connection 
between the conflict in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole. In mid-1976, a foreign 
office cable stated that “we are of the opinion that today the chances for a solution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict would be higher without the civil war in Lebanon”.132 However, Bonn also did 
not feel that it had much leverage in the country. In an early European meeting on the topic, 
Genscher noted that he put little faith in verbal notes and UN resolutions, but at least that was 
the one thing one could try – an admission of powerlessness, if there ever was one.133  
As a result, Bonn put some faith in the Syrian intervention in Lebanon which started in 
May 1976 and would basically continue until 2005. Shortly after the intervention, the 
Auswärtiges Amt noted: “We still believe that Syria now sincerely wishes for peace in Lebanon 
[…].134 Only by 1978, when it had become clear that the Syrian intervention would not bring 
peace, scepticism as to Damascus’s role rose. In July 1978, the then head of the Middle East 
unit Alfons Böker cabled to the West German ambassador in Syria, Joachim Peckert: 
“Everyone knows that the Syrians did not pursue altruistic goals when they intervened [in 
Lebanon] with their troops. One should also not forget that the Syrians significantly promoted 
the initial outbreak of violence in April 1975 through weapons deliveries to left-wing forces 
[…].”135 Shortly afterwards Peckert even recommended a “German initiative in the Lebanon 
 
127 PA/AA (B36 104828, unfoliated) 22.09.1975. Jesser to Beirut embassy.  
128 AAPD 21.01.1976. Document 13. Conversation of Genscher with Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal.  
129 Ibid.  
130 AAPD 20.03.1978. Document 83. Notes by Böcker. 
131 AAPD 18.11.1976. Document 326. Notes by Lahn. 
132 AAPD 18.08.1976. Document 266. Jesser (Bonn) to Steltzer (Cairo). 
133 AAPD 31.10.1975. Document 327. Circular by von der Gablentz. 
134 AAPD 18.08.1976. Document 266. Jesser (Bonn) to Steltzer (Cairo). 
135 PA/AA (B36 119898, unfoliated) 05.07.1978. Böcker (Bonn) to Peckert (Damascus). 
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crisis” through a European framework, as the Syrian intervention had clearly failed.136 But 
there is no indication whatsoever that anyone in Bonn ever seriously considered such a direct 
involvement in Lebanon. 
Overall, while Bonn was well aware that the Lebanese civil war was closely related to 
and interlinked with the Arab-Israeli conflict, it never saw or sought a clear role in it for itself. 
In Genscher’s grand 1979 tour of the Middle East Lebanon was one of the seven Arab countries 
he visited. However, as the Auswärtiges Amt admitted internally, this was merely a symbolic 
visit to illustrate West German support for Lebanon’s territorial integrity.137 The FRG 
acknowledged the link between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Lebanese civil war. But its 
support for the resolution of the latter remained largely superficial, which once again shows 
how in the second part of the 1970s the FRG was increasingly comfortable with the role of 
bystander in the Middle Eastern peace process. If there was a part of the Arab world that Bonn 
focused on in this regard, it was Egypt. 
It was indeed Egypt which would shake up the quest for Middle Eastern peace for good 
by the late 1970s. More than anyone, Sadat himself seems to have been frustrated by the 
stagnation of the peace process. At home, protests signalled public dissatisfaction,138 while new 
research suggests that by the summer of 1977 his greatest international worry was not so much 
a new war with Israel but rather with Libya – something which is corroborated by West German 
foreign office reporting from that period.139 The Egyptian president clearly felt that something 
had to give – and in an unexpected violation of all three ‘No’s’ of Khartoum opted for his visit 
to Israel on 19 November 1977, even giving a speech in the Israeli Knesset.140 
The West Germans were as surprised by this move as anyone else. As the next chapter 
will show, Bonn was embroiled in the ‘German autumn’ at the time, fighting off the challenge 
of domestic terrorism at home. For weeks it had only viewed the Middle East through the lens 
of counterterrorism, as Palestinian terrorists had captured the Lufthansa-airplane Landshut and 
led it on a wild goose chase through the Arab peninsula.141 It seems as if Schmidt and Genscher 
were not in the mindset to give Sadat’s initiative their immediate, full attention. 
 
136 PA/AA (B130 121010, unfoliated) 06.10.1978. Peckert (Damascus) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
137 PA/AA (B21 112902, unfoliated) 04.09.1979. Fiedler (Bonn) to Dublin embassy. 
138 PA/AA (B36 119868, unfoliated) 19.01.1977. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
139 Daigle, Craig. Sadat’s African dilemma. Libya, Ethiopia, and the making of the Camp David Accords. Cold 
War History 19:2 (2019): 295-313; in a similar vein, the West German military attaché to Cairo speculated 
about a war between Egypt and Libya in the summer of 1976 (PA/AA (B36 108718, unfoliated). 15.09.1976. 
Memorandum by the Auswärtiges Amt). 
140 Quandt, Peace Process (2001), 191. 
141 See chapter III on Palestinian terrorism.  
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Ultimately, the West German government’s initial response to Sadat’s journey was 
marked by restrained positivity. There was no clear statement of public support; in an EPC 
meeting Genscher pushed for a positive message by the Nine in support of Sadat. However, 
Paris, intent on placating more radical Arab states, objected to this, which Genscher openly 
called “remarkable” in the meeting.142 In their final communique, the Nine thus merely 
applauded Sadat’s “bold” initiative on a sidenote.143 However, as much as anyone else 
Genscher was also well aware that there remained the challenges of splits in the Arab camp 
and Israeli demands. In Tel Aviv, Israeli prime minister Begin invited the West German 
ambassador Klaus Schütz for an “extensive explanation of Israeli security needs, for which 
[he] used a map which he held in front of my eyes again and again”, as the diplomat reported 
back to Bonn.144 This rather bizarre episode illustrated for Schütz that the Israeli prime minister 
was not willing to drop his hard-line attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In this situation, the West German government agreed that while peace talks between 
Sadat and Begin were to be encouraged, they would only represent a success if they resulted 
in a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace treaty. As the Auswärtiges Amt concluded: 
All will depend upon re-constituting the unity of the confrontational states and to 
prevent anything which would lead to a polarisation of Egypt and the West on the 
one and the other Arab states […] as well as the Soviet Union on the other side. 
We have to assume that a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which does not 
address the Palestinian question, would cause such a polarisation.145  
Bonn communicated this message to both the Israelis and the Egyptians. In late November 
1977, Schmidt told Israeli foreign minister Dayan that a separate peace treaty between Tel Aviv 
and Cairo would represent a severe problem for the EEC.146 Bonn had the same message for 
the Egyptians, but not without also showing principal support for Sadat’s initiative. For 
Schmidt not only travelled to Egypt at the end of 1977, but also prolonged his stay in the 
country after his official state visit for a short holiday. Sadat and Schmidt even celebrated New 
Year’s Eve together on a Nile boat, symbolising a closeness of both their personal and political 
relationship which would have been unthinkable only a few years earlier. Almost a decade after 
launching its Arab policy, the FRG could show for some success in strengthening its bilateral 
relations with at least some of the Arab states. Moreover, in their “most important 
 
142 AAPD 22.11.1977. Document 335. Circular by Engels. 
143 Bulletin of the European Communities, 11/1977: 52. 
144 AAPD 25.11.1977. Document 337. Schütz (Tel Aviv) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
145 PA/AA (B36 108716, unfoliated) 15.12.1977. Notes by 310. ‘Confrontational states’ (Konfrontationsstaaten) 
was the term used within the Auswärtiges Amt for the rejectionist Arab states, who were most strongly opposed 
to Sadat.  
146 AAPD 28.11.1977. Document 339. Conversation of Schmidt with Dayan. 
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conversation” Sadat had assured Schmidt that he “seriously and exclusively sought a global 
solution of the Middle East conflict; a separate peace treaty between Egypt and Israel seems 
unthinkable”.147 Schmidt and Genscher thus felt comfortable to support Sadat’s efforts as long 
as he followed this premise.  
But the bilateral talks between Egypt and Israel, which had commenced in the aftermath 
of Sadat’s trip to Israel, soon reached a deadlock due to Israeli intransigence.148 The Egyptians 
hoped that the Europeans and in particular the West Germans could convince the US to keep 
their peace initiative alive and to move Israel towards concessions. It was certainly no 
coincidence that Sadat’s new foreign minister as of December 1977, Muhammad Kaamel, had 
been his ambassador to Bonn over the preceding years.149 To an extent, Bonn played along 
with this strategy. Over the following months, Schmidt and Genscher stressed the need for 
keeping the peace process alive in their communications with the US, the Arab states and 
Israel.150 They also underlined that this should lead to a comprehensive solution, rather than to 
a separate peace. It was enough to put off the Israelis, who, ambassador Schütz reported from 
Tel Aviv, complained that the West Germans were becoming more critical of Israel than the 
French.151 But there were limits in Bonn’s advocacy of Sadat’s position. Bonn would not get 
involved as a peace broker itself or push for a European initiative in this regard, at least not for 
the moment.152 Without a doubt, however, the Egyptian president had won the significant 
respect of both Schmidt and Genscher. The West German chancellor told Greek prime minister 
Karamanlis that Sadat’s initiative had won him worldwide sympathies, regardless of whether 
it would succeed or not, while Genscher explained to Waldheim: “Sadat’s initiative has 
changed the world.”153 Even years later, in a 2008 television interview, Schmidt said about 
Sadat: “In my view, the man was a hero.”154 
By the summer of 1978, when it had become clear that direct talks between Egypt and 
Israel would not succeed, US president Jimmy Carter took it upon himself to broker an 
 
147 PA/AA (B36 108715, unfoliated) 02.01.1978. Notes by 310.  
148 AAPD 14.01.1978. Document 10. Schütz (Tel Aviv) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
149 AAPD 15.02.1978. Document 49. Conversation of Genscher with Kaamel. 
150 AAPD 26.01.1978. Document 21. Notes by Wentker; AAPD 12.02.1978. Document 42. Conversation of 
Genscher with Dayan; AAPD 30.03.1978. Document 91. Conversation of Genscher with US Deputy Secretary 
of State Christopher; AAPD 21.06.1978. Document 195. Conversation of Schmidt with Saudi crown prince 
Fahd. 
151 AAPD 03.02.1978. Document 39. Notes by Meyer-Landrut. 
152 On debates about a European initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the West German role therein, see 
Chapter V. 
153 AAPD 31.01.1978. Document 26. Conversation of Schmidt with Karamanlis; AAPD 24.07.1978. Document 
228. Notes by Gorenflos. 
154 Beckmann. Helmut Schmidt bei Reinold Beckmann. (ARD, 22.09.2008).  
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agreement. In September 1978, he invited Sadat and Begin to the presidential country retreat 
Camp David. The West Germans cautiously welcomed the initiative, hoping that it might bring 
Sadat’s 1977 journey to Israel to a successful conclusion.155 Just before talks were about to 
start, Schmidt sent Carter a personal letter, urging the US president to not lose sight of the 
Palestinian issue and warning of a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace deal.156 
The Camp David accords, which were ultimately agreed upon by Israel, Egypt and the 
US on 17 September 1978 had two elements: the ‘Framework for Peace in the Middle East’ 
and the ‘Framework Peace Treaty Egypt and Israel’. The latter was supposed to represent a 
steppingstone for a bilateral peace treaty between Tel Aviv and Cairo, the former for a global 
peace solution in the Middle East, which would have included a settlement of the Palestinian 
question.157 Schmidt was sceptical but did not reject the outcome of the talks outright. As long 
as Sadat would only proceed with the latter framework after progress on the former, a 
comprehensive solution could be salvaged. West German efforts therefore focused on 
promoting the ‘Framework for Peace in the Middle East’ in the hope that it could lead to a 
global solution. But private talks by Schmidt with Sudanese president Jaafar Nimeiry or 
Jordan’s king Hussein confirmed the public Arab rejection of Camp David.158 Before the deal 
was announced, Syria’s president Hafez al-Assad had already informed Schmidt in a “45-
minute lecture on the situation in the Middle East” that he rejected all aspects of Sadat’s policy 
and whatever Camp David would bring.159 
By late October, it increasingly became clear that Sadat might indeed be willing to 
proceed with the ‘Framework Peace Treaty Egypt and Israel’ without any progress on the 
‘Framework for Peace in the Middle East’.160 Scepticism rose in Bonn and a position paper on 
Camp David by the Auswärtiges Amt written shortly thereafter called the talks “an important 
step on the path to a just and encompassing peace. At the same time, we are aware of its 
unsolved, substantial problems […]. It is now vital to expand the number of negotiation 
partners.”161 Bonn was increasingly losing its faith into the Camp David process. At the 
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Guadeloupe summit of Carter, Callaghan, Giscard and Schmidt in January 1979 “the West 
German chancellor held back” in the discussion on the issue.162 
On 26 March 1979, Israel and Egypt signed their separate peace treaty in Washington 
D.C. The West Germans were not unhappy with this partial peace, but certainly disappointed 
with the fact that a more comprehensive solution had not been achieved. “Only now are we 
entering the tunnel at the end of which we cannot necessarily see the light yet”, Schmidt told 
Waldheim merely one day after the signing of the treaty.163 On the one hand, one can 
sympathise with the FRG’s hope that Sadat’s 1977 trip to Israel might culminate in a 
comprehensive Middle Eastern peace deal. On the other hand, in view of the scepticism, which 
Schmidt and Genscher had encountered throughout the late 1970s in this regard at various 
governmental talks, the lack of realism within Bonn is striking. 
There still was a glimmer of hope to “preserve the momentum of the Camp David 
process”, as State Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt van Well put it at a NATO meeting.164 
Genscher now undertook a major journey through the Middle East, visiting seven Arab states 
throughout the summer of 1979 in an effort to find a common ground between the various 
Middle Eastern actors and “to promote the peace process in [the Arab] capitals”, as Sadat 
acknowledged with approval.165 But the differences were too stark and Genscher’s position too 
careful to convince anyone. In his conversations with Assad, Hussein or Sadat he had no 
difficulties to point to issues which should now be addressed, such as the Palestinian question. 
Also, like Schmidt, he was quick to distance himself from the talks between Egypt and Israel. 
As Genscher told the Iraqi foreign minister: “He [Genscher] was a good friend of the 
Americans, but he had never been to Camp David.”166 Ultimately, however, he was unable or 
unwilling to take a clearer stance on key questions. Trying not to offend anyone, he also won 
no-one over.  
 
Since 1973 Bonn had been distancing itself from becoming involved in the quest for peace in 
the Middle East. By 1979, it was no longer in a position to act as intermediary of any sort. 
Genscher’s comment on Camp David in his conversation with four Arab ambassadors in 
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November 1979 is exemplary not only for this West German restraint, but also for the passivity 
of West German policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict by the end of the decade: “We 
acknowledge what has been agreed as a fact, but have no opinion on it.”167 Beginning with the 
EEC’s Venice declaration, from 1980 onwards West Germany would mostly channel any 
efforts for a Middle East peace process through the European level, rather than engage as an 
actor in its own right.168 
 
6. Conclusion: West Germany’s decade of engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
The Middle East conflict was not the primary reason why the FRG engaged in an ‘Arab policy’ 
from 1970 onwards, but it remained the key factor preventing Brandt’s ‘even-handed’ Middle 
Eastern policy to unfold in a sustainable way. The conflict split the Arabs from Israel, and 
ultimately the Arabs themselves. Without the ability to overcome the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
West German project of an ‘Arab policy’ itself had become redundant by 1979.  
Still, the 1970s were the years when the FRG engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict more 
directly than ever. Before, it had not considered an engagement either necessary nor adequate; 
later, it would work through the European framework of EEC and EU. As has been shown, 
Brandt in particular attempted to get much more involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict than 
previously known. Moreover, this chapter also covered ground which has been largely 
neglected by scholarship to date, showing how, after Sadat’s 1977 trip to Jerusalem, Genscher 
in particular attempted to re-activate the FRG’s role in the Middle East peace process. He tried 
to promote – in the end unsuccessfully – the search for a comprehensive agreement instead of 
a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.  
Cooperation with Western allies on the Arab-Israeli conflict was sporadic and largely 
unsuccessful. Noteworthy are also attempts in the run-up to the October War by European 
middling powers to cooperate across blocs on the topic without involving their superpower 
peers, as Brandt’s conversations with Ceaușescu and Tito illustrate. 
Brandt’s and Scheel’s attempts to promote Ostpolitik as blueprint for peace in the 
Middle East are noteworthy, too. Less so due to their historiographical value, as at least 
Brandt’s attempts to float this idea in his conversations with Meir has already been mentioned 
by Fink.169 But they highlight the political psychology of international diplomacy by 
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illustrating how much subjective perspectives and egocentrism shape the use of historical 
comparison in international diplomacy. In 1968 the Auswärtiges Amt had strongly rejected 
linking German-German relations with the situation in the Middle East, when Arab diplomats 
compared the division of Jerusalem with that of Berlin in order to gain sympathy in Bonn. But 
the West Germans argued forcefully that the two could not be compared.170 A mere five years 
later, it was the West Germans who attempted to convince the Arabs that, just like they 
themselves talked directly with their counterparts in order to improve the situation in Central 
Europe, now Arabs and Israelis should engage with each other through direct negotiations. This 
time, it was the Arabs who forcefully rejected this idea.   
There were also stark differences between the two personal constellations of the social-
liberal coalition when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Up to 1974, Brandt was certainly 
the one to think more about an active West German role in conflict resolution, whereas Scheel 
was less enthusiastic in this area. A fact that did not go unnoticed, as one Arab ambassador 
complained on the eve of the October War: “The chancellor speaks one way and his foreign 
minister in another way. So what could one rely on in the future?”171 From 1974 onwards, it 
was the exact opposite way. Schmidt, sober and calculating, showed more personal restraint 
on the Middle East than his predecessor, who had been prone to visionary idealism. At the 
same time, Genscher in the Auswärtiges Amt displayed a markedly increased travel activity in 
the region and attempted to reconcile different positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
After 1973, Bonn had purposefully left the geopolitics of the Middle East to the 
Americans. Also, West Germany’s unwillingness to address the civil war in Lebanon within 
the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict illustrates how after the October War the FRG settled 
into the role of a bystander in the Middle East peace process. Genscher’s 1979 journey to re-
ignite a broader peace process was too little, too late. As the man who shaped the FRG’s foreign 
policy over twenty years told Assad in 1979: “Before we used to overestimate ourselves, now 
it is others who overestimate us.”172 While the former part of the statement most likely referred 
to Germany’s foreign policy in the first part of the 20th century, it is also an apt description of 
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Chapter III: Terrorism and West Germany’s stance on the 
Palestinian question* 
 
The Palestinian guerrilla organisations […] document their 
political independence and reject any peaceful solution of the 
Middle East conflict. Thereby, a new element as emerged in the 
Middle East, whose long-term importance cannot currently be 
assessed clearly.1 
Background paper by the Auswärtiges Amt, 1969. 
 
We consider the Palestinian problem to be at the core of the 
Middle East conflict.2 
Memorandum by the Auswärtiges Amt, 1979 
 
1. Introduction: a gradual process of Palestinian recognition by Bonn 
The Six-Day War moved the Palestinian question into the centre of Middle Eastern politics due 
to the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip by Israel. As a result, almost by default 
West Germany had to give it more attention in its attempts to engage more in the region. 
However, Bonn only picked up on the issue of Palestine with a delay. Between 1967 and 1980, 
the FRG went through a process of gradual formulation and re-formulation of its position 
towards the Palestinian question. First it ignored the issue and only started to acknowledge it 
as pertinent as of 1970. Then, after the October War of 1973, Bonn moved to publicly 
acknowledge rather vague “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”.3 Finally, the completion 
of the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt, insufficient in the eyes of the FRG, 
led the administration of chancellor Schmidt and his foreign minister Genscher to a stance 
which, in a nutshell, still defines the FRG’s policy on the Palestinian question today: 
recognition of the need for an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel as well as the 
acknowledgement of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as representative of the 
Palestinian people. 
Three factors were crucial in this process of policy transformation. First, in the analysis 
of the Auswärtiges Amt the Palestinian question became the key issue for any attempt towards 
a Middle Eastern peace process, in particular after 1973. It could no longer be ignored. Second, 
the FRG accepted revisions to its stance on the Palestinian issue for the broader purpose of 
 
* Some of the research of this chapter is also the basis of a separately published journal paper (Hirsch, Philipp. 
Politics as counterterrorism: the role of diplomacy in the West German response to Palestinian terror, 1970-
75.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 12:3 (2020): 186-202). 
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2 AAPD 09.08.1979. Document 220. Memorandum by Petersen. 
3 EEC, Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East (06.11.1973).  
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managing its relations to the Arab states more generally. Finally, and crucially when it comes 
to the bilateral relations between Bonn and the Palestinian movement, terrorism pushed the 
FRG down a path of recognition of both the Palestinian question and the PLO.4 West Germany 
became entangled in terrorism from 1970 onwards. Consequently, West German officials hoped 
that denser networks of communication and cooperation with Palestinian representatives would 
prevent attacks on West German soil. Moreover, the links between Palestinian and West 
German left-wing terror groups such as the RAF made the Bonn government engage more with 
the Palestinian question as a whole. This is not to claim that the history of the Palestinian 
movement is solely one of terrorism. Yet, to understand the gradual emergence of a West 
German ‘Palestinian policy’ in the 1970s one has to acknowledge the close links between 
political violence and West German politics: the former pushed the latter into an ever more 
overt recognition of the principle of Palestinian statehood. 
This chapter represents the first coherent, historically grounded analysis of the 
emergence of West German policy towards the Palestinian question throughout the 1970s. So 
far, West German engagement with the Palestinian question has mostly been covered through 
research on individual events or terror attacks. Fink, Wolffsohn and Gerlach include analyses 
of the 1970 Dawson’s Field Hijackings and the 1972 Munich Massacre in their books on West 
German Middle Eastern policy during the 1970s.5 Munich is also the focus of a book by 
Dahlke.6 Geiger’s paper on the Landshut-hijacking focuses on the late 1970s.7 All these works 
do well in covering the spill-over of Palestinian terrorism to West Germany, but rather focus 
on individual incidents. Unlike Blumenau’s book on West German efforts to coordinate 
counter-terrorism at the UN or Dahlke’s paper in the Wischnewski-Protokoll, in this chapter I 
link West German responses to both terrorism and the Palestinian question.8 Finally, I can show 
that unofficial contacts between West German diplomats and violent elements of the Palestinian 
 
4 Definitions of terrorism are inherently contested (Schmid, Alex. The Revised Academic Consensus Definition 
of Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism 6:2 (2012): 158-9). Here, I follow Hoffman’s approach, according to 
whom terrorism is “ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent – or, equally important, threatens violence; 
designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted by 
an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspirational cell structure (whose members wear no 
uniform or identifying insignia); and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.” (Hoffman, Bruce. 
Inside Terrorism. (New York, 2006): 43.  
5 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019); Wolffsohn, Friedenskanzler (2018); Gerlach, Doppelte Front (2006). 
6 Dahlke, Matthias. Der Anschlag auf Olympia '72: die politischen Reaktionen auf den internationalen 
Terrorismus in Deutschland. (Munich, 2006). 
7 Geiger, Landshut in Mogadischu (2009). 
8 Blumenau, The United Nations and Terrorism (2014); Dahlke, Das Wischnewski Protokoll (2009); see also 
Riegler, ‘Spinnennetz’ des internationalen Terrorismus (2012); and Hürter, Johannes. Anti-Terrorismus-Politik. 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57:3 (2009): 330-48. 
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movement date back to 1970, three years earlier than, for example, Fink asserts.9 Overall, then, 
this chapter links a study of both diplomacy and counterterrorism within the FRG’s emerging 
Palestinian policy. It thus contributes both to research on the relationship between foreign 
policy and the fight against terrorism as well as on the emergence of the Palestinian movement 
and its international dimensions more generally.10 
Today, the fact that the FRG has an official policy towards the issue of Palestine seems 
self-explanatory. But in 1967, Bonn did not even acknowledge that a Palestinian question 
existed. Then, more than a decade later, the FRG by 1980 had recognised the need for a two-
state solution with a role therein for the PLO. In a nutshell, this has remained the FRG’s policy 
on the question of Palestine to this day. The following is an explorative analysis of the trajectory 
of how the West German stance on ‘Palestine’ evolved as part of Brandt’s and Schmidt’s ‘Arab 
policy’ throughout the 1970s. 
 
2. Blissful ignorance and a silver lining: the absence of the Palestinian question from 
West German Middle Eastern policy, 1967-1969  
Before the June war, the Palestinian question had not been of great importance for West 
Germany. In the years running up to 1967, a ‘Palestinian question’ simply did not exist in the 
minds of policymakers in Bonn. Instead, one would refer to a ‘refugee problem’.11 Of this latter 
issue, however, the Auswärtiges Amt was well aware. In fact, it even represented a political 
opportunity for West German policy makers. The Palestinian refugees were spread over several 
countries, which meant that dealing with them had a pan-Arab element. Moreover, most of 
them lived in countries which had broken their relations with the FRG, such as Egypt or 
Lebanon. For these states, the West German cabinet had passed a ban on any new financial aid 
or support in 1965.12 If Bonn wanted to improve its relations to these Arab states with financial 
 
9 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019); Dahlke (Das Wischnewski Protokoll (2009)) dates similar West 
German efforts to 1977, only. 
10 On the former, see, for example, Vultee, Fred. Securitization: A new approach to the framing of the ‘war on 
terror’. Journalism Practice 4:1 (2010): 33-47; Coolsaet, Rik. EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or 
chimera? International affairs 8:4 (2010): 857-73; Savun, Burcu, and Brian Phillips. Democracy, foreign policy, 
and terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53:6 (2009): 878-904; Gardner, Hall. American global strategy 
and the ‘war on terrorism. (Aldershot, 2005); Pillar, Robert. Terrorism and US foreign policy. (Washington, 
2003); on the latter, see, for example, Pappe, Ilan. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. 
(New York/ Cambridge, 2004); or Sayigh, Yazid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian 
National Movement 1949-1993. (Oxford, 1997). 
11 AAPD 13.06.1967. Document 217. Von Braun (New York/UN) to Auswärtiges Amt. On the history of the 
Palestinian question, see, for example, Gelvin, James. The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War. 
(Cambridge, 2007); Shlaim, Avi. The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921-
1951. (Oxford, 1998); Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National 
Consciousness. (New York, 1997). 
12 PA/AA (B130 8822A, unfoliated) 14.08.1967. Memorandum by D III. 
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means, aid to the Palestinians was a handy backdoor to legally circumvent its own previous 
ban; the issue of Palestinian refugees had a silver lining for the Auswärtiges Amt. 
 
When in late 1966 it looked like there might be a chance to re-establish diplomatic relations 
with the Arabs states, foreign minister Brandt soon turned to the Palestinians as a vehicle to 
catalyse this development. Bonn had already given aid to the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the previous years, but Brandt 
now suggested a significant increase of this support. In January 1967, he proposed to the West 
German cabinet an extraordinary aid package for Palestinian refugees of DM 50 million over 
five years, to be paid to UNRWA.13 This represented a sharp rise when compared to the total 
of DM 22 million which the FRG had given to UNRWA since 1952.14 For example, in 1965 
the FRG’s contribution to UNRWA had been a mere DM 2 million; Brandt now suggested to 
quintuple that annual amount.15 
Officially, the aid package was conceived of as a humanitarian project, but it comes out 
very clearly from the internal documents of the Auswärtiges Amt that the real reasons lay 
elsewhere. By giving money to the Palestinians, Brandt hoped to spur on a general West 
German-Arab rapprochement. When the West German cabinet discussed the proposition, 
Brandt very directly pointed to the broader considerations of West Germany’s relations to the 
Arab world for this aid package. Finance minister Franz-Joseph Strauß opposed the idea for 
reasons of financial discipline, but Brandt’s arguments won over the West German chancellor. 
As Kiesinger stated, he was “in principle of the opinion that for political reasons the proposition 
could be accepted” and later added that “he would veto any aid to the Palestinians if there was 
not the previously explained political dimension to it”.16 Moreover, after the cabinet session 
Brandt was very clear about the quid-pro-quo nature of the decision: “Confidentially, it was 
also recorded that payments shall only be made once diplomatic relations with the Arab states 
had in fact been re-established.”17 The motion passed. But as the big wave of West German 
embassy openings failed to materialise in spring 1967, no payments were made for the moment. 
 
13 PA/AA (B130 2563A, unfoliated) 26.01.1967. Excerpt from cabinet minutes. 
14 Defrates John F. UNRWA, The Federal Republic of Germany and the Palestine Refugees. Orient 13:3 (1972): 
124. Quoted in: Lewan, Kenneth. How West Germany Helped to Build Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies 4:4 
(1975): 41-64. 
15 Yearbook of the United Nations 1965. Chapter XIV – Questions relating to the Middle East. Office of Public 
Information. United Nations, New York. The year book gives USD 500.000 as West German contribution to 
UNRWA. Historic exchange rate data puts the exchange of USD to DM at 1:4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 PA/AA (B130 2565A, unfoliated) 26.01.1967. Notes by Brandt. 
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However, a few months later the June War fundamentally transformed the nature of the 
Palestinian question. The war resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, the 
Golan heights and the Sinai Peninsula. This quadrupling of Israel’s size reconfigured the 
geopolitical map of the modern Middle East and introduced the Palestinian question on its 
political agenda. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians had fled from the occupied territories 
to neighbouring countries, while a significant number of them fell under Israeli administration 
in the West Bank, Gaza and Golan.18 This was immediately recognised by Bonn as a major new 
aspect of the Middle East conflict.19 
The June War brought up the humanitarian aid package again. In the June memorandum, 
which discussed the West German response to the Six-Day War, the idea of the 50 million DM 
fund for Palestinian refugees was revived immediately.20 After all, Bonn was deeply worried 
about its reputation in the Arab states in the aftermath of the war, given the perception that it 
had sided with Israel in the conflict.21 In this situation, the project of humanitarian aid for 
Palestinian refugees once more became the preferred public relations instrument through which 
Bonn hoped to improve its image. Furthermore, the Auswärtiges Amt went even further by 
proposing the establishment of a special West German representative for aid to the Palestinians. 
Again, this was about more than just aiding Palestinian refugees. As a senior West German 
diplomat noted: “[This] approach should achieve that the appointed representative nolens 
volens [italics added] becomes an interlocutor for the Arab governments on other political 
topics, too.”22 
Overall, in the late 1960s the Palestinians served the FRG with quite a useful purpose: 
whenever Arab leaders asked for a gesture of sympathy to the Arab world, Bonn would refer to 
its special assistance programme for Palestinian refugees.23 Of course, the Auswärtiges Amt had 
recognised in the June memorandum that the Palestinian question had now changed in nature. 
While the document had originally referred to the need for the FRG to improve its relations 
with the Arab states, Brandt himself changed the original draft and by hand turned “states” into 
“people” – a clear reference to the Palestinians.24 Ultimately, however, foreign office 
 
18 See, for example, Bunton, Palestinian-Israeli conflict (2006). 
19 See, for example, AAPD 13.06.1967. Document 217. Von Braun (New York/UN) to Auswärtiges Amt; or 
AAPD 30.06.1967. Document 242. Grewe (Paris/NATO) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
20 AAPD 23.06.1967. Document 232. Memorandum by Meyer-Lindenberg. On the June Memorandum, see 
Chapter I. 
21 AAPD 11.07.1967. Document 257. Meyer-Lindenberg to Paris embassy.  
22 PA/AA (B130 2575A, unfoliated) 22.08.1967. Notes by Frank. 
23 See, for example, AAPD 27.07.1967. Document 283. Memorandum by Meyer-Lindenberg; or AAPD 
08.02.1968. Document 50. Conversation of Duckwitz with the head of the office of the Arab League, Cabani. 
24 AAPD 23.06.1967. Document 232. Memorandum by Meyer-Lindenberg. This is also the document’s 
interpretation brought forward by Gerlach (in: Doppelte Front (2006): 56ff.). 
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memoranda in the late 1960s relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict mostly circled around the War 
of Attrition between Israel and Egypt, UN mediation or the continued closure of the Suez 
Canal.25  
In the Middle East, the PLO was only just stepping out of the shadow of its previous 
sponsor, Egypt. Under its new leader Yasser Arafat, it started to claim the role as representative 
of the Palestinian people.26 The first specific reference in the files of the Auswärtiges Amt to 
this development noted “increasing attempts to create an ‘entité Palestinienne’ […] [which 
adds] a specific Arab-Palestinian dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is hardly conceivable 
that the Palestinian National council or the other resistance movements can be passed over by 
the current parties in a potential solution of the conflict”.27 From this document onwards, 
written in March 1969, Bonn started to refer to a ‘Palestinian issue’, rather than a ‘refugee 
problem’.  
There were also first warning signs that violent elements of the Palestinian movement 
might take aim at the FRG. In late 1969, the West German delegation in Beirut started to receive 
reports on potential terrorist attacks by Palestinian groups in the FRG. Informants visited the 
premises and, in return for money or requests for asylum in West Germany, shared plans about 
possible attacks.28 Yet, the challenge with such incidents was how to judge their reliability, as 
at times informants were not considered trustworthy and interested only in cash.29 But a much 
more general warning was sent by the FRG’s representative in Beirut, Walter Georg Nowak, to 
Bonn only shortly thereafter: “Have been informed by third party that leader of Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] is considering attacks in Europe. Representative of 
[PFLP leader] Dr. Habash has engaged in relevant preparations from 20 to 25 October via flight 
route London – Brussels – Frankfurt – Amsterdam.”30 It is not clear whether this message 
caused any sort of reaction in Bonn, but Brandt’s administration could and should have been 
warned about impending Palestinian attacks on West German soil.31  
 
25 AAPD 23.06.1967. Document 232. Memorandum by Meyer-Lindenberg; see also PA/AA (B36 312, pp. 66ff.) 
24.01.1968. Notes by I B 4; PA/AA (B130 2890A, unfoliated) 27.01.1969. Notes by Gehlhoff. 
26 Aburish, Said. Arafat: From defender to dictator. (London, 1998): 69-98. 
27 PA/AA (B130 2804A, unfoliated) 11.03.1969. Notes by Gehlhoff.  
28 PA/AA (B130 2812A, unfoliated) 30.09.1969. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B130 2812A, 
unfoliated) 04.10.1969. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B130 2812A, unfoliated) 06.10.1969. 
Gehlhoff to Fröhlich (Ministry of the Interior). 
29 PA/AA (B130 2812A, unfoliated) 09.10.1969. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
30 PA/AA (B130 2812A, unfoliated) 30.10.1969. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
31 No reaction to these cables was found in the archives of the Auswärtiges Amt. Similarly, Guttmann describes a 
similar level of unawareness of terrorism trends in the Swiss administration of the late 1960 (Guttmann, Origins 
of counterterrorism (2017): 27-43).  As she points out, by this time Bonn had already joined the secret network 
of the Club de Berne, which as of 1969 facilitated intelligence sharing on terrorist threats amongst West states 
(ibid.: 183f.). However, the FRG still was unable to assess the threat level of Palestinian terrorism.  
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For the moment, however, both the transformation of the Palestinian movement and 
warnings about terrorism remained without consequences. After all, Bonn did not consider 
itself one of the “current parties” actively working on containing or ending the Arab-Israeli 
conflict; no change of policy was undertaken or even discussed in the Auswärtiges Amt.32 The 
extent to which the FRG had misjudged the relevance and risk associated with a transformed 
and, at least in part, violent Palestinian movement is also illustrated by a report on the topic by 
the Auswärtiges Amt to its NATO delegation from April 1970. It does not mention any 
European dimension to Palestinian terrorism and merely notes the latter’s “nuisance value” in 
the occupied territories.33 But this perception would be challenged soon. 
 
The Palestinian question as such did not exist in the minds of West German foreign policy 
makers in the 1960s. Consequently, the question of Palestinian refugees played no important 
role in the re-calibration of Bonn’s Middle Eastern policy after the June War of 1967. The 
transformation of the Palestinian movement was only noted with marginal interest in the 
Auswärtiges Amt, which did not expect West Germany to be embroiled in the escalation of what 
Bunton calls “the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” in the 1970s.34 
 
3. The year that terrorism reached West Germany 
1970 was the year in which Palestinian terrorism arrived in West Germany through an attack at 
Riem airport near Munich. Then, in September 1970, the FRG was closely involved in the 
Dawson’s Field Hijackings. On top of that, the core of what would become the Baader-Meinhof 
Group turned up in the Middle East, connecting Palestinian terrorism to German left-wing 
terrorism. Bonn, caught unprepared, was surprised by these developments. The main response 
of the Auswärtiges Amt was to set up sporadic channels of communication on a working level 
with the Palestinian movement, including its violent elements. 
 
In February 1970, three Palestinians tried to hijack an El-Al plane on its way to London while 
stopping in Munich.35 The attack failed but killed an Israeli and seriously injured two more. 
The three hijackers were arrested by the West German police. It was the first ever Palestinian 
attack on West German soil. 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 PA/AA (B130 2804A, unfoliated) 06.04.1970. Bente to Brussels (NATO). 
34 Bunton, Martin. The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. A Very Short Introduction. (Oxford, 2013). 
35 Herzinger, Richard. Deutschland hätte gewarnt sein müssen. (Die Welt, 17.07.2012). 
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Bonn now wanted to know more about what it was actually dealing with. On 17 April 
1970, the Auswärtiges Amt cabled its representations in Amman, Cairo, Damascus and Beirut 
asking for reports to be compiled about the status of “Palestinian Resistance Organisations”, 
whose “military but more importantly political importance has increased continuously since 
[…] 1967”.36 The reports Bonn subsequently received illustrate well where the Palestinian 
movement was concentrated at the time: the West German representatives in Jordan, Lebanon 
and Egypt sent back 42, 30 and 13 pages, respectively.37  
But the West German government was willing to go even further in getting to know the 
Palestinians. New material found in the archive of the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin shows that 
soon after the Riem attack, a West German diplomat in Amman met with Issam Sartawi, head 
of the ‘Active Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine’ (AOLP), which had been behind 
the attack. Sartawi told his interlocutor that he regretted the exchange of fire in Munich. It was 
supposed to have been a bloodless operation. But the FRG “had been chosen purposefully as 
venue for the hijacking [as it] was important for the struggle of the Palestinians due to economic 
size, political influence and previous sympathies of its people to the Arabs”.38 Sartawi ended 
by indicating that there would be no further attacks on West Germany if the three terrorists 
were released quickly. 
Bonn did not immediately take up Sartawi on the offer, but internal discussions on the 
issue continued. In August, West German ambassador to Jordan Hans-Joachim Hille reported 
a case in Greece where Athens had simply freed and deported Palestinian terrorists after Arab 
diplomats had assured the Greeks that no further attacks would happen. Hille recommended 
that Bonn follow the same strategy.39 His advice was not heeded, but only a month later the 
three terrorists would be free anyway.  
At the start of September 1970, PFLP commandoes took control of four international 
airplanes, redirected them towards Jordan and landed them on the Dawson’s Field airstrip near 
Amman. Several hundred passengers, many of them West Germans, were now in the hands of 
Palestinian terrorists. What followed was a short but intense drama, in which several crises, 
dilemmas and levels of interaction overlapped.  
 
36 PA/AA (B36 402, p. 312ff) 21.05.1970. Hille (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B36 402, p. 381ff) 
09.06.1970. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B36 402, p. 354ff) 22.05.1970. Jesser (Cairo) to 
Auswärtiges Amt. The original directive could not be found in the archives, but all three report refer to a 
directive by the Auswärtiges Amt from 17 April 1970 to report on “Palestinian Resistance Organisations” to 
Bonn. 
37 Ibid. 
38 PA/AA (B36 372, p. 290) 23.02.1970. Hille (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
39 PA/AA (B36 372, p. 500f) 18.08.1970. Hille (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. On this episode and consequent 
discussions within the Swiss government, see Guttmann, Origins of counterterrorism (2017): 32. 
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The hijackings coincided with skirmishes between the Jordanian army and Yasser 
Arafat’s PLO, which would soon escalate into outright civil war: Jordan’s Black September. At 
the time, West German ambassador Hille was away on holiday. Given the tense situation in 
Jordan, the Auswärtiges Amt decided that it was too dangerous to let him return to Amman.40 
Instead, the only other West German diplomat in the country would be responsible for 
managing the crises on the ground. It was Hille’s deputy, Peter Mende, who was only 36 years 
of age.41  
Soon, the PFLP demanded the release of several terrorists in European prisons in 
exchange for the hostages, amongst them the three terrorists engaged in the February 1970 
Riem attack.42 The situation in Amman itself was characterised by chaos and uncertainty. In 
Mende’s words: “Work after sundown significantly hindered, as scattered heavy shootings in 
some suburbs of Amman, and [Palestinian] Fedayeen largely control traffic through ‘black 
lists’.”43 
The difficult situation in Jordan was compounded by a complex international setting. 
Amongst the other hostages were British, American, Swiss and Israeli citizens. Thus, Bonn not 
only had to consider its own unilateral response to the crisis but also needed to coordinate its 
actions on a multilateral level. To ensure this, the Americans, West Germans, British and Swiss 
set up an impromptu coordination group in Bern on 8 September 1970.44 The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took over negotiations between the Bern group and the 
PFLP in Amman.  
Brandt and Scheel decided that the FRG would in principle support multilateral efforts 
to free the hostages due to an “absolute requirement for solidarity”.45 This was not just a choice 
but reinforced by intense pressure on the FRG by its allies in Bern. At some point, the American 
ambassador there even said to the West German representative “jokingly [that] we should not 
step out of line, otherwise we had to be careful in Berlin”.46 If it really had been a joke, the 
West Germans did not find it funny. The Auswärtiges Amt took the comment seriously, citing 
it as evidence that the Americans might hold back support to the West Germans in the future if 
the FRG stepped out of line.47 Thus, the West German government intended to support an 
international solution for as long as possible. Only when there was no prospect of success for 
 
40 PA/AA (B36 374, p. 389) 16.09.1970. Draft (author unknown). 
41 Der Spiegel. Personalien. (21.09.1970). 
42 PA/AA (B36 374, unfoliated) 07.09.1970a. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
43 PA/AA (B36 374, unfoliated) 07.09.1970b. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
44 PA/AA (B36 375, p. 62) 08.09.1970. Notes by Redies. 
45 Ibid. 
46 PA/AA (B36 375, p. 146) 12.09.1970. Memorandum by crisis group (Auswärtiges Amt). 
47 PA/AA (B36 375, p. 177) 15.09.1970. Müller to Frank. 
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such a multilateral approach and when West German hostages were considered in severe danger 
would Bonn opt for the unilateral action of dealing its prisoners in Munich for the West German 
hostages. 
The tense atmosphere of crisis comes out clearly in the archival material. Within days, 
inter-ministerial coordination had to be moved from telex to the telephone, as the typing, 
sending and receiving of messages from Auswärtiges Amt to the Ministry of the Interior took 
too much time in view of the amount of communication.48 All the while, news from Amman 
pointed to a worsening situation on the ground. “Since 15[.]15 local time heaviest shooting in 
Amman, army shoots with artillery and grenade launchers, […] Fedayeen use rockets and 
smaller grenades […]”.49 At times, the employees of the West German embassy, too, had to 
take cover.50 Misfortune was added to crisis when the automatic deciphering machine in the 
West German embassy in Amman broke down. Now, Mende asked Bonn to send telegrams 
openly, as his staff now had to decipher classified messages “letter for letter by hand, which is 
very time consuming”.51   
Meanwhile, international negotiations reached a dead end, as the PFLP was only willing 
to release hostages in two stages and was ambivalent over its treatment of prisoners with dual 
Israeli-American citizenship.52 Washington in particular was afraid that they would be 
considered Israelis by the PFLP and not let go. Now, Brandt decided to take some sort of 
unilateral action and, against US wishes, sent Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski to Jordan.53 
Wischnewski was supposed to use his contacts with and good reputation amongst the Arabs to 
facilitate a solution and prevent any damage to the West German citizens.54 
Upon his arrival, Wischnewski immediately rang the alarm bell. On the morning of 12 
September, he sent a confidential message for the eyes of Brandt, Scheel and interior minister 
Genscher, only. He strongly recommended a unilateral exchange of the three Palestinians 
detained in Munich for all West German hostages.55 In the afternoon he cabled again. “The 
three airplanes have been blown up [by the PFLP]. […] Situation is becoming more critical. 
 
48 PA/AA (B36 375, p. 94f) 09.09.1970. Notes by Redies. 
49 PA/AA (B36 374, p. 32) 09.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
50 Ibid. 
51 PA/AA (B36 375, p. 126) 11.09.1970. Notes by ZB 6-10. 
52 PA/AA (B36 375, p. 120) 11.09.1970. Notes by Bente; see also Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019): 146. 
53 FRUS 1969-76, Volume XXIV. 11.09.1970. Document 225. Kissinger to Nixon. 
54 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 11.09.1970. Notes by Bente. On Wischnewski’s standing amongst the Arab 
states, see Chapter I. 
55 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 12.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. The telex was sent by 
Mende but drafted by Wischnewski and marked as personal message to chancellor and the foreign and interior 
ministers. 
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Have been waiting for hours on a reply to my telex.”56 Rumours of an impending US and Israeli 
raid on the airplanes had led the PFLP to blow up the airplanes (see Picture 6).57 
Picture 6: The image of the exploding airplanes on Dawson’s Field is amongst the most well-known pictures in 
the history of 20th century terrorism.58 
Brandt and his government did not immediately follow Wischnewski’s advice.59 However, 
based on his report Bonn now started to give a unilateral solution more consideration. Later on 
12 September, Wischnewski received the following message by the Auswärtiges Amt: “We ask 
you to tell your Arab interlocutors the following: the readiness of the federal government to 
release the three Palestinians in German custody is confirmed. Further information only 
possible Sunday [tomorrow] morning.”60 Some hours later, around midnight, Wischnewski 
went to meet Abu Maher, spokesperson of the PFLP.61 As per instruction, the West German 
politician declared Bonn’s willingness to release the three Palestinians. He even gave Abu 
Maher a letter confirming the respective message.62 In return, Abu Maher declared that the 
 
56 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 12.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
57 Guttmann, Origins of counterterrorism (2017): 47. 
58 Shortwave Radio Archive. Palastinian Highjackings in Jordan (1970) (10.12.2016). 
59 Ibid. 
60 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 12.09.1970. Frank to Wischnewski (Amman). 
61 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 13.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. Also present were 
Mende, Dingels (head of the department for International Relations of the SPD) and a representative of the 
Palestinian Red Crescent. 
62 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 13.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. According to Fink (West 
Germany and Israel (2019): 147), Wischnewski that day also met Arafat for a conversation, which did not yield 
any result. He later unsuccessfully tried to buy out the West German hostages, too.  
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PFLP was willing to release all male West German hostages.63 The PFLP gave Bonn four days 
to officially declare an acceptance of this deal.64 The clock was ticking.  
Therefore, already on 12 September Brandt’s government had decided to switch to a 
dual strategy.65 It had started to actively prepare the option of a unilateral deal with the PFLP. 
The increasingly dangerous situation and Wischnewski’s urgent warnings were clearly one 
reason for this. Another one was the growing West German frustration with the inability of 
international negotiations to achieve any sort of progress. Finally, the Bonn government knew 
that it might not have been the only one keeping its options open. Mende, in his urging for Bonn 
to accept Abu Maher’s offer, gave as one of the reasons for his recommendation “similar 
negotiations of the English side”.66 
On 13 September, the PFLP decided to allow all women and children under their control 
to leave Jordan immediately. But 54 male hostages remained, were paraded in front of the press 
and then scattered amongst different locations in Jordan as “prisoners-of-war”.67 That included 
two West German hostages. 
Increasingly, Bonn was “disappointed” by the slow progress of work in the Bern 
Group.68 On the evening of 15 September, the Auswärtiges Amt cabled the following message 
to Amman: “If by midday tomorrow [16 September] Bern group not with a new negotiator and 
clear negotiating mandate with adequate participation of all governments, then federal 
government will have to look for other solutions.”69 
Then, on 16 September, events in Amman escalated. Jordanian King Hussein decided 
to break the power of the PLO in his country. The Jordanian civil war had started for real, 
putting the hostage crisis on temporary standstill, as its outcome would now depend on the 
course of war. On 17 September, the Syrian army marched into the north of Jordan in support 
 
63 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 13.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. The fact that 
Wischnewski and Maher discussed only male hostages can only mean that by this time the release of all women 
and children was already decided upon by the PFLP and thus not caused by Brandt’s message through 
Wischnewski. 
64 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 13.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
65 This is three days earlier than Fink’s account of the events lets on (Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019): 
147).  
66 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 13.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. That very evening the 
BBC World Service in fact broadcasted an announcement in Arabic stating that the British government would 
exchange Palestinian terrorist Leila Khaled for the British hostages (BBC News. Black September: Tough 
negotiation (01.01.2001). London had publicly budged into PFLP demands before Bonn did. 
67 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019): 147. 
68 PA/AA (B36 375, p. 164) 14.09.1970. Memorandum by Fiedler.  
69 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 15.09.1970. Bente to Mende (Amman). Both the Bern group as well as the 
British and American government were informed of the contents of this message by the West Germans. 
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of the Palestinians. But due to Israeli air support for Hussein, it had to withdraw again by 22 
September. The Jordanian government had prevailed.70 
On 25 September, the Jordanian army announced that it had freed fifteen hostages, 
including the two West German ones.71 They arrived at Amman airport on the morning of 26 
September, “all in good physical condition and good mood”.72 Mende as well as the Swiss and 
British consul were present when they were flown out, putting an end to the 1970 Jordanian 
hostage crisis. 
But the episode had not quite finished yet. None of the Palestinian terrorists in Europe 
had actually been released. In a way, the Bern group states might just as well have considered 
the issue concluded, as all hostages still alive had been saved. But promises to the Palestinians 
had been made, and one can only suppose that the concerned states did not want to go back on 
their word in view of potential future crises. After some confusion, a British plane with a PFLP 
terrorist on board flew to Syria on 30 September 1970, landing in Munich for a quick stop to 
take the three West German prisoners on board.73 For the West Germans, Black September 
seemed to have ended. 
Wischnewski managed to leave Amman in late September, after having been stuck there 
for almost a week.74 Celebrated in West Germany for the role he had played in ensuring an end 
to the crisis (after all, all West German hostages came out alive and well from the event), he 
personally seems to have been quite critical of Brandt’s and Scheel’s performance. In the 
archive of the Auswärtiges Amt, a draft reply of Scheel to an earlier Wischnewski letter can be 
found. In it, Scheel shows understanding for Wischnewski’s criticism, but “larger political 
interests did not allow the federal government to follow any other path than the one it took to 
free the hostages”.75 Wischnewski’s original letter is not in the files, and it is not clear whether 
Scheel actually sent off his reply. But it is hard to think of another explanation for the presence 
of this draft than internal criticism by ‘Ben Wisch’, as Wischnewski was now nicknamed by 
the West German media.76 
 
70 On the Jordanian civil war of 1970, see, for example, Salibi, Kamal. Modern history of Jordan. (London, 
1998). 
71 PA/AA (B36 374, unfoliated) 25.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
72 PA/AA (B36 374, p. 71) 26.09.1970. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
73 PA/AA (B36 375, unfoliated) 30.09.1970. Notes by Redies. 
74 PA/AA (B130 2799A, unfoliated) 23.09.1970. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
75 PA/AA (B36 375, unfoliated). December 1970 (exact date unkown). Draft letter by Scheel. 
76 The other main West German protagonist, Mende, got out well from the crisis. Brandt himself was full of 
praise for the young diplomat, telling Scheel: „He belongs to the new generation of diplomats. They are great. At 
some point you have to tell them how much I like how they are different from the others.” (Der Spiegel 
Personalien (21.09.1970).) Mende would go on to later become German ambassador in Sudan (1993-96) and 
Jordan (1996-99). 
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The 1970 Dawson’s Field Hijackings represented the first thorough engagement of West 
Germany with international terrorism. It was a novel experience, which West German foreign 
policy makers both in Bonn and abroad had to deal with. Both Fink and Guttmann provide 
excellent and well researched accounts of what has also been called ‘Skyjack Sunday’, though 
neither found or used the cables of the Auswärtiges Amt on the matter.77 Fink argues that despite 
criticism by its allies the FRG had gained stature during the crisis by showing its willingness to 
go it alone in the Middle East.78 But what comes out more than before in view of the new 
archival material from the Auswärtiges Amt is how close negotiations between Bonn and the 
PFLP were all along. Moreover, the intense pressure the FRG felt itself, most importantly from 
the Americans, is noteworthy. The comments on Berlin by the American representative in the 
Bern group were heard loud and clear in Bonn. Palestinian terrorism had certainly moved 
beyond the stage of being a mere “nuisance” for the FRG.79 Best to not be in a situation like 
Dawson’s Field again, Brandt and Scheel might well have thought to themselves. 
The FRG’s concerns about terrorism in the Middle East went beyond Palestinian 
attacks. In June 1970, West German left-wing terrorist Andreas Baader, who had only recently 
escaped custody in West Berlin, arrived in Beirut together with Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin 
and Horst Mahler. Due to passport problems, they had been temporarily taken into custody by 
the Lebanese police. Bonn immediately, yet unsuccessfully tried to achieve their extradition. 
As Bonn’s representative in Beirut explained to his superiors, the Baader-Meinhof Group had 
links to the Palestinian movement so that “the Lebanese treat the matter with a light hand”.80 
Within a day, Baader and his fellow travellers had been freed, and it was unclear where 
they went next. Information pointed to Syria or Jordan as potential destinations.81 In Amman, 
Hille pleaded to not be instructed to seek the group’s extradition if they were indeed in the city. 
The situation, only months before the civil war was about to break out, was sensitive enough 
and he did not want to increase tensions between the king and the PLO by asking the former to 
arrest allies of the latter.82 It is a telling example of how counterterrorism and foreign policy 
can overlap. Years before left-wing terrorism would escalate in West Germany, Hille clearly 
considered the demands of the latter to surpass those of the former.  
 
 
77 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019): 144-9; Guttmann, Origins of counterterrorism (2017): 27-56. 
78 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019): 147. 
79 PA/AA (B130 2804A, unfoliated) 06.04.1970. Bente to Brussels (NATO). 
80 PA/AA (B36 372, p. 231f) 09.06.1970. Notes by Strothmann. 
81 PA/AA (B36 372, p. 235ff) 10.06.1970. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B36 372, p. 238) 
18.06.1970. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
82 PA/AA (B36 372, p. 242f) 06.07.1970. Hille (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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From 1970 onwards, the FRG was embroiled in Palestinian terrorism. Diplomacy and 
counterterrorism became intricately linked, as the West German government hoped to avoid 
further Palestinian terror on West German soil through direct communication with the 
Palestinian movement. Bonn’s perspective on the Palestinian question was starting to change 
fundamentally. 
 
4. Politics as counterterrorism: talking to the Palestinians, 1971-1973 
The most important consequence of this West German embroilment in terrorism was an 
increased effort by Bonn to set up communication channels to the Palestinian movement. 
Sporadic contacts on a working level, which had been established in the aftermath of the Riem 
attack and Dawson’s Field Hijackings, failed to prevent further violence such as the infamous 
1972 Munich Massacre. In its aftermath, the FRG’s Middle Eastern policy was temporarily 
unhinged, as relations to both Israel and the Arabs were in crisis. The Auswärtiges Amt 
significantly stepped up its engagement with the Palestinian movement, imploring Arab leaders 
to lean on Arafat to stop further violence on West German soil. It also set up regular 
communications to the PLO, but stopped short of recognising the organisation outright. 
 
The meeting with Sartawi in reaction to the Riem attacks in February 1970 might have been a 
one-off affair, but more regular conversations between officials of the Auswärtiges Amt with 
Palestinian representatives started soon after Dawson’s Field. In November 1970, Nowak in 
Lebanon talked to the chairman of the PFLP Beirut branch. Their meeting, Nowak stated, was 
influenced by Black September. This “let it appear advantageous to have the opportunity for 
contact in special circumstances […]. We exchanged phone numbers.”83 In Cairo, the West 
German head of the delegation, Walter Jesser, reported talks between one of his staff members 
with the deputy head of the PLO headquarters in the city.84 The picture is completed by a telex 
from Mende to Bonn in January 1971, in which he reports a conversation with a “close 
confidant of Jassir [sic] Arafat”.85 There was also an effort made to strengthen informal West 
German-Palestinian networks outside the Middle East, as is shown by a message of Nowak to 
Bonn. A senior Fatah representative was about to take up a position in the Geneva delegation 
of the Arab League. The West German diplomats there, Nowak proposed, should get in contact 
 
83 PA/AA (B36 402, p. 441ff) 02.11.1970. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
84 PA/AA (B36 402, p. 451ff) 11.11.1970. Jesser (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
85 PA/AA (B36 403, p. 16f) 27.01.1971. Mende (Amman) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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with the delegate, as he spoke German and had a German wife.86 On a working level, networks 
between the Auswärtiges Amt and the Palestinian movement started to form.  
This effort was motivated by a sense of necessity in Bonn, as contacts were considered 
useful to avert future crises. However, there was now also an element of anxious awe and maybe 
even of fear in Bonn when it came to the question of Palestinian terrorism. When in June 1972 
the Auswärtiges Amt was informed by the FRG’s domestic security service that Wadi Haddad, 
leader of the PFLP’s military arm, might be travelling to Bonn with a fake Syrian diplomatic 
passport, the Auswärtiges Amt advised against an arrest.87 It would be hard to prove Haddad’s 
involvement in terror attacks in a West German court, and in any case there would be a risk of 
retaliation by his followers.88 The government in Bonn still thought that the cup of Palestinian 
terror might pass the FRG. But these hopes would be disappointed. 
1972 would bring the most infamous of all Palestinian attacks to West Germany. Munich was 
hosting the summer Olympics when a Palestinian commando group of the Black September 
Organisation (BSO) took eleven Israeli athletes hostage on 5 September. A failed attempt to 
free the hostages by the Munich police ended in the death of the athletes and a number of the 
terrorists.89 
Bizarrely enough, the attack’s most immediate negative impact did not concern West 
Germany’s relations with Israel. While the Israeli public was fuming at West German 
incompetence in dealing with the crisis, Israeli prime minister Golda Meir publicly defended 
Brandt for political reasons.90 Instead, a severe crisis in relations to the Arab states ensued, 
which at times even threatened the recently re-established diplomatic relations with states such 
as Egypt.  
In Munich, the Palestinian commandos had demanded to be flown out to Egypt. Calling 
President Sadat, Brandt had been told that the Egyptian president was unavailable and in his 
absence Egypt’s prime minister refused to allow the Palestinians to fly to Cairo.91 Thus, after 
the attack, a West German government spokesperson publicly complained about this Egyptian 
behaviour.92 Moreover, in response to domestic pressure Brandt felt compelled to show a tough 
reaction against the attack. His government therefore banned two Palestinian student 
 
86 PA/AA (B36 403, p. 80f) 30.06.1971. Nowak (Beirut) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
87 Haddad would soon thereafter be expelled from the PFLP and set up is own, more militant, organization called 
“PFLP – External Operations”. 
88 PA/AA (B130 9863A, unfoliated) 09.06.1972. Von Schenk to State Secretary. 
89 Dahlke, Anschlag auf Olympia (2006). 
90 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019): 185ff.; see also AAPD 25.09.1972. Document 289. Puttkamer (Tel 
Aviv) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
91 AAPD 05.09.1972. Document 257. Notes by Niemöller. 
92 PA/AA (B36 525, unfoliated) 11.9.01972. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. See also AAPD 07.09.1972. 
Document 259. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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organisations (GUPS and GUPA) in West Germany and introduced special security measures 
for Arab travellers from and to the FRG. Every visa application was to be checked against lists 
of suspects, and “[e]very Arab, for whom it cannot be excluded that he is a security risk, is to 
be rejected.”93 An internal document, in which the West German Ministry for the Interior 
outlined the new security procedures to the Auswärtiges Amt, went even further: “If the Arab 
is travelling to the FRG as tourist, a security risk cannot be routinely excluded.”94  
Taken together, these measures caused outrage in the Arab states generally and in Egypt 
specifically. Shortly after the Munich attack, Bonn’s ambassador Hans-Georg Steltzer was 
summoned by the Egyptian foreign minister, who heavily reproached the West German 
government for its allegedly anti-Arab reaction to the crisis. The Arab media in particular 
slammed West Germany. “Right now, the Federal Republic of Germany unfortunately comes 
out in the local press as an emotionless, brutal police state with racist tendencies, as subservient 
to Israeli interests, of whom from an Arab viewpoint nothing positive can be expected 
anymore.”95 The Tunisian foreign office even demanded that the West Germans extend the 
special security measures to Israeli travellers to the FRG, too, in the spirit of “even-
handedness”.96  Ultimately, however, the crisis cooled down over time. By November, Steltzer 
in Cairo reported that it was “in the process of subsiding”.97 He explained that the Egyptian 
government had wielded anti-West German rhetoric mostly in order to not look weak in the 
public eye, without a real interest to substantially hurt the West German-Egyptian relations.98  
But there was little respite in Bonn. By November the FRG was in Israel’s bad books, 
as Brandt’s administration had freed the three surviving Palestinian attackers from Munich in 
exchange for an airplane hijacked on 29 October. The architect of the Munich Massacre, Abu 
Daoud, even claimed in his autobiography that the West German government had offered him 
USD 9 million to engineer the attack on Lufthansa Flight 615. Wolffsohn finds the argument 
credible, but to date there is no evidence found in German archives to substantiate this 
assertion.99 Moreover, Wolffsohn argues that the entire episode must have been staged with the 
consent of the West German government, as Bonn’s agreement to swap the imprisoned 
Palestinian prisoners came too quickly and smoothly for it to have been a spontaneous 
decision.100 On this latter observation he is right, but most likely for the wrong reasons: after 
 
93 PA/AA (B36 509, p. 26) 07.09.1972. Smoydzin (BMI) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
94 Ibid. 
95 AAPD 09.10.1982. Document 318. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
96 AAPD 12.09.1972. Document 265. Naupert (Tunis) to Frank. 
97 PA/AA (B36 525, unfoliated) 16.11.1972. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
98 PA/AA (B36 525, unfoliated) 19.10.1972. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
99 Wolffsohn, Friedenskanzler (2018): 98ff. 
100 Ibid.: 84.  
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all, such a debate about the benefit of releasing terrorists before they are freed through further 
terror acts happened already in the summer of 1970.101 At the time, the Auswärtiges Amt had 
ruled out such a deal, only for the West German government to release the Riem attackers a 
few weeks later after the Dawson’s Field Hijackings. It is quite possible that Brandt’s 
government felt they were learning from past experience – all much less conspiratorial than 
Wolffsohn would let on. Guttmann also refutes the notion that the attack was staged by the 
West Germans, pointing to classified communication between the FRG and its Western allies. 
She shows that Bonn feared an event like the Tripoli hijacking for weeks and continuously 
asked for and shared intelligence with its partners on possible attacks. Why would the West 
Germans have done this if they were planning the hijacking themselves?102 In any case: whether 
the attack had been engineered or not, now not even Meir was willing to defend Brandt.103 In 
late 1972, West Germany had few friends in Israel for a while. Once again, terrorism had shown 
its ability to unhinge West Germany’s Middle Eastern policy. 
Picture 7: West Germany newspaper Welt am Sonntag takes aim at its government’s handling of the Munich 
Massacre: Scheel and Brandt portrayed kowtowing before Sadat and Palestinian terrorism. This is yet another 
illustration of how significant the foreign political dimension of the terror attack was.104 
 
101 See subchapter 3 (pp 117ff.).  
102 Guttmann, Origins of counterterrorism (2017): 221ff. 
103 AAPD 30.10.1972. Document 352. Puttkamer (Tel Aviv) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
104 Courtesy of the AdL; Source: Welt am Sonntag, 17.09.1972. The caption reads: “Mercy, oh Sadat, we aim to 
please you!” 
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Bonn responded to Palestinian terror attacks by further intensifying its attempts to establish 
networks with the Palestinian movements. This happened on two levels: below and above a 
direct line of communication to the PLO’s central committee. In the months following the 
Munich Massacre, Bonn’s diplomats engaged both with Arab leaders who could lean on Arafat 
as well as with lower-level PLO functionaries linked to the organisation’s leadership. 
The initiative for this came out of the Middle East. Merely a week after Munich, 
Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba told West Germany’s ambassador to Tunis “that he would 
ask […] Arafat to come for a meeting in order to make clear to him that new terror acts would 
only harm the Palestinian effort.”105 Unsurprisingly, Bonn tried to take advantage of this top-
down lever of influence on the Palestinians.106 As a result, the State Secretary in the 
Auswärtiges Amt, Paul Frank, headed to the Maghreb. He met Bourguiba as well as Muammar 











Picture 8: Hans-Georg Steltzer, West German ambassador to Egypt from 1972 to 1978. Less than a month 
after his arrival in Cairo, he successfully managed the severe crisis in bilateral relations in the aftermath of 
the Munich Massacre.108 
 
105 AAPD 12.09.1972. Document 265. Naupert (Tunis) to Frank. 
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unfoliated) 09.10.1972. Report by Herrmann (BND).). See also Guttmann, Origins of counterterrorism (2017): 
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Both told Frank they would do so, and in January 1973 the West German embassy in Tunis 
reported of a conversation between Bourguiba and Arafat, according to which “the circles of 
the Palestinian resistance organisations, as far as they are united under Arafat, have decided to 
carry out no more terror acts in or against the Federal Republic”.109 But of course, all this came 
at a price. Shortly before leaving for Tunis, Frank managed to gain, with some difficulty, an 
agreement by the West German Ministry of the Interior for “the intake of 2000 Tunisian guest 
workers for a Volkswagen plant and a corresponding increase of the ceiling [of guest workers] 
for Tunisia by 2000, if the Tunisians agree to cooperate in the security sector.”110 Today, 
migration is often discussed in the public in relation to the risk of terrorism. In 1972, it was the 
price to facilitate counterterrorism, and Bonn was willing to pay it. 
To establish lines of communication to the PLO from bottom-up, the Auswärtiges Amt 
also focused on more contacts to Palestinians on a working level. For Frank “[this] is the 
pathway that promises the most success [for the prevention of further Palestinian attacks against 
the FRG] to […] continue connections with the Palestinian organisations in order to quite 
generally clarify our relationship with the Palestinians”.111 He was aware that such a policy did 
not guarantee success, as due to its fragmented nature the Palestinian movement did not have 
“one point of contact”.112 But clearly the situation was considered grave enough to at least give 
it a try. In January 1973, the head of the Auswärtiges Amt’s Middle Eastern unit, Helmut Redies, 
had a number of meetings with Abdallah Frangie. Frangie had been the informal PLO’s 
representative in the Arab League’s office in Bonn from 1970 onwards.113 As a result, he now 
became the PLO’s point man for the FRG. In their conversation, Frangie made several points 
as to a “clarification of the relationship to the Federal Republic”.114 Amongst them was the 
demand that Bonn’s special aid package for Palestinian refugees, which had run out in 1972, 
would be extended. Moreover, unlike before the money should no longer go through UNRWA 
but directly to the PLO. Ultimately, the cabinet agreed to an extension of the aid package, and 
while it would still go through the UN, “the Palestinian side is content with some participation 
in the distribution of the fund (right of proposal for projects)”.115 Thus, there is a clear indication 
that both the extension of the aid package and its design were shaped by Palestinian demands 
and Bonn’s desire to prevent further attacks on West German soil. 
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Shortly thereafter, in April 1973, the West German embassy in Beirut was ordered to 
establish contact with the Palestinians again “in as inconspicuous a manner as possible”: “It is 
our desire to improve […] the FRG’s image amongst the Palestinians, in order to thereby 
simultaneously prevent new attacks in the FRG or against its institutions abroad.”116 For this, 
Frangie introduced a West German diplomat in Beirut to Mohammed Youssef Al-Najjar, or 
Abu Youssef, a close confidant of Arafat’s. Abu Yousef was, unlike Frangie, a leading member 
of the PLO, part of its central committee and thus a much more direct channel of communication 
for Bonn to the Palestinian leadership.117  
However, the complicated situation of the Middle East made it challenging for West 
German diplomats to maintain such networks. In April 1973, the embassy in Beirut informed 
the Auswärtiges Amt that during an “Israeli raid on Beirut” the “Palestinian leadership has been 
decimated”.118 Amongst the victims of the attack, which had been carried out by the Israelis to 
kill several of the planners of Munich, was Abu Youssef. One can read between the lines the 
disappointment by the West German embassy staff, which considered the victims members of 
the Palestinian “moderate wing”.119 It would take the West Germans almost two years to re-
establish a link to the PLO at such a high level again. 
 
Overall, one has to concede that in the early 1970s terror had paid off for the Palestinians to a 
certain extent. It was in response to events such as the Dawson’s Field Hijackings and the 
Munich Massacre that the West German government acknowledged the need to set up networks 
of communication with the Palestinian movement, including its violent components. Contacts 
were, at least for the moment, unofficial and did not signify a recognition of the PLO as 
representative of the Palestinian people. Nonetheless, on a working level the FRG was 
beginning to live with the PLO as an independent factor of Middle Eastern politics, which was 
a significant success for Arafat’s organisation. These contacts were motivated by the 
expectation that such channels of communication could help to avert further attacks on West 
Germans. Bonn increasingly felt the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, as Chapter II has 
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5. The October War and the emerging issue of Palestinian statehood 
Up to the 1973 October War, the FRG had reacted to the emergence of the Palestinian question 
by covertly establishing lines of communication with the Palestinians on various levels. But 
after the war, the issue had moved into the focus of international public attention and no longer 
could only be addressed behind the scenes. As Brandt admitted to two Arab oil ministers by 
January 1974: “In regard to the Palestinian problem there has been a profound change, not only 
with us but also in the Arab world.”120 Various UN debates on the issue forced the FRG to 
refine its international stance on the Palestinian question, leading it ever closer to recognition 
of a two-state solution. 
 
Initially, the key arena for a West German re-assessment of the Palestinian question in the 
aftermath of the October War was the European level. The French in particular argued for a 
more pronounced European attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict once the fighting had 
stopped. Upon their insistence, a declaration was formulated which the nine European foreign 
ministers published on 6 November 1973 at a meeting in Brussels. Its fourth point demanded 
“recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinians”.121 A month later, the European heads of government 
confirmed this declaration at their summit in Copenhagen.122 For European policy in the Middle 
East, 1973 was a turning point which will be described in detail in Chapter V of this thesis.123 
More importantly from a perspective of the Palestinian question, Copenhagen represented a 
ground-breaking moment, as for the first time there was a significant public acknowledgment 
of a role for the Palestinians in achieving peace in the Middle East.124 
Why did the FRG and its European allies change their position and publicly recognise 
a role for the Palestinians within the Arab-Israeli conflict? In effect, the October War had 
clarified that some sort of peaceful solution would be necessary for the Middle East. The war 
had challenged the aura of Israel’s overwhelming military superiority. It could not afford to live 
in an entirely hostile environment forever.125 But the Arab states made clear that any sort of 
solution would have to include a settlement of the Palestinian question. As a Palestinian 
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representative told West German ambassador Steltzer in Cairo just after the war had ended, it 
was a “question of political principle to what extent the rights of the Palestinians were supported 
by the international community”.126 Steltzer sent a warning to his superiors in Bonn: a 
Palestinian state was becoming a realistic possibility, and the FRG should start to prepare for 
it.127  
Shortly after, there were even rumours that a Palestinian ‘government-in-exile’ might 
be formed in London.128 Whilst considered unrealistic, the Auswärtiges Amt still decided to 
give the question its full attention. An internal memorandum was drafted by its international 
law unit, concluding that “from a traditional legal perspective, the recognition of the PLO as 
government in exile for a Palestinian state would represent an anomaly”.129 After all, the FRG 
would thereby recognise a state which did not even exist yet. For the moment, the memorandum 
concluded, a recognition of any Palestinian government in exile was therefore 
incomprehensible for the ministry’s lawyers, but their advice ended on a warning: attempts by 
the ‘Third World’ to introduce “a ‘new’ international law” could change this interpretation.130 
Even without a Palestinian government in exile, the FRG was still required to engage 
further with the Palestinian question. By late 1974, Arab states and their allies from the non-
aligned movement proposed in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to include the PLO as an 
observer in the UN and officially recognise it as representative of the Palestinian people. This 
challenged Bonn to be more precise about its public position towards the Palestinian question. 
After all, the Copenhagen Declaration had been rather vague and unspecific. What exactly were 
these “legitimate rights of the Palestinians” that the Europeans had acknowledged in 
Brussels?131 And who should represent the Palestinians in their efforts to claim these rights? 
Bonn’s first reaction to the emergence of the Palestinian question on a UN level was to 
seek a European response. But the EEC states were unable to reach a unified stance on any of 
the resolutions tabled in autumn 1974 at the UNGA. Bonn would abstain on two of them, while 
voting against a resolution granting the PLO observer status at the UN. All resolutions were 
accepted by the UNGA with overwhelming majority nonetheless.132 
 
126 PA/AA (B36 104865, unfoliated) 14.11.1973. Steltzer (Cairo) to foreign office. A conference of Islamic 
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132 See Chapter V for a detailed analysis of the unsuccessful negotiations for a united European vote.  
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Importantly, however, the UN debate on the Palestinian question had confirmed to the 
Auswärtiges Amt that it could no longer close its eyes before a larger role for the PLO in Middle 
Eastern politics. Moreover, the West German government increasingly seemed to lose control 
over the issue. In December 1974, CDU politician Gerhard Schröder independently organised 
a meeting with Arafat in Damascus. Schröder had been West German foreign minister from 
1961 to 1966, under Adenauer and Erhard. Since 1969, he was chairman of the select committee 
on foreign affairs in the West German Bundestag and thus something of a shadow foreign 
minister in the FRG. His decision to meet Arafat, it would appear, was not coordinated either 
with his own party or the Auswärtiges Amt, as both distanced themselves from the entire 
affair.133 Still, it was the first meeting of such a senior West German politician with Arafat, and 
while it remained an isolated incident the entire episode illustrated that the West German 
government was increasingly unable to uphold its previous stance on the Palestinian 
question.134 
By early 1975, West German foreign policy underwent an internal shift. It started with 
a memorandum by Walter Jesser, by now assistant director (Ministerialdirigent) in the 
Auswärtiges Amt with responsibility for the Middle East and as such one of the most senior 
diplomats on that topic. He wrote a memorandum entitled “the German position on the 
Palestinian question” and concluded that the FRG would have to accept that “as sole 
representative of the Palestinian people the Arab side […] is considering the PLO. […]. We 
have to live with the PLO – and the PLO has to live with us”.135  
Jesser’s conclusions went far and in effect would have represented a fundamental U-
turn for West German policy on the Palestinian question. In the long run, he recommended an 
extension of unofficial contacts that already existed with the PLO in Beirut, Damascus, Cairo 
and Bonn and an inclusion of the PLO into the new Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD).136 Moreover, 
public West German declarations on the Arab-Israeli conflict should move away from what 
Jesser considered one-sidedness, as they only included demands for the PLO but not for Israel 
to make compromises for a peace settlement. Even though Jesser’s recommendations were not 
implemented right away, they are significant as his memorandum represents the first time that 
 
133 AAPD 13.12.1974. Document 371. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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Memorandum by Lahn.). 
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the Auswärtiges Amt engaged in a principal fashion with the political dimension of the 
Palestinian question. 
By March 1975, a much less ambitious yet still significant policy shift was instead 
decided upon in the Auswärtiges Amt. It emerged through another memorandum, this time 
written by Alfons Böcker, Redies successor as head of the Middle Eastern unit in the 
Auswärtiges Amt. In it, it comes out clearly that a major worry for the West Germans was to be 
left behind by international trends. Böcker stressed that “the most important reason for our 
extremely restrained attitude towards the PLO was our consideration for American efforts 
towards a gradual solution of the Middle East conflict.”137 By 1975, however, these efforts were 
stagnating and an international recognition of the PLO was likely.138 West Germany’s allies, 
Böcker noted, had already established regular contacts with the PLO: French and Italians on 
ambassadorial level, British and Americans on a working level.  “It cannot be our interest to be 
left behind by such a development.”139 Moreover, the desire of the PLO to be included in peace 
talks would also represent an incentive for it to curb any terrorism. As a conclusion, the 
memorandum recommended a subtle intensification of working level contacts with the 
Palestinians, still hesitating to cross the line of official contacts on the highest levels of 
policymaking. However, similar to Jesser, Böcker recommended a more nuanced approach in 
West Germany’s public communication.  
Indeed, in line with Böckers memorandum soon three things changed in West German 
policy on the Palestinian question. Firstly, the West German government started to publicly 
equate Israeli and Palestinian rights and obligations with the search for peace in the Middle 
East. In an interview of the West German foreign minister with an Egyptian newspaper in April 
1975, Genscher linked the rights and responsibilities of Israel and the Palestinians: “There is an 
internal relationship between the secure existence of the state of Israel and the recognition of 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians in the sense that I am talking about: both rights have to 
be respected, without compromising each other.”140  
Secondly, the West German government gave up its resistance against PLO 
representation in the FRG by the following year.141 A ‘Palestinian Information Office’ in Bonn 
would be tolerated, although the Auswärtiges Amt did not confer any special diplomatic status 
 
137 AAPD 24.03.1975. Document 62. Memorandum by Lahn. 
138 On Kissinger’s mission, see Chapter II. 
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to it.142 The office was led by Abdallah Frangie, who had been the PLO’s point man for West 
Germany since 1970.143  
Finally, in the European arena Bonn supported a recognition of Palestinian statehood at 
least as an abstract concept. In their 1977 London Declaration, the EEC member states pointed 
to a Palestinian “national identity […] which would take into account the need for a homeland 
for the Palestinian people”.144 This was not quite an acceptance of the idea of a separate 
Palestinian state, but it stopped just short of it.145 
 
The PLO’s breakthrough at the UN had triggered to a cascade of policy shifts in West 
Germany’s attitude to the Palestinian question in the mid-1970s. Almost within a year, the West 
German government had increased contacts to the PLO, allowed it a de-facto political 
representation in Bonn and rhetorically equated the Israeli right of existence with some sort of 
similar right for the Palestinians. The latter’s shape was left unclear, as was – at least officially 
– the role of the PLO in the path towards a Palestinian entity. The Auswärtiges Amt under 
Genscher felt that global trends forced the FRG to accept a stronger role for the PLO in Middle 
Eastern politics.  
 
6. A third crisis of terror and the recognition of the PLO 
By 1977, terrorism once again entered the fray of West German Middle Eastern policy. This 
time, it was the link between Palestinian and West German left-wing terror groups that caused 
what has become one the most memorable terrorism-related crisis in modern German history. 
In the ‘German autumn’ (Deutscher Herbst) of 1977, Schmidt’s government was faced with 
terrorism both at home by the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion – RAF) and 
internationally by the hijacking of the Lufthansa plane Landshut. Ironically, however, the PLO 
gained stature in Bonn through the crisis as it was not associated with the event. Later, a secret 
written deal between the FRG and PLO solidified cooperation on security questions. This, 
together with West German disappointment about Sadat’s inability to provide a solution to the 
Palestinian question at Camp David, led the FRG to the culmination of its Palestinian policy: 
public support for a two-state solution, and an indirect recognition of the PLO via the 1980 
Venice Declaration by the EEC. 
 
 
142 PA/AA (B36 108756, unfoliated) 24.05.1976. Notes by 310. 
143 Die Zeit, Arafats Mann in Bonn (31.08.1979). 
144 AAPD 04.07.1977. Document 174. Circular by Engels. 
145 See also PA/AA (B36 109111, unfoliated) 04.11.1976. 310 to UN delegation (New York). 
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On 5 September 1977, RAF members kidnapped Hans-Martin Schleyer, the chairman of the 
Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie – BDI).146 Their aim 
was to force the release of leading imprisoned RAF members such as Andreas Baader or 
Gudrun Ensslin by the West German government. But the Schmidt administration was 
unwilling to give in to the terrorists’ demands and instead hoped that a large-scale manhunt 
would allow it to track down the kidnappers and free Schleyer. Thus, the leader of a PFLP 
splinter group, Wadi Haddad – the same man whose arrest the Auswärtiges Amt had advised 
against in 1972 – proposed to the RAF a plan to put more pressure on the FRG: on 13 October 
1977, a Palestinian commando hijacked the Lufthansa airplane Landshut with 90 passengers 
and personal on board and demanded the release of Baader, Ensslin and the other imprisoned 
RAF members.147 
Not for the first time, the West German government was confronted with a dilemma 
between steadfastness and risking the lives of hostages. Schmidt himself was deeply troubled 
by the question, discussing it not only with his confidants and cabinet colleagues in Bonn but 
also with international partners.148 Ultimately, he and his government concluded that the FRG’s 
newly formed special police force GSG 9 should free the passengers of the Landshut.  
By 14 October, the Landshut had reached Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
where it remained for two days. Here, Schmidt hoped for a police operation by the GSG 9, but 
in view of the large number of Palestinian guest workers in his country the ruler of Dubai 
refused.149 Schmidt held various conversations with politicians from the Emirates and even with 
British prime minister Callaghan, hoping that Britain, the former protective power of the Gulf 
states, could swing Emirati opinion in the FRG’s favour.150 In a desperate final phone call, 
Schmidt personally leaned on the UAE’s ruler, Sheikh Zayed, to not let the Landshut leave 
Dubai as the airfield there was considered well-suited for a police operation.151 He impressed 
upon Zayed the urgency of the situation and asked “in the name of humanity” to prevent the 
Landshut from taking off, if need be even by shooting at its tires if it were to start moving.152 
Zayed, however, was unwilling to comply, and instead urged Schmidt to let the RAF prisoners 
 
146 The BDI was and still is the leading association of German industrial companies. 
147 Peters, Butz. Hundert Tage: Die RAF-Chronik 1977. (Munich, 2017). 
148 On the internal deliberations and decision-making processes of the West German government during the 
crisis, see Kraushaar, Wolfgang. Die Geschichte der RAF. Staatliches Handeln. In: Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung. “Dossier: Die Geschichte der RAF.” (2007). See also AAPD 14.10.1977. Document 284. Telephone 
call between Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing. 
149 AAPD 15.10.1977. Document 288. Lewalter to Genscher (currently Teheran).  
150 See AAPD 16.10.1977. Document 289. Telephone call between Schmidt and Callaghan; AAPD 16.10.1977. 
Document 290. Telephone call between Schmidt and UAE minister of defence Sheikh al-Maktum. 
151 AAPD 15.10.1977. Document 288. Lewalter to Genscher (currently Teheran). 
152 AAPD 16.10.1977. Document 291. Telephone call between Schmidt and Sheikh Zayed Sultan al-Nahayan. 
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go free. Schmidt pointed to political and practical difficulties for doing so. The protocol of their 
conversation captures the drama of these minutes. It ends on the following note:  
He [Schmidt] once again asked to consider that the departure of the airplane would 
certainly lead to the death of all passengers. The chancellor closed with assurances 
of the highest respect for Sheikh Zayed. In this moment the chancellor was 
informed by his situation centre [added by hand by Schmidt] that the hijacked plane 
took off in Dubai one minute ago [added by hand by Schmidt].153  
In the end, all but one of the hostages were successfully freed the following day in Mogadishu, 
where finally GSG 9 was authorised to carry out a rescue operation. Schleyer, however, could 
not be saved and was found executed two days later in the trunk of a car in France.154 
Pushed to its limits by terrorism at home, the social-liberal coalition was intent to cut 
the link between domestic left-wing terrorism and international Palestinian terrorism. As a 
result, the FRG lobbied for an international convention against terrorism, which proved a 
difficult endeavour.155 Moreover, it tried to find bilateral agreements to end state support for 
terrorism linked to West Germany. These efforts were successful in the case of Algeria,156 but 
not with Iraq.157 Moreover, security cooperation was increased with pro-Western states such as 
Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco and, in particular, Saudi Arabia.158 This included more exchange of 
information and visits to GSG 9 facilities for learning purposes.159 
Maybe the most important consequence of the Landshut incident in the context of the 
Palestinian question, however, concerned Bonn’s relationship to the PLO. The latter had acted 
quite cooperatively during the crisis. The mainstream Palestinian umbrella organisation had 
long broken with Wadi Haddad’s much more radical approach.160 At the start of the Landshut 
crisis, the airplane had landed shortly in Cyprus, where PLO representatives had attempted to 
negotiate with the terrorists about the release of the hostages. Although they had been 
unsuccessful, their efforts were considered genuine and recognised by the Auswärtiges Amt, as 
was Arafat’s dissociation from the action.161 
The West German government tried to build on this. Just a month after the Landshut 
affair had ended, on 24 November, Wischnewski – by now State Secretary in the Chancellery 
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(Bundeskanzleramt) – took part in a secret meeting. Dahlke found the protocol of this meeting 
1977 in Wischnewski’s personal papers.162 Organised by Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky, 
its main participants from the Palestinian side were two men officially sought for terrorism by 
the authorities. The first was Arafat’s ‘crown prince’ and ‘interior minister’ of the PLO Ali 
Hassan Salameh, who years before in 1972 had headed the BSO’s intelligence unit.163 The 
second was another close confidant of Arafat: Issam al-Sartawi, the same man who had been 
behind the 1970 Riem attack and who had initiated contacts to the FRG’s diplomats 
thereafter.164 Seven years before he had helped to bring Palestinian terrorism to West Germany. 
Now, he was part of a group of people who would work together to permanently keep attacks 
out of the FRG. They made a simple deal: in return for “some sort of recognition”, the PLO 
would share its knowledge about European terror cells.165 However, Dahlke unfortunately was 
not able to show to what extent the agreement was actually implemented. On the one hand, the 
Austrian government shortly afterwards granted the Palestinian observer at the UN 
International Development Organisation (UNIDO) full diplomatic status, which would have 
been in the spirit of the deal. On the other hand, Dahlke’s claim that in 1978 the ‘Palestinian 
Information Office” was recognised as unofficial Palestinian representation in Bonn is 
somewhat surprising; the archive of the Auswärtiges Amt shows that the office had been 
established already in late 1976 and there is no evidence that the step to its formal recognition 
was undertaken two years later.166 Therefore, it is unclear how exactly the FRG held its side of 
the bargain. Maybe the PLO was satisfied with the Austrian action for the moment, or there 
was a normalisation of working-level relations between the informal Palestinian representation 
and the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn, which has not been documented in archived material. Be that 
as it may, “some sort of recognition” for the PLO would soon ensue by the FRG.167 
The Landshut hijacking and Wischnewski’s negotiations with the PLO almost coincided 
with Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, which initiated the Camp David process and the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty of 1979.168 Sadat’s inability to link the latter to a solution of the Palestinian 
question would result in heavy criticism from the Europeans and is crucial to understand the 
West German shift towards supporting an independent Palestinian state. 
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As has previously been shown, by the late 1970s the concept of Palestinian statehood 
had already emerged. However, there were two opposing views as to how a Palestinian state 
could manifest itself: would it have to be independent, in which case the PLO was more likely 
to take over its administration, or could it also consist in confederation with Jordan? In 
September 1978, shortly before the Camp David accords, the West German government 
indicated its support for the former, less revolutionary option. In a letter to Carter, chancellor 
Schmidt clarified that while he recognised the right of the Palestinians to their own homeland, 
“a close link with Jordan would correspond both to the political constellation and the 
demographic conditions”.169 
But at Camp David, Sadat failed to reach any de facto agreement on Palestinian self-
determination. While the agreement with the Israelis set a three-month deadline for the 
finalisation and implementation of measures concerning Egypt and Israel, the same deadline 
with respect to the occupied territories was set at five years.170 Thus, Israel could and ultimately 
would simply pull out of efforts for the settlement of the Palestinian question after 
normalisation of relations with Egypt.171 In early 1979, it became clear that Camp David’s 
ultimate outcome would be a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty without a settlement for the 
Palestinian question. At this point, the Schmidt-Genscher administration seems to have lost 
faith in Arab statesmen to successfully advocate for Palestinian self-determination and would 
subsequently support an independent Palestinian state. As Genscher himself made clear in 
conversation with Ghaddafi in June 1979: “The Palestinians have to be enabled to enact their 
right to self-determination. For this, they need to have their own homeland.”172 No more 
references to a confederation.  A month later, Willy Brandt – still chairman of the SPD – took 
part in a meeting with Kreisky and Arafat in Vienna. It is unclear to what extent this was 
coordinated with chancellor Helmut Schmidt, but the meeting certainly confirmed the trend 
towards acknowledging a role of the PLO in a genuine two-state approach.173 
 
Since 1974, the Palestinian question had been identified by Bonn as the core issue of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. With the failure of Camp David to facilitate broader agreement on the latter, 
Bonn increasingly and informally switched to all-out support for an independent Palestinian 
state. One year later, the West Germans used the European arena to complete their volte-face. 
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At the 1980 Venice Declaration, the EEC states not only recognised the right of the Palestinians 
to their own homeland, but would also for the first time openly acknowledge a role for the PLO 
in a peace settlement.174  
 
7. Conclusion: the link between diplomacy and counterterrorism  
By the end of the 1970s the West German stance towards the Palestinian question had, after 
going through several iterations, reached a point where – in essence – it has remained up to this 
day: support for a two-state solution with an independent Palestinian state and recognition of 
the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people.175  
The West German government did not reach this point overnight. Initially, in the 1960s, 
it merely recognised the presence of a ‘refugee problem’, to which the FRG even saw a silver 
lining. Bonn hoped that humanitarian gestures towards Palestinian refugees could improve its 
standing in the Arab world as a whole. But from 1970 onwards, a gradual process led the FRG 
from ignoring to acknowledging the Palestinian question as pertinent. Then, it started to 
informally engage with the Palestinian movement and finally publicly acknowledged the 
legitimacy of the PLO’s claim to an independent state.  
Throughout this process, the FRG was merely reacting to specific events rather than 
proactively shaping its Palestinian policy. It was reluctant to engage with the issue, as it 
guaranteed clashes with Israel. Thus, any change in its position happened only when it seemed 
unavoidable due to Arab pressure and the overarching demands of relations to the Arab states 
as a whole or due to a particularly vicious terror attack. Important were also fears about being 
left behind by international trends and the perceived link between the Palestinian question and 
a peace process in the Middle East. While debates about ‘solidarity with Palestine’ were no 
doubt present in domestic West German politics, these discussions did not play a significant 
role within foreign policy elites.176 Overall, Bonn would recalibrate its Palestinian policy only 
to the slightest degree necessary until the next key event necessitated that it concede more 
ground to the Palestinian movement. By 1980, the FRG’s government had fundamentally 
altered its stance on the Palestinian question, but ironically enough the gradual process that led 
it there was shaped by passivity.  
Ultimately, one has to acknowledge that, in the context of the 1970s, Palestinian terror 
attacks affecting the FRG had to an extent strengthened the position of the Palestinian 
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movement within West German policy making circles. Brandt might have recognised the 
increasing importance of the Palestinian question after 1967 in the June Memorandum. But it 
was really the 1970 Riem attack and Black September which kickstarted on-the-ground, 
working level contacts between West German diplomats and representatives of different 
Palestinian organisations. Several attacks later these contacts had ultimately grown into broad 
networks of communication with the PLO and its de-facto recognition through the 1980 Venice 
Declaration. In response to terror attacks, politicians often like to state that they will not 
negotiate with terrorists. In West Germany’s dealings with Palestinian terrorists during the 
1970s, one has to recognise that the opposite was the case.  
This chapter has shed light on the evolving and increasingly dense networks of contact, 
which the Auswärtiges Amt built to various elements of the Palestinian movement, including 
its violent ones, throughout the 1970s. This happened much earlier and more systematically 
than has so far been known.177 As a result, this chapter also points to the role that diplomacy 
plays in counterterrorism.178 Most importantly, however, previous research dealt with the West 
German stance on the Palestinian question merely as a side-aspect of Bonn’s broader Middle 
Eastern policy or with a focus on the role of the topic for the West German left.179 Crucially, 
then, this chapter provides the first comprehensive account of the evolving West German stance 
on the Palestinian question from 1967 to 1980 onwards; this is a key period, as it covers the 
years from West German ignorance of the topic to a position which broadly remains in place to 
this day. In essence, support for a two-state solution and a recognition of a key role for the PLO 
remain the pillars of Germany’s stance on the question of Palestine.180 The position which Bonn 
formulated on this issue in the 1970s still shapes the approach Berlin takes towards it today. 
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Chapter IV: Schizophrenic foreign policy – the geopolitics of oil 
and West German relations to the Gulf 
The Arab ‘oil weapon’ will most likely  
not be of crucial importance in the near future yet 1 
From a meeting of European diplomats in Brussels, 
September 1973 
 
Relations [to the oil producing states] might remain 
 in the schizophrenic state of coexistence  
of good bilateral and tense multilateral relations  
for a long while.2 
Workshop by the Auswärtiges Amt, 1975 
 
The presence of high-ranking personalities from the 
 business world would underline the link between  
foreign and economic policy.3  
Foreign office briefing in preparation of a trip by Genscher  
to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 1975 
 
1. Introduction: West Germany and its discovery of the Gulf in the 1970s 
In July 1974, Karl-Heinz Kunzmann sent a lengthy report to the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn. 
Kunzmann had only recently been appointed as West Germany’s first ever ambassador to the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The report, written in an unusually vivid style, contains his 
impressions of a first tour of the country and visits to the UAE’s seven emirs. His depiction of 
the country as the “living tension between tradition and modernity, between the middle ages 
and the nuclear age, between desert and civilisation, between oil, date palms and camel 
caravans” reads more like an ancient travel report, rather than the memorandum of a West 
German civil servant.4 The narrative culminates in a banquet given by the ruler of Ras-al-
Khaimah, Mohammad al-Qassami, at the end of Kunzmann’s journey. 
Around 60 native dignitaries and advisors have been ordered to dinner. As the ruler 
arrives and I meet him by the car, all of them stream into the night in order to pay 
him their respect. We are not talking about gestures of subordination, but next to it 
[English in original]. Here, there clearly still exists real rule. On enormous plates 
several lambs in oversize rice bowls are carried in. All the tables are filled with 
dishes of Arabic specialties. Most eat with their hands, only a few with fork and 
knife. Large meat chunks are ripped off the animals by hand. This colourful picture 
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is impossible to forget. Fascinated, I am looking at the head of an animal, from 
which two sheep eyes stare at me menacingly. Will they really be offered to me?5  
They were not, to Kunzmann’s relief. He ends this report of his journey, which left an obvious 
and somewhat orientalist impression on him, with an almost enthusiastic verdict: “Now I am 
absolutely certain: the adventure South Arabia will happen.”6 
Kunzmann had good reason to provide his colleagues and superiors in the Auswärtiges 
Amt with such a colourful first impression of the Gulf, reminiscent of Marco Polo’s travel 
account. After all, in diplomatic terms, by the mid-1970s the Gulf truly was terra incognita for 
West German foreign policy. Before 1973, Bonn had hardly paid attention to the Gulf. 
However, after the 1973 oil shock, the FRG not only had to reconsider the significance of 
energy security, but also fundamentally changed its attitude to the Gulf region. Both themes 
are the key topics of this chapter. 
Throughout the 1960s, the FRG had been dependent on Arab, in particular Libyan oil. 
However, policymakers in Bonn did not consider energy dependence a matter of foreign policy 
– not even when some Arab oil producers organised a ‘mini oil boycott’ against Western states 
in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in 1967. At the time, Bonn responded by establishing its 
own, West German oil company to ensure the country’s oil supply: DEMINEX. It took the 
West German government, including the Auswärtiges Amt, until 1972 to draw up a formal ‘oil 
strategy’. By then, the spectre of the oil weapon had emerged, as changes in the structure of 
the oil market enabled Arab oil producers to use their key economic resource as political 
ammunition. The 1973 oil crisis found West Germany largely unprepared. Suddenly, oil 
became a major factor of West German-Arab relations. Bilaterally, Bonn quickly invested 
heavily into stronger relations to the Arab Gulf countries. It is no coincidence that diplomatic 
relations to states such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE or Kuwait were not (re-) established 
before 1973. Multilaterally, the FRG attempted to mediate between the Arab oil producing and 
the Western oil consuming countries, hoping that compromise would avert future oil crises. 
Here, Helmut Schmidt’s government was often pitted against members of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) cartel. The Auswärtiges Amt characterised this 
discrepancy of cordial bilateral and tense multilateral relations to the Arab oil producers as a 
 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. Kunzmann most likely referred to the south of the Arabian Peninsula with the term of ‘South Arabia’, 
even though historically it rather describes the southern coastline of the peninsula (present-day Oman and 
Yemen). But given Kunzmann posting in the UAE, it is very unlikely that he would have meant Yemen or 
Oman and not the Gulf with his statement.  
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“schizophrenic parallelism”.7 This characterisation of a superficially contradictory foreign 
policy resembles the concept of “hedging”, which over the past few years has been used 
frequently to describe the foreign policies of Asian states towards China.8 Overall, the West 
German focus on the Gulf and its relations to Saudi Arabia in particular grew ever closer, until 
in 1979 multiple crises – the Iranian revolution, the Siege of Mecca and the second oil crisis – 
shook Bonn’s faith in the value of its political investment into the Gulf.  
This chapter also covers the dynamics and importance of West German trade to and 
from the Middle East. Exports and imports grew throughout the 1970s, but never reached the 
levels which West German diplomats at times had hoped for. The open fracturing of Arab 
political unity towards 1979 hampered the formation of a coherent Arab market. Disappointed 
West German expectations about the Arab market’s potential came alongside a realisation that 
the political, ‘geo-economical’ influence deriving out of the FRG’s economic weight had its 
limits.9  
The relevance of Middle Eastern oil for the FRG’s economy has been dealt with by 
previous authors such as Maull, Karlsch and Stokes or Kaiser and Steinbach.10 Hohensee 
focuses on the impact of the 1973 oil crisis on West Germany as a whole, and obviously the 
importance of oil as a factor of Bonn’s Middle Eastern policy has not gone unnoticed for 
authors such as Gerlach or Hünseler.11 However, this chapter represents the first 
comprehensive analysis of oil as a factor for West Germany’s Middle Eastern policy after 
World War II. It links questions of energy security and foreign policy making in a new way, 
and many of the documents quoted here have not been used by other scholars. Moreover, from 
an international perspective, it complements existing research on the multilateral political 
reactions to the oil crisis with a depiction of one state’s – the FRG’s – bilateral response to this 
seminal event.12 Finally, it engages with a topic which is less well covered in international 
 
7 PA/AA (B36 109107, unfoliated) 02.06.1975. Third inter-departmental workshop of the planning unit on 
energy policy.   
8 “Hedging normally refers in that context to a national security or alignment strategy, undertaken by one state 
toward another, featuring a mix of cooperative and confrontational elements.” (Ciorciari, John, and Jürgen 
Haacke. Hedging in international relations: an introduction. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19:3 
(2009): 367-74.) 
9 Luttwak, From geopolitics to geo-economics (1990). 
10  Karlsch and Stokes, Faktor Öl (2003); Maull, Economic relations with the Middle East (1992); Kaiser and 
Steinbach, Deutsch-Arabische Beziehungen (1982). 
11 Gerlach Doppelte Front (2006); Hohensee, Der erste Ölpreisschock (1996); Hünseler, Außenpolitische 
Beziehungen der BRD zu den arabischen Staaten (1990). 
12 Bini, Elisabetta, Guliano Garavini and Federivo Romero (eds.). Oil shock. The 1973 crisis and its economic 
legacy. (London/New York, 2016); Stern, Roger. Oil scarcity ideology in US foreign policy, 1908–97. Security 
Studies 25:2 (2016): 214-57; Painter, David. Oil and geopolitics: The oil crises of the 1970s and the cold 
war. Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 39:4 (2014): 186-208; Licklider, Roy. The power 
of oil: the Arab oil weapon and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States. 
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relations research: the impact of the second oil crisis, as compared to the first, which is analysed 
here in conjunction with the Iranian revolution and the Siege of Mecca, the other key political 
events happening in the Gulf in 1979.13  
Collective memory of the oil shock and terms such as ‘petrodollars’ have created the 
popular assumption that oil was by definition a key factor of any foreign power’s Middle 
Eastern policy. But, as this chapter establishes, the shift of West German foreign policy towards 
the Arab states under Brandt and Scheel long neglected the political relevance of oil. After 
1973, the question of oil was closely interlinked with two other factors dealt with in this thesis: 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and a common European Middle Eastern policy. For several years, 
Schmidt and Genscher feared that continued failure to resolve the former kept the prospect of 
a second use of the oil weapon alive. Simultaneously, the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) as part 
of the latter suffered from the diametric opposition between French hopes and American 
objections to addressing the question of oil supplies.  
Today, Germany has overcome its reliance on Arab oil. But the legacy of its oil policy, 
formulated in the 1970s, remains through its links to the Arab Gulf states, which Bonn only 
really started to discover in a political sense – so vividly described by its ambassador 
Kunzmann – from 1973 onwards. 
 
2. The mini oil-boycott of 1967 and the formation of a West German oil ‘champion’ 
In the 1960s, oil was not a major factor in West German foreign policy making. Of course, the 
FRG was reliant on Arab oil. Almost half of West German petroleum imports came from Libya 
alone, which therefore made it the most important supplier for the FRG.14 But oil dependence 
was not yet understood as a geopolitical, strategic issue in Bonn. As has already been 
mentioned in Chapter I, the 1967 June Memorandum, in which the Auswärtiges Amt and Willy 
Brandt conceptualised a fundamental revaluation of West Germany’s relations to the Arab 
states, does not mention energy security at all – something that would be unimaginable for any 
Middle East-related foreign office memo less than ten years later.15  
 
 
International Studies Quarterly 32:2 (1988): 205-26; Ikenberry, John. The irony of state strength: comparative 
responses to the oil shocks in the 1970s. International Organization 40:1 (1986): 105-37. 
13 On this topic, see, for example, Bösch, Frank, and Rüdiger Graf. Reacting to Anticipations: Energy Crises 
and Energy Policy in the 1970s. Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 39:4 (2014): 7-21. 
14 PA/AA (B52 337, unfoliated) 09.06.1967. Memorandum by Bismarck-Ohnken. 
15 See Chapter I for an analysis of the 1967 June Memorandum. 
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In the area of energy, too, the June War heralded change. At the end of the war, some Arab 
states half-heartedly attempted an oil-boycott. At a conference of Arab oil ministers in Baghdad 
on 4-5 June 1967, it was decided that Arab oil should be denied to those countries directly or 
indirectly supporting Israel.16 However, the boycott came too late to change the outcome of the 
war and was badly coordinated. Moreover, as Mann shows, the structure of the oil market at 
the time limited the leverage Arab oil producing states had.17 In hindsight and in full knowledge 
of the 1973 oil crisis it might thus seem odd how little prominence has been given to the 1967 
mini-boycott, but in the context of the 1960s this cannot come as too much of a surprise. At the 
time, the power in the oil market mostly lay with the large Anglo-American oil companies.18 
Thus, a memo by the Auswärtiges Amt from June 1967 on the oil question is markedly 
calm in its tone. It noted that West German oil reserves were high, that the closure of the Suez 
Canal was more of a nuisance than a significant problem and with coordinated Arab action on 
oil matters practically non-existent the FRG had little to fear.19 The only major risk was a long-
term cessation of oil deliveries from Libya. But good relations with the government in Tripoli, 
which, after all, was one of only four Arab countries in which Bonn had an embassy at the 
time, ensured that a temporary halt of oil production for the West German market ended after 
less than a month already.20  
As a result, Bonn concluded that on the political level all was well as far as oil was 
concerned. The key risk for the FRG was instead located in the realm of private business. After 
all, West Germany’s ability to import oil was dependent on the reliability of international 
consortia from which it was buying, such as Shell. These companies had no direct attachment 
to the FRG and thus in a crisis could not be relied upon to keep up oil-deliveries to the West 
German market. Therefore, a memorandum by the West German Ministry of Finance 
concluded that “first and foremost […] German [oil] companies needed to be made more 
competitive as well”.21 Another issue were technical questions, such as tanker storage.22 Thus, 
in its reaction to the 1967 mini-boycott of oil the West German government saw the key to 
 
16 FRUS 1964-68, Volume XXXIV. 06.06.1967. Document 232. Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the 
Department of State. 
17 Mann, Joseph. A reassessment of the 1967 Arab oil embargo. Israel Affairs, 19:4 (2013): 693-703.  
18 For a history and analysis of the global oil markets, see Lehmann, Timothy (ed.). The Geopolitics of Global 
Energy. The New Cost of Plenty. (Boulder/London, 2017); Bridge, Gavin, and Philippe Le Billon. Oil. 
(Hoboken (NJ), 2013); Yergin, Daniel. The prize. The epic quest for oil, money and power. (New York, 1991). 
19 PA/AA (B52 337, unfoliated) 09.06.1967. Notes by Bismarck-Ohncken. 
20 PA/AA (B130 8822A, unfoliated) 13.07.1967. Seydel (Tripoli) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
21 PA/AA (B52 238, unfoliated) 22.02.1968. Notes by Mitzka (Ministry of Finance). 
22 Larger tankers would make a journey around Africa in view of the closed Suez Canal profitable. 
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energy security in the international oil market rather than in the geopolitics of oil as they were 
to emerge after 1970.23 
Consequently, the Grand Coalition increasingly felt the need to engage more directly 
in the oil market and initiated the establishment of a German oil company in March 1969.24 It 
was called DEMINEX, which stood for ‘German oil supply corporation’ (Deutsche 
Erdölversorgungsgesellschaft). It was a consortium made up of eight West German companies 
already active in the energy sector.25 Whilst a private enterprise, the records clearly show that 
the government pushed forward its creation: The merger of the eight companies was driven by 
the West German Ministry of Economy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft – BMWi); the 
Auswärtiges Amt was charged with international negotiations in the attempts to establish 
DEMINEX in the oil market.26 The purpose of the new company was “to reduce our 75% 
dependence on big international oil companies und instead support the independent German 
oil companies”.27 It had taken the FRG almost two years to react to the 1967 oil boycott with 
the creation of what it hoped would be a new, West German oil ‘champion’. Now, the challenge 
for Bonn was to ensure that DEMINEX would emerge as a serious player on the international 
oil market. 
But this proved to be more complicated than expected. DEMINEX’s first major project 
was supposed to be the purchase of a concession for an Iranian oil field in Kermanshah. It was 
judged a rich field by the company, but a pipeline would have to be built in order to transport 
the oil from there. The West German government was asked to support its financing, but Bonn 
was hesitant.28 Furthermore, Western friendship seems to have stopped where oil was 
concerned, as US and French oil companies, the Auswärtiges Amt complained, obstructed 
DEMINEX from entering the Iranian market.29 Ultimately, a Japanese consortium got the 
Kermanshah concession.30 
Then, focus shifted to the opposite shore of the Gulf. BP seemed willing to give 
DEMINEX a share of one of its new projects in Abu Dhabi.31 But, again, there were problems. 
 
23 PA/AA (B52 239, unfoliated) 02.02.1968. Memorandum by Harkort. 
24 Bundesarchiv. 12.03.1969. Minutes of the 159th cabinet meeting.  
25 GBAG, Scholven-Chemie AG, Wintershall AG (18,5% of shares respectively), Union Rheinische 
Braunkohlen Kraftstoff AG, Wesseling (13,5%), Schachtbau Thyssen GmbH, PREUSSAG, C. Deilmann AG, 
Saarbergwerke AG (rest of shares). (PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 22.07.1969. Memorandum by Herbst.) 
26 Ibid. See also PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 22.07.1969. Memorandum by Herbst; or Bamberg, British 
Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975 (2008). 
27 PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 10.03.1971. Notes by III A1.  
28 PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 14.04.1970. Lantzke (BWMi) to Rohwedder (BMWi). 
29 PA/AA (B52 231, unfoliated) 28.01.1971. Foreign office to diplomatic missions. 
30 PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 30.06.1971. Schöller (Tehran) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
31 PA/AA (B52 231, unfoliated) 10.05.1971. Lantzke (BMWi) to Rohwedder (BMWi). 
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Firstly, the British initially only envisaged an indirect West German holding for the project, 
which would have decreased DEMINEX’s influence on its management.32 A personal letter of 
Brandt to prime minister Heath was drawn up to support DEMINEX in its negotiations.33 
Second, and more importantly, the Auswärtiges Amt had doubts about the political risks 
associated with the problem. By 1971, the British were retreating from the Gulf and it was 
unclear what order would follow. A new, united emirate was in the making – what, to a large 
extent, would become the UAE. But Bonn wondered whether Iran might assert itself more 
aggressively in the Gulf as a whole, causing disruption to the oil industry therein as well.34 
Neither Bonn’s representative in Kuwait nor the Americans, who were both consulted on the 
issue and saw no disproportionate risk in the Gulf project, could soothe West German worries.35 
The Abu Dhabi project, too, failed.36 By 1972, two years into its operations, DEMINEX had 
still not landed a major contract. The whole affair seems to have bemused the FRG’s allies. 
After a meeting in Paris, the West German delegate summed up what, in his own words, the 
French were really thinking:  
If you Germans are not ready to take the economic, financial but also political risks 
that our companies – usually without state support – are willing to bear, then leave 
your hands off the oil business which, alas, is costly and risky. But then you rob 
yourself of the chance to enter the international oil business in large manner and 
win a place for DEMINEX.37 
It increasingly transpired that in response to the FRG’s oil dependence DEMINEX was not the 
magic wand which policy makers in Bonn had hoped it would be. The West Germans were 
simply too cautious and risk averse. Moreover, as members of the administration themselves 
noted on several occasions, the financial backing for DEMINEX was thin.38 For instance, in 
support of the Abu Dhabi project DEMINEX was supposed to pay DM 750 million, with 
further investments of DM 700 million following over the next few years for a 30% share of 
the project. This was already more than the DM 600 million the West German government had 
initially provided DEMINEX with as a subsidy.39 DEMINEX was a top-down project, pushed 
on by the state, but still the federal government’s engagement – as the French had well noted 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 18.08.1971. Fischer (chancellory) to Schönfeld. 
34 PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 30.07.1971. Notes by Simon. 
35 PA/AA (B52 239, unfoliated) 07.09.1971. Freundt (Kuwait) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B52 234, 
unfoliated) 05.10.1971. Notes by Schlaich. 
36 PA/AA (B52 244, unfoliated) 20.07.1972. Telex from London. 
37 PA/AA (B52 244, unfoliated) 05.10.1971. Herbst to DIII. 
38 PA/AA (B52 244, unfoliated) 08.08.1972. Herbst to State Secretary; PA/AA (B52 244, unfoliated) 
05.07.1972. Notes by III A1. 
39 PA/AA (B52 234, unfoliated) 09.06.1971. Schlaich to D III. 
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– appeared half-hearted. As so often with West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’ at the time, what 
looked convincing and self-evident on paper turned out to be much more complicated to 
implement. 
However, the problems with DEMINEX went deeper than that. It was not only that the 
project was not pursued with the necessary vigour; the whole approach to remedy West 
Germany’s oil dependence by means of a private company turned out to be flawed. By 1970, 
at the time DEMINEX was established, the structure of the oil market was changing 
profoundly. As no one in Bonn had foreseen after the June War, and maybe no one could have 
foreseen, power in the oil market was starting to shift from the big companies to the oil 
producing countries. 
In 1970, a new spectre started to haunt Europe – that of the oil weapon. In January 1970, 
the Americans announced at an OECD meeting that in case of a Middle Eastern oil crisis they 
would be unable to supply the Europeans from their own oil fields. “For the FR[G] the 
consequences from this new situation are of particular importance, as of all the other great 
European industrial nations it has the lowest oil reserves”, the Auswärtiges Amt concluded.40 
Simultaneously, the oil producing countries started to organise themselves more efficiently in 
OPEC and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).41  
Bonn remained slow to acknowledge not only the economic, but also the political risks 
associated with its dependency on Arab oil. It is notable how only a few months earlier, in 
reaction to the Libyan coup, oil did not figure on the list of risks which the Auswärtiges Amt 
associated with the new regime in Tripoli around Colonel Ghaddafi. On the contrary: the 
Auswärtiges Amt had even ventured that it might profit from the coup through stronger 
engagement in the country’s oil sector, if necessary at the expense of its ‘imperialist’ Western 
partners such as the US, France or the UK.42 Bonn had not recognised the momentous shifts 
taking place on the global oil markets.  
The ability of oil producing countries all over the world to increase control over their 
own oil industries turned into a challenge for the FRG and the industrialised West in general. 
The process increased the leverage particularly of the Arab oil producing countries both 
economically on the oil market and politically in the arena of international relations. This 
 
40 PA/AA (B52 238, unfoliated) 19.01.1970. Lantzke (BMWi) to Rohwedder (BMWi). 
41 Garavini, Giuliano. The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century. (Oxford, 2019); Painter, Oil and 
geopolitics (2014). Both OPEC and OAPEC had been founded back in the 1960s, but only started to grow in 
importance in the following decade.  
42 PA/AA (B36 412, pp. 214ff.) 28.11.1969. Gehlhoff (Bonn) to Turnwald (Tripoli).   
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leverage, or indeed potential for blackmail, was what would later become known and feared in 
the energy-dependent West as the ‘oil weapon’.43  
In February 1971, the oil producers landed a first punch against the big Western oil 
companies at negotiations in Tehran by enforcing a higher posted price, the minimal amount 
that oil companies had to pay to oil producing countries per barrel of oil. On the one hand, a 
higher posted price meant larger revenues for the oil producing countries. On the other hand, 
the Tehran agreement marked the first occasion when the oil producing countries managed to 
coherently make their influence felt on the international stage against the large oil companies 
of the West.44  
In light of this, Brandt’s government now attempted to remedy its reliance on Arab oil. 
To begin with, emergency oil reserves were planned for. In September 1970, the cabinet agreed 
in principle to increase them to 20 million tons, enough to cover 30 days of supplies in West 
Germany.45 Moreover, a West German tanker programme was envisaged to increase shipping 
opportunities. But all this would take time. For oil reserves, new cavern storage facilities had 
to be outfitted. The estimated time frame for all reserves to be set up was 1975.46  
In all this, Bonn still largely neglected the area of foreign policy. This becomes very 
clear when one considers the role, or rather the lack thereof, of the Arab Gulf in West German 
foreign policy up to the early 1970s. There, since 1965 the FRG’s only diplomatic 
representation was a consulate in Kuwait.47 It had no embassy in Saudi Arabia, even though 
relations with Riyadh were mostly free of tensions. Maybe that was because, as a 1967 foreign 
office report notes, “trade has hardly suffered from the breaking of diplomatic relations in 
1965”.48 
 
43 On the oil weapon, see, for example Hughes, Llewelyn, and Austin Long. Is there an oil weapon? Security 
implications of changes in the structure of the international oil market. International Security 39:3 (2015): 152-
89; Licklider, The power of oil (1988); Maull, Hanns. Oil and influence: The oil weapon examined. The Adelphi 
Papers 15:117 (1975): 1-37. 
44 See Bridge and Le Billon, Oil (2013); Yergin, The Price (1991).  
45 PA/AA (B52 233, unfoliated) 29.09.1970. Keilig (BMWi) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B52 231, unfoliated) 
20.01.1971. Notes by III A1. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Technically, Kuwait had not been a state which had broken off relations with Bonn in 1965. At the time, the 
opening of a West German embassy had been agreed upon between the two governments, but the move was not 
carried out due to the 1965 crisis around Ulbricht’s visit and West German-Israeli relations. But, of course, all 
this amounted to the same thing: Bonn was politically largely absent from the country by the 1970s (PA/AA 
(B36 383, p. 60ff) 03.01.1970. Country briefing Kuwait). When the GDR managed to turn its trade delegation 
there into a general consulate in 1971, the West Germans also increased their representation from consulate to 
general consulate, but only after some internal back and forth (see PA/AA (B36 442, p. 19) 07.01.1971. Redies 
to Montfort (Kuwait)). 
48 PA/AA (B36 273, pp. 182ff.) 07.02.1967. Notes by I B 4. 
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Only slowly did the geopolitics of oil start to enter West German foreign policy 
discourse. If anything, this development was promoted bottom-up, as West German diplomats 
on the ground started to complain about the neglect of the oil topic in West German foreign 
policy making. In January 1971, West German ambassador to Libya Wilhelm Turnwald wrote 
an angry letter to his superiors in Bonn. At the outset, he stated: “From the perspective of the 
embassy [in Libya] there is a sensitive gap in German oil policy”.49 He saw the writing on the 
wall. If, or rather when the oil producers organised into a powerful cartel, the oil companies 
would lose out. Instead of putting its money on DEMINEX, the FRG should rather focus on 
strengthening bilateral ties with key oil producers. Slowly, his complaints bore fruit. When in 
late 1971 the West Germans started negotiations with Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE over 
the establishment of diplomatic relations, oil was a key consideration. The West German 
negotiator was instructed: “In your talks with the representatives of Abu Dhabi and other Gulf 
emirates, you can […] point to the fact that we consider the future relations with the Gulf states 
important not least because of our demand for oil […].”50  
At the same time, however, the prospect of more sovereign states in the Gulf led to a 
bizarre discussion in Bonn which illustrates how underdeveloped the relevance of the Gulf 
states in the FRG’s Arab policy was. Who, the Auswärtiges Amt wondered, should take over 
West German diplomatic representation in Oman, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Bahrain? The West 
German consul general in Kuwait could do the job, but it was rather unusual to let a consul 
general in one country be the part-time ambassador in another.51 An alternative option was to 
give the task to the West German envoy to Saudi Arabia, but maybe this would be an insensitive 
signal. After all, the smaller sheikdoms were already afraid of Saudi domination. Better to not 
symbolically fuel this fear even more and create a negative West German image in the region 
by the representation of the FRG through Bonn’s envoy in Jeddah.52 Another option brought 
up was Walter Georg Nowak, West Germany’s envoy in Beirut. No risk for political 
insensitivities there, one might rightly assume. Then again, given the distance of Lebanon to 
the Gulf of almost 2000 miles, this was not too convincing a solution either.53 When relations 
were re-established with Oman on 16 May and with Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain on the 17 
May 1972, the question of diplomatic representation was left open for the moment.54 All the 
 
49 PA/AA (B52 231, unfoliated) 31.01.1971. Turnwald (Tripoli) to Bonn. 
50 PA/AA (B52 241, unfoliated) 24.11.1971. Lebsanft to III B 6. 
51 PA/AA (B36 532, p. 212f.) 15.05.1972. Notes by Redies. 
52 PA/AA (B36 532, p. 232ff.) 28.08.1872. Jung to Dg I B. 
53 PA/AA (B36 532, p. 212f.) 15.10.1972. Notes by Redies. 
54 PA/AA (B36 532, pp. 21ff.) 10.05.1972. Notes by Redies; PA/AA (B130 9864A, unfoliated) 17.12.1972. 
Freundt (Kuwait) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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while, early informal talks between West German and Saudi representatives about a resumption 
of diplomatic relations were stagnating.55 Truly, relations between West Germany and the Gulf 
were still “in limbo”, as a West German diplomat had noted succinctly in the same year.56  
Only slowly, oil became a theme of West German foreign policy. A memorandum by 
the Auswärtiges Amt from June 1972 for the first time, and a good five years after the mini-
boycott of 1967, established a direct link between West German Arab policy and oil: “Minister 
strongly interested that we put oil aspect in the foreground of regularising our relations to Near 
East countries.”57  
 
The June War of 1967, which had led Bonn to fundamentally reconceive its policy towards the 
Arab states, also affected the energy sector in the form of the unsuccessful mini-boycott of oil 
to the West. The West German government noted the warning shot. But rather than including 
the oil question within its foreign policy agenda, for example through stronger bilateral 
engagement with the oil producing states, it engaged in – largely insufficient – efforts in the 
area of economics and business with the foundation of a new German oil company: DEMINEX. 
In part that is understandable in view of the structure of the oil industry at the time, but it also 
was too little, too late. Bonn was slow to read the signs of the times when the Tehran conference 
of 1971 heralded the beginning of a new period in the history of the oil markets: the rise of the 
oil producers as economic and political actors. Now, the oil weapon started to loom over world 
politics. Brandt’s government needed to take energy security into account in its efforts for an 
‘Arab policy’. 
 
3. Oil weapon and oil crisis, 1971-1973 
In February 1973, West Germany’s consul general in Kuwait wired a report back to Bonn: the 
Kuwaiti crown prince had stated in an interview that “Kuwait will not hesitate to use the oil 
weapon in a new conflict with Israel or the USA”.58 It is the first time that specific mention of 
the ‘oil weapon’ can be found in the archival material reviewed for this thesis. 
 
By this time, Bonn had noted the political ramifications which resulted from the revolution 
within the oil market. In response, the BMWi and the Auswärtiges Amt had jointly drafted a 
 
55 See Chapter III of this thesis. 
56 PA/AA (B36 494, p. 161f.) 15.03.1972. Country briefing Qatar. 
57 PA/AA (B52 244, unfoliated) 16.06.1972. Notes by III A1. 
58 PA/AA (B36 104822, unfoliated) 28.02.1973. Freundt (Kuwait) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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memorandum in August 1972, which in effect represented the first take on a comprehensive 
West German oil strategy. The memorandum introduced the term of a “German oil policy”, 
whose “main task should be to ensure the West German oil supply”.59 It then went on to 
recognise the vast extent to which the FRG depended on foreign, in particular Middle Eastern 
oil. “Currently, 54.6% of the West German energy demand is covered by oil. We assume that 
the [West] German annual oil consumption will increase from 120 million tons to 200 million 
tons by 1980.”60 85 percent of oil imports came from the Middle East, an information which 
the Auswärtiges Amt’s State Secretary Paul Frank underlined when he read the memorandum. 
The document then went on to name a number of technical points to respond to the situation. 
DEMINEX, which “so far has not been able to explore any new sources of oil”, was to be 
strengthened in order to decrease reliance on foreign companies.61 In particular, it should be 
encouraged to search for oil projects outside of the Middle East, in Africa and the North Sea. 
However, the document also made clear that – at least in the near future – there was no realistic 
alternative to Arab oil.  
Therefore, it appears necessary to utilise all means – including our trade and 
development policy – to create or maintain good bilateral relations to the oil 
producing countries. Otherwise, it will be almost impossible to protect our oil 
interests in the long term. The [West] German oil policy should therefore also be 
used as part of our foreign policy aims in the relevant regions, in particular the 
Middle East and the African Mediterranean countries.62  
Thus, for the FRG, oil had at last entered the realm of foreign policy, and the Brandt 
administration worked towards the formulation of an official energy policy which was 
supposed to be finalised in the summer of 1973.63 
One result of this was that Bonn now decided to give more attention to the Gulf. First 
and foremost, it worked towards a re-establishment of relations with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia was 
of vital importance in the oil market for two reasons. By the early 1970s it had moved to second 
place in the list of oil suppliers to the FRG, covering approximately a quarter of West German 
oil demand.64 But that was only half the story, and – with Libya singlehandedly still providing 
almost half of the FRG’s oil imports – arguably the less important half. More importantly, then, 
Saudi Arabia’s dominant position in the oil market at the time needs to be taken into account. 
The country had easy access to vast amounts of oil, making it an important swing producer 
 
59 AAPD 08.08.1972. Document 225. Memorandum by Herbst.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 PA/AA (B36 104991, unfoliated) 02.04.1973. Kruse to Jeddah representation.  
64 PA/AA (B36 104840, unfoliated) 19.12.1972. Berghaus (Tripoli) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
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with substantial leverage on overall developments on the oil market. Moreover, it “belongs to 
the category of oil producers with huge oil reserves at their disposal, but only limited ability to 
invest the profits from oil sales in their own country”.65 Its own financial dependency on oil 
sales was, therefore, limited. As a result, the political relationship to Saudi Arabia had a 
particular, strategic dimension as far as the geopolitics of oil were concerned.  
Initial attempts to re-establish diplomatic relations between Bonn and Riyadh around 
1971 soon reached an impasse due to temporary anti-West German sentiments in some Arab 
states in the aftermath of the 1972 Munich massacre.66 However, a coincidental meeting 
reinvigorated the negotiations. On a flight from Jeddah to Paris in July 1973, West German 
envoy to Saudi Arabia Peter Metzger ended up in a seat behind the Saudi foreign minister Omar 
al-Zaqqaf. They started a conversation, which soon turned to the possibility of exchanging 
ambassadors. At the end of their talk, Zaqqaf invited Metzger to his private home for a “chat 
amongst friends”.67 When Metzger noted the possibility of a meeting between Zaqqaf and 
Scheel during the UN General Assembly that year, the Saudi minister replied: “I shall be 
pleased, I shall be very pleased, I feel we should cooperate.“68 This chance meeting on an 
airplane kicked off a round of meetings and negotiations, which by September 1973 climaxed 
in the re-establishment of West German-Saudi diplomatic relations. As the newly appointed 
State Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt, Hans-Georg Sachs, noted: “Due to the important status 
of Saudi Arabia in the entire region, its oil wealth and its financial strength, the importance [of 
this event] comes close to the re-establishment of German-Egyptian relations in the past 
year.”69 The statement is just another indicator which shows that by 1973 the West German 
administration had started to move on from its initial view of oil as a merely economic issue; 
it was now clearly acknowledging it as belonging to the sphere of politics. This was also noted 
amongst West Germany’s Arab interlocutors. A West German diplomat summarised comments 
by an Arab League official in July 1973 “with some irony” as: “you [the West Germans] are 
arriving [in the Arab states] with a delay, but at least you are arriving”.70 
 
65 PA/AA (B36 104868, unfoliated) 07.09.1973. Notes by Jesser. 
66 See Chapter III of this thesis. 
67 PA/AA (B36 104868, unfoliated) 26.07.1973. Notes by Metzger. 
68 Ibid.  
69 AAPD 21.09.1973. Document 291. Sachs (currently Jeddah) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
70 PA/AA (B36 104870, unfoliated) 24.07.1973. Notes by Wentzel. 
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Picture 9: Cartoon in a West German newspaper about Scheel’s 1973 journey to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. 
The caption reads: “Thoughts while watching the pyramids”; Scheel sees oil, his Egyptian counterpart West 
German capital aid. The cartoon illustrates how by 1973 oil had started to emerge as a theme of West 
German-Arab relations.71 
Above all of this, the oil weapon was hanging like the sword of Damocles. In September 1973, 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC) convened an expert group meeting on the Middle 
East, bringing together its member states’ senior diplomats on the topic. Two years into the 
EPC, these meetings had become quite regular. For the FRG, Walter Redies, head of the Middle 
Eastern unit in the Auswärtiges Amt, took part. Summarising the conclusions of the meeting, 
he wrote: “The Arab ‘oil weapon’ will most likely not be of crucial importance in the near 
future yet”, although this would change “with the increasing demand of the industrialised 
countries in the coming years”.72 Exactly one month after his report, Egypt and Syria attacked 
Israel and thereby kicked off the October War. The first use of the oil weapon had not been 
years, but merely weeks away. 
Soon after the fighting began, the Auswärtiges Amt started to worry about the energy 
dimension of the October War. In a directive from the 10 October 1973, four days into the war, 
all embassies and delegations in the Middle East were instructed to provide “continuous and 
 
71 Courtesy of the AdL; source: Hasper Zeitung, 22.05.1973.  
72 AAPD 06.09.1973. Document 276. Notes by Redies.  
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immediate reporting about relevant plans or actions by your host governments (‘oil as 
weapon’)”.73 Even though Bonn had started to plan for this worst-case scenario, it knew that it 
was by no means ready for it yet. The federal government had decided to provision oil reserves 
of 10 million tons, but these would be ready by late 1974 at the earliest. A legal basis for 
emergency measures in the energy sector had been planned for January 1974.74 However, 
importers were already required to keep about two months’ worth of reserves in their own 
storage. Short delivery interruptions of one or two weeks of even half the oil supply would 
therefore not represent a significant problem, but a reduction of imports over a longer term, 
even in the range of a mere 20%, would be “more unpleasant”.75 In this case, a plan by the 
BMWi envisioned to first convince oil companies to voluntarily provide their commercial oil 
reserves, before in a second step a law would oblige them to give out their mandatory 
reserves.76 The ministry was keen to keep any such plans under wraps for the moment in order 
to prevent a run on the petrol stations. The need to plan for the worst case and the necessities 
of secrecy were thus diametrically opposed.  
On 16 October 1973, the Saudi foreign ministry handed the European ambassadors in 
Jeddah an aide-memoire which threatened the use of the oil weapon if direct US support for 
Israel were to continue.77 It was, as the West German representative at the meeting reported, 
clearly an attempt to move the Europeans to convince Washington of ending the airlift to Israel. 
As has already been established in Chapter II, the FRG did not act accordingly. In fact, the 
conversation between US ambassador Hillenbrand and Scheel, in which Bonn gave the 
unofficial nod to the use of West German territory for the weapons deliveries, happened on the 
exact same day. One day later, on the evening of 17 October, the Arab oil ministers agreed to 
cut oil production by five percent on a monthly basis “until the full Israeli retreat from the 
occupied territories and the re-constitution of the full rights of the Palestinian people”.78 
Moreover, oil boycotts against countries considered particularly pro-Israel were announced: 
the US, South Africa, Rhodesia (present day’s Zimbabwe) and two European countries with 
Portugal and the Netherlands.79 
 
73 PA/AA (B36 104991, unfoliated) 10.10.1973. Bartels to several embassies and delegations.  
74 PA/AA (B36 104991, unfoliated) 10.10.1973. Notes by Bartels. 
75 PA/AA (B36 104991, unfoliated) 17.10.1973. Notes by Kruse. 
76 Ibid. 
77 PA/AA (B36 104991, unfoliated) 16.10.1973. Metzger (Jeddah) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
78 PA/AA (B36 104991, unfoliated) 18.10.1973. Freundt (Kuwait) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
79 PA/AA (B36 104868, unfoliated) 30.11.1973. Conversation notes. 
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As a result, the oil price jumped from three to five dollars a barrel.80 The oil price had 
doubled over night at a time when cheap oil seemed self-evident. Also, further price increases 
were now only a matter of time. Crucially, on a psychological level, the industrialised world 
for the first time had to confront its vulnerability due to resource dependence. 
Chapter II has shown that it took the Auswärtiges Amt almost two weeks to formulate 
an official position on the October War.81 In fact, the respective circular was distributed within 
the ministry on 19 October, a mere two days after the meeting of Arab oil ministers in Kuwait. 
This certainly was no coincidence. The oil question forced the FRG to a more concrete position 
on the conflict. The circular underlines the European dependency on Arab oil, while the US 
only imported a fraction of its oil from the Middle East.82 “Not least for this reason we are 
working towards convincing the Arabs that Europe is neutral in this conflict.”83 
Bonn now concentrated on two levels to achieve this aim. Saudi Arabia was the first 
focal point of its diplomacy due to its importance within OPEC. On the 23 October, the Saudi 
foreign ministry passed on an aide-memoire to Peter Metzger, number two in the West German 
embassy in Jeddah. It stated that Saudi Arabia was “extremely offended because of the latest 
American stand”.84 It threatened consequences for the EEC should the Europeans not succeed 
in changing America’s stance on the conflict. Two days later, Frank basically told US 
ambassador Hillenbrand that the FRG would no longer accept US weapons deliveries to Israel 
via the FRG.85 Clearly, the decision to ultimately pressure the US to end the airlift via West 
Germany – after Israel’s victory had been ensured – was not due to abstract fears of the oil 
weapon, but rather to concrete threats. The timing of the Auswärtiges Amt worked. On 30 
October, a relieved Metzger reported back to Bonn that since the reception of the aide-memoire 
“the position of the FRG has improved significantly. Media and Saudi businessmen are full of 
praise of the documented neutrality of the FRG in the current crisis.”86  
The FRG’s second priority was its diplomacy towards Tripoli, as Libya was still the 
most important oil supplier for the FRG. Here, the Auswärtiges Amt relied on a personal letter 
by Brandt, as well as support by Egypt’s president Sadat, to prevent any direct boycott against 
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Anticipations (2014). 
81 See Chapter II. 
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the FRG.87 Despite some heated conversations between West German and Libyan officials in 
Tripoli, Bonn ultimately got its way.88  
It is worthwhile to stress that at no point was there an oil boycott against the FRG. The 
biggest impact on the West German oil supply came from the Arab oil boycott against the 
Netherlands, which remained the only boycotted EEC country throughout the crisis. But 
indirectly, this also affected the FRG, as international oil deliveries to West Germany usually 
went through Rotterdam. Of course, driving bans on Sundays as well as speed limits for 
motorways were introduced in Germany. The images of empty West German motorways today 
create the impression of a widespread fuel shortage in the FRG at the time. However, these 
measures had rather been introduced by Bonn for psychological reasons, to convince the 
broader population of the need to save fuel. Today, the saving effect of the car-free Sundays is 
considered to have been marginal.89  
Ultimately, the impact of the oil weapon on the FRG was as much psychological as it 
was material. As other Western nations, too, the FRG had recognised the dangers of the oil 
weapon before the oil crisis took place. Bonn had reacted to it, for example through increased 
efforts towards better bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia. Still, like all Western European 
states, West Germany was by no means ready for the energy crisis when it started. On the one 
hand, this was out of Bonn’s control. Measures such as the increases of oil reserves simply 
took time to be implemented. On the other hand, both the Kiesinger and Brandt governments 
had miscalculated: first by placing too much emphasis on industrial measures such as the 
creation of DEMINEX, then by misjudging both the ability and willingness of the Arab oil 
producers to wield the oil weapon. In October 1973 itself, however, this chapter shows how 
meticulous and relentless diplomacy by the Auswärtiges Amt averted the worst-case scenario 
for the FRG: a direct oil boycott.  
 
By November 1973, the fighting between Syria, Egypt and Israel had stopped. But on another 
front the conflict was just about to start. The oil crisis had opened a significant rift between the 
EEC states and the US as the industrialised world now discussed how to respond to the ongoing 
energy crisis.  
 
 
87 AAPD 30.10.1973. Document 346. Müller-Chorus (Tripoli) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Hohensee, Der erste Ölpreisschock (1996). 
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4. Fighting over the future: Bonn between multi- and bilateral responses to the energy 
crisis, 1974-1979 
The oil crisis had profound political, economic and even social effects. It challenged existing 
assumptions about the nature of growth and the availability of resources. Global political 
dynamics changed, as suddenly some members of the so-called ‘Third World’ disposed of more 
capital than countries of the ‘First World’ – something which in the view of the Auswärtiges 
Amt led to “a change of consciousness amongst the states of the Third World”.90 Debates about 
limits of growth and sustainable energy savings emerged then, with some of them lasting to 
this very day. While all of these changes are of great interest and importance, this chapter only 
focuses on the impact of the oil crisis on West German relations to the Arab states, both in a 
multilateral and a bilateral setting.  
 
After the oil shock, it was clear that the FRG now had to “make great efforts to become 
independent of blackmail in the long term”, as Brandt had told Brezhnev by the end of the 
October War.91 Bonn would follow a two-pronged approach for this. On the one hand, it 
strengthened its bilateral relations with the oil producing countries in the Gulf. On the other 
hand, it engaged in a strenuous cooperation with the other industrialised, oil importing 
countries of the West to reach some sort of agreement with the oil exporters. 
The industrialised countries of the West – almost all of them relying on oil imports to a 
greater or smaller extent – now faced two questions. Firstly, they obviously were intent on 
finding a political response to the risk of their oil dependence. Secondly, the less obvious 
question pertained to the issue of so-called ‘petro-dollar recycling’. After all, billions of dollars 
moved from the West to the oil producing countries. Now, states like the US were keen to 
ensure that at least some of that wealth would be re-invested in the West and thus not be lost 
for good. Both these questions required negotiations with the oil producers, and there was a 
great deal of disagreement between Washington and its European allies as to how to approach 
these talks.  
The underlying problems of Western cooperation on the energy issue were lack of trust 
and a divergence of interests. The FRG’s faith in the Nixon administration was undermined by 
the misunderstanding between Washington and Bonn around the airlift to Israel as well as a 
general feeling that the US did not do enough to keep their European allies informed throughout 
 
90 PA/AA (B36 109107, unfoliated) 09.12.1974. Memorandum by planning unit. 
91 AAPD 07.11.1973. Document 364. Brandt to Breschnew. 
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the October War.92 Moreover, the Europeans felt that the US – who only imported a fraction 
of their oil from the Middle East – did not take the massive European overreliance on Arab oil 
seriously enough.93 It has been argued in Chapter I of this thesis that the clash between 
Washington and Bonn over the Middle East conflict was merely superficial. Ultimately, Brandt 
and later Schmidt strongly supported Kissinger’s Middle Eastern policy after 1973. However, 
in the area of energy politics, the rift between the US and both Bonn as well as the EEC states 
was real, substantial and profound. 
In the aftermath of the October War, Kissinger urged the Western oil importers to build 
a united front against the oil producers, creating influence though a cartelisation of consumers, 
so to speak. For this purpose, the US government invited eight consumer countries to an energy 
conference in Washington, DC, in January 1974.94 Scheel accepted the invitation only 
reluctantly, as he feared that the event would upset the OPEC countries.95 In the end, France 
declined to join the follow-up coordination group, setting back Kissinger’s approach. The other 
countries continued with their work on a common position of the consumer countries before 
entering into a dialogue with the oil producers.  
At the same time, the EEC states were pressured by the US to shelve their schemes for 
a new conference format between European and Arab states to address the energy issue. 
Kissinger feared that such a project would represent a fatal division of the West in face of Arab 
pressure.96 The Americans viewed the entire project as a “stab in the back of their peace efforts 
in the Middle East”, as a senior West German civil servant warned Brandt.97 But the French in 
particular were intent on going ahead with what would become the EAD. Bonn took a 
mediating position, as it was torn between its commitment to European solidarity and the 
transatlantic alliance. It had always wanted for the Energy Conference and the EAD to continue 
in unison, but now recognised the political contradictions between the two.98 As a result, it 
successfully lobbied the French to accept that both oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict would have 
to be left off the EAD’s agenda for the moment, whilst it convinced Washington that such a 
dismantled dialogue forum would not undermine US policy in the Middle East.99 Subsequently, 
both the EAD and the Energy Conference could go ahead. 
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It took until October 1974 for the latter to conclude consultations of the ‘energy 
coordination group’, resulting in an International Energy Program (IEP). It focused on a 
common crisis mechanism, transparency of the oil market, a reduction of oil dependency by 
promoting alternative energy sources as well as the preparation of a consumer-producer 
dialogue.100 By now, France – where the more moderate Jean Sauvagnargues had replaced the 
aggressive Michel Jobert at the Quai d’Orsay – supported the program. In 1975, a pre-
conference of oil-producing and -consuming countries met in Paris. However, no agreement 
could be reached. The biggest success, as the West German representative noted, was that a 
“hard confrontation of both groups” had been avoided, leaving the chance for another 
conference in the future.101  
Once again, when it came to addressing energy questions and oil dependency, the FRG 
took a middling position in multilateral efforts to produce an international agreement. It needed 
to address its energy dependency and thus could not afford the somewhat nonchalant attitude 
that Kissinger at times displayed towards the OPEC’s blackmail potential. At the same time, 
there was a real fear that Euro-American divergences on the energy issue could threaten the 
alliance as such. Thus, Schmidt, who became chancellor a few months after the Energy 
Conference had started, did his best to convince Paris of the use of the format, which might 
have helped to secure French support for the IEP.102 By the summer of 1975, when the 
consumer-producer dialogue, now termed ‘North-South dialogue’, was stuck, Schmidt sent 
Wischnewski on a fact-finding mission to Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, India and 
Venezuela. His task was to get a better sense of the interests of the producer countries and 
convey them to Bonn’s Western allies.103 Schmidt even launched his own, as he stressed, 
“private initiative” in December 1975 to facilitate an agreement between producers and 
consumers through informal, secret meetings of private experts, who would, however, be 
nominated by their respective governments.104 They were to pre-negotiate an agreement, which 
at a later stage would then be taken up on an official level.105 But this Track II approach 
ultimately failed, as Algeria was unwilling to commit itself to it.106 
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Alongside multilateral efforts to address the oil crisis the FRG further geared up its 
bilateral relations with the Arab states in the Gulf. One episode from January 1974 alone shows 
how much Bonn had neglected the region for years: the West German embassy in Jeddah had 
to apply for the construction of a radio station on its premises, as at the time urgent cables to 
Bonn took up to six days to arrive in the West German capital!107 But now, the Auswärtiges 
Amt was intent to upgrade the Gulf region on its list of priorities. Norbert Montfort, who had 
been nominated as West German ambassador to the Saudi kingdom, left his current posting in 
Mauritania prematurely so that the FRG’s representation in Jeddah at the highest level was 
ensured.108 Almost immediately he demanded – and was granted – two more diplomats to work 
in his embassy, one of which focused solely on matters of oil.109 Moreover, the Auswärtiges 
Amt now planned the construction of an embassy in Abu Dhabi.110 The representation to 
Bahrain and Qatar was to be taken over by the West German ambassador to Kuwait. Moreover, 
in February 1974 the FRG was able to announce the resumption of diplomatic relations with 
another oil-rich Arab country neighbouring the Gulf: Iraq. The first political conversations 
surrounding the resumption of diplomatic relations circled, as could be expected, around “Iraqi 
wishes for economic cooperation, the question of outstanding debt and negotiations about 
DEMINEX in Iraq”.111  
The linchpin of West German Gulf policy, however, was Saudi Arabia. Not only 
because by 1974 it was West Germany’s main supplier of oil and Bonn hoped for stronger 
economic ties with the kingdom. But the Auswärtiges Amt now also recognised “the leadership 
function of King Faisal in the Arab world”.112 Saudi Arabia was viewed as “the crucial anchor 
of stability in the region” by the West German government.113 It is certainly no coincidence 
that Genscher’s first journey as foreign minister to the Arab states led him first to Egypt and 
then to Saudi Arabia.114 In May 1976, Schmidt became the first German chancellor ever to visit 
the kingdom.115 Even key members of the West German opposition such as the Bavarian 
Ministerpräsident (chief minister) Franz-Joseph Strauß personally visited Saudi Arabia.116 
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Relations focused on bilateral economic cooperation, the Arab-Israeli conflict and, of 
course, energy policy. Again, the dominant Saudi position in the oil market made Riyadh an 
important target of bilateral diplomacy. For example, in December 1976 Schmidt sent a 
personal letter to crown prince Fahd, who was considered the eminence grise of the kingdom 
at the time. In the letter, the West German chancellor gave his thanks for Saudi Arabia’s recent 
role in preventing an oil price increase of more than 5% by OPEC.117 A 1979 memorandum on 
Saudi Arabia sums up the West German policy towards the country succinctly: 
The core aim of our Saudi Arabia policy is to find a political consensus with the 
Saudi leadership, so that we can support what has so far been a moderate and 
responsible position by Saudi Arabia regarding energy supply, global economic 
questions and the Near East conflict. Through visits of the heads of government, 
several visits of the Saudi foreign minister and also of several other ministers in 
Bonn throughout the last two years, a stable bond of trust between our two 
governments has emerged.118 
The new-found closeness in West German-Saudi relations came with expectations that almost 
overwhelmed the Auswärtiges Amt. Saudi Arabia “puts a lot of hopes into its relations to the 
FRG, but overestimates the latter’s potential influence”, a West German diplomat warned Bonn 
in late 1974 as if to keep expectations on a realistic level.119 Looking at the archival evidence, 
it seems as if there was a sort of hype around Saudi Arabia in Bonn for a few years. Riyadh 
was about to overtake Cairo as prime focus of West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’.  
 
In June 1975, an inter-departmental workshop on energy policy in the Auswärtiges Amt 
concluded that the FRG’s relationship to the Arab oil producers had been and for a while would 
remain in “a schizophrenic state of coexistence of good bilateral and tense multilateral 
relations”.120 Indeed, in response to the oil crisis, the FRG had followed a delicate dual strategy. 
On a multilateral level, it ultimately supported US efforts to coordinate a more or less united 
consumer position towards the energy issue, pitted Bonn against the OPEC countries. Although 
in the end no substantial agreements with the oil producers could be found, it probably was 
considered a success in Bonn that there was at least no open breakdown of transatlantic 
cooperation and no obvious failure on the multilateral level. At the same time, on a bilateral 
level Bonn worked hard to strengthen its relations to the Arab, oil producing countries of the 
Gulf. In particular, this pertained to its policy towards Saudi Arabia, now welcomed as a leader 
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of the moderate Arab states. Not only did the FRG switch the focus of its oil supply from Libya 
to Saudi Arabia, but Riyadh was also relied upon to mitigate an aggressive OPEC price policy. 
At least in regard to Saudi Arabia, Bonn’s “schizophrenic” foreign policy bore some fruits, as 
there was a remarkable increase in bilateral exchange.121 As Genscher noted in a speech, “the 
close exchange of opinions of our two governments has gained tradition and continuity […] 
[and] our several meetings, which have taken the form of a conversation between good friends, 
illustrate how closely our countries are connected.”122 Had it not been for the events of 1979, 
a lasting strategic partnership with Riyadh might well have developed that could have looked 
like the bond between Cairo and Bonn.  
 
5. 1979: year of crisis and disappointment 
1979 tested the West German approach to both the economics and geopolitics of oil. In regard 
to the former, the second oil crisis challenged the FRG’s post-1973 responses to its oil 
dependency. In regard to the latter, the Iranian revolution and the Siege of Mecca dashed West 
German assumptions about stability in the Gulf. Instead of the enthusiasm of the mid-1970s, 
now a more careful attitude entered West Germany’s stance on the Gulf, mutually re-enforced 
by and re-enforcing the general fading out of Bonn’s attempts at a coherent ‘Arab policy’ by 
1980.  
Five years after the 1973 oil crisis, the West once again had to confront its energy 
dependency. The second oil crisis was caused largely by the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, as 
strikes and unrest within the country hampered the oil production of one of the world’s biggest 
producers.123 On the one hand, the crisis in Iran represented a particular challenge for the FRG, 
as by 1979 Tehran had overtaken Saudi Arabia as the FRG’s main oil supplier, providing a 
fifth of West German oil imports. Moreover, “for our economy Iran is the most important 
export market of the Third World”, as a memo by the Auswärtiges Amt noted in late 1978. On 
the other hand, there obviously also was a more global dimension to the crisis.124 Schmidt in 
particular feared that a repetition of price spikes like in 1973 would throw the world economy 
into turmoil once again.125 “A crisis in this [the energy] sector could cause great difficulties for 
global trade balances and the monetary system”, the West German chancellor told Poland’s 
 
121 Ibid.  
122 PA/AA (B36 119949, unfoliated) 22.06.1979.  Meyer-Landrut to Genscher. 
123 See Gross, Samantha. What Iran’s 1979 revolution meant for US and global oil markets. Brookings 
(05.03.2019); Ikenberry, John. Reasons of state: oil politics and the capacities of American government. (Ithaca, 
1988).   
124 AAPD 11.09.1978. Document 258. Notes by Meyer-Landrut.  
125 AAPD 19.01.1979. Document 17. Conversation of Schmidt with Saud al-Faisal. 
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leader Edward Gierek.126 In a conversation with French prime minister Barre he noted oil price 
increases amongst the four foreign policy threats to his re-election in 1982.127 
However, 1979 was not 1973. Much of the crisis was due to panic and misperception. 
If the West had underestimated its oil dependency in 1973, it now overestimated it. A mere 4% 
decrease of global oil production caused oil prices to triple over the next two years.128 This 
shows that most of the price increase reflected the fear that global oil production might collapse 
rather than the actual state of global oil supply. To an extent, therefore, the crisis was about 
perception, brought about by the memories of the original 1973 ‘oil shock’. The saying that 
generals always fight the last war seems just as adequate to politicians dealing with oil crises.  
The second key difference to 1973 lies in the level of cooperation that now characterised 
international energy diplomacy. This time, the oil crisis was the accidental by-product of 
political turmoil in one country, rather than a purposeful oil boycott for political reasons. Quite 
the opposite. Initially, Schmidt had feared that other OPEC countries would try to use the 
turmoil in Iran to further increase prices and their profits.129 But after a visit of his economics 
minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff to Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, Bonn was assured that the Arab 
oil producers would rather try to increase their production to offset the loss of Iranian oil in the 
global supply chain.130 In the end, this move covered almost half of what Iran had produced 
before its year of revolution.131 This higher level of cooperation between the Arab oil producers 
in the Gulf and the consumer countries was matched by better coordination amongst the 
consumers themselves as compared to the 1973 oil crisis. Unlike in 1973, when Europe and 
the US were almost continuously at loggerheads, by June 1979 Schmidt noted after a 
conversation with Carter in Washington, DC: “He [Schmidt] had gotten the impression that in 
the energy sectors their interests were aligned quite closely.”132 Within the EEC, the Europeans 
themselves agreed to diversify towards “coal, nuclear energy and hydrocarbons”.133  
Overall, in 1979 the ‘oil weapon’ had gone off by accident and in effect weakened the 
Arab oil producers themselves. OPEC’s unity started to fade and broke completely when the 
Iran-Iraq war began in 1980. New energy markets in the North Sea and the Soviet Union 
allowed the FRG to diversify. Between 1980 and 1982, West Germany decreased its oil imports 
 
126 AAPD 17.08.1979. Document 236. Conversation of Schmidt with Gierek. 
127 AAPD 01.19.1979. Document 284. Conversation of Schmidt with Barre.  
128 Gross, What Iran’s 1979 revolution meant for US and global oil markets (05.03.2019). 
129 AAPD 27.03.1979. Document 92. Conversation of Schmidt with Waldheim. 
130 PA/AA (B36 137648, unfoliated) 28.04.1979. Notes by von Würzen.  
131 Gross, What Iran’s 1979 revolution meant for US and global oil markets (05.03.2019). 
132 AAPD 06.06.1979. Document 162. Conversation of Schmidt with Carter in Washington.  
133 AAPD 05.12.1979. Document 362. Circular by Ellerkmann.  
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from the Middle East and North Africa by more than a third.134 Although for the FRG the 
political necessity to engage in the Gulf for reasons of energy security did not disappear, it was 
reduced. The first oil crisis had brought the Gulf in particular to Bonn’s attention. The second 
oil crisis led it to shift its focus away from the region again.  
If the Iranian revolution sunk one half of the political capital Bonn had invested in the 
Gulf throughout the 1970s, then the Siege of Mecca in Saudi Arabia stirred up fears in 
Schmidt’s administration that the other half was about to vanish as well. On 20 November 
1979, several hundred heavily armed militants around two leaders - Mohammed Abdullah al-
Qahtani and Juhayman al-Otaybi – stormed the Grand Mosque of Mecca, killing security 
personnel and taking hostages amongst the pilgrims within the complex. Claiming to represent 
the true form of Islam, they called for the overthrow of what they perceived to be decadent and 
impious rule by the al-Saud family. In fact, this religious aspect was heavily intertwined with 
the tribal politics of Saudi Arabia, making the event more than just an attack of religious 
fanatics. It took more than two weeks for Saudi security forces, with secret help by French 
special forces, to reassert control over the Mosque and either kill or capture the attackers.135 
In recent years, the Siege of Mecca has mostly been interpreted as part of the larger 
trend of radicalising political Islam towards the end of the 20th century. One example is a 
French-German documentary from 2018 which argued that the attack in fact represented the 
beginning of modern jihadism.136 Similarly, Lawrence Wright places it in a chain of events 
culminating in the 9/11 attacks.137 At the time, the attack also received enormous attention 
within the foreign policy community in Bonn, but for an entirely different reason. The Iranian 
people had just surprised the West with overthrowing their regime; was the Saudi regime now 
the next to fall? The French immediately made this connection, as they described the attack as 
“a symptom of unrest, which emanates from the Iranian revolution”.138 West German 
ambassador Schlagintweit, however, doubted foreign meddling and mostly saw religious 
motivation at play.139 Over the next few weeks, he was asked time and again to assess the 
 
134 Bischof, Gerhard, and Werner Gocht. Energietaschenbuch Deutschland. (Braunschweig/Wiesbaden, 1984): 
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136 Dirk van den Berg (director), The Siege of Mecca (2018). 
137 Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. (London, 2006). 
138 PA/AA (B36 119948, unfoliated) 21.11.1979. Herbst (Paris) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
139 PA/AA (B36 119948, unfoliated) 22.11.1979. Schlagintweit (Jeddah) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
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stability of the Saudi regime.140 The conclusion he drew only two days into the siege, on 22 
November 1979, proved prescient: 
The government will easily handle this leftover of a past period [of fanatical-
religious aggression]. But the attack […] will lay bare to the government the extent 
of domestic tensions which have been caused by economic development and the 
opening of the former Bedouin state to the world. Therefore, a more conservative 
approach [by the Saudi government] has to be expected in the future.141 
Saudi Arabia might not have fallen, but Bonn’s belief in the value of its alliance with Riyadh 
was shaken. 
Another disappointment in West German-Arab relations pertained to the area of 
economics.142 In the 1960s, the Arab world had been considered a region of great opportunity 
for economic development.143 In particular after the oil crisis there had been high hopes for a 
boost of German investment in key Arab states such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia.144 From Cairo, 
ambassador Steltzer sent several reports in the mid-1970s about the “boom” that Egypt was on 
the brink of and the potential this offered for the FRG.145 Moreover, trade and foreign policy 
were often seen as interlinked. With the absence of diplomatic relations to most of the Arab 
states in the late 1960s, the Auswärtiges Amt had hoped that it could “[…] focus on first 
improving our relationship with the Arab states below the diplomatic level, that is on the 
economic and cultural level.”146 Later, too, the West German government had thought that 
stronger economic links would increase its political leverage in the region. ‘Geo-economics’ is 
what Luttwak terms this logic of using a state’s economic strength for foreign political 
leverage.147 The pervasiveness of this notion in West German foreign policy-making is 
illustrated well by an episode from early 1975. When asked whether a delegation of 
businessmen should accompany him on a visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, foreign minister 
Genscher immediately agreed: “The presence of high-ranking personalities from the business 
world would underline the link between foreign and economic policy.”148  
 
140 PA/AA (B36 119948, unfoliated) 29.11.1979. Schlagintweit (Jeddah) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B36 
119948, unfoliated) 04.12.1979. Meyer-Landrut to Genscher. 
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142 On this, see also Maull, Economic relations with the Middle East: weight and dimensions (1992). 
143 Henry and Springborg, Globalisation and the Politics of Development in the Middle East (2010): 314. 
144 PA/AA (B36 104663, unfoliated) 04.02.1974. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B36 104868, 
unfoliated) 30.11.1973. Notes on visit of foreign minister Saqqaf in Bonn. 
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But two factors impeded both the market potential and the effectiveness of geo-
economics in West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’. Firstly, while West German trade with the region 
had grown throughout the 1970s, the Arab states never became a priority for West German 
companies. At no time between 1967 and 1979 did imports or exports to the Arab states exceed 
a tenth of overall West German trade. Even though the numbers go up significantly in 1974 
because of the oil crisis, trade to the Arab states still fluctuated between a mere five to seven 
percent of all West German imports and exports in those years.149 By the end of the 1970s it 
was clear that there would be no united Arab state or entity, and thus no coherent Arab market. 
Not even the oil crisis and the new-found wealth of the Gulf states fundamentally changed that. 
Figure 2: West German-Arab Trade, 1967-1979 (in billion Deutschmark). The ‘share‘-row denotes the 
percentage of exports/imports to all Arab states as compared to the overall share of West German exports 
and imports in the respective years.150 
On the ground, too, enthusiasm for West German economic engagement waned. “This is the 
story of an industrial project in Egypt”, is how a 1976 report on the state of the Egyptian 
economy by the West German embassy in Cairo started.151 It had the unflattering title 
“economic situation in Egypt; here: factor human inadequacies” and was a damning judgement 
on the economic reforms Sadat had initiated in 1974: “Everywhere one comes across a hardly 
bearable mix of disinterest, arrogance, intrigue, rivalries, personal incompetence, technical 
inabilities and intentional destruction.”152 Already earlier in that year ambassador Steltzer had 
reported of “the catastrophic state of the budget, increasing public debt and trade deficit, 
inflation, corruption, brain-drain and social injustice”.153 The Auswärtiges Amt had attempted 
 
149 See Graph 1. 
150 Calculation by author; data taken from Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart, 
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151 PA/AA (B36 108917, unfoliated) 15.09.1976. Strenziok (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
152 Ibid. 
153 PA/AA (B36 108714, unfoliated) 18.02.1976. Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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to promote trade in the region, for example by urging West German trade delegations to visit 
states such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia.154 But this top-down trade policy clashed with and was 
unable to overcome setbacks such as the ones described in the above-mentioned report. 
Secondly, geo-economics is an ambivalent source of political power. Luttwak considers 
it a measure of strength and, of course, the ability to wield influence through economic capacity 
indicates greater authority. It was, after all, on the back of the 1950’s Wirtschaftswunder and 
its translation into stronger exports and developmental aid that the FRG was able to return to 
the arena of international relations as serious player as of the 1960s. But the West Germans 
also turned to economics as instrument in the making of their Middle Eastern policy due to the 
lack of alternatives. Power projection through military means, networks of post-colonial 
patronage or symbolic power, as compared to the permanent Security Council members like 
Britain or France, were not available to the young West German republic. Therefore, 
economics was not only an instrument of choice, but also of necessity for Bonn. As such, it 
was to an extent a measure of last resort. Here, once again the example of Egypt is telling. 
Despite its significant support for Sadat’s government with capital aid and a promotion of trade, 
Bonn ultimately was unable to shape Egyptian attitudes towards key political issues such as 
the Camp David Accords. Geoeconomics did not automatically pay a political dividend and 
was to an extent merely pursued for the lack of alternative approaches.155 
The enthusiasm of West German diplomats about the economic potential of West 
German investments in the Arab states after the oil crisis in particular was premature. The 
Auswärtiges Amt and BMWi did what they could to promote West German industrial 
engagement top-down, but West German companies were less enthusiastic about local market 
conditions. The gap between business mentalities was too large to bridge, and geo-economics 
in any case only a semi-effective instrument in the toolbox of West German diplomacy. 
 
1979 was the year of crisis in the Gulf.156 Three crises – of oil, in Saudi Arabia and in Iran – 
shook the West German confidence in the value of its political investment in the region. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, the country underwent a fundamental social and political transformation 
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after the 1979 Mecca uprising. This created an emotional distance between it and the West. 
The events of 1979 convinced Bonn of the confines that its political engagement in the Gulf 
region should have. Moreover, throughout the 1970s the FRG also faced the limits that its 
economic engagement had in the Middle East as a whole. The desire for a stronger West 
German economic role in the Arab states was met with much more caution within the West 
German business community. More trade and investment followed, but the Arab world never 
became a market of the highest priority for the FRG. Bonn also had to acknowledge that 
economic power did not automatically translate into political leverage. After some lows and 
highs for West German foreign policy in the Gulf, by the end of the 1970s the FRG’s diplomacy 
ended up on a level of political engagement in the region which might be described as 
sufficient. Not less, but also not more. 
 
6. Conclusion: from industry to diplomacy 
The FRG joined the geopolitics of oil with some delay. When the spectre of the oil weapon 
first emerged with the mini-boycott of 1967, Bonn’s initial reaction was to focus on business 
as a remedy for its oil dependency. The West German government promoted the creation of its 
own, West German oil company DEMINEX in 1969. But that was too little, too late. The oil 
markets were changing, and power migrated to the – mostly Arab – oil producing countries. 
By 1971, the Brandt administration had realised that it needed to react to these changes. It 
ultimately underestimated the threat of a sudden oil boycott, but that probably did not make 
too much difference – the late formulation of a German oil policy meant that the FRG would 
have been caught unprepared to defend against the oil weapon in 1973 in any case.  
The oil shock had political, economic, social, psychological and diplomatic effects. In 
regard to the latter, the important ones were West German attempts to mediate between 
consumer and producer countries, which at times led Bonn into severe conflict with 
Washington. Also, the oil crisis kickstarted a diplomatic turn towards the Gulf which stands in 
stark contrast to the previous, open neglect of that region by policy makers in Bonn. New 
embassies in the Gulf were established, and existing ones reinforced. Saudi Arabia became a 
linchpin of West German diplomacy both in regard to oil and to broader political issues such 
as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Of course, this did not make Bonn an arbiter of oil politics. But the 
constant exchange with the Saudis on formulation of international energy policy and the setting 
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of the oil price certainly illustrates how much more Bonn was part of the conversation about 
oil after 1973 as compared to before.157 
The 1973 crisis had pulled the FRG into the Gulf; the 1979 crises limited the extent of 
this engagement. On the one hand, the second oil crisis did not hit West Germany as hard as 
the first. On the other hand, notwithstanding its significant political investment in the Gulf, the 
Schmidt administration had been unable to prevent the crisis from happening. Moreover, 
turmoil on both sides of the Gulf shook the belief of West German policy makers in the alliance 
with Saudi Arabia. By the end of the 1970s, the FRG had established a diplomatic presence 
that was sufficient to secure key foreign policy goals. The ‘year of crisis’ 1979 illustrated both 
Bonn's limited need and its limited ability to engage in the Gulf.  
Overall, this chapter has shown that the Middle East is indeed “more than oil and 
conflicts”, as a book title by Steinbach stipulates.158 Oil did not factor into the formulation of 
a West German ‘Arab policy’ in 1970 – it only entered the frame from 1973 onwards. It also 
never dominated political considerations – even when facing an Arab oil boycott, the Brandt 
government prioritised indirect support to Israel during the October War of 1973 over directly 
securing its oil supplies from the Middle East. But oil became a factor of West German Middle 
Eastern policy from 1973 onwards and was the foremost reason for Bonn’s much stronger 
engagement in Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states.  
This chapter represents the first analysis of oil as component of West German post-war 
foreign policy more generally and Middle Eastern policy more specifically. It provides a 
cohesive previously missing narrative of the link between Bonn’s energy and foreign policy.159 
It adds to existing works on the legacy of the oil shock by analysing its impact in the area of 
diplomacy.160 Moreover, it contributes to the foreign political analysis of the second oil 
crisis.161 It shows that West Germany’s ‘schizophrenic’ diplomacy predates the more 
contemporary foreign policy concept of “hedging”.162 Finally, it also elaborates on the role of 
trade for West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’ and on both the potential and limits of geo-economics 
as source of the FRG’s political power in the post-war era. 
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The FRG’s relations to the Gulf in the second part of the 1970s were shaped by its 
attraction to the region’s political and economic potential, and a simultaneous profound sense 
of cultural distance to it. The latter comes out well in ambassador’s Schlagintweit’s verdict on 
the 1979 Siege of Mecca: “Now, it was the turn of Arab fanaticism to raise its voice again – 
according to the character of the desert inhabitant in its emotional, bloody, irrational way, 
totally constrained by religious and moral criteria.”163 Even today, this dualism can still be 
observed in German relations towards the Gulf – on the one hand repeated scepticism to 
weapons deliveries for Riyadh, on the other hand the inclusion of Saudi Arabia as a strategic 
partner into the Auswärtiges Amt’s 2012 concept of “shaping powers” (Gestaltungsmächte).164 
It is exactly this dualism of attraction and cultural repulsion which we also encounter in 
Kuntzmann’s report about the UAE. The ‘South Arabian adventure’ which began for him in 
1974 has continued for the FRG to this day.  
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Chapter V: The European dimension of West German Middle 
Eastern policy 
 
With all its weaknesses […] this ‘Europe’ of the Six or the Ten 
might be the only ‘community’ we can have. A deviation from the 
long and cumbersome path to a political unification of Europe 
would lead back to a policy of the ‘concert of great powers’, to 
which the European middling powers individually do not count 
anymore.1 
Memorandum by ministerial director Bernd von Staden, 1971 
 
European unification is based upon integration within EEC and 
EPC, which help to avoid interfering or even destructive effects on 
the community from areas where willingness to integration does 
not exist yet.2 
From a memorandum by the Auswärtiges Amt, 1978 
 
1. Introduction: the legacy of European Middle Eastern policy 
In February 2019, the EU and the Arab League (or League of Arab States – LAS) came together 
for a joint summit at the Egyptian holiday destination of Sharm el Sheikh. The main topics of 
discussion were economic cooperation, migration and the fight against terrorism. European 
Council president Donald Tusk hailed the meeting as a “new step forward” in the relationship 
between Europe and the Arab world.3 According to a press release by the German government, 
the event was supposed to “inaugurate a new era of cooperation and coordination”.4 But, in 
fact, the summit was not entirely unprecedented. In 1974, in the aftermath of the October War, 
the leaders of the EEC agreed to launch a new institutional platform aimed at strengthening the 
ties between Europe and the Arab states: the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD).5 It was promoted by 
Paris, loathed by Washington and cautiously embraced by West Germany. Its trials, tribulations 
and failure encapsulate the main theme of this chapter: the emergence of a European Middle 
Eastern policy during the 1970s, and its configuration within West Germany’s attempts at an 
‘Arab policy’ in this period. 
 
1 AAPD 26.10.1971. Document 369. Notes by von Staden.  
2 PA/AA (B21 112902, unfoliated) 07.04.1978. Notes by 200.  
3 European Council. Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the press conference after the EU-LAS summit in 
Egypt. (25.02.2019). 
4 Die Bundesregierung. Treffen in Sharm el-Sheikh – EU und Arabische Liga vertiefen Zusammenarbeit. 
(25.02.2019). 
5 As the EEC is the forerunner of today’s EU, throughout the text “European“ will at times be used in reference 
to what has in fact before the 1990’s only been Western European policy. 
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When the FRG reformulated its Middle Eastern policy in the aftermath of the 1967 June 
War, there was no European dimension to consider. Foreign policy was not yet part of the 
European project. Three years later, the members of the EEC agreed to launch a forum to 
strengthen foreign policy cooperation and coordination by forming the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). Its initial focus lay solely on relations to Eastern Europe and the Middle 
East, with one of its first outcomes being a 1971 working paper on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
However, the document was considered so close to pro-Arab positions that, upon Israeli 
criticism, Scheel quickly distanced himself from it. The entire episode almost led to the 
premature end of the EPC. Two years later, the October War and the oil crisis rekindled the 
interest of the EEC members in developing a common approach towards the Middle East. In a 
three-pronged strategy, the EPC was supposed to strengthen Europe’s leverage on the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the EAD was to expand relations to the Arab states and a policy termed 
Approche Globale served as a comprehensive European Mediterranean policy. Despite some 
progress, all three would ultimately stagnate.  
Yet, for West Germany, the European dimension of its Middle Eastern policy became 
more important despite, or perhaps even because of, the shortcomings of the Nine’s common 
efforts. On the one hand, Bonn looked to Europe as a genuine instrument to leverage its 
influence in the Middle East through common action. On the other hand, the Auswärtiges Amt 
always considered policies such as EPC or EAD within the broader framework of ongoing 
European integration. Admitting failure in the former might have implied failure of the latter. 
Thus, Bonn’s usual response to the EPC’s difficulties and shortcomings was more Europe.  
European foreign policy in the Middle East has been explored extensively by previous 
research.6 A seminal study is provided by Moeckli, who uses French, British and German 
archival material to analyse EPC in its early years.7 A number of authors deal more 
descriptively with the topic, covering large periods after 1970.8 One issue which has garnered 
particular attention is the EU’s attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East 
 
6 See, for example, Kaya, Taylan Özgür. The Middle East Peace Process and the EU: foreign policy and 
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peace process.9 Jacobs or Jawad focus exclusively on the EAD.10 Ultimately, all these scholars 
highlight internal coordination, transatlantic tensions and a lack of European leverage as key 
challenges for early European foreign policy making in the Middle East.  
The main contribution of this chapter lies in providing a study of EPC and EAD from 
the perspective of a single member state: West Germany. It analyses the European dimension 
as a component of Bonn’s Middle Eastern policy. As such, this chapter is not as much about 
European foreign policy in the Middle East, but rather about how the latter served, influenced 
and interacted with the Middle Eastern policy of a single member state. One of its key findings 
is that, following a functionalist logic, the link between the EPC and European integration was 
more important for Bonn than previously known.11 Moreover, as this chapter is based on 
archival material, it helps to better illustrate the details and dynamics of West German attitudes 
to European policies on the Middle East during the 1970s. It therefore goes further than 
Neustadt’s much older book on the European dimension of West German-Israeli relations and 
links to Sattler’s recent study on French policy within the formative years of the EPC.12 
 A key variable moderating the FRG’s stance towards European initiatives was the 
relationship to the US. In principle, Bonn was supportive of European policies. At the same 
time, it was also careful not to undermine American efforts. Therefore, in the early days of the 
EAD Bonn very much curtailed the extent of the project. However, this chapter shows that, as 
a result of the breakdown of Kissinger’s step-by-step approach to a Middle Eastern peace 
process in 1975, the FRG suddenly became a main driver of the EAD. Additionally, the idea 
for a joint European initiative on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the same year, which ultimately 
culminated in key European statements on the conflict such as the 1977 London or 1980 Venice 
Declaration, goes back to Genscher personally. Overall, a much more nuanced and detailed 
picture emerges as to the importance and development of European foreign policy cooperation 
from a member state’s perspective. 
There is an important caveat to this chapter: it only deals with EPC and similar measures 
in as much as they relate to the Middle East. Any conclusions are therefore also limited to this 
policy subfield. As has already been mentioned, EPC was not a project exclusively focusing 
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on the Middle East. Its ability to coordinate a European stance within the CSCE-process is 
widely recognised as a success story.13 This view is not challenged here.  
Ultimately, the early days of European policy making in the Middle East were not such 
a success story. One can forgive Tusk for his neglectful take on European policymaking in his 
remarks on the EU-LAS summit, omitting any reference to the EAD as its historical 
predecessor, which after all in theory ran from 1974 to 1991. Presumably, failures do not make 
good material for memory. Nonetheless, despite all its shortcomings, the European dimension, 
which entered the FRG’s Middle Eastern policy in 1970, has remained part and parcel of 
Germany’s engagement with that region to this day.  
 
2. Prologue: 1967 and the failure of Western solidarity 
When the Six-Day War profoundly reconfigured the Middle East in 1967, nothing which 
resembled a coherent European foreign policy existed. And yet, the events surrounding the war 
serve as a prologue to the multilateral, European dimension of West German Arab policy that 
developed during the 1970s, involving two other organisations which brought together the 
Western European allies: NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). 
Ambitions at stronger political cooperation within Western Europe – which would have 
included the issue of foreign policy – date back to the 1950s with the 1952 project of ‘European 
Political Community’. The latter would have combined the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) with a new European Defence Community (EDC). But the French 
National Assembly torpedoed the entire project by voting down the EDC. Instead, in 1954 
Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries established the WEU, a much 
looser European collective defence pact, which was soon to be eclipsed by NATO.14  
In the absence of a stronger European forum for foreign policy cooperation, these two 
organisations – WEU and NATO – were the only multilateral frameworks in which the Western 
alliance would discuss the Six-Day War. Indeed, Bonn considered the fall-out of the June War 
to be of great significance for the Western allies and therefore expected more of a joint response 
to the conflict. The 1967 June Memorandum by the Auswärtiges Amt, after all, mentions the 
need to protect Europe’s South-Eastern flank, a task for the Western alliance as a whole.15 
 
13 Romano, Angela. The EPC main task: fostering détente in Europe. In: Poul Villaume, and Odd Arne Westad 
(eds.). Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985. 
(Copenhagen, 2010): 123-41. 
14 Duke, Elusive quest for European security (2000); Griffiths, Europe’s First Constitution (1994). 
15 See Chapter I. 
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Moreover, as a bystander of Middle Eastern politics in 1967, the FRG was more reliant on 
exercising influence through its allies than some of the other NATO or WEU member states. 
But the experience of the Six-Day War left no illusions in Bonn about the ability to 
engage on Middle Eastern topics in existing Western institutional frameworks. Chancellor 
Kurt-Georg Kiesinger in particular voiced his disappointment that the topic had not even made 
it on the agenda at the Rome meeting of the WEU on the eve of the war.16 After the cessation 
of hostilities, the West attempted to find a mechanism for tackling the issue through NATO, 
and a consultation process for the Middle East was agreed upon.17 But there were hardly any 
substantial outcomes, as the Western allies were split: some states leaned more towards the 
Arabs, others towards Israel; some wanted NATO to engage actively in the Middle East and 
others preferred having NATO stay out.18 The West German ambassador to NATO offered a 
damning judgement on the performance of the alliance: “One can only hope that the council 
shows more willingness to action in case of a crisis that directly affects alliance territories.”19 
This sentiment of disappointment persisted after the war. In later West German government 
documents on Middle Eastern politics, neither WEU nor NATO are mentioned anymore.20 
West German policy makers had to realise that if multilateral efforts were to be included in 
Bonn’s re-calibrated Middle Eastern policy, existing structures such as NATO or the WEU 
would be of little use.  
 
3. The emergence of a European Middle Eastern policy, 1970-1973  
From 1970 onwards, a common European foreign policy started to emerge through the EPC. It 
seemed to yield a quick result on the Middle East in the form of a working paper, wherein the 
Six agreed upon a common position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. But Scheel quickly had to 
distance himself from the so-called Schumann Document (Schumann-Papier) due to what in 
Israel was perceived as the document’s pro-Arab line. Paris was furious and only temporary 
inactivity saved the Middle Eastern dimension of EPC from immediate cessation.  
 
The European project went through some difficult years during the 1960s. De Gaulle’s empty 
chair policy and his veto against British membership of the EEC set back further European 
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integration for several years.21 By 1969, however, de Gaulle was out of office and the much 
more pro-European Georges Pompidou had taken over the French presidency. In July 1969, 
the EEC leaders came together for their pivotal Hague summit, which was to reinvigorate the 
European project. There, the EEC agreed both to include Britain into its ranks and to widen 
European integration. As a result, some sort of stronger foreign policy cooperation was to be 
added to the European project. Belgian diplomat Etienne Davignon was charged with drafting 
proposals for the Europeanisation of foreign policy. Within a year, he had produced the 
‘Davignon report’, which outlined an information exchange and coordination mechanism on 
foreign policy issues on a European level. This was the EPC. Thirty years later it would 
culminate in today’s Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). EPC ran outside 
the EEC’s regular institutional framework. It was not supervised by the Commission or the 
Council, but by an entirely intergovernmental process, consisting of regular meetings by the – 
then six – EEC member states’ foreign ministers and key diplomats. EPC initially had two 
focus areas, which covered the two main flanks of European foreign policy: relations to Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East conflict.22 
From a West German perspective, it made sense to include the Arab-Israeli conflict on 
the EPC’s first agenda. In response to the June War, NATO and WEU had proved ineffective 
platforms for developing a more coherent Western approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
EPC was the logical next step in the search for a better platform. For Bonn, it had two great 
advantages: on the one hand, together the Europeans might develop more diplomatic firepower 
on the ground, in particular at a time when the Americans were focused on Vietnam and not 
giving their full attention to the Middle East. On the other hand, Bonn would be able to relay 
controversial decisions – in particular in view of its difficult past in relation to Israel – to the 
European level, thus absolving itself of complicated choices either for or against Israel or the 
Arab states.23  
Initially, the EPC seemed to go off well. The first task of the Six was to agree on 
common formulae and positions. This had begun even before the Davignon report had been 
finalised, as a briefing for Scheel from February 1970, more than half a year before the report’s 
publication, shows.24 It outlined five dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict on which the 
 
21 On the early years of European integration, see, for example, Dinan, Desmon. Europe Recast: A History of 
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Europeans needed to coordinate positions: “freedom of the seas, demilitarised zones, 
composition of international control troops, the sovereignty of an internationalised Jerusalem, 
the refugee problem”.25 To do so, at a meeting in Munich on the 19  November 1970, the foreign 
ministers of the Six instructed their senior diplomats to prepare a report on the Middle East 
along those points.26 A year later, the Auswärtiges Amt’s head of the Middle Eastern unit, 
Helmut Redies, jubilantly informed Scheel about the successful conclusion of preliminary talks 
in the “Political Committee” (Politisches Komitee – PK) of the EPC. The PK brought together 
diplomats of all member states to prepare meetings of their respective foreign ministers.  
On all important elements of the topics we discussed, an agreement could be 
reached […]: This has to be viewed as a great success – in particular in view of the 
difficult topic of Near East questions – and will have an encouraging effect on the 
continuation of the political cooperation by the Six [EPC states].27  
This agreement within the EPC framework included a system of collective security guarantees 
in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories (with the exception of small 
border corrections), an internationalisation of the old city of Jerusalem and a common 
European support scheme for Palestinian refugees. It represented a clear position and, at least 
in the mind of Redies, a balanced compromise for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Of course, 
it had the slight drawback that it had been agreed upon in Brussels, far away from the Middle 
East and without the participation of any of the conflict parties. It was a solution which, in 
essence, had been negotiated in a geopolitical vacuum.  
In May 1971, the foreign ministers of the Six met in Paris to finalise their EPC 
consultations. They approved the report on the Middle East which the PK had prepared. It was 
not intended for publication. Instead, “it is planned to send it to the representatives of the Six 
at the United Nations and directly to interested governments (Near-East countries, great 
powers), in order to inform the UN Secretary General […] about essential results of the 
consultations and to use [the] report as common position”.28  
The West Germans were happy, and so were their European partners. A month after 
their Paris meeting, an enthusiastic French foreign minister Schumann told diplomats in 
Brussels: “Dealing with the Near East questions has shown three things: for the first time, the 
Six had the opportunity to find a common position. This common position consists not only of 
vague formulas but is very specific. [It] is not only academic but crafted for practice.”29 This 
 
25 Ibid. 
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27 AAPD 28.04.1971. Document 143. Notes by Redies. 
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latter comment is important, as it shows that EPC on the Middle East was not just seen as a 
theoretical exercise, but instead was envisaged as a concrete policy instrument. 
Ironically, even though Redies foresaw Israeli resistance to this new, European position, 
both he and State Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt Paul Frank considered the compromise 
even-handed.30 Unfortunately for them, it turned out that this view was not shared. It was so 
close to the more pro-Arab French position on the Arab-Israeli conflict that observers dubbed 
it the Schumann Document in reference to the French foreign minister. Maybe this explains 
the latter’s enthusiasm over the report. Unsurprisingly, the Israelis openly rejected Europe’s 
new, united view on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their reservations pertained not only to the 
position of the Six, but to the entire exercise as such. “Israel finds it odd that the EEC 
governments deal with questions of the Near-East conflict, as the latter primarily touches on 
Israeli interests; at least Israel could have expected that the discussions would not happen 
‘behind its back’, that is, that it would have been permitted to participate”, Israel’s ambassador 
in Bonn Ben Horin told Frank.31 
Complications turned into embarrassment when Scheel visited Israel in July 1971. By 
the time of the much anticipated first visit of a German foreign minister to the Jewish state the 
Schumann Document had been leaked to the press. In Israel, it was received with outrage. 
Pressed by his hosts, Bonn’s foreign minister had to publicly distance himself from the report. 
For instance, even though the Schumann Document had been written in French, Scheel stated 
that the West Germans still supported the English translation of UN Security Council resolution 
242.32   
In Paris, Schumann was fuming. As soon as he heard of Scheel’s statements, he 
immediately summoned the West German ambassador to the Quai d’Orsay. Schumann, “in the 
highest state of excitement”, stated that only recently Scheel had told him that the West German 
government considered itself bound to the contents of the EPC report.33 Scheel, Schumann 
complained, would have had the duty to defend the paper in Israel, rather than distance himself 
from it. The French foreign minister even questioned the EPC itself. “It would, in his 
[Schumann’s] view, […] no longer make sense to cooperate in the Near East question, and he 
was considering to instruct the French side to stop the discussion of Near East matters amongst 
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the Six.”34 Ultimately, the French calmed down, but the initial fervour of EPC Middle East 
consultations had quickly subsided.35 
Why did the Six not simply bury the topic at this point and take the Middle East out of 
the EPC altogether? The answer lies in a memorandum written by Bernd von Staden from the 
Auswärtiges Amt, a senior diplomat and later West Germany’s influential ambassador in 
Washington D.C. (1973-79) as well as State Secretary in the foreign ministry (1981-83). In an 
internal memorandum from October 1971, he acknowledged that the EPC in the Middle East 
had, unlike in Eastern Europe, fallen short of expectations. But he was careful to note that no 
consequences should follow from that.  
With all its weaknesses […] this ‘Europe’ […] might be the only ‘community’ we 
can have. A deviation from the long and cumbersome path to a political unification 
of Europe would lead back to a policy of the ‘concert of great powers’, to which 
the European middling powers individually do not count anymore.36  
Thus, the success of EPC was linked to the success of European integration as a whole, a much 
more important issue. To paraphrase Angela Merkel’s famous dictum during the European debt 
crisis: If EPC fails, Europe fails. Thus, as far as the Middle East was concerned, the EPC, rather 
than dying off, went into a temporary coma.  
 
The feeling of an early success within the EPC was quickly replaced by consternation about 
the episode surrounding the Schumann Document. Bonn’s hopes to unburden itself from its 
historical obligation to Israel within a multilateral setting did not materialise. But the link which 
policymakers in Bonn saw between EPC and European integration in general meant that rather 
than abandoning efforts of European coordination on Middle Eastern questions, the Six merely 
halted the project temporarily.  
 
4. Copenhagen, the EAD and a reinvigoration of EPC in the Middle East, 1973-75 
The October War of 1973 brought the EPC out of its slumber again. In the face of open conflict 
in the Middle East, a possible Arab oil boycott and the threat of a military clash between the 
superpowers of the Cold War, the EEC states concluded that unity was their best response to 
crisis. The October War re-invigorated European engagement with the question of Middle 
Eastern affairs, for which the EEC’s 1973 Copenhagen Declaration represents the starting 
point. The – now Nine – EEC members envisaged a European Middle Eastern policy resting 
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on three pillars: the EPC, a dialogue exclusively with the Arab states and a comprehensive 
Mediterranean policy.  
 
Coordinating a European approach throughout October 1973 was a slow and tedious process. 
It took almost a week of argument for the Nine to agree on a communiqué, which urged all 
parties to stop fighting and start peace negotiations on the basis of UN Security Council 
resolution 242. Towards the end of the war, on 25 October, the Belgians proposed the 
participation of an EEC contingent in a UN peacekeeping force. To their dismay, there was no 
support for such a move among their European friends, including the West Germans. A few 
days later, it took the French threat to boycott an EPC meeting by the foreign ministers to agree 
on a declaration which stressed the role of the UN security council in finding a solution to 
conflict in the Middle East. Clearly, this was an – unsuccessful – attempt to prevent an 
exclusion of permanent security council member France from any peace process. Ultimately, 
the peace conference in Geneva would go ahead without European participation.37 Finally, on 
6 November, the EEC members published what Moeckli considers a “breakthrough” 
declaration which for the first time mentioned the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and 
ended “by recalling the ties of all kinds which had long linked Europe to the littoral states of 
the south and east of the Mediterranean”.38  
It is hard to make out the West German position within the European arena on these 
questions. Bonn seems to have accepted a stronger engagement with the Middle Eastern 
conflict on the European stage, but nothing suggests that it pushed for a greater European role 
in any particular way. Unlike the French, it was willing to accept an exclusion of the Europeans 
from the peace conference which Kissinger was organising in Geneva. Notes prepared by the 
Auswärtiges Amt for a meeting of Brandt with his European colleagues stated that the FRG 
considered it “unfortunate” that the Europeans had been excluded from the conference, but that 
the focus now was to ensure the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East.39 “Right now, 
therefore, Europe should avoid anything which could disturb the efforts of the superpowers.”40 
Bonn’s focus lay much more on the question of oil. As mentioned in previous chapters, 
for the West Germans the crisis of Euro-American relations was about energy, not the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Europe depended on Arab oil to a significantly larger extent than the US, and 
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40 Ibid.  
 176 
Bonn pushed for a European response to this question. In early November, the European 
council of ministers agreed on a statement stressing a joint European effort to overcome the 
energy crisis “against strong initial British and French resistance”.41 In December, a meeting 
of European finance and foreign ministers agreed to work on a pooling mechanism to share 
energy resources more efficiently. Once again, the FRG was at the helm of the effort. It was 
passed despite French and British misgivings with the support of Italy, Denmark and the 
Netherlands.42 
By the end of 1973, the French proposed an entirely new concept for European 
engagement with the Middle East: a conference between the European and the Arab states. 
This idea derived from discussions between French foreign minister Michel Jobert and several 
Arab ministers in November 1973, followed up by similar talks at European level around the 
EEC’s Copenhagen summit in December that year.43 It arose from French misgivings about 
their exclusion from the Geneva peace conference by Kissinger. In January 1974, the foreign 
ministers of the Nine instructed their diplomats to carve out the details for what had by then 
already been termed the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD).44  
Bonn was open to the idea, but it also had some reservations. The first PK meeting on 
the topic was a quite open discussion concerning purpose, structure and timing of the new 
dialogue format. Helmut Redies, present for the Auswärtiges Amt, mostly posed a number of 
questions: should the dialogue involve all Arab states? If so, would that be productive? What 
topics should be discussed, and which third countries would have to be informed?45 Clearly, 
the EAD would be more complicated than the French had hoped. Their representative limited 
his reply to Redies to the comment that “the Europeans had to make their attention to the Arab 
sphere more visible”.46 
Of all the open questions surrounding the EAD which Redies had mentioned, the most 
important one in Bonn’s view regarded the question of third countries. Or, in fact, one third 
country: the USA. Kissinger made no secret of his misgivings about the EAD. As he told Scheel 
in February 1974: „Efforts towards a conference with the Arabs contain the risk that thereby 
the radicals would succeed over the moderates. The Europeans could not allow themselves to 
join one side over another. […] Everything which the Americans had achieved over the past 
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four months would be put at risk.”47 Jobert, however, was unwilling to sacrifice his project on 
the altar of good transatlantic relations and did not hide his personal dislike of Kissinger.48 
Bonn and the other EEC-members were stuck between a French rock and an American hard 
place, a situation well characterised by a comment which the Dutch ambassador made to State 
Secretary Frank in February: “The EEC-partners should now simultaneously plead with France 
and America” – as if France was not itself an EEC state, and both countries not also NATO 
allies.49 
Bonn tried to find a middle way in this situation. Frank told the French that progress on 
the EAD could hardly be expected if Paris continued to stay out of the energy dialogue of 
consumer countries organised by Washington.50 Simultaneously, as has already been alluded 
to in the previous chapter, the FRG helped to water down the EAD to address key US concerns. 
In April 1974, the Nine agreed at an EPC meeting to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict and oil off 
the EAD’s agenda for the moment.51 Moreover, the structure of the EAD was turned upside-
down: instead of starting with a conference of European and Arab foreign ministers, such a 
meeting would now stand at the end of the dialogue, probably not earlier than 1975. Instead, 
the EAD would kick off with a meeting of the ‘General Commission’ (Allgemeine Komission), 
wherein experts would “determine substance and priorities of cooperation and set up working 
groups on the individual areas of cooperation (industry, agriculture, energy, resources, science, 
technology, vocational training)”.52 On 31 July 1974, the EAD was officially initiated.53  
A second and oft-neglected pillar of European policy towards the Middle East after 
1973 was the so-called Approche Globale. The purpose of this policy, which had already been 
drawn up in 1972, was “the regulation of historical and unsystematically growing relations 
between EEC and Mediterranean countries”.54 The idea was to make an offer of closer relations 
to basically all Mediterranean countries, starting off in the area of trade, in the hope that many 
or most of them would consequently be bound closer to the EEC.55 In essence, it was supposed 
to form a sort of common European Mediterranean policy. It was considered ‘global’ as, on 
the one hand, it brought together several separate trade agreements from the 1960s and, on the 
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other hand, it was directed to all Mediterranean states, simultaneously addressing the Balkan 
countries, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Israel as well as the Arab states.56 
However, the Approche Globale never took off. Located conceptually somewhere 
between EAD and EPC, it did not attract much interest from the region. By the end of 1974, 
the EEC had managed to initiate talks with only six countries.57 By the mid-1970s, focus on 
the Mediterranean was on the possible EEC accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal. As a 
result, the Approche Globale remained exclusively limited to trade topics such as agriculture 
and the service industry.58 Instead of becoming a global policy, the EEC chose the easier option 
of bilateral trade agreements with Israel (1975), as well as with the three Maghreb states of 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (1976).59 Ultimately, the Approache Globale never became a 
policy field of much value during the 1970s. However, it is noteworthy as it represents the 
origins of what in the 1990s turned into the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP) and the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UMP) during the 2000s.60 Just as much as these, the FRG was 
never particularly enthusiastic about the Approche Globale, once again confirming the notion 
that its focus on the Mediterranean as a comprehensive strategic arena had run out of steam by 
1973.61  
The third and final pillar of post-1973 European Middle Eastern policy remained the 
EPC. Unlike EAD or Approche Globale, it was almost solely focused on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as far as the Middle East was concerned. However, based not least on West German 
unease the Nine mostly took a back seat as far as peace efforts were concerned and gave 
Kissinger the space he asked for in pursuing agreements between the conflict parties of the 
October War.62 European engagement should only be viewed as “flanking measures rather than 
competition for your peace efforts”, as Brandt assured Nixon by letter in 1974.63 
Ideas about a more direct European involvement in peace measures, such as a British 
proposition on robust European participation in guarantees for a peace deal, were talked down 
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and silently dropped from the agenda of EPC meetings.64 Instead, in the aftermath of the 
October War discussions in the EPC would circle around the Palestinian question. The latter 
had taken centre stage within the Arab-Israeli conflict following the war. As has already been 
mentioned in Chapter III of this thesis, by late 1974 the UN were debating resolutions 
recognising the PLO as legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. When the issue was 
first discussed at an EPC meeting in September 1974, the Nine could not agree on a common 
position. While they decided to not actively fight the resolution, their preference was to avoid 
a vote on it altogether.65 A month later, the first of several Palestine-related resolutions made 
it to the floor of the UN General Assembly, inviting Arafat to give a speech at the UN. Hectic 
intra-European consultations took place: the French were pushing for ‘Yes’,66 the British for 
‘No’,67 and most of the other EEC members – including West Germany – hoped for a 
unanimous European abstention.68 In the end, UNGA resolution 3210 (XXIX) was accepted 
by an overwhelming majority of 104 to 4 votes, with 20 abstentions.69 Amongst the latter group 
was the FRG with most of the European states, while at the last minute Italy and Ireland had 
joined France in the ‘Yes’-camp. 
In November, two further resolutions were tabled, the first outlining the rights of the 
Palestinian people within the Arab-Israeli conflict and the second to make the PLO on observer 
at the UN. This time, the Nine managed to jointly abstain on the former. But on the latter, 
France – as so often intent of maintaining its ties to the Arab states – abstained while the other 
EEC states voted against the resolution.70  
Once again, the FRG felt let down by Europe when it came to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The West German envoy to the UN, Rüdiger von Wechmar, did not hold back on his criticism 
of the entire episode: “The effort to achieve a united European vote failed miserably.”71 A few 
months later, in March 1975, Bonn successfully proposed to establish a new working group 
within the EPC to improve European coordination at the UN.72 Consequently, the number of 
unanimous European votes increased in the following years, but, in particular on questions 
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Nine often openly displayed disagreement on the global 
 
64 See, for example, PA/AA (B130 9897A, unfoliated) 22.01.1974. Notes by Niemöller. 
65 PA/AA (B36 104867, unfoliated) 19.09.1974. Notes by Redies. 
66 PA/AA (B36 104867, unfoliated) 09.10.1974. Von Wechmar (New York) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
67 PA/AA (B36 104867, unfoliated) 11.10.1974a. Von Wechmar (New York) to Auswärtiges Amt 
68 PA/AA (B36 104867, unfoliated) 11.10.1974b. Von Wechmar (New York) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
69 PA/AA (B36 104867, unfoliated) 14.10.1974. Von Wechmar (New York) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
70 PA/AA (B36 104867, unfoliated) 23.11.1974. Notes by Jesser. 
71 PA/AA (B36 104867, unfoliated) 14.10.1974. Von Wechmar (New York) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
72 PA/AA (B36 109107, unfoliated) 14.03.1975. Intra-ministerial meeting on UN policy.  
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stage.73 It would take the establishment of the EU and its CFSP in the 1990s to achieve regular, 
united European voting behaviour at UN level.74 
Picture 10: Genscher meeting Tunisian foreign minister Fitouri during the UN General Assembly in New York in 
1979. Throughout the 1970s, engagement with the Arab states through the UN became an increasingly important 
task for Bonn’s foreign policy makers.75 
After the 1973 October War, the Nine reinvigorated their efforts towards a common European 
approach to the Middle East. Their policy was supposed to rest on three pillars: EAD, EPC and   
Approche Globale. Bonn’s initial attitude was mostly cautious, weary of pushing European 
projects ahead too far out of fear to antagonise the US and undermine their peace efforts in the 
Middle East.  All three policy fields proved hard to implement and ultimately failed to achieve 
the FRG’s desired goals. Yet, they lay the groundwork for the long-term consolidation of EU 
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5. Stagnation and take-off of EAD and EPC, 1975-1977 
The EAD had a difficult start. But the apparent breakdown of Kissinger’s efforts towards 
peace-making in the Middle East shook Bonn’s confidence in leaving the political stage to the 
US, only. As a result, Genscher in particular was now much more supportive of European 
initiatives, helping to get the EAD off the ground and to move the EPC towards more 
substantial policymaking on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
In July 1974, the Nine and the LAS had initiated the EAD at a meeting in Paris between the 
president of the EEC commission François-Xavier Ortoli, French foreign minister Jean 
Sauvagnargues, Kuwait’s foreign minister Sabah al-Sabah and LAS Secretary General 
Mahmoud Riad.76 In “friendly and constructive” conversations they had agreed on the 
European plan to start the dialogue with expert talks.77 The grand conference of ministers was 
spared for the culminating end of the EAD, and the experts were supposed to work towards it 
through their meetings in the EAD’s ‘General Commission’. 
However, from its start in November 1974, the work of the General Commission did 
not go as planned. The sticking point was the question of participation. The Arab League 
insisted that the PLO should be allowed to participate in the meetings of the General 
Commission. For the Nine, however, this risked the sort of politicisation and inclusion of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the EAD which they had assured Kissinger would not take place. 
Moreover, it would have indicated an implicit recognition of the PLO as representative of the 
Palestinian people.78 While the French proposed to give in to keep the EAD going, Britain, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the FRG objected to the participation of official PLO delegates 
at the EAD. In essence, for an entire year the project was stuck. The Europeans were caught 
between their commitment and belief in the value of the EAD on the one and their assurances 
to the USA on the other hand. Moreover, it is noteworthy that for the West Germans the EAD 
was not viewed from a perspective of Middle Eastern politics. A memorandum prepared for 
Genscher in December 1974 mentions the need to have better communication links with the 
Arabs in case of a renewed escalation in the Middle East. But it also once again connects 
European Middle Eastern policy to the inward-looking question of European integration: “The 
dialogue has great significance in terms of integration as to European cooperation.”79  
 
76 Sauvagnargues was present as France at the time held the rotating presidency of the council of the EEC. 
77 AAPD 24.07.1974. Document 222. Circular by Steffler. 
78 AAPD 18.12.1974. Document 379. Memorandum by Schirmer. 
79 Ibid.  
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Finally, after a year of deadlock, the Nine finally budged. Notes from an EEC foreign 
minister meeting in early 1975 show that this was linked to Kissinger’s inability to provide a 
peace deal in the Middle East and links the resumption of the EAD with the “abortion of 
Kissinger’s step-by-step approach [in the Middle East]”.80 In February 1975, the foreign 
ministers of the Nine met in Dublin and carved out a compromise formula. There would be one 
European and one Arab delegation at the General Commission, without any further breakdown 
of the delegations internally. This way, if there were Palestinian delegates at a meeting, they 
would still only be regarded as ‘Arab’ delegates. Moreover, the Nine stated that  
[t]he presence of Palestinian experts in the Arab delegation does not imply any 
acceptance by the Nine of claims by the PLO regarding its own status. Accordingly, 
it would be advisable to avoid any public statement concerning the status of 
Palestinian experts. In the event of a public statement being made [by the LAS], 
the Nine would also find it necessary to state their position publicly.81 
The Nine had opted for the EAD and against the Americans, clearly with Bonn’s approval. At 
least, for them the decision paid off in the short term. In July 1975, a second expert meeting 
within the structure of the EAD took place in Rome, which – as Italian foreign minister Mariano 
Rumor told Genscher – went “fairly well”.82  The Arab side ultimately agreed to the so-called 
“Dublin formula”.83 
Now, however, the problems within the EAD shifted to another issue. Having found a 
working compromise on the question of participation, the Nine and the Arabs started to diverge 
on the matter of topics. The Arabs pushed for an inclusion of political questions on the agenda, 
by which they obviously meant a discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Auswärtiges Amt 
was not thrilled about conceding the second red line it had drawn around the EAD in 1974 and 
wanted to keep discussions focused on technical questions. An expert meeting of the Nine in 
Rome even touched upon “Euro-Arab cooperation in questions of outer space”.84 However, 
this was just bureaucratic euphemism for the idea to sell the Arabs European communication 
satellites.  
But in further discussions on the political dimension it was not the FRG which was 
blocking compromise. In an April 1976 meeting the Dutch and British openly opposed the 
expansion of the EAD to include political questions. Wischnewski, by this time minister of 
state (Staatsminister) in the Auswärtiges Amt and West German representative at the meeting, 
 
80 AAPD 12./13.04.1975. Document 76. EEC foreign minister conference in Dublin. See also Chapter II. 
81 PA/AA (B21 108882, unfoliated) 13.02.1975. Gablentz (currently Dublin) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
82 AAPD 11.08.1975. Document 246. Conversation of Genscher with Rumor. 
83 PA/AA (B36 109107, unfoliated) 22.12.1975. Intra-ministerial meeting on the Middle East. 
84 PA/AA (B36 109111, unfoliated) 10.10.1975. Memorandum by Weigl. 
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pointed out that “the Arabs expect the discussion of political topics, too, and that the EAD 
would reach a critical stage if the Europeans would not acknowledge this”.85 By now the West 
German government valued the EAD too much to threaten it in principle. It therefore wanted 
to save the project from failure and push it ahead.  
Moreover, the Nine had come up with another compromise idea. They accepted in 
principle that political topics would feature in the EAD. A memorandum by the Auswärtiges 
Amt from August 1976 lists the issues the Nine were willing to address: Cyprus, the Balkans, 
the Horn of Africa, collective security in the Gulf, the Law of the Seas and even pollution in 
the Mediterranean.86 The one topic missing from this expansive list: the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
The Nine had budged on a number of questions and Bonn had turned from brake to 
catalyst of the EAD. Indeed, after years of stagnation it seemed like the compromises paid off. 
For the first time, the archival material conveys a sense of optimism and progress. In late 1976, 
LAS Secretary General Riad assured Brussels “that the Arab side wants to successfully 
continue the dialogue”.87 Notes from the second meeting of the General Commission in 
February 1977 cherish a “new, restrained negotiation style” of the Arabs.88 The meeting had 
“illustrated that the Arab side attaches increasing importance to the economic and technological 
dimension of the EAD”.89 Finally, the EAD started to pick up speed and develop a positive 
dynamic.  
Just as with the EAD, 1975 was a turning point for the EPC and its engagement with 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Until then, the Nine had mostly been passive on the topic, fighting 
diplomatic rear-guard action on questions such as the Palestine resolution at the UN. But as 
faith into Kissinger’s ability to deliver a Middle Eastern peace process faltered, the EPC started 
to move towards a more active attitude on the conflict.  
By April 1975, both the Egyptians and Saudis used Genscher’s first trip to the Middle 
East to float the idea that the Europeans should put pressure on Israel to make concessions in 
the Middle East. The Auswärtiges Amt disapproved of the idea, as Bonn would not support 
one-sided action against Israel. However, unlike in previous years, Bonn did not reject the 
principle that the Nine should get actively involved in the region as such, as long as a European 
initiative would address all states of the Middle East, both the Arabs and Israel.90 Two weeks 
 
85 AAPD 04.04.1976. Document 130. Circular by Engels.  
86 PA/AA (B43 116912, unfoliated) 25.08.1976. Memorandum by Jesser. 
87 AAPD 19.10.1976. Document 309. Circular by Engels. 
88 PA/AA (B21 111227, unfoliated) 03.03.1977. Notes by AS 32.  
89 Ibid. 
90 PA/AA (B36 109111, unfoliated) 30.04.1975. Lahn to Genscher. 
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after Genscher’s return, the Auswärtiges Amt drew up an elaborated memorandum on the idea 
of a European initiative. In essence, it considered different scenarios of a diplomatic demarche 
in Middle Eastern capitals, carried out either by the EEC presidency or the Nine in unison.91 In 
June 1975, the West Germans presented the idea at an EPC meeting. Due to British, Danish 
and Dutch objections, the idea was put on hold for the moment, as Washington had asked the 
Nine to wait for an upcoming review of US Middle Eastern policy.92 In the end, it was Danish 
opposition which stopped the demarche from coming to fruition. But it is noteworthy that it 
was the FRG which put the EPC on track for a more active engagement on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict after its more restrained attitude in the immediate aftermath of the October War.93  
Now, discussions within the EPC focused on an “evolution” of the 1973 Copenhagen 
Declaration.94 Together with France, Italy and Belgium the FRG pushed for a more pronounced 
recognition of the Palestinian dimension within the Arab-Israeli conflict. By January 1977, it 
was a West German proposition, coordinated closely with France, which managed to receive 
support within an EPC meeting.95 In June 1977, the European council published its declaration 
– the first on the Arab-Israeli conflict since November 1973 – in the aftermath of their London 
summit. The London Declaration repeated many of the points of the Copenhagen Declaration. 
Its most important addition was on the Palestinian question. The Nine no longer merely 
demanded a recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, but even went so far 
as to refer to a Palestinian “national identity […] which would take into account the need for a 
homeland for the Palestinian people”.96 Palestinian representatives should be included in 
negotiations “in an appropriate manner”97 even though French demands to specifically name 
the PLO in the declaration were rejected.98 
 
At the eve of Sadat’s trip to Israel, the Nine had significantly stepped up their engagement on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bonn had played an important role in this. Between 1973 and 1975, 
it had been crucial in staving off French efforts to push European engagement against US 
wishes. Then, after Kissinger’s inability to convert ceasefire agreements into lasting peace 
deals became increasingly apparent, the FRG internally drove the progress of the EAD and an 
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evolution of the EPC towards engagement on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the ground, too, 
European cooperation improved, as by 1977 the West German embassy in Damascus reported 
that “the ambassadors of the EEC member states are almost regularly meeting every month for 
a comprehensive exchange of ideas”.99 As a result of all this, the EAD had finally got going 
and the European position on the Arab-Israeli conflict became more pronounced. However, the 
fundamental problem of EPC remained its internal focus. In order to reach agreements, the 
members of the Nine polished texts and debated over wording as to include Dutch worries, 
French demands, British objections and West German ideas. The effect or meaning of these 
texts outside of European meeting rooms mattered less. The Arabs were usually disappointed 
by European restraint in criticising Israel, whereas the latter did not take the Nine too seriously. 
As Rabin told Genscher in 1975, when the West Germans were pushing the idea of a European 
demarche in the Middle East: “Whoever takes on a pronounced position (as the Nine had done 
in their [Copenhagen] declaration), loses the ability to exert influence.”100 
 
6. The breakdown of the European approach, 1977-1980 
Sadat’s trip to Israel shook up the geopolitics of the Middle East and challenged existing 
assumptions of European Middle Eastern policy. The EAD was now again brought to a 
standstill, hampered by internal Arab divisions and European indecisiveness. Within EPC, the 
Nine struggled to agree on a common position and fell back on a wait-and-see attitude. Only 
when Camp David did not materialise in a solution of the Palestinian question did they, West 
Germany included, agree on an openly pro-PLO and Israel-critical stance through the 1980 
Venice Declaration. But Europe’s statements, formulated far away from the Middle East with 
a focus on reaching inner-European consensus, proved incapable of developing a lasting impact 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
For the EAD, Sadat’s trip was like a death blow. The dialogue had just started to show some 
sort of positive dynamic. Now, differences about Palestinian participation or a discussion of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict were eclipsed by the ostracism of Egypt within the LAS. “Existing 
difficulties in administrative coordination and topical harmonisation, which were already 
almost unsurmountable, have only worsened with the current split of the Arab world”, a 1978 
memo by the Auswärtiges Amt states.101 Even though Bonn acknowledged that the EAD’s 
 
99 PA/AA (B21 111227, unfoliated) 23.03.1977. Damascus embassy to Auswärtiges Amt. 
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results thus far had been meagre, “the German position is that in the long term the dialogue has 
a ‘net function’ [Netzfunktion] and therefore has to be kept going”.102 In the words of a West 
German diplomat, the Nine considered it “unjustifiable to let the EAD fall asleep” and therefore 
wanted “to invest just about enough activity to keep it alive”.103  
But the EAD was beyond saving. On the Arab side, the hard-line countries such as Iraq 
or Syria had gotten the upper hand. Their appetite of engaging with the Nine, who were always 
so careful to find a compromise acceptable to everyone, was practically non-existent. The 
Europeans did what they could to salvage the dialogue. They engaged in a much more Israel-
critical attitude in their dealings with the EAD and agreed to recognise the new LAS with its 
headquarters in Tunis, even though this publicly weakened Sadat.104 Genscher and British 
foreign minister Owen even discussed launching a new, Euro-Arab-African Dialogue, a 
desperate and rather bizarre idea in view of the EAD’s stagnation.105 But nothing the Europeans 
did would rekindle Arab interest in the EAD. Not even the return of Egypt to the LAS in 1989 
changed this, as “[t]he outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990 brought a definitive close to the 
conversation”.106 The Nine had invested a lot of political capital in pursuing France’s political 
pet project against US objections. After initial hesitation, Bonn had gotten behind the EAD, 
only to ultimately validate Kissinger’s scepticism of the whole idea. 
European efforts towards a stronger engagement in the peace process were also 
challenged by Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem. A common European statement on the issue was 
blocked by France, to Schmidt’s and Genscher’s displeasure.107 At the same time, both were 
as unsure about how to react to the unfolding Camp David process from a European perspective 
as the other EEC members. On the one hand, Sadat enjoyed a particularly high standing in 
Bonn. On the other hand, too open support for him would have jeopardised European attempts 
to build better relations with the other Arab states. In a meeting in December 1977, the 
European heads of governments and their foreign ministers agreed to wait and see.108 In the 
run-up to Camp David, the Nine held back on openly criticising Israel, as per US demands and 
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against Egyptian wishes.109 When after the Camp David accords the Saudis in particular 
pressed the Nine for a critical statement, the latter refused again.110 For more than a year, EPC 
was in limbo as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned. Then, the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty from March 1979 made it clear that a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
would not be achieved. Now, the Nine managed to agree to a cautiously sceptical statement. It 
applauded the peace treaty but stressed that it could only be a first step towards a broader peace, 
pointing to the rights of the Palestinians and criticising Israel’s settlement policy.111  
But the European desire to find a balanced stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict had, over 
the past two years, led to an indecisive back-and-forth which had cost the EEC its credibility 
in the region. In fact, the Nine’s statement did not even meet significant opposition, since, as a 
West German diplomat noted, it was not given much attention in the Middle East in the first 
place.112 An informal meeting of the EPC foreign ministers in France in May 1979 showed the 
dilemma all too clearly. Everyone agreed on their discontent with Camp David. And yet there 
was no consensus on what should follow from this. The French wanted to put more pressure 
on Begin personally, but the British and West Germans objected. Genscher preferred to focus 
on “outlining a perspective for the Palestinian question”.113 Ultimately, the Nine could only 
agree to postpone further discussions on the topic.  
 
There was a growing sense of frustration with European irrelevance in the Middle East. At the 
same time, other problems such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led to a shift of focus 
away from the region. In this context, Bonn agreed to the Nine issuing their strongest statement 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict yet. In June 1980, a meeting of the European council in Venice 
passed a new declaration on the Middle East, which called for an end of Israeli occupation as 
well as for a participation of the PLO in peace talks as representative of the Palestinian 
people.114 With this, however, the Europeans lost support in Washington and Tel Aviv while 
gaining fewer friends amongst the Arab states than they had expected.115 Until the EU aligned 
its position with the Madrid process and later the Oslo peace process in the 1990s, European 
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policy making on the Arab-Israeli conflict would not go much further than the Venice 
Declaration. 
 
7. Conclusion: Functionalism and early European policy making in the Middle East 
The emergence of European Middle Eastern policy lies in the 1970s. During this decade, 
attempts to coordinate a joint position amongst the Nine, in particular regarding the Arab-
Israeli conflict, went through a number of iterations. Starting with high-hopes, EPC 
immediately reached a dead-end with controversy around the Schumann Document. The crises 
of 1973 helped to reinvigorate European efforts towards the Middle East. A three-pronged 
approach of EPC, EAD and Approche Globale was supposed to provide a comprehensive 
European policy towards the Middle East. But in all three areas, the Nine were unable to meet 
their own expectations. By 1980 the EAD was an empty shell, Approche Globale downgraded 
to a select number of bilateral trade agreements, and EPC stuck in its own contradictions. 
An early West German hope about the European element of its ‘Arab policy’ never 
materialised: initially, Bonn had ventured that it would be able to escape the guardrails of its 
Middle Eastern policy within a European framework. There, it would be able to think and act 
more freely, less constrained by the burden of its historical obligations to Israel. But this proved 
to be wishful thinking, as Israel was deeply critical of European policies towards the Middle 
East and rightly saw the more pro-Arab hand of France behind many of them. When criticising 
an EPC project, Israel usually targeted West Germany. “In fact, the Israelis have focused almost 
exclusively on us in this regard,” Redies complained in 1974.116 
Yet, the West German government also saw a value in European engagement in the 
Middle East. By the late 1970s, Bonn had turned from sceptic to true believer in the EAD, 
appreciating what the Auswärtiges Amt termed the dialogue’s “net function”.117 However, 
engagement for EPC and EAD was strongly moderated by US policies and demands. Between 
1973 and 1975, the FRG held back the French from pushing ahead with formulating stronger 
European positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only when Kissinger’s peace efforts faltered 
in 1975 did Bonn support a more pronounced European stance on the Middle East. A similar 
dynamic can be observed in the aftermath of Sadat’s journey to Israel, as Bonn helped to 
restrain the EPC before Camp David. It only supported clearer European positions such as the 
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1980 Venice Declaration after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which had disappointed West 
German hopes for a more comprehensive peace deal in the Middle East. 
Crucially, however, it becomes clear how much for West Germany European Middle 
Eastern policy ultimately was about something entirely unrelated to the Middle East: in 
essence, EPC or EAD were soon judged by their contributions to European integration. Their 
success was largely measured by whether the Nine had achieved internal unity – an endeavour 
so time-consuming that little thought was actually spared on what effect certain policies would 
have ‘on the ground’ in the Middle East. The FRG approached European foreign policy from 
the angle of functionalism, hoping that positive spill over effects would promote the European 
project as a whole.118 A memorandum by the Auswärtiges Amt from 1978 is telling in this 
regard. At a time when the EAD was halted and EPC in the Middle East in limbo, it hailed 
European successes such as coordinating the Nine’s voting behaviour at the UN.  
European unification is based upon integration within EEC and EPC, which help 
to avoid interfering or even destructive effects on the community from areas, where 
willingness to integration does not exist yet. In the long-term, this lays the 
groundwork for internal development [towards further integration].119 
Consequently, despite the shortcomings of European engagement in the Middle East, for West 
Germany the only response to failure was more Europe. In 1971, Bernd von Staden had argued 
that despite the escapade surrounding the Schumann Document disengagement from EPC was 
no option for the FRG.120 His assessment remained true for years to come. 
This chapter has expanded upon existing research on the emergence of European 
foreign policy by focusing on the perspective of one EEC member state, the FRG.121 It has 
provided a more nuanced and detailed analysis of the interaction between European and West 
German Middle Eastern policy, adding new understanding to previous work on this topic such 
as by Neustadt.122 It has shown that, for West Germany, the interaction between the European 
and US dimension of Middle Eastern politics as well as the link between EPC and European 
integration were crucial. It therefore complements and provides new understanding to existing 
research strands both on EU studies and German politics.   
European policy making on the Middle East during the 1970s was a fundamentally more 
inward- than outward-looking exercise. But for Bonn, this was often sufficient; it avoided 
 
118 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (2000): 20-74; Haas, Uniting of Europe (1958). 
119 PA/AA (B21 112902, unfoliated) 07.04.1978. Notes by 200. 
120 AAPD 26.10.1971. Document 369. Notes by von Staden. 
121 Moeckli, European foreign policy during the Cold War (2009): Sattler, Institutionalisierung europäischer 
Nahostpolitik (2017); Jacobs, Problematische Partner (2008); Jawad, Euro-Arab Relations (1992). 
122 Neustadt, Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen im Schatten der EG-Nahostpolitik (1983). 
 190 
controversy and served the greater purpose of European integration through instruments such 
as the EPC. Ironically, the more disappointing the European dimension of its Middle Eastern 
policy was, the more important it became for Bonn.  
Picture 11: European and Arab leaders meet in February 2019 for a summit of EU and Arab League. It is telling 
that the EAD found no reference at the meeting.123 
Today, the EU has mostly been relegated to the role of bystander in the geopolitics of the 
Middle East.124 In 2019, a European project reminiscent of the EAD does not seem to cause 
too many worries outside of the EU. There was no outcry from Washington and no criticism 
from Israel in response to the EU-LAS summit in Sharm el Sheikh. Nothing to remind of the 
bitter infighting amongst the Western allies about the EAD back in 1974. Not even the 
European leaders themselves seemed to remember the historical precedent of their summit. Of 
course, this time they went about the whole project the other way around – letting it start with 
rather than culminate in a conference of ministers. At the end of their Sharm el Sheikh meeting, 
the conference participants agreed to keep their dialogue going, with the next meeting 
scheduled for 2021 in Brussels. Perhaps then will we be able to get a better sense as to whether 
the EU-LAS summits will tie into the legacy of the EAD. In view of how the latter played out, 
one can only hope that they do not.  
 
123 Deutsche Welle, Terror, migration dominate EU and Arab League's first summit (25.02.2019). 
124 Palacio, Ana. Europe on the Sidelines. Project Syndicate (13.02.2016). 
 191 
Conclusion: Disappointment and West German-Arab relations, 
1967-1979 
The ‘tradition of German-Arab friendship’ has been more legend than 
reality. 
Beginning of a memorandum by the Auswärtiges Amt, 19691 
 
The political relationship with the Federal Republic [of Germany] is 
still ambivalent; it is characterised emotionally by Arab, in a sense 
disappointed, love […], but rationally receptive to German work of 
quality, for which even a high price will be payed. 
Report by West German ambassador to Libya, Günter Franz Werner, 
19742 
 
“The ‘tradition of German-Arab friendship’ has been more legend than reality,” is the first line 
of a memorandum by the Auswärtiges Amt on West German-Arab relations.3 It was written in 
1969, at a time when diplomats like the Auswärtiges Amt’s State Secretary Ferdinand von 
Duckwitz regularly referred to this alleged “tradition of friendly relations between Germany 
and the Arab states”.4 The apparent contradiction between such statements and the memo puts 
in a nutshell the nature, predicament and ambiguity which characterised West German-Arab 
relations during the period studied in this thesis. Bonn’s high hopes for what it considered an 
‘Arab policy’ were often marked by wishful thinking rather than by sober realism.  
Still, the 1970s were the only period after World War II when the FRG at least attempted 
to have a specific ‘Arab policy’. The key finding of this thesis, therefore, is that an ‘Arab 
policy’ temporarily existed in West Germany, even if it did not unfold as successfully as either 
the FRG or Arab leaders might have hoped. This West German ‘Arab policy’ evolved around 
the dimensions of the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian question, as well as 
oil politics. These factors were increasingly interlinking and overlaid with the emerging 
element of common European foreign policy making.  
The main factor behind this stronger focus on the Arab states were Cold War dynamics. 
For this, the 1967 June War was a watershed moment, as it embedded the regional, Arab-Israeli 
conflict into the global Cold War more than ever.5 As a result, Bonn feared that an escalation 
of the Cold War in the Middle East would spill over to Europe and West Germany. In addition, 
 
1 PA/AA (B36 271, p. 258) 14.11.1967. Lahn (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
2 PA/AA (B36 104844, unfoliate) 09.09.1974. Werner (Tripoli) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
3 PA/AA (B36 271, p. 258) 14.11.1967. Lahn (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
4 AAPD 08.02.1968. Document 50. Conversation of Duckwitz with the head of the office of the Arab League, 
Cabani. The same wording was used by Brandt in an interview for Egyptian television (AAPD 21.02.1972. 
Document 35. Notes by Scheel) or in a conversation of State Secretary Frank with Egypt’s National Security 
Advisor Ismael (PA/AA (B130 9981A, unfoliated) 08.03.1973. Notes by Redies). 
5 Citino, The Middle East and the Cold War (2019): 449.  
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from 1969 onwards chancellor Willy Brandt was afraid that his Ostpolitik could be unhinged 
by conflict in the Mediterranean. Secondly, the FRG felt the genuine need to contribute to 
halting a Soviet advance in the more left-leaning Arab states. One of the prime manifestations 
of this motivation was Bonn’s temporary focus on the Western Mediterranean during West 
Germany’s ‘Mediterranean Moment’, a key new finding of this thesis.6 Cut out from the 
Mashreq, necessity and opportunity led the FRG to temporarily shift its focus to the Maghreb. 
But difficult relations with Algeria and Libya, as well as the opening up of Egypt to the West 
ultimately led Bonn to abandon its prioritisation of North Africa. Moreover, after the October 
War, the perception of a Soviet advance in the Mediterranean subsided. Even the 1979 split of 
the Arab League did not, as Bonn had initially feared, lead to a resurgence of the Soviets in 
Middle Eastern geopolitics. Thirdly, in particular before 1972, German-German antagonism 
tied the FRG to the Middle East. Bonn was intent on preventing the GDR’s diplomatic 
breakthrough in the Arab states. Even after the end of the Hallstein Doctrine in 1969, “[West 
German] Arab policy has to be seen in conjunction with our Eastern- and German policy”, as 
Scheel himself stated. It took until the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies for this 
linkage to be dissolved.7 Unlike Trentin or Maeke, who stress the antagonism between FRG 
and GDR in the Middle Eastern arena, I find evidence for a significant relaxation of German-
German relations there post-1972.8 Increasingly, the relationship between East and West 
German diplomats in most Arab countries was characterised by managed co-existence of 
cooperation with elements of competition. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict shaped West German Middle Eastern policy as a whole, even 
though it did not initially cause the increased focus of the social-liberal coalition on the Arab 
states. Before 1970, the FRG quite actively tried to keep out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But 
the latter’s continuation helped Cold War antagonism persist in the Middle East. Moreover, its 
presence hindered a smooth implementation of Brandt’s concept for an ‘even-handed’ Middle 
Eastern policy. On top of that, from 1970 onwards the issue of Israel-Palestine arrived on West 
German soil through the spill-over of Palestinian terrorism. As a result, Brandt in particular 
increased his engagement with the Arab-Israeli conflict, even entertaining ideas about a more 
direct involvement in mediation between key conflict parties. In the aftermath of the 1973 
October War, Schmidt and Genscher followed a more restrained attitude. They first put their 
hopes on Kissinger, then on a European approach to broker lasting peace in the Middle East. 
 
6 Hirsch, The Arab world, the Cold War and West Germany’s ‘Mediterranean moment’ (2020). 
7 AAPD 11.02.1970. Document 48. Memorandum by Gehlhoff. 
8 Maeke, DDR und PLO (2017); Trentin, Tough negotiations (2008). 
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However, Genscher in particular remained preoccupied personally with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, launching a major trip to the Arab states in 1979 to gauge prospects for an expansion 
of the Camp David accords into a more comprehensive peace deal. But after Brandt had 
unsuccessfully toyed with the idea of involving the FRG more directly in a Middle Eastern 
peace process, Bonn seemed to have accepted that such engagement was too costly, too risky 
and too complex to single-handedly invest in. 
Palestinian terrorism had forced West Germany to pay more attention to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. As other states, too, the FRG for a long time considered the Palestinian question 
primarily as one of refugees, not of nationhood. During the 1960s, it even saw a silver lining 
to the issue of Palestinian refugees, as aid to them allowed to improve Bonn’s standing in states 
such as Egypt or Lebanon. But from 1970 onwards, terrorism and the international 
transformation of the Palestinian question spurred the development of a West German policy 
towards Palestine. On this, the Bonn government was merely reactive. By the end of the decade, 
it in effect recognised both a two-state solution and a role for the PLO in the conclusion of an 
Arab-Israeli peace deal. More active were efforts by the Auswärtiges Amt to establish a variety 
of links to the Palestinian movement, including its violent elements, throughout the 1970s. 
These attempts at using diplomacy as counterterrorism meant that by the end of the decade 
Bonn disposed of an intricate network of communication to the Palestinian movement.9 
Just as profound as the development of Bonn’s stance towards the Palestinian issue was 
the emergence and transformation of a West German oil policy. The FRG was a latecomer to 
the geopolitics of oil. In response to the 1967 mini oil-boycott, the West German government 
focused on the sphere of industry, rather than diplomacy. It initiated the creation of a West 
German ‘oil champion’, DEMINEX. But not only was the company underfunded; by 1971, the 
structure of the oil market was changing profoundly, with power moving away from the large 
oil companies towards the – mostly Arab – oil producing states. The usefulness of DEMINEX 
was reducing. Although the West German government had started to conceptualise a coherent 
oil policy in 1971, the latter’s shortcomings were laid bare by the 1973 oil crisis. Now, the 
energy issue became a priority in West German foreign policy, causing a real rift between Bonn 
and Washington. In addition, the Auswärtiges Amt now turned its attention to upgrading West 
Germany’s thus far underdeveloped relations with the Arab Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia 
became a particular focal point of West German efforts, before in 1979 the second oil crisis 
 
9 Hirsch, Politics as counterterrorism (2020). 
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and the Siege of Mecca caused doubts about both the necessity and the benefit of its focus on 
the Gulf.  
Throughout the 1970s, a previously non-existent European dimension was added to 
West German relations with the Arab states. As of 1971, the EEC members attempted to 
coordinate their stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict through the EPC. From late 1973 
onwards, the EAD was added to this. Overall, Bonn’s attitude in these forums was supportive, 
even though this support was conditional: in 1971, Israeli objections led Bonn to distance itself 
from the Schumann Document, and in 1973/74 the FRG put the brakes on the EAD due to US 
concerns. Also, EPC and EAD remained slow and complicated institutional frameworks, which 
hardly yielded any material policy gains in the Middle East itself. However, despite this, 
Bonn’s generally favourable view on a European approach to the Middle East never wavered 
and even grew stronger regardless of any setbacks. After all, the Auswärtiges Amt largely saw 
a functionalist benefit from EPC or EAD, considering them on the basis of their contributions 
to further European integration. 
Geographically, West Germany’s ‘Arab policy’ shifted its focus from the Maghreb in 
the late 1960s to the Mashreq in the early 1970s and then to the Gulf in the late 1970s. As for 
agency, the clearest break was between the Grand Coalition and the social-liberal coalition. 
Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger never appreciated the strategic value of the Arab states. Willy 
Brandt, however, had given the Arab states more attention from the Six-Day War onwards, 
which led his government into taking them more into consideration in 1969. In 1973, he 
focused strongly on the Arab-Israeli conflict and even entertained the idea of a personal role 
for himself in a peace process before the October War. His foreign minister Scheel took a more 
sober view on the West German role in the Middle East and was content with strengthening 
Bonn’s bilateral ties to the Arab states. From 1974 onwards, the distribution of roles would be 
exactly the other way around: Chancellor Schmidt refrained from too much engagement in the 
region, whereas his foreign minister Genscher in particular in the context of EPC was time and 
again willing to turn his attention to the Middle East. Overall, strategic interests had drawn the 
FRG closer to the Arab states from 1967 onwards, but the constellation of the West German 
political actors involved considerably influenced the shape of West German-Arab relations in 
this period. 
Attempts at a coherent West German ‘Arab policy’ dissipated by the end of the 1970s. 
On the one hand, Bonn’s hope that re-opening its embassies in all Arab states would almost 
automatically ensure smoother political relations with them did not materialise after 1975. On 
the other hand, any pretences about the existence of a coherent ‘Arab world’ were no longer 
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sustainable after Egypt’s eviction from the Arab League in 1979.10 Finally, the dynamics of the 
Cold War, which had originally tied the FRG’s perceived political interests closer to the Arab 
states, were now moving West Germany’s focus away from the region: by 1980, détente was 
threatened by the emergence of the Second Cold War in Europe itself.11 In the Middle East, the 
Soviet Union mostly found itself locked out of the geopolitical arena. The region was no longer 
a battleground for German-German antagonism. The Arab-Israeli conflict was not solved, but 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty at least limited the risk of broader war on one of its previous 
main fronts. Energy security started to be dominated by debates around gas deals with the 
Soviet Union or oil in the North Sea, rather than focusing on the Middle East. In short, the 
West German shift of focus to the Arab states had first failed to fully pay off politically, before 
ultimately both the points of reference and the strategic necessities underlying it disappeared. 
Of course, the FRG would continue to have relations with the Arab states. But no further 
attempts at a West German ‘Arab policy’, or indeed the open formulation of a West German 
Middle Eastern policy, would be made after 1980. Maybe the repeated setbacks of Bonn’s 
‘Arab policy’ explain why so far it has been neglected by studies on the FRG in the Middle 
East.  
 
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, West German Middle Eastern policy can be 
understood as a coin, the two sides of which represent relations to Israel and to the Arab states, 
respectively. This thesis has studied the latter in detail. But what do its results tell us about the 
coin in its entirety, and of West German Middle Eastern policy more generally? 
Brandt’s ‘policy of even-handedness’ in the Middle East was supposed to ensure a 
balanced West German stance towards Israel and the Arab states. On one hand, this clearly was 
an upgrade in priority of the Arab states for the FRG. On the other, relations never really were 
entirely ‘even-handed’. Ultimately, as Chapter I has shown, the concept of ‘even-handedness’ 
was at its core a symbolic signal to the Arab states as to the increased appreciation of their 
importance in Bonn. When in doubt, however, Bonn put its relations to Israel over those to the 
Arab states. There was no even-handedness in financial aid, which disproportionally benefited 
Israel. During the October War, the FRG tolerated the American airlift to Israel despite threats 
of an Arab oil boycott. Despite all efforts towards an ‘Arab policy’, the Bonn government 
therefore never really followed up attempts to escape the special relationship to Israel. Bonn’s 
 
10 See, for example, AAPD 09.06.1969. Document 193. Memorandum by political units I and III; reg: German-
Arab relations; or AAPD 06.03.1979. Document 69. Schlagintweit (Jeddah) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
11 Halliday, Making of the Second Cold War (1983). 
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support to Tel Aviv remained stable, despite sporadic attempts to cooperate more with the Arab 
states. 
Probably the only author so far who has attempted to conceptualise the two sides of 
West Germany’s Middle Eastern policy in conjunction is Joffe, who sees the FRG conflicted 
between ‘realpolitic’ drawing it to the Arab states and ‘moralpolitic’ drawing it to Israel. But 
as De Vita has only recently shown, a mere reduction of West German-Israeli relations to 
morality is too simplistic.12 Bonn’s early relations to Israel, too, followed geo-strategic interests 
within a Cold War setting. 
Rather, as I have shown in Chapter I, West German Middle Eastern policy during the 
period of study for this thesis resembles the distinction between diffuse and specific support. 
Borrowing this concept from Easton, I argue that the FRG reserved diffuse support in the 
Middle East for Israel, even though on specific issues it would cooperate well with the Arab 
states.13 Ultimately, the nature of diffuse support for Israel related to a multiplicity of factors, 
such as historical obligation, moral pressure and geostrategic interest regarding Tel Aviv. No 
similar configuration of factors existed as far as Bonn’s relations to the Arab states were 
concerned.  
 
This thesis relates most directly to a broader strand of research on Germany’s role in the Middle 
East from the beginning of the 20th century onwards. What do its results tell us about 
“continuities and discontinuities” in Germany’s relationship with this region and the Arab 
states in particular?14 There are some remarkable continuities. Just as in the first part of the 20th 
century, the Middle East was not in and of itself an area of strategic relevance; its importance 
derived from its links to the geopolitics of Central Europe. Also, just as Wilhelmine Germany 
or the Third Reich, the FRG struggled to naturally assume a political role in the Middle East 
as a whole. Similar to its predecessors, Bonn’s strategy for the Arab states was mostly inward-
looking. Foreign policy elites in Bonn overestimated the potential of building stronger bonds 
to the Arab states and the ease with which that would be possible. Consequently, schemes 
drawn up to strengthen ‘German-Arab friendship’ did not materialise. 
But, of course, key differences to the first half of the 20th century are visible. The FRG 
was no longer part of ‘great power politics’ in the Middle East – nor did it ever see itself as 
 
12 De Vita, Israelpolitik (2020). 
13 Easton, A re-assessment of the concept of political support (1975). 
14 Smith, Helmut Walser. The continuities of German history: nation, religion, and race across the long 
nineteenth century. (Cambridge, 2008).  
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such. Chapter II has also shown that during the 1970s the link between World War II and West 
German Middle Eastern policy was becoming weaker.  Personal links to the Nazi-period were 
disappearing. Jelinek and De Vita show how in the 1960s there was some continuity of thinking 
on the relevance of the Arab states in the Auswärtiges Amt from the years of the Third Reich.15 
However, while there certainly were some remnants of such tradition, during the 1970s the 
personal connections of the Auswärtiges Amt to the Nazi-era were breaking. Key diplomats 
such as State Secretary (1970-74) Paul Frank or Walter Jesser, who worked on the Middle East 
for more than a decade, had joined the Auswärtiges Amt only in the 1950s.16 Unlike Kiesinger, 
neither Brandt, Scheel, Genscher nor Schmidt had been NSDAP members.17 Historical legacies 
do not disappear from institutions such as ministries over night, but during the period studied 
for this thesis the shadow of the Third Reich over West German policy towards the Arab states 
was fading out. The further away we move from 1945, the more discontinuity shaped the FRG’s 
relations to the Arab states.  
The study of the FRG’s foreign policy from 1949 onwards is also the story of West 
Germany’s return to the international stage as it gradually reclaimed sovereignty and 
independence in foreign policy making. Authors such as Haftendorn or Ash show how the 
years of Ostpolitik were a key juncture in this endeavour.18 This representation is confirmed by 
the results of this thesis, as it becomes clear how in Europe’s adjacent region, too, the FRG 
from 1969 onwards sought its own political path more independently, assertively and 
confidently.  
Finally, as Chapter I has also shown, this thesis provides new insights for the study of 
external powers in the Middle East, wherein the topic of German-Arab relations after World 
War II has, so far, not received a lot of scholarly attention. Here, this gap is closed a bit further. 
Moreover, this thesis provides a detailed foreign political analysis of West Germany’s oil 
policy and the development of its stance on the Palestinian question. To my knowledge, similar 
studies are missing in such detail for other major external powers in the Middle East such as 
France or the UK. Finally, this thesis has shown how Brandt’s concept of an ‘even-handed’ 
Middle Eastern policy struggled with the challenge that a coherent ‘Arab world’ did not exist. 
 
15 De Vita, Israelpolitik (2020); Jelinek, Deutschland und Israel 1945-1965 (2004). 
16 Jesser was West German delegate in Cairo (1969-1972) and Ministerial Director with a responsibility for the 
Middle East (1972-1978). 
17 There is still some unclarity about Scheel’s membership in the Nazi party. In 1978, Scheel declared that he 
had been included in the party in 1942 without him ever applying for membership (Der Spiegel, Carstens: Ich 
habe so dunkle Erinnerungen. (13.11.1978)). 
18 Haftendorn, Kurswechsel (2006); Ash, Timothy Garton. In Europe's name: Germany and the divided 
continent. (London, 1993). 
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In fact, the FRG was usually forced to contend with Israel on the one and at least two Arab 
camps on the other hand. I argue that this challenge of purporting a ‘policy of dual-
evenhandedness’ was not unique to the FRG but might also serve as a suitable framework for 
the engagement of other external powers in the Middle East during the Cold War. 
 
A number of theoretical conclusions come out of this dissertation. Bonn’s hope that the 
establishment of embassies in the Arab states would significantly add to its political clout was 
only fulfilled in part. As literature on diplomatic theory stipulates, diplomatic representation is 
a necessary condition “to buy into and operate within the system”.19 But it is by no means 
sufficient. Fink’s excellent study of West Germany and Israel in the 1960s shows how relations 
between the FRG and Israel on a diplomatic level were underpinned by network building 
beyond the level of the state.20 But there were no similar efforts made to organise school class 
exchanges with Arab states. No West German students worked on Arab farms, as they did in 
the Israeli Kibbutz. Thus, the importance of the substance of diplomatic relations and not just 
their structure become clear in this study and deserves attention in diplomatic theory more 
generally.21  
Similarly, Chapter IV in particular suggests that a sort of cultural distance persisted 
between West German diplomats and their Arab hosts. Here, one can point to ambassador 
Schlagintweit’s 1979 lines on the “religious-fanatical aggression which corresponds to the 
desert” of Saudi Arabia or ambassador Kuntzmann depictions of what he considered archaic 
practices of rule in the UAE.22 This shows how a focus on diplomatic culture, which so far 
sadly lacks clear theoretical underpinning, can substantiate a study of diplomatic relations.23  
Finally, this thesis was approached from a perspective of political psychology, 
attempting not so much to write history ‘as it was’, but trying to understand how key actors 
perceived the issues, interests and dynamics around their work.24 Today, for instance, we know 
that from 1967 onwards the Soviet Union was on a back-foot in the Middle East. However, as 
 
19 Spies, Yolanda Kemp. Global Diplomacy and International Society. (Basingstoke, 2018). 
20 Fink, West Germany and Israel (2019). 
21 Berridge, Diplomacy (2015); Rana, Kishan. The 21st century ambassador: plenipotentiary to chief executive. 
(Msida, 2004). 
22 PA/AA (B36 119948, unfoliated) 22.11.1979. Schlagintweit (Jeddah) to Auswärtiges Amt; PA/AA (B36 
104921, unfoliated) 13.07.1974. Kunzmann (Abu Dhabi) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
23 McDonnel, Fiona, and Jason Dittmer. Diplomatic Culture. In: Constantinou, Costas, Pauline Kerr and Paul 
Sharp (eds). The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy. (Los Angeles, 2016): 104-13; Kappeler, Dietrich. The birth 
and evolution of a diplomatic culture. In: Slavik, Hannah (ed). Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy. 
(Malta/Geneva, 2004): 353-60. 
24 Rapport, Cognitive approaches to foreign policy analysis (2017); Levy, Psychology and Foreign Policy 
Decision Making (2013). 
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the first chapter has shown, in the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War, the FRG and its 
Western allies instead viewed Moscow’s status in the Arab states as strengthened. It is this 
latter assumption which motivated West German policy towards the Arab states. From a 
perspective of political psychology, the often inward-looking nature of West German policy 
making regarding the Arab states is also noteworthy. One example is the functionalist nature 
of EPC, described in detail in the fifth chapter. Another is the use of comparison by West 
German policymakers as described in Chapter II of this thesis. As soon as Ostpolitik had borne 
fruit, Brandt, Scheel and later Genscher repeatedly used it as a model to convince both Arabs 
and Israel to enter direct talks.25 Their personal experiences shaped their perspective on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, despite repeated assurances by both Israeli and Arab leaders that the 
comparison was inadequate for the Middle East.26 Just a few years earlier, in 1967, it had been 
Bonn’s diplomats who openly rejected Arab attempts to link Deutschland- with Nahostpolitik, 
as Arab representatives started to compare the division of Berlin by the Soviets with the 
division of Jerusalem by Israel.27 The compatibility of global phenomena was shaped through 
an egocentric lens, which tells us something about the possibility, as well as difficulty, of 
bridging differences of perspective and position in international diplomacy. 
 
What future research agendas come out of this thesis? Through this dissertation, I hope that I 
have been able to show that there is value in pursuing further studies on German-Arab relations 
in the post-war period. For example, this thesis has highlighted how diversely the relaxation of 
German-German relations of 1972 played out internationally. How did what Fulbrook calls the 
FRG’s and GDR’s “mutual antagonism and self-definition” manifest itself once the Hallstein-
Doctrine and Alleinvertretung had been abandoned?28 Chapter I has illustrated how, in Egypt, 
the West German ambassador reported an immediate improvement of relations ‘on the ground’ 
with his East German counterpart, while his colleague in Sudan complained about continued 
obstruction by the East German embassy. De Vita has only recently shown how a simultaneous 
study of both East and West Germany can bring new understanding to topics which have 
already been studied in depth separately. In view of the under-researched nature of Bonn’s 
foreign political relations to the Arab states it was a conscious decision to only focus on the 
West German dimension in this thesis. Nonetheless, and not least in view of the results of the 
 
25 See Chapter II.3. 
26 See, for example, AAPD 30.05.1973. Document 170. Notes by Redies; AAPD 05.06.1973. Document 176. 
Steltzer (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt; AAPD 07./08.06.1973. Document 184. German-Israeli government talks. 
27 AAPD 27.11.1967. Document 404. Pauls (Tel Aviv) to Auswärtiges Amt.  
28 Fulbrook, German Identity after the Holocaust (1999): 2. 
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research presented here, the trans- and international impact of German-German relations in the 
second half of the Cold War deserves further scholarly attention.  
Moreover, in the plethora of research done over the past decade on Germany in the 
Middle East, the absence of studies using Arab sources is as obvious as it is regrettable. Of 
course, access to government archives might be either difficult or even unrealistic to obtain in 
some cases.29 But then newspaper articles, autobiographies or oral history sources could 
represent a path into exploring the ‘Arab perspective’ on relations with Germany and its role 
in the Middle East. 
Finally, this thesis as a history of foreign-political relations between Bonn and the ‘Arab 
world’ has mostly engaged with official sources of diplomacy, such as government material or 
documents of key politicians. But as I have concluded above, the struggle of West German 
diplomats to fill relations to the Arab states with life shows us how much successful diplomacy 
requires social and cultural networks, which go beyond the official channels of embassies and 
government consultations. The approach of New Diplomatic History conceptualises diplomatic 
relations beyond the echelons of foreign ministers or senior diplomats.30 More research on the 
sub-state dimension of German-Arab relations during the Cold War can only be welcomed. 
These are all suggestions of where the study of German-Arab relations could or should 
move in the future. But they go beyond the limits of this thesis, which provides new, explorative 
research on West German foreign policy towards the Arab states during the 1960s and 1970s. 
It sheds light on an area which has not often received attention, as the FRG’s Middle Eastern 
policy has usually been analysed through a focus on Israel – even in studies such a Gerlach’s 
Doppelte Front, where the Arab states are extensively dealt with.31 At the centre of this thesis 
are the Cold War and Central European geopolitics; while the former has subsided, the latter 
still links Germany to the Middle East. To give but one example, in 2015 a stream of refugees 
connected the country directly with the civil war in Syria. This thesis has also provided a more 
nuanced understanding of West Germany’s stance to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the European 
dimension of Bonn’s Middle Eastern policy, while also providing entirely new analyses on the 
emergence of the FRG’s oil politics and its diplomatic stance on the question of Palestine. 
Consequently, I argue with confidence that what has been written here helps us understand 
German-Arab relations better not only for the period of 1967 to 1979, but also beyond.  
 
29 An example to the contrary is Connelly, Matthew. Rethinking the Cold War and decolonization: the grand 
strategy of the Algerian war for independence. International Journal of Middle East Studies 33:2 (2001): 221-
45. 
30 Mori, The State of the Art (2019). 
31 Gerlach, Doppelte Front (2006). 
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The prospect of a West German ‘Arab policy’ was indeed “more legend than reality”.32 
The Bonn government had put high hopes in the strengthening of its bonds to the Arab states 
and worked hard to re-open embassies in their capitals. But despite the ultimate success of this 
endeavour, the relationship remained difficult, complicated and unpredictable. Neither was the 
hope of naturally closer relations with Bonn, expressed by Arab leaders on several occasions, 
fulfilled.33 Disappointment is the feeling which describes the inability to reach one’s 
expectations. Indeed, in the period studied here, Bonn’s diplomats more than once referred to 
this sentiment. It is maybe summarised best by West Germany’s ambassador to Tripoli, 
Günther Franz Werner, who in 1974 described Libya’s relations to the FRG as “characterised 
emotionally by Arab, in a sense disappointed, love”.34 In a sense, the history of West German-
Arab relations during the Cold War is, therefore, also the history of a disappointment. 
 
32 PA/AA (B36 271, p. 258) 14.11.1967. Lahn (Cairo) to Auswärtiges Amt. 
33 See, for example, PA/AA (B36 438, p. 21) 21.12.1970. Moltmann (Tunis) to Auswärtiges Amt. 




 Monographs and book chapters 
Abu-Samra, Dalia. 2002. “Deutschlands Außenpolitik gegenüber Ägypten. Abbruch und 
Wiederaufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen (1965 bis 1972).” PhD Thesis at the 
Freie Universität Berlin. 
Aburish, Said. 1998. “Arafat: From defender to dictator.” Bloomsbury, London. 
Aran, Amnon. 2009. “Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the PLO.” Sussex Academic Press, 
Brighton. 
Ash, Timothy Garton. 1993. “In Europe's name: Germany and the divided continent.” Jonathan 
Cape, London. 
Atiq, Wagih and As-Sadiq, Abd. 1983. “Probleme der deutsch-ägyptischen Beziehungen.” PhD 
Thesis at the University of Essen. 
Aust, Stefan. 1985. “Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex.” Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg. 
Ayubi, Nazih. 1995. “Over-stating the Arab state: politics and society in the Middle East.” 
Bloomsbury Publishing, London. 
Bamberg, James. 2008. “British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975. The challenge of 
nationalism.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Baring, Arnulf. 1982. “Machtwechsel. Die Ära Brandt-Scheel.” Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
Stuttgart. 
Barrett, Roby. 2007. “The Greater Middle East and the Cold War. US Foreign Policy under 
Eisenhower and Kennedy.” I.B. Tauris, London/New York. 
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. 1980. “The Israeli-Egyptian war of attrition, 1969-1970: a case study 
of limited local war.” Columbia University Press, New York/Guildford. 
Bender, Peter. 1995. “Die ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ und ihre Folgen: vom Mauerbau bis zur 
Vereinigung.” DTV, Munich. 
Berger, Mark, and Heloise Weber. 2014. “Rethinking the Third World: international 
development and world politics.” Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke/New York. 
Berggötz, Sven Olaf. 1998. “Nahostpolitik in der Ära Adenauer: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, 
1949-1963.” Droste, Düsseldorf. 
Berridge, Geoff. 2015. “Diplomacy: theory and practice.” Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.  
Binder, David. 1975. “The Other German: Willy Brandt’s Life and Times.” New Republic Book 
Co., Washington, DC. 
 203 
Bini, Elisabetta, Guliano Garavini and Federivo Romero (eds.). 2016. “Oil shock. The 1973 
crisis and its economic legacy.” I.B. Tauris, London/New York.  
Bischof, Gerhard, and Werner Gocht. 1984. “Energietaschenbuch Deutschland.” Friedr. 
Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig/Wiesbaden. 
Blumenau, Bernard. 2014. “The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and 
Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s.” Springer, Houndsmill/New York. 
 . 2010. “West Germany and the United States during the Middle East Crisis of 1973: 
‘Nothing but a Semi-Colony’?” In: Germond, Basil, Jussi Hanhimäki and Georges-
Henri Soutou (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security. Routledge, 
London: 123-37. 
Booz, Rüdiger. 1995. “‘Hallsteinzeit’: deutsche Außenpolitik 1955-1972.” Bouvier, Bonn. 
Borchard, Michael. 2019. “Eine unmögliche Freundschaft. David Ben-Gurion und Konrad 
Adenauer.” Herder, Freiburg. 
Bösch, Frank. 2019. “Zeitenwende 1979: als die Welt von heute begann.” C.H. Beck, Munich. 
Braune-Steininger, Franz. 1988. “Die Nahostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” PhD 
Thesis at the University of Gießen. 
Bridge, Gavin, and Philippe Le Billon. 2013. “Oil.” John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken (NJ). 
Buettner, Friedemann. 2003. “Germany's Middle East Policy: The Dilemmas of a ‘Policy of 
Even-Handedness’ (Politik der Ausgewogenheit).” In: Goren, Haim (ed.). Germany and 
the Middle East: Past, Present and Future. Hebrew University Press, Jerusalem: 115-
59. 
Bunton, Martin. 2013. “The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. A Very Short Introduction.” Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Byrne, Jeffrey James. 2016. “Mecca of Revolution.” Oxford University Press, New York. 
Cahn, Jean-Paul, and Klaus-Jürgen Müller. 2003. “Le rôle de l'Allemagne dans la guerre 
d'Algérie.” Felin, Paris. 
Chamberlin, Paul Thomas. 2012. “The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order.” Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Choueiri, Youssef. 2000. “Arab nationalism: a history. Nation and state in the Arab world.” 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Chubin, Shahram (ed.). 1992. “Germany and the Middle East. Patterns and Prospects.” Pinter, 
London. 
 204 
Clarkson, Alexander. 2013. “Fragmented Fatherlands: Immigration and Cold War Conflict in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1980.” Berghahn, New York. 
Conze, Eckart, et al. 2010. “Das Amt und seine Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten 
Reich und in der Bundesrepublik.” Blessing, Munich. 
Costigiola, Frank. 2010. “US foreign policy from Kennedy to Johnson.” In: Leffler, Melvyn P., 
and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 2. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 112-33. 
Creuzberger, Stefan. 2009. “Westintegration und Neue Ostpolitik. Die Außenpolitik der Bonner 
Republik.” Be.Bra, Berlin. 
Dahlke, Matthias. 2006. “Der Anschlag auf Olympia '72: die politischen Reaktionen auf den 
internationalen Terrorismus in Deutschland.” M Press, Munich. 
Daigle, Craig. 2012. “The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973.” Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Damm, Ullrich. 1965. “Versuch einer Darstellung der politischen Beziehungen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu den Entwicklungsländern unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Entwicklungshilfe.” Graphischer Betrieb Hans Biehl, Geneva. 
Danziger, Raphael and Gabriel Ben-Dor. 1978. “Algeria and the Palestinian Organizations.” In: 
Ben-Or, Gabriel (ed.). Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict. Turtledove, Ramat 
Gan: 347-73. 
Dedman, Martin. 1996. “The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-1995: A 
History of European Integration.” Routledge, London. 
De Vita, Lorena. 2020. “Israelpolitik. German-Israeli relations, 1949-1969.” Manchester 
University Press, Manchester. 
Di Nolfo, Ennio. 2010. “The Cold War and the transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960-
1975.” In: Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of 
the Cold War. Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 238-57. 
Dinan, Desmon. 2014. “Europe Recast: A History of European Union.” Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Dosenrode, Soren, and Anders Stubkjaer. 2002. “The European Union and the Middle East.” 
Sheffield Academic Press, London/New York. 
Duke, Simon. 2000. “The elusive quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP.” Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. 2007. “Globalization and Geopolitics in the Middle East.” 
Routledge, London. 
 205 
Elbl, Franz. 2001. “Politik der Bewegung: Gerhard Schröder als Aussenminister, 1961-1966.” 
Oldenbourg, Munich. 
Engel, Ulf and Hans-Georg Schleicher. 1998. “Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika: 
Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz 1949-1990.” Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 
Hamburg. 
Engler, Katja. 2007. “Die Deutsche Frage im Nahen Osten. Politische Beziehungen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland zum Irak und zu Jordanien, 1951-1965.” LIT Verlag, 
Berlin. 
Feldman, Lily Gardner. 2012. “Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to 
Amity.” (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham. 
 . 1984. “The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel.” Allen & Unwin, 
Boston.  
Fink, Carole. 2019. “West Germany and Israel. Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics, and the 
Cold War, 1965-1974.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 . 2009. “Ostpolitik and West German-Israeli relations.” In: Fink, Carole, and Bernd 
Schaefer (eds.). Ostpolitik, 1969-1974. European and global responses. Cambridge 
University Press, Washington D.C.: 182-205. 
Fink, Carole, and Bernd Schaefer (eds.). 2009. “Ostpolitik, 1969-1974. European and global 
responses.” Cambridge University Press, Washington D.C. 
Frei, Norbert. 2007. “Vergangenheitspolitik: die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-
Vergangenheit.” C.H.Beck, Munich. 
Fulbrook, Mary. 1999. “German national identity after the Holocaust.” Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1997. “We now know. Rethinking Cold War history.” Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.  
Gainar, Maria. 2012. “Aux Origines de la diplomatie européenne: Les Neuf et la coopération 
politique européenne de 1973 à 1980.” Peter Lang, Brussels. 
Garavini, Giuliano. 2019. “The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century.” Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Gardner, Hall. 2005. “American global strategy and the ‘war on terrorism.” Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Gassert, Philipp. 2006. “Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, 1904-1988: Kanzler zwischen den Zeiten.” 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich. 
Gelvin, James. 2007. “The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War.” Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 206 
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. “Case studies and theory development in the 
social sciences.” MIT Press, Cambridge (MA)/London. 
Gerlach, Daniel. 2006. “Die doppelte Front: Die Bunderepublik Deutschland und der 
Nahostkonflikt 1967-1973.” LIT Verlag, Berlin. 
Gilbert, Mark. 2015. “Cold War Europe. The Politics of a Contested Continent.” Rowman & 
Littlefield, London. 
Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. 2017. “The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973. The USSR's 
Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict.” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 . 2007. “The Origins of a Misnomer: The ‘Expulsion’ of Soviet Advisers from Egypt 
in 1972.” In: Ashton, Nigel (ed.). The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict 
and the Superpowers, 1967-1973. Routledge, London: 136-63. 
Golan, Galia. 2010. “Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis.” 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Goren, Haim (ed.). 2003. “Germany and the Middle East: Past, Present and Future.” Hebrew 
University Press, Jerusalem. 
Graf, Rüdiger. 2010. “Gefährdungen der Energiesicherheit und die Angst vor der Angst. 
Westliche Industrieländer und das arabische Ölembargo 1973/74.” In: Bormann, 
Patrick, Thomas Freiberger and Judith Michel (eds.). Angst in den Internationalen 
Beziehungen. Bonn University Press, Göttingen. 
Gray, William Glenn. 2003. “Germany’s cold war: the global campaign to isolate East-
Germany, 1949-1969,” University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. 
Griffiths, Richard. 1994. “Europe’s First Constitution: The European Political Community, 
1952-1954.” In: Martin, Stephen. The construction of Europe. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Dordrecht/London: 19-39. 
Gupta, Amit Das. 2014. “The non-aligned and the German question.” In: Mišković, Nataša et 
al. (eds.). The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War. Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade. 
Routledge, London. 
 . 2008. “‘Ulbricht am Nil. Die deutsch-deutsche Rivalität in der Dritten Welt’.” In: 
Wengst, Udo, and Hermann Wentker (eds.). Das doppelte Deutschland. 40 Jahre 
Systemkonkurrenz. Ch. Links, Bonn: 111-33. 
Guttmann, Aviva. 2017. “The origins of counterterrorism. Switzerland at the forefront of crisis 
negotiations, multilateral diplomacy, and intelligence cooperation (1969-1977).” Brill, 
Leiden/Boston. 
 207 
Haas, Ernst. 1958. “The uniting of Europe: political, social and economical forces, 1950-57.” 
Stevens & Sons, London. 
Hacke, Christian. 2003. “Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad 
Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder.” Ullstein Taschenbuch, Berlin. 
Hahn, Peter. 2004. “Caught in the Middle East: US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
1945-1961.” University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.  
Halliday, Fred. 1983. “The Making of the Second Cold War.” Verso, London. 
Hanrieder, Wolfram F. 1995. “Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Außenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1994.” Schöningh, Paderborn.  
Hansen, Jan. 2016. “Abschied vom Kalten Krieg? Die Sozialdemokraten und der 
Nachrüstungsstreit (1977-1987).” De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin/Boston.  
Hansen, Niels. 2002. “Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe. Die deutsch-israelischen 
Beziehungen in der Ära Konrad Adenauer und David Ben-Gurion.” Droste, Düsseldorf. 
Hassner, Ron. 2009. “War on Sacred Ground.” Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Heinebäck, Bo. 1974. “Oil and Security.” Humanities Press, New York. 
Henry, Clement, and Robert Springborg, 2010. “Globalisation and the Politics of Development 
in the Middle East.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Herf, Jeffrey. 2016. “Undeclared Wars with Israel. East Germany and the West German far left, 
1967-1989.” Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Hestermann, Jenny. 2016. “Inszenierte Versöhnung: Reisediplomatie und die deutsch-
israelischen Beziehungen von 1957 bis 1984.” Campus Verlag, Frankfurt. 
Heumann, Hans-Dieter. 2011. “Genscher: Die Biographie.” Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn. 
Hill, Christopher. 2003. “The changing politics of foreign policy.” Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Hoeres, Peter. 2013. “Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit: Massenmedien, Meinungsforschung 
und Arkanpolitik in den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen von Erhard bis Brandt.” 
De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin/Boston. 
Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. “Inside Terrorism.” Columbia University Press, New York. 
Hofmann, Arne. 2007. “The emergence of détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the 
formation of Ostpolitik.” Routledge, London. 
Hofmann, Gunter. 2015. “Helmut Schmidt. Soldat, Kanzler, Ikone.” C.H. Beck, Munich. 
Hohensee, Jens. 1996. “Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973-74: die politischen und 
gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen der arabischen Erdölpolitik auf die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und Westeuropa.” Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart. 
 208 
Hollis, Rosemary. 2016. “Europe in the Middle East.” In: Fawcett, Louise. International 
Relations of the Middle East. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 380-99. 
Hong, Young-sun. 2015. “Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global 
Humanitarian Regime.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Hopkirk, Peter. 1994. “On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring down the 
British Empire.” John Murray, London. 
Hubel, Helmut. 1992. “Germany and the Middle-East conflict.” In: Chubin, Shahram (ed.). 
1992. Germany and the Middle East. Patterns and Prospects. Pinter, London: 41-54. 
Hünseler, Peter. 1990. “Die außenpolitischen Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu 
den arabischen Staaten von 1949-1990.” Europäische Hochschulschriften, Frankfurt 
(Main). 
Hynes, Catherine. 2009. “The Year That Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration and 
the Year of Europe.” University College Dublin Press, Dublin. 
Ikenberry, John. 1988. “Reasons of state: oil politics and the capacities of American 
government.” Cornell University Press, Ithaca.   
Jacobs, Andreas. 2008. “Problematische Partner: europäisch-arabische Zusammenarbeit 1970-
1998.” SH-Verlag, Cologne. 
Jawad, Haifaa. 1992. “Euro-Arab Relations. A study on collective diplomacy.” Ithaca Press, 
Reading. 
Jelinek, Yeshayahu. 2004. “Deutschland und Israel 1945-1965. Ein neurotisches Verhältnis.” 
R. Oldenbourg, Munich. 
Joffe, Josef. 1992. “Reflections on German policy in the Middle East.” In: Chubin, Shahram 
(ed.). 1992. Germany and the Middle East. Patterns and Prospects. Pinter, London: 
195-209. 
Jones, Clive. 2008. “Britain, Covert Action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1967.” In: Levey, 
Zach, and Elie Podeh (eds.). Britain and the Middle East. Sussex Academy Press, 
Brighton/Portland: 248-63. 
Kaiser, Karl and Udo Steinbach. 1982. “Deutsch-arabische Beziehungen. 
Bestimmungsfaktoren und Probleme einer Neuorientierung.” Oldenbourg 
Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich/Vienna. 
Kaufmann, Herbert. 1960. “The Forest Ranger. A study in administrative behavior.” Johns 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 
 209 
Kappeler, Dietrich. 2004. “The birth and evolution of a diplomatic culture.” In: Slavik, Hannah. 
Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy. DiploFoundation, Malta/Geneva: 353-
60. 
Karlsch, Rainer, and Raymond Stokes. “Faktor Öl: die Mineralölwirtschaft in Deutschland 
1859-1974.” C.H.Beck, Munich. 
Kaya, Taylan Äzgür. 2013. “The Middle East Peace Process and the EU. Foreign Policy and 
Security Strategy in International Politics.” I.B. Tauris, London/New York. 
Kerr, Malcolm. 1965. “The Arab cold war, 1958-1964; a study of ideology in politics.” Oxford 
University Press, London/New York. 
Khalidi, Rashid. 2004. “Resurrecting Empire. Western footprints and America's perilous path 
in the Middle East.” Beacon Press, Boston. 
 . 1997. “Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness.” 
Columbia University Press, New York. 
Kienle, Eberhard. 1991. “Ba’ath versus Ba’ath. The Conflict Between Syria and Iraq.” 
Bloomsbury Academic, London. 
Killian, Werner. 2001. “Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und 
der DDR 1955-1973. Aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Außenministerien.” Duncker 
& Humblot, Berlin. 
Kleßmann, Christoph. 2005. “Spaltung und Verflechtung – Ein Konzept zur integrierten 
Nachkriegsgeschichte 1945 bis 1990.” In: Kleßmann, Christoph, and Peter Lautzas 
(eds.). Teilung und Integration. Die doppelte deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte. 
Wochenschau Verlag, Bonn: 20-37. 
Korn, David A. 1992. “Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the 
Middle East, 1967-1970.” Westview Press, Boulder. 
Krögel, Dirk. 2009. “Einen Anfang finden! Kurt-Georg Kiesinger in der Außen- und 
Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition.” Oldenbourg, Munich. 
Kröger, Martin. 1994. “Revolution als Programm. Ziele und Realität deutscher Orientpolitik 
im Ersten Weltkrieg.” In: Michalka, Wolfgang. Der Erste Weltkrieg: Wirkung, 
Wahrnehmung, Analyse. Seehammer Verlag, Munich: 366-91. 
Lake, David. 2009. “Hierarchy in International Relations.” Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Laqueur, Walter. 2016. “The Struggle for the Middle East. The Soviet Union and the Middle 
East, 1958-68.” Routledge, London. 
Laron, Guy. 2017. “The six-day war: the breaking of the Middle East.” Yale University Press, 
New Haven. 
 210 
Lavy, George. 2013. “Germany and Israel: moral debt and national interest.” Routledge, 
Abingdon. 
Lee, Christopher J. (ed). 2010. “Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Movement and its 
Political Afterlives.” Ohio University Press, Athens.  
Lehmann, Timothy (ed.). 2017. “The Geopolitics of Global Energy. The New Cost of Plenty.” 
Lynne Rienner, Boulder/London. 
Lenczowski, George. 1990. “American Presidents and the Middle East.” Duke University 
Press, Durham/London. 
Leffler, Melvyn. 2000. “Bringing it together: the parts and the whole.” In: Westad, Odd Arne 
(ed.). Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory. Routledge, 
London/New York: 43-63. 
Lesch, David. 2018. “The Middle East and the United States: history, politics and ideologies.” 
Routledge, London. 
 . 2001. “1979: the year that shaped the modern Middle East.” Routledge, New York. 
Leveau, Rémy. 2001. “France’s Arab Policy.” In: Brown, Carl (ed.). “Diplomacy in the Middle 
East. The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers.” I.B. Tauris, 
London/New York. 
Levy, Jack. 2013. “Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision Making.” In: Huddy, Leon, et al. 
(eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Little, Douglas. 2010. “The Cold War in the Middle East. Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords.” 
In: Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War. Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 112-33. 
 . 2008. “American orientalism: the United States and the Middle East since 1945.” 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. 
Lorenz, Einhart. 2012. “Willy Brandt : Deutscher, Europäer, Weltbürger.” W. Kohlhammer, 
Stuttgart.  
Loth, Wilfried. 2000. “Germany in the Cold War: Strategies and Decisions.” In: Westad, Odd 
Arne (ed.). Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory. Routledge, 
London/New York: 242-57. 
Louis, Wm. Roger, and Avi Shlaim (eds). 2012. “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Origins and 
Consequence.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Louis, Wm. Roger. 2001. “Britain and the Middle East after 1945.” In: Brown, Carl (ed.). 
“Diplomacy in the Middle East. The International Relations of Reginal and Outside 
Powers.” I.B. Tauris, London/New York. 
 211 
Ludlow, Piers (ed.). 2007. “European integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 
1965-1973.” Routledge, London.  
Lüthi, Lorenz. 2015. “The regional cold wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: crucial 
periods and turning points.” Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington D.C. 
Maeke, Lutz. 2017. “DDR und PLO: die Palästinapolitik des SED-Staates.” Walter de Gruyter 
GmbH & Co KG, Berlin. 
Marshall, Barbara. 1990. “Willy Brandt.” Cardinal, London. 
Maull, Hanns. 1992. “Economic relations with the Middle East: weight and dimensions.” In: 
Chubin, Shahram (ed.). Germany and the Middle East. Patterns and Prospects. Pinter, 
London: 113-35. 
Maull, Hanns. 2008. “Deutschland als Zivilmacht.” In: Schmidt, Siegmar, Gunther Hellmann 
and Reinhard Wolf (eds.). Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik. VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden: 73-84. 
Maulucci, Thomas. 2012. “Adenauer's Foreign Office: West German diplomacy in the shadow 
of the Third Reich.” Northern Illinois University Press, Chichester. 
McDonnel, Fiona, and Jason Dittmer. 2016. “Diplomatic Culture.” In: Constantinou, Costas, 
Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp (eds). The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy. SAGE, Los 
Angeles: 104-13. 
McMahon, Robert. 2015. “Agency, Structure, and Interdependence: Reflections on the 
Regional and Global Cold Wars.” In: Lüthi, Lorenz (ed.). The Regional Cold Wars in 
Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points. Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C. 
McMeekin, Sean. 2010. “The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s 
Bid for World Power.” Penguin, London. 
Mejcher, Helmut. 2003. “Hitler’s route to Baghdad? Some aspects of German oil policy and 
political thinking on the Middle East in the 1930s and early 1940s.” In: Goren, Haim 
(ed.). Germany and the Middle East: Past, Present and Future. Hebrew University 
Press, Jerusalem. 
Merseburger, Peter. 2002. “Willy Brandt.” Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart/Munich. 
Miard-Delacroix, Hélène. 2016. “Willy Brandt: life of a statesman.” I.B. Tauris, London/New 
York.  
Michels, Eckard. 2006. “Deutsche in der Fremdenlegion 1870-1965. Mythen und Realitäten.”  
Schöningh, Paderborn. 
 212 
Moeckli, Daniel. 2009. “European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, 
Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity.” I.B. Tauris, London. 
Motadel, David. 2015. “The Muslim World in the Second World War.” In: Bosworth, Richard, 
and Joseph Maiolo (eds.). The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 604-626. 
 . 2014. “Islam and Nazi Germany’s war.” Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)/London. 
Musu, Constanza. 2010. “European Union policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process: the 
quicksands of politics.” Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Muth, Ingrid. 2000. “Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949–1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen. ” 
Ch. Links, Berlin. 
Neustadt, Amnon. 1983. “Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen im Schatten der EG-
Nahostpolitik.” Haag und Herchen Verlag, Frankfurt (Main). 
Nicosia, Francis. 2015. “Nazi Germany and the Arab World.” Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Njølstad, Olav. 2010. “The collapse of superpower détente, 1975-1980.” In: Leffler, Melvyn P., 
and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 3. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 112-33. 
Noack, Hans-Joachim. 2013. “Willy Brandt: ein Leben, ein Jahrhundert.” Rowohlt, Berlin. 
Nuttall, Simon. 2000. “European foreign policy.” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Oren, Michael B. 2002. “Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle 
East.” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Orkaby, Asher. 2017. “Beyond the Arab Cold war: the international history of the Yemen civil 
war, 1962-68.” Oxford University Press, New York. 
Pappe, Ilan. 2004. “A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples.” Cambridge 
University Press, New York/ Cambridge. 
Pedaliu, Effie. 2016. “Fault Lines in the Post-War Mediterranean and the ‘Birth of Southern 
Europe’, 1945-1975.” In: Calandri, Elena, Daniele Caviglia and Antonio Varsori. 
Détente in Cold War Europe. Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. I.B. Tauris, London/New York: 15-32. 
Peters, Butz. 2017. “Hundert Tage: Die RAF-Chronik 1977.” Knaur, Munich. 
Pillar, Robert. 2003. “Terrorism and US foreign policy.” Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington. 
 213 
Primakov, Yevgeny. 2009. “Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from 
the Cold War to the Present.” Basic Books, New York. 
Quandt, William. 2001. “Peace Process. American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
since 1967.” Brookings Institutions Press, Washington D.C. 
Rana, Kishan. 2004. “The 21st century ambassador: plenipotentiary to chief executive.” 
DiploFoundation, Msida. 
Rapport, Aaron. 2018. “Cognitive approaches to foreign policy analysis” In: Thies, Cameron. 
The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Regelsberger, Elfriede, et al. 1997. “Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP 
and Beyond.” Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.  
Regelsberger, Elfriede. 1988. “EPC in the 1980s: reaching another plateau?” In: Pijpers, Alfred, 
et al. European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for 
Western Europe? Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. 
Reichel, Peter. 2001. “Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland: die Auseinandersetzung mit 
der NS-Diktatur von 1945 bis heute.” C.H. Beck, Munich. 
Reuth, Ralf Georg. 1985. “Entscheidung im Mittelmeer. Die südliche Peripherie Europas in der 
deutschen Strategie des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1940-1942.” Bernard & Graefe, Koblenz. 
Richter, Jan Stefan. 1997. “Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelm II., 1898. Eine Studie zur deutschen 
Außenpolitik an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert.” Verlag Dr. Kovač, Hamburg. 
Risse, Thomas. 2008. “Deutsche Identität und Außenpolitik.” In: Schmidt, Siegmar, Gunther 
Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf (eds.). Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik. VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden: 49-61. 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1992. “Muddling through mined territory: German foreign policy-
making and the Middle East.” In: Chubin, Shahram (ed.). Germany and the Middle 
East. Patterns and Prospects. Pinter, London: 177-94. 
Roberts, George. 2016. “Politics, decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam 1965-72.” 
PhD Thesis at Warwick University.  
Romano, Angela. 2010. “The EPC main task: fostering détente in Europe.” In: Poul Villaume, 
and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, 
Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985. Museum Tusculanum Press: 
Copenhagen: 123-41. 
Rosamond, Ben. 2000. “Theories of European Integration.” St. Martin’s Press, New York. 
Rother, Bernd, and Klaus Larres. 2019. “Willy Brandt and international relations: Europe, the 
USA and Latin America, 1974-1992.” Bloomsbury Academic, London. 
 214 
Rother, Bernd. 2011. “Willy Brandt: Neue Fragen, neue Erkenntnisse.” Dietz, Bonn.  
Rubin, Barry, and Wolfgang Schwanitz. 2014. “Nazis, Islamists and the making of the modern 
Middle East.” Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Rubinstein, Alvin. 2001. “The Middle East in Russia’s Strategic Prism.” In: Brown, Carl (ed.). 
“Diplomacy in the Middle East. The International Relations of Reginal and Outside 
Powers.” I.B. Tauris, London/New York. 
Rundel, Otto. 2006. “Kurt-Georg Kiesinger: sein Leben und politisches Wirken.” W. 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart.  
Salibi, Kamal. 1998. “Modern history of Jordan.” I.B. Tauris, London. 
Sattler, Verena. 2017. “Die Institutionalisierung europäischer Nahostpolitik. Frankreich in der 
Europäischen Politischen Zusammenarbeit 1969/70-1980.” Springer, Wiesbaden. 
Savaranskaya, Svetlana, and William Taubmann. 2010. “Soviet foreign policy, 1962-1975.” In: 
Leffler and Westad, Cambridge History of the Cold War II. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 136-157. 
Sayigh, Yazid. 1997. “Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement 1949-1993.” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Sayigh, Yezid, and Avi Shlaim (eds.). 1997. “The Cold War and the Middle East.” Clarendon 
Press, Oxford. 
Scheffler, Thomas. 1993. “Von der ‘Orientalischen Frage’ zum ‘Tragischen Dreieck’. Die 
Nahostpolitik der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom Zerfall des 
Osmanischen Reichs bis zum deutsch-israelischen Wiedergutmachungsabkommen.” 
PhD Thesis at the Freie Universität Berlin. 
Schliephake, Konrad. 1990. “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
den Arabischen Golfstaate (GCC).” Edition Schanneik, Bonn. 
 . 2000. “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem 
Haschemitischen Königreich Jordanien.” Edition Schanneik, Bonn. 
 . 2001. “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem 
Königreich Saudi Arabien.” Edition Schanneik, Berlin. 
Schoenborn, Benedikt. 2020. “Reconciliation road: Willy Brandt, Ostpolitik and the quest for 
European peace.” Berghahn Books, New York. 
Schöllgen, Gregor. 2001a. “Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” C.H. Beck, 
Munich 
 . 2001b. “Willy Brandt. Die Biographie.” Propyläen, Berlin/Munich.  
 215 
Scholz, Günther. 2004. “Walter Scheel.” In: Scholz, Günther, and Martin Süskind (eds.). Die 
Bundespräsidenten. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich: 251-89. 
Schulz, Matthias, and Alan Schwartz. 2010. “Strained alliance. US-European relations from 
Nixon to Carter.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York. 
Schwanitz, Wolfgang.1995. “Deutsche in Nahost 1946-1965: Sozialgeschichte nach Akten und 
Interviews.” Habilitationsschrift, Bd.1. Freie Universität Berlin/ Princeton University. 
Seebacher, Brigitte. 2004. “Willy Brandt.” Piper, Munich. 
Segev, Tom. 2008. “Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East.” Henry 
Holt & Company, New York. 
Shlaim, Avi. 2014. “Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab world.” Penguin Books, London. 
 . 1998. “The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921-
1951.” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Siniver, Asaf. 2013. “The October War. Politics, diplomacy, legacy.” Hurst & Company, 
London. 
Slobodian, Quinn. 2012. “Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany.” Duke 
University Press, Durham (NC). 
Smith, Helmut Walser. 2008. “The continuities of German history: nation, religion, and race 
across the long nineteenth century.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Smith, Charles. 2007. “Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict.” Bedford/St. Martin, Boston. 
Soave, Paolo, and Luciano Monzali. 2020. “Italy and the Middle East. Geopolitics, Dialogue 
and Power during the Cold War.” I.B. Tauris, London.  
Soell, Harmut. 2008. “Helmut Schmidt.” Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich. 
Spiegel, Steven. 1991. “The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, 
from Truman to Reagan.” University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Spies, Yolanda Kemp. 2018. “Global Diplomacy and International Society.” MacMillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Spohr, Kristina. 2016. “The Global Chancellor. Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the 
International Order.” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Staack, Michael. 2000. “Handelsstaat Deutschland. Deutsche Außenpolitik in einem 
internationalen System.” Schöningh, Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Berlin. 
Stein, Simon. 2011. “Israel, Deutschland und der Nahe Osten. Beziehungen zwischen 
Einzigartigkeit und Normalität.” Wallstein, Göttingen. 
 216 
Steinbach, Udo. 2007. “Naher und Mittlerer Osten.” In: Schmidt, Siegmar, Gunther Hellmann 
and Reinhard Wolf (eds.). Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik. VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden: 494-505. 
  (ed.). 1992. “Arabien: Mehr als Erdöl und Konflikte.” Springer VS, Berlin. 
 . 1992. “Freundschaft und Frustration – die deutsch-arabischen Beziehungen.” In: 
Steinbach, Udo (ed.). Arabien: Mehr als Erdöl und Konflikte. Springer, Berlin: 221-32. 
Steininger, Rolf. 2018. “Germany and the Middle East: from Kaiser Wilhelm II to Angela 
Merkel.” Berghahn Books, New York. 
 . 2014. “Deutschland und die USA. Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart.” 
Reinbek, Hamburg. 
Storkmann, Klaus. 2012. “Geheime Solidarität. Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der DDR 
in die ‘Dritte Welt’” Ch. Links, Berlin. 
Stürmer, Michael. 2003. “From Moltke to Gallipoli: Strategies and Agonies in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.” In: Goren, Haim (ed.). Germany and the Middle East: Past, Present 
and Future. Hebrew University Press, Jerusalem. 
Szabo, Stephen. 2015. “Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics.” Bloomsbury, 
London. 
Thomas, Teresa Fava. 2016. “American Arabists in the Cold War Middle East, 1946-75: From 
Orientalism to Professionalism.” Anthem Press, London.  
Tim, Angelika. 1997. “Hammer, Zirkel, Davidstern. Das gestörte Verhältnis der DDR zu 
Zionismus und Staat Israel.” Bouvier Verlag, Bonn. 
Trachtenberg, Marc. 2010. “The structure of great power politics, 1963-1975.” In: Leffler, 
Melvyn P., and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 
2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 482-502. 
 . 2009. “The craft of international history: A guide to method.” Princeton University 
Press, Princeton/Oxford. 
Trofimov, Yaroslav. 2008. “The Siege of Mecca. The forgotten uprising in Islam holiest shrine.” 
Penguin, London. 
Varon, Jeremy. 2004. “Bringing the war home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army 
Faction, and revolutionary violence in the sixties and seventies.” University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
Venn, Fiona. 2002. “The Oil Crisis.” Pearson, London.  
Von Bülow, Mathilde. 2016. “West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War.” 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 217 
Weingardt, Markus. 2002. “Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik. Die Geschichte einer 
Gratwanderung seit 1949.” Campus, Frankfurt/New York. 
Wentker, Hermann. 2007. “Aussenpolitik in engen Grenzen: die DDR im internationalen 
System, 1949-1989.” Oldenbourg, Munich. 
Westad, Odd Arne. 2005. “The Global Cold War. Third World interventions and the making of 
our times.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Wiegeshoff, Andrea. 2013. “‘Wir müssen alle etwas umlernen’. Zur Internationalisierung des 
Auswärtigen Dienstes der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Wallstein, Göttingen. 
Wohlforth, William. 2000. “A certain idea of science: how International Relations theory avoids 
reviewing the Cold War.” In: Westad, Odd Arne (ed.). Reviewing the Cold War. 
Approaches, Interpretations, Theory. Routledge, London/New York: 126-45. 
Wolffsohn, Michael. 2018. “Friedenskanzler? Willy Brandt zwischen Krieg und Terror.” DTV, 
Munich. 
Wright, Lawrence. 2006. “The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.” Penguin,  
London. 
Yergin, Daniel. 1991. “The prize. The epic quest for oil, money and power.” Simon and 
Schuster, New York. 




Adamsky, Dima P. 2006. “‘Zero-Hour for the Bears’: Inquiring into the Soviet Decision to 
Intervene in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition, 1969-70.” Cold War History Vol. 6, 
No. 1: 113-21. 
Albinyana, Roger, and Fátima Fernández. 2018. “From the Euro-Arab Dialogue to a Euro-Arab 
Summit: Revamping the EU-Arab Partnership.” Mediterranean Yearbook: 255-9. 
Arnon, Arie. 2007. “Israeli Policy toward the Occupied Territories: The Economic Dimension, 
1967-2007.” The Middle East Journal Vol. 61, No. 4: 573-81. 
Aykan, Mahmut Bali. 1993. “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 
1950s to the 1990s.” International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 25, No. 1: 91-
110. 
Bachleitner, Kathrin. 2019. “Diplomacy with Memory: How the Past Is Employed for Future 
Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 15, No. 4: 492-508 
 218 
Bar-Joseph, Uri. 2013. “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise 
of the Yom Kippur War.” The Middle East Journal Vol. 67, No. 4: 531-46. 
 . 2006. “The Last Chance to Avoid War: Anwar Sadat’s Peace Initiative of February 
1973 and Its Failure.” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 41, No. 3: 545-56. 
Bar-Simon-Tov, Yaakov. 1984. “The Myth of Strategic Bombing: Israeli Deep-Penetration Air 
Raids in the War of Attrition, 1969–70.” Journal of Contemporary History 19: 549-70. 
Berdat, Christophe. 2007. “L'avènement de la politique méditerranéenne globale de la CEE.” 
Relations internationales Vol. 130, No. 2: 87-109. 
Bini, Elisabetta. 2014. “A Transatlantic Shock: Italy’s Energy Policies between the 
Mediterranean and the EEC, 1967-1974.” Historical Social Research Vol. 39, No. 4: 
145-64. 
Blanga, Yehuda. 2016. “The Egyptian War Plan and Collaboration with Syria in the October 
1973 War.” The Maghreb Review Vol. 41, No. 2: 261-89. 
Borowsky, Peter. 2002. “Große Koalition und Außerparlamentarische Opposition.” 
Informationen zur politischen Bildung, No. 258. 
Bösch, Frank. 2015. “Zwischen Schah und Khomeini. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
die islamische Revolution im Iran.” Vierteljahrszeitschrift für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 63, 
No. 3: 319-49. 
 . 2015. “Geteilte Geschichte. Plädoyer für eine deutsch-deutsche Perspektive auf die 
jüngere Zeitgeschichte.” Studies in Contemporary History Vol. 12, No. 1: 98-114. 
 . 2014. “Energy Diplomacy: West Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Oil Crises of the 
1970s.” Historical Social Research Vol. 39, No. 4: 165-85. 
Brown, Nevile. 1971. “Jordanian Civil War.” Military Review Vol. 51, No. 9: 38-48. 
Büttner, Friedemann. 1977. “German Perceptions of the Middle East Conflict: Images and 
Identifications during the 1967 War.” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 6, No. 2: 66-81. 
Cahn, Jean Paul. 2011. “La République fédérale d’Allemagne et l’Afrique du Nord (1949-
1962).” Outre-mers. Revue d’histoire, Vol. 98, No. 372-73: 21-43. 
Chamberlin, Paul. 2012. “Schönau and the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution: Refugees, 
Guerillas, and Human Rights in the Global 1970s.” Cold War History Vol. 12, No. 4: 
595-614. 
 . 2011. “The Struggle against Oppression Everywhere: The Global Politics of 
Palestinian Liberation.” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 47, No. 1: 25-41. 
Ciorciari, John, and Jürgen Haacke. 2009. “Hedging in international relations: an introduction.” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 19, No. 3: 367-74. 
 219 
Citino, Nathan. 2019. “The Middle East and the Cold War.” Cold War History Vol. 19, No. 3: 
441-56.  
Collier, David. 2011. “Understanding Process Tracing.” Political Science & Politics, Vol. 4, 
No. 44: 823-30. 
Connelly, Matthew. 2001. “Rethinking the Cold War and decolonization: the grand strategy of 
the Algerian war for independence.” International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 
33, No. 2: 221-45. 
Coolsaet, Rik. 2010. “EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?” International 
affairs Vol. 8, No. 4: 857-73. 
Dahlke, Matthias. 2009. “Das Wischnewski Protokoll: Zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
westeuropäischen Regierungen und transnationalen Terroristen 1977.” Vierteljahrshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte Vol. 57, No. 2: 201-15.  
Daigle, Craig. 2019. “Sadat’s African dilemma. Libya, Ethiopia, and the making of the Camp 
David Accords.” Cold War History Vol. 19, No. 2: 295-313. 
 . 2004. “The Russians are going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet presence in Egypt, 1970-
1971.” Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 8, No. 1: 1-15. 
Daoudi M. S. and M. S. Dajani. 1984. “The 1967 Oil Embargo Revisited.” Journal of Palestine 
Studies Vol. 13, No. 2: 65-90. 
Defrates John F. 1972. “UNRWA, The Federal Republic of Germany and the Palestine 
Refugees.” Orient 13:3: 124-6. 
De Vita, Lorena. 2017. “Overlapping rivalries. The two Germanys, Israel and the Cold War.” 
Cold War History Vol. 17, No. 4: 351-66. 
Easton, David. 1975. “A re-assessment of the concept of political support.” British Journal of 
Political Science Vol. 5, No. 4: 435-57. 
Elman, Colin, and Miriam Elman. 1997. “Diplomatic History and International Relations 
Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries.” International Security Vol. 
22, No. 1: 5-21. 
Fulbrook, Mary, and Ulinka Rublack. 2010. “In Relation: The ‘Social Self’ and Ego-
Documents.” German History Vol. 28, No. 3: 263-72. 
Geiger, Tim. 2009. “Die ‘Landshut’ in Mogadischu: Das außenpolitische Krisenmanagement 
der Bundesregierung angesichts der terroristischen Herausforderung 1977.” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Vol. 57, No. 3: 413–45. 
Geppert, Dominik. 2009. “Grossbritannien und die Neue Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik.” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Vol. 57, No. 3: 385-412. 
 220 
Greenbaum, Avraham. 2007. “The US Airlift to Israel in 1973 and its Origins.” Israel Affairs 
Vol. 13, No. 1: 131-40. 
Gross, Samantha. 05.03.2019. “What Iran’s 1979 revolution meant for US and global oil 
markets.” Brookings. 
Gutfeld, Arnon and Boaz Vanetik. 2016. “‘A Situation That Had to Be Manipulated’: The 
American Airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur War.” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 52, 
No. 3: 419-47. 
Haftendorn, Helga. 2006. “Kurswechsel. Ein Paradigma außenpolitischer Reform.” Politische 
Vierteljahrszeitschrift Vol. 47, No. 4: 671-85. 
Hildebrand, Klaus. 1990. “‘Atlantiker’ versus ‘Gaullisten’: Zur Aussenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der sechziger Jahre.” Revue d’Allemagne Vol. 
22, No. 4: 583-92. 
Hirsch, Philipp. 2020. “The Arab world, the Cold War and West Germany’s ‘Mediterranean 
moment’.” Cold War History Vol. 20, No. 2: 161-78. 
 . 2020. “Politics as counterterrorism: the role of diplomacy in the West German 
response to Palestinian terror, 1970-75.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political 
Aggression Vol. 12, No. 3: 186-202 
Hughes, Geraint. 2008. “Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.” 
Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 10, No. 2: 3-40. 
 . 2014. “Skyjackers, Jackals and Soldiers: British Planning for International Terrorist 
Incidents during the 1970s.” International Affairs Vol. 90, No. 5: 1013-31. 
Hughes, Llewelyn, and Austin Long. 2015. “Is there an oil weapon? Security implications of 
changes in the structure of the international oil market.” International Security Vol. 39, 
No. 3: 152-89. 
Hürter, Johannes. 2009. “Anti-Terrorismus-Politik.” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Vol. 
57, No. 3: 330-48. 
Ikenberry, John. 1986. “The irony of state strength: comparative responses to the oil shocks in 
the 1970s.” International Organization Vol. 40, No. 1: 105-37. 
Kraushaar, Wolfgang. 2007. “Die Geschichte der RAF. Staatliches Handeln.” In: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Dossier: Die Geschichte der RAF.  
Kundnani, Hans. 2011. “Germany as a Geo-economic Power.” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 
34, No. 4: 31-45. 
Labbate, Silvio. 2017. “The Beginning of the Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Trans- Atlantic 
Relations (1973–1975).” Nuova Rivista Storica Vol. 101, No. 2: 347-70. 
 221 
Laurens, Henry. 2009. “La Diplomatie Française dans le conflict israélo-arabe (1967– 1970).” 
Matériaux pour l’Histoire de Notre Temps Vol. 4, No. 96: 3-11. 
Levy, Jack. 1997. “Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the 
Study of International Relations.” International Security Vol. 22, No. 1: 22-33. 
Lewan, Kenneth. 1975. “How West Germany Helped to Build Israel.” Journal of Palestine 
Studies Vol.4, No. 4: 41-64. 
Licklider, Roy. 1988. “The power of oil: the Arab oil weapon and the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States.” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 
32, No. 2: 205-26. 
Lorenzini, Sara. 2009. “Globalising Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik revisited.” Cold War History Vol. 9, 
No. 2: 223-242.  
Luttwak, Edward. 1990. “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce.” The National Interest, No. 20: 17-23. 
Mandell, Brian, and Brian Tomlin. “Mediation in the development of norms to manage conflict: 
Kissinger in the Middle East.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1: 43-55. 
Mann, Joseph. 2013. “A reassessment of the 1967 Arab oil embargo.” Israel Affairs Vol. 19, 
No. 4: 693-703.  
Maull. Hanns. 1990. “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
69, No. 5: 91-106. 
 . 1975 “Oil and influence: The oil weapon examined.” The Adelphi Papers Vol. 15, No. 
117: 1-37. 
McCourt, David. 2009. “What was Britain’s ‘East of Suez Role’? Reassessing the Withdrawal, 
1964-1968.” Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 20, No. 3: 453-72. 
Meitan, Yoram. 2000. “The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 War: A 
Reexamination.” Middle East Journal Vol. 54, No. 1: 64-82. 
Michels, Eckard. 1999. “Die Bundesrepublik und die Unabhängigkeit Tunesiens und Marokkos 
1951–1962.” Revue d’Allemagne et de Pays de langue allemande Vol. 31, No. 3-4: 439-
52. 
Miller, Rory. 2014. “The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention 
in the Middle East, 1974–1977.” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 50, No. 6: 936-59. 
Mori, Jennifer. 2019. “The State of the Art. The Way of the Future." Diplomatica Vol. 1, No. 1: 
5-12. 
Müller, Klaus-Jürgen. 1990. “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Algerienkrieg.” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Vol. 38, No. 4: 609-41. 
 222 
Mueller, Patrick. 2013. “Europe's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Peace Process: The 
Construction of EU Actorness in Conflict Resolution.” Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society Vol. 14, No. 1: 20-35. 
Nevo, Joseph. 2008. “September 1970 in Jordan: A Civil War?” Civil Wars Vol. 10, No. 3: 217-
30. 
Onley, James. 2009. “Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971. The Politics of Protection.” 
Georgetown University Centre for International and Regional Studies. 
Painter, David. 2014. “Oil and geopolitics: The oil crises of the 1970s and the Cold 
War.” Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung Vol. 39, No. 4: 186-208. 
Peretz, Pauline. 2006. “La France et la Guerre du Kippour.” Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique 
Vol. 120, No. 2: 143-54. 
Perlmutter, Amos. 1975. “Crisis Management: Kissinger’s Middle East Negotiations (October 
1973–June 1974).” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 19, No. 3: 316-43. 
Pfeiffer, Rolf. 2000. “Ein erfolgreiches Kapitel bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik: Die Adenauer-
Regierung und die Suez-Krise von 1956.” Historische Mitteilungen Vol. 13, No. 1: 213-
32. 
Pietrantonio, Silvia. 2010. “The year that never was: 1973 and the crisis between the United 
States and the European Community.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies Vol. 8, No. 2: 
158-77 
Prestel, Joseph Ben. 2019. “Palästina-Solidarität. Bruchstelle einer globalen Linken.” Merkur 
Vol. 73, No. 839: 61-7. 
Raz, Avi. 2013. “The Generous Peace Offer That Was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet 
Resolution of June 19, 1967.” Diplomatic History Vol. 37, No. 1: 85-108. 
Riegler, Thomas. 2012. “Das ‘Spinnennetz’ des internationalen Terrorismus: Der ‘Schwarze 
September’ und die gescheiterte Geiselnahme von Schönau 1973.” Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte Vol. 60, No. 4: 579-601. 
Rubner, Michael. 2006. “Massacre in Munich.” Middle East Policy Vol. 13, No. 2: 176-84. 
Schmid, Alex. 2012. “The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism.” Perspectives 
on Terrorism Vol. 6, No. 2: 158-9 
Schmidt, Wolfgang. 2014. “Aus historischer Verantwortung, moralischer Verpflichtung und 
politischer Überzeugung.” Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, Berlin. 
Schroeder, Paul. 1997. “History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit 
or Misfit.” International Security Vol. 22, No. 1: 64-74. 
 223 
Shemesh, Moshe. 2010. “On Two Parallel Tracks: The Secret Jordanian-Israeli Talks, July 
1967-September 1973.” Israel Studies Vol. 15, No. 3: 87-110. 
Shlaim, Avi and Raymond Tanter. 1978. “Decision Process, Choice, and Consequences: Israel’s 
Deep-Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970.” World Politics 30, No. 4: 483-516. 
Shlomo, Yinon. 2015. “The Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Negotiations of 1973-74.” Middle 
East Studies Vol. 15, No. 4: 636-48. 
Sittmann, Julia. 2018. “Illusions of care: Iraqi students between the Ba’thist State and the Stasi 
in socialist East Germany, 1958-89.” Cold War History Vol. 18, No. 2: 187-202. 
Smith, Tony. 2000. “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the 
Cold War.” Diplomatic History Vol. 24. No. 4: 567-91. 
Stern, Roger. 2016. “Oil scarcity ideology in US foreign policy, 1908-97.” Security Studies Vol. 
25, No. 2: 214-57. 
Stocker, James R. 2017. “A Historical Inevitability? Kissinger and US Contacts with the 
Palestinians (1973-76).” International History Review Vol. 39, No. 2: 316-37. 
Tomlinson, B.R. 2003. “What is the Third World?” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 38. 
No. 2: 309-311. 
Trentin, Massimiliano. 2008. “‘Tough negotiations.’ The two Germany’s in Syria and Iraq, 
1963-1974.” Cold War History Vol. 8, No. 3: 353-80.  
Türk, Henning. 2014. “The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy 
Cooperation among Western Industrialized Countries.” Historical Social Research Vol. 
39, No. 4: 209-30. 
Vultee, Fred. 2010. “Securitization: A new approach to the framing of the ‘war on terror’.” 
Journalism Practice Vol. 4., No. 1: 33-47. 
Wouters, Jan. 2001. “The European Union as an actor within the United Nations General 
Assembly.” Leuven Institute for International Law, Working Paper 2. 
Zakariah, M. 2012. “Oil, War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973-74.” 
Middle Eastern Issues Vol. 48, No. 4: 589-611. 
Zeiler, Thomas. 2009. “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field.” The Journal 
of American History Vol. 95, No. 4: 1053-73. 
Zernichow, Simen and Hilde Henriksen Waage. 2014. “The Palestinian Option: Nixon, the 
National Security Council, and the Search for a New Policy, 1970.” Diplomatic History 




Autobiographies and personal documents 
Bahr, Egon. 1996. “Zu meiner Zeit.” Blessing, Munich. 
Brandt, Willy and Helmut Schmidt (edited by Meik Woyke). 2015. “Partner und Rivalen: Der 
Briefwechsel (1958-1992).” Dietz, Bonn. 
Brandt, Willy. 1990. “Erinnerungen.” Propyläen, Frankfurt (Main). 
 . 1976. “Begegnungen und Einsichten: die Jahre 1960-1975.” Hoffmann und Campe, 
Hamburg. 
Brosio, Manlio. 1974. “Consultation and the Atlantic Alliance.” Survival Vol. 16, No. 3: 115-
21. 
Frank, Paul. 1985. “Entschlüsselte Botschaften.” DTV, Munich. 
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich. “Erinnerungen.” Siedler, Berlin. 
Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein. 1973. “The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and 
His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.” Doubleday and Co., 
Garden City. 
Jobert, Michel. 1974. “Mémoires d’avenir.” Grasset, Paris. 
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg. 1989. “Dunkle und helle Jahre. Erinnerungen 1904-1958.” Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart.  
Kissinger, Henry. 2003. “Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises.” Simon 
& Schuster, New York.  
 . 1979. “Memoiren.” Bertelsmann, Munich. 
Kreisky, Bruno. 2000. “Memoiren: Im Strom der Politik. Vol. 2.” Kremayr & Scheriau, 
Vienna. 
Kunzmann, Karl Heinz. 2012. “Zwischen Okzident und Orient – Aus dem Leben eines 
Botschafters.” Deutsche Literaturgesellschaft, Berlin. 
Lahr, Rolf. 1981. “Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg. Private Briefe 1934-1974.” Albrecht Knaus, 
Munich. 
Sadat, Anwar. 1978. “In Search of Identity: An Autobiography.” Harper & Row, New York.  
Scheel, Walter, Jürgen Engert, and Arnulf Baring. 2004. “Walter Scheel im Gespräch mit Jürgen 
Engert: Erinnerungen und Einsichten.“ Hohenheim, Stuttgart.  
Schmidt, Helmut. 2015. “Was ich noch sagen wollte.” C.H. Beck, Munich. 
 . 2008. “Außer Dienst: Eine Bilanz.” Siedler, Berlin. 
 . 1996. “Weggefährten. Erinnerungen und Reflexionen.” Siedler, Berlin. 
Staden, Berndt von. 2005. “Zwischen Eiszeit und Tauwetter: Diplomatie in einer Epoche des 
Umbruchs – Erinnerungen.” WJS Verlag, Berlin.  
 225 
Van Well, Günther. 1976. “Die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Nahost-Politik der Neun.” 
Europa-Archiv Vol. 31, No. 4: 119-28. 
 . 1973. “Die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit in der aussenpolitischen Sicht der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Europa–Archiv Vol. 28, No. 17: 581-90.  
Wischnewski, Hans-Jürgen. 1989. “Mit Leidenschaft und Augenmass: in Mogadischu und 
anderswo – politische Memoiren.” Bertelsmann, Munich. 
 
Online and newspaper sources 
Associated Press. 25.03.1976. “Bonn wants to be more flexible towards the PLO.” 
Auswärtiges Amt. 2012. „Globalisierung gestalten - Partnerschaften ausbauen - Verantwortung 
teilen: Gestaltungsmächtekonzept der Bundesregierung. ” (https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/blueprint/servlet/blob/216964/09ff755d2f1ba268ce4ebc580da0082c/gestaltung
smaechtekonzept-dt-data.pdf – last accessed 01.10.2020).  
BBC News. 06.06.2017. “1967 war: Six days that changed the Middle East.” 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39960461 - last accessed 
26.03.2021). 
 . 01.01.2001. “Black September: Tough negotiations.” 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2000/uk_confidential/1089694.stm - last 
accessed 20.12.2020).  
Beckmann. 22.09.2008. “Helmut Schmidt bei Reinold Beckmann.” ARD 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZrKWoIJjynM – last accessed 20.03.2020).  
Brandt, Willy. “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen 
Bundestag in Bonn am 28. Oktober 1969.”  Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung 
(https://www.willy-brandt-biografie.de/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/Regierungserklaerung_Willy_Brandt_1969.pdf - last checked 
20.12.2020).  
Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung. “Reisen 1967-74.” (https://www.willy-brandt-
biografie.de/reisen/1967-1974/ - last accessed 20.12.2020).  
Carstens, Peter. 22.12.2013. “Genscherismus – ausgleichende Vermittlung.” FAZ 
(https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/genscherismus-ausgleichende-vermittlung-
12724366.html - last accessed 20.12.2020). 
Der Spiegel. 13.11.1978. “Carstens: ‘Ich habe so dunkle Erinnerungen’.” 
(https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-40606982.html - last accessed 20.12.2020).  
 226 
 . 21.09.1970. “Personalien.” (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-44904954.html - 
last accessed 01.10.2020). 
Der Spiegel. 02.03.1970. “Israel-Politik: Nicht normal.” 
(https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45202430.html - last accessed 20.12.2020). 
Deutsche Welle. 09.06.2019. “Nahost-Konflikt: Für Maas gibt es nur eine Zwei-Staaten-
Lösung.” (https://www.dw.com/de/nahost-konflikt-für-maas-gibt-es-nur-eine-zwei-
staaten-lösung/a-49119382 - last accessed 20.12.2020).  
 . 25.02.2019. “Terror, migration dominate EU and Arab League's first summit.” 
(https://www.dw.com/en/terror-migration-dominate-eu-and-arab-leagues-first-
summit/a-47673270 - last accessed 20.09.2020).  
Deutscher Bundestag. 30.06.2020. “Frieden, Sicherheit und Stabilität im Nahen Osten fördern 
– Am Ziel der verhandelten Zweistaatenlösung festhalten.” Antrag der Fraktionen der 
CDU/CSU und SPD (Drucksache 19/20594). 
Die Bundesregierung. 25.02.2019. “Treffen in Sharm el-Sheikh – EU und Arabische Liga 
vertiefen Zusammenarbeit.” (https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/eu-
und-arabische-liga-vertiefen-zusammenarbeit-1583002 - last accessed 20.09.2020). 
Die Zeit. 31.08.1979. “Arafats Mann in Bonn.” (https://www.zeit.de/1979/36/arafats-mann-in-
bonn?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com – last accessed 20.12.20).  
Dirk van den Berg (director). 2018. “The Siege of Mecca.” (Produced by Arte, HR, INA, K2, 
NDR, ORF, RTS, WDR). 
European Council. 25.02.2019. “Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the press conference 
after the EU-LAS summit in Egypt.” (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-
releases/2019/02/25/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-press-conference-of-the-
eu-las-summit-in-egypt/ - last accessed 20.09.2020). 
EEC. 13.06.1980. “Venice Declaration.” 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf – 
last accessed 01.10.2020). 
 .  06.11.1973. “Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the 
Middle East.”  (https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-
475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable_en.pdf – last accessed 01.10.2020).  
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. “Grundsatz-, Regierungs- und Wahlprogramme der SPD (1949 - 
heute).” (https://www.fes.de/bibliothek/grundsatz-regierungs-und-wahlprogramme-
der-spd-1949-heute - last accessed 20.12.2020). 
 227 
 . “Brandt. Leben und Werk.” 
(https://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/archive/brandt.leben_und_werk.htm - last 
accessed 20.10.2019). 
German Embassy, Cairo. “Hans-Georg-Steltzer.” 
(http://www.kairo.diplo.de/contentblob/434798/BildDaten/11227/galeriebild_steltzer.j
pg – last accessed 01.10.2019).  
Herzinger, Richard. 04.12.2012. “Deutschland erlebt die Rückkehr des Genscherismus.” Die 
Welt (https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article135031545/Deutschland-erlebt-
die-Rueckkehr-des-Genscherismus.html - last accessed 20.12.20).  
 . 17.07.2012. “Deutschland hätte gewarnt sein müssen.” Die Welt. 
(https://www.welt.de/fernsehen/article108306622/Deutschland-haette-vor-der-PLO-
gewarnt-sein-muessen.html - last accessed 01.10.2020). 
HistoryNet. Date unknown. “The Arab-Israeli War of 1973: Honor, Oil, and Blood.” 
(https://www.historynet.com/the-arab-israeli-war-of-1973-honor-oil-and-blood.htm - 
last accessed 26.03.2021). 
Kraushaar, Wolfgang. 2007. “Die Geschichte der RAF. Staatliches Handeln.” In: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Dossier: Die Geschichte der RAF. 
(https://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-geschichte/geschichte-der-
raf/49296/staatliches-handeln - last accessed 20.12.2020).  
New York Times. 02.04.1978. “Wadi Haddad, Palestinian Hijacking Strategist, Dies.” 
Palacio, Ana. 13.02.2016. “Europe on the Sidelines.” Project Syndicate (https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/europe-weakens-international-order-by-ana-palacio-2016-
02?barrier=accesspaylog – last accessed 20.09.2020). 
Shortwave Radio Archive. 10.12.2016. “Palastinian Highjackings in Jordan (1970).” 
(https://shortwavearchive.com/archive/palastinian-highjackings-in-jordan-1970 - last 
accessed 01.10.2020). 
Tsoref, Hagai, and Michael Wolffsohn. 09.06.2013. “Wie Willy Brandt den Nahost-Frieden 
verspielte.” Die Welt (https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article116955753/Wie-
Willy-Brandt-den-Nahost-Frieden-verspielte.html - last accessed 20.12.2020).  
Wolffsohn, Michael. 21.10.2013. “Yom-Kippur Krieg. Für Erdöl setzte Bonn 1973 das Bündnis 
aufs Spiel.” Die Welt (https://www.welt.de/geschichte/article121069722/Fuer-Erdoel-




Editions and archival publications 
AAPD 1968 (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Published in 
1999. Edited by Lindemann, Mechthild, and Matthias Peter. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1969. Published in 2000. Edited by Eibl, Franz, Hubert Zimmermann. Oldenburg, 
Munich. 
AAPD 1970. Published in 2001. Edited by Pautsch, Ilse Dorothee, Daniela Taschler, Franz Eibl, 
Frank Heinlein, Mechthild Lindemann and Matthias Peter. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1971. Published in 2002. Edited by Koopmann, Martin, Matthias Peter and Daniela 
Taschler. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1972. Published in 2003. Edited by Lindemann, Mechthild, Daniela Taschler and Fabian 
Hilfrich. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1973. Published in 2004. Edited by Peter, Matthias, Michael Kieninger, Michael Ploetz, 
Mechthild Lindemann and Fabian Hilfrich. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1974. Published in 2005. Edited by Taschler, Daniela, Fabian Hilfrich and Michael 
Ploetz. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1975. Published in 2006. Edited by Kieninger, Michael, Mechthild Lindemann and 
Daniela Taschler. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1976. Published in 2007. Edited by Peter, Matthias, Michael Ploetz and Tim Geiger. 
Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1977. Published in 2008. Edited by Das Gupta, Amit, Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, 
Fabian Hilfrich and Mechthild Lindemann. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1978. Published in 2009. Edited by Taschler, Daniela, Amit Das Gupta, and Michael 
Mayer. Oldenburg, Munich. 
AAPD 1979. Published in 2010. Edited by Ploetz, Michael, and Tim Szatkowski. Oldenburg, 
Munich. 
Auswärtiger Ausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages. Sitzungsprotokolle 1969-1972. Edited by 
Hölscher, Wolfgang. Leinen, Düsseldorf, 2007. 
 . Sitzungsprotokolle 1972-1976. Edited by Hölscher, Wolfgang, and Joachim Wintzer. 
Leinen, Düsseldorf, 2010. 
 . Sitzungsprotokolle 1976-1980. Edited by Hölscher, Wolfgang, and Joachim Wintzer. 
Leinen, Düsseldorf, 2013. 
CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1966-1969. Edited by Marx, 
Stefan. Leinen, Düsseldorf, 2011. 
 229 
 . Sitzungsprotokolle 1969-1972. Edited by Zehender, Kahtrin. Leinen, Düsseldorf, 
2016. 
FDP Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1969. Edited by Stalmann, 
Volker. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2017. 
FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) 1964–1968. Published in 1999. “Volume 
XXXIV: Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues.” United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington. 
FRUS 1969-76. Published in 2008. “Volume XXIV: Middle East Region and Arabian 
Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970” United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington. 
SPD Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1966-1969. Edited by Tüffers, 
Bettina. Leinen, Düsseldorf, 2009. 
 . Sitzungsprotokolle 1969-1972. Edited by Jungerkes, Sven. Leinen, Düsseldorf, 2016. 
Statistisches Bundesamt. 1967. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” 
W. Kohlhammer GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1968. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1969. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1970. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1971. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1972. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1973. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 .  1974. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1975. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1976. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 230 
 . 1977. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1978. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 
 . 1979. “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, Stuttgart/Mainz. 





























PA/AA List of Inventories (Bestände) consulted: 
 
B 1:  Ministerbüro (office of the minister) 
B 2:  Büro Staatssekretäre (office of the secretaries of state) 
B 8:  Protokollabteilung (protocol unit) 
B 14:  NATO und Verteidigung (NATO and defence) 
B 21:  Europarat, Europäische politische Integration, Schweiz, Liechtenstein, Island, 
Norwegen (Council of Europe, European political integration, Switzerland, 
Lichtenstein, Iceland, Norway) 
B 26:  Länderreferate Mittelmeer und Nordische Staaten, Bulgarien, Rumänien (country units 
Mediterranean and Nordic states, Bulgaria, Romania) 
B 28:  Gesamteuropäische politische Strukturen, KSZE, OSZE (European political structures, 
CSCE, OSCE) 
B 30:  Vereinte Nationen (United Nations) 
B 32:  Länderreferate USA, Kanada (country units USA, Canada) 
B 36:  Länderreferate Naher und Mittlerer Osten (country units Near and Middle East) 
B 38:  Berlin und Wiedervereinigungsfragen (Berlin and matters of reunification) 
B 41:  Länderreferate Sowjetunion und GUS (country units Soviet Union and CIS) 
B 43:  Abrüstung und Sicherheitspolitik (disarmament and security policy) 
B 46:  Koordinierung, Dritte Welt, Ausrüstungshilfe, Organisierte Kriminalität, Terrorismus 
(Coordination, Third World, technical assistance, organized crime, terrorism) 
B 52:  Grundsatzfragen der Handelspolitik (fundamental questions of trade policy) 
B 110:  Organisation (organisation) 
B 130:  VS-Registraturen (classified documents) 
B 200: Europäische Gemeinschaften Grundsatzangelegenheiten (fundamental questions 
European Communities) 
B 201: Handels- und Agrarpolitik (European trade and agriculture policy) 
P 14: Personalakten (personnel files) 
Appendix A 
 
Appendix A contains short biographies of key politicians and diplomats who came up by name 
throughout the thesis. The details given focus on their relationship with Middle Eastern issues 
in the years between 1967 to 1979. 
For orientation, key roles within the hierarchy of the Auswärtiges Amt are explained in the 
following: 
 
State Secretary (verbeamteter Staatssekretär): Most senior civil servants and diplomats within 
a ministry. During the 1970s, there were always two State Secretaries in a ministry. 
Ministerial Director (Ministerialdirektor): rank given to diplomats which headed the – at the 
time seven – divisions (Abteilungen) in the Auswärtiges Amt.  
Assistant Director (Ministerialdirigent): the rank held by deputy division heads in the 
Auswärtiges Amt (Unterabteilungsleiter).  
Head of Unit (Referatsleiter): each division in the Auswärtiges Amt is made up of several units 
(Referate). For example, the Political Division 3 had a Middle Eastern Unit (Nahostreferat), 
South East Asia Unit (Südasienreferat), East Asian Unit (Ostasienreferat), and so on. Each of 
these units had one head (Referatsleiter) and one deputy head. 
Parliamentary State Secretary (parlamentarischer Staatssekretär)/ State Minister (Staats-
minister): a position which is held by a politician and not a civil servant. They act as deputies 
to the minister. In 1974, the West German government decided to rename the position of 























Bente, Wolfgang:  From 1967 to 1969, 
Bente headed the West German delegation 
at the French embassy in Beirut, as at the 
time France was the FRG’s protective 
power in Lebanon in the absence of full 
diplomatic relations between Bonn and 
Beirut. Bente then worked in the Middle 
Eastern unit (Nahostreferat) in the 
Auswärtiges Amt until 1972. In 1970, he 
was temporarily seconded to Amman as 
deputy for ambassador Hille. The events of 
the Jordanian civil war fell in this period. 
From 1985 to 1990, he was West German 
ambassador in Tunisia and from 1990 to 
1992 German  ambassador in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Böker, Alexander: After several postings 
abroad and in Bonn, Böker was promoted 
to the rank of ministerial director and was 
responsible for the allocation of West 
German funds for Palestinian refugees from 
1963 to 1968. 
 
 
Böker, Alfons: Alfons Böker followed 
Helmut Redies as head of the Middle 
Eastern Unit in the Auswärtiges Amt in 
1974 and remained in this post. He then 
moved on to become deputy ambassador at 
the West German embassy in London. 
 
Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand: Duckwitz 
had joined the Auswärtiges Amt in 1941. 
During World War II, he was posted at the 
German embassy Copenhagen. In the post-
war period, he was sceptical about the 
usefulness of the Hallstein Doctrine. He 
retired from the Auswärtiges Amt in 1965. 
However, when Brandt became foreign 
minister, he soon recalled Duckwitz to 
active service due to the similarity of their 
views on Ostpolitik. Consequently, 
Duckwitz was one of the State Secretaries 
in the ministry from 1967 to 1970. He 
finally retired upon the signing of the 
Treaty of Warsaw.  
 
Frank, Paul: From 1965 to 1968 assistant 




Political Division, subunit A (Western 
Europe). In 1968, he was promoted to 
Ministerial Director and head of the 
Political Unit I, which also included 
responsibility for the Middle East and 
North Africa. He became State Secretary in 
the Auswärtiges Amt in 1970 under Walter 
Scheel. When Scheel became the FRG’s 
Federal President in 1974, Frank became 
Head of the Office of the Federal President 
(Bundespräsidial-amt). He remained in this 
position until 1979. 
 
Harkort, Günter: Harkort had been West 
German envoy to the EEC before 1965, 
when he was called back to Bonn to serve 
as head of the Division III for Trade and 
International Development in the 
Auswärtiges Amt in the rank of Ministerial 
Director. In 1969, he became State 
Secretary in the ministry until his 
retirement in 1970. 
 
Hille, Hans-Joachim: In 1967, Hille left 
his posting as deputy ambassador in Turkey 
to become West German ambassador in 
Jordan. He remained there for four years 
until 1970. After a quick interlude in the 
Political Division of the Auswärtiges Amt in 
Bonn, in 1971 he moved on to become West 
German ambassador in Ecuador. In 1978, 
he became West German envoy to the 
Middle East (Beauftragter für Nah- und 
Mittelostpolitik) within the Auswärtiges 
Amt. From 1979 to 1982, he was West 
German ambassador in Egypt. 
 
Jahn, Gerhard:  A member of the SPD, 
Jahn was Parliamentary State Secretary in 
the Auswärtiges Amt from 1967 to 1969. He 
then served as West German Minister of 
Justice until 1974.  
 
Jesser, Walter: Jesser was West German 
envoy in Cairo from 1969 to 1972. At the 
time, Italy acted as Protective Power for the 
FRG in Egypt. Upon the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between Bonn and 
Cairo, Jesser became ministerial director 




and South-East Asia in the Auswärtiges 
Amt in Bonn. From 1978 to 1984, he was 
West German ambassador in Morocco. 
 
Lahr, Rolf: Lahr was State Secretary in the 
Auswärtiges Amt from 1961 until 1969. He 
then took over the position as West German 
ambassador in Italy until his retirement in 
1974. 
 
Kunzmann, Karl-Heinz: Kunzmann acted 
in various positions in the Auswärtiges Amt, 
before he became West German 
ambassador in the UAE from 1974 to 1975. 
Later postings led him to Haiti and Peru. 
His final posting before retirement was that 
of West German ambassador to Tunisia 
from 1991 to 1995. 
 
Metzger, Peter: Metzger joined the Ausw-
ärtiges Amt in 1966. From 1971 to 1974, he 
acted as West German envoy in Saudi 
Arabia, where at the time Italy was 
Protective Power for the FRG. He later 
served as ambassador in Chad (1977-79), 
North Yemen (1983-86), Bulgaria (1995-
99) and Norway (1999-2001). 
 
Moersch, Karl: Moersch was a member of 
the liberal FDP party and member of West 
German parliament from 1964 to 1976. In 
July 1970, he became Parliamentary State 
Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt, which he 
remained until 1976 (from 1974 onwards, 
the position had been renamed to State 
Minister). 
 
Montfort, Norbert: Montfort had held 
posts in Lebanon and Iraq, before in 1966 
he became West German consul in Kuwait. 
After serving as ambassador in Mauretania 
from 1971 to 1974, he moved on directly to 
Saudi Arabia. There, he remained 
ambassador until 1976. He then became 
head of the North African Unit in the 
Auswärtiges Amt. In 1979, he followed 
Hans-Joachim Hille as West German envoy 
to the Middle East (Beauftragter für Nah- 
und Mittelostpolitik) within the 




before retirement, Montfort was West 
German ambassador in Morocco from 1984 
to 1990. 
 
Nowak, Walter Georg: From 1968 to 
1973, Nowak was head of the West German 
delegation in Beirut at a time when there 
were no diplomatic relations between West 
Germany and Lebanon. He then moved to 
the embassy in Teheran as deputy 
ambassador. From 1985 to 1990, he was 
West German ambassador in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Redies, Helmut: As a diplomat, Redies 
repeadetly worked on topics relating to the 
Middle East. From 1964 to 1967 he was the 
deputy head of the Middle Eastern Unit 
within the Auswärtiges Amt. He returned 
from a posting in Urugay to head the 
Middle Eastern Unit from 1970 to 1974. He 
then worked in Bonn on UN issues and later 
became West German ambassador in 
Venezuela and Copenhagen. 
 
Sachs, Hans-Georg: From 1965 to 1973, 
Sachs was West Germany’s envoy to the 
EEC in Brussels. He then became State 
Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt until 
1975, when he was killed in a climbing 
accident in Austria.  
 
Schlagintweit, Reinhard: Schlagintweit 
had worked in the Culture Division of the 
Auswärtiges Amt, before he followed 
Norbert Montfort as West German 
ambassador to Jeddah. He remained in 
Saudi Arabia until 1979.  
 
Schütz, Karl: Schütz had not originally 
been a diplomat, but was active as politician 
in West Berlin with close links to Willy 
Brandt. In 1966, he became State Secretary 
in the Auswärtiges Amt under Brandt, but 
within a year he had returned to West Berlin 
where he became mayor until 1977. He was 
then appointed as West German 
ambassador to Israel, where he remained 





Steltzer, Hans-Georg: Steltzer had gotten 
to know Willy Brandt when the former 
worked for the federal parliament, or 
Senate, of Berlin. Steltzer then became 
head of the Culture Division in the 
Auswärtiges Amt in 1970. In 1972, he went 
to Cairo as West German ambassador to 
Egypt, where he remained until his 
retirement in 1978. 
 
Turnwald, Wilhelm: In 1969, Turnwald 
became West German ambassador in 
Libya. He retired in 1971. 
 
van Well, Günter: From 1971 onwards, 
van Well headed the Political Division in 
the Auswärtiges Amt, first in Political 
Division 2 for the West and the Soviet Bloc, 
then from 1973 onwards in Political 
Division 3 with a responsibility for Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. From 1977 to 
1981, he was State Secretary in the 
Auswärtiges Amt. 
 
von Staden, Bernd: Von Staden was head 
of the Political Division in the Auswärtiges 
Amt from 1970 to 1973. He then moved on 
to become West German ambassador to the 
US until 1979. From 1981 to 1983, he was 
State Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt. 
 
Werner, Günter-Franz: 
Werner had been working at the West 
German embassy in India, before in 1971 
he became West German ambassador to 




Wischnewski was a member of West 
German parliament from 1957 to 1990 for 
the SPD. He was Minister for International 
Development in the Grand Coalition from 
1966 to 1968, before giving up this post to 
became party manager (Bundes-
geschäftsführer) for the SPD until 1972. 
From 1974 to 1976, he was State Minister 
in the Auwärtiges Amt and then State 




(Bundeskanzleramt) under Helmut Schmidt 























Resolution of the Arab League to call back 
all Arab ambassadors from Bonn in view of 
the possible establishment of diplomatic 
relations between West Germany and Israel 
 
12.05.1965 Establishment of diplomatic relations 
between West Germany and Israel; break-up 
of diplomatic relations between most Arab 
states and West Germany; only Morocco, 
Tunisia and Libya maintain diplomatic ties 
with Bonn 
  
19.09.1965 General election in West Germany, won by 





Election of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger as 
chancellor by West German parliament; 
formation of ‘Grand Coalition’ with Willy 





Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
between West Germany and Jordan 
 
May 1967 Visit of Abdel-Khaled Hassouna, Secretary 
General of the Arab League, in Bonn 
 
05.-10.06.1967 Six-Day/June War 
 
06.06.-01.09.1967 Oil embargo by Arab oil states 
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Meeting in the Auswärtiges Amt to discuss 
consequences of the June War for West 
German foreign policy. The ‘June 
Memorandum’ is the result of this meeting. 
 
29.08.1967 Beginning of the Arab League summit in 
Khartoum 
 
01.09.1967 Khartoum Declaration of ‘Three ‘No’s’ by 
the Arab League 
 
26.11.1967 First backchannel meeting between 
Wischnewski and Bouteflika in New York, 
discussing a possible resumption of 






Formation of Organization of Arab 






Establishment of West German oil company 
DEMINEX 
 
May 1969 Establishment of diplomatic relations 









Establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the FRG and the Yemen Arab 
Republic (North Yemen) 
 
01.09.1969 Libyan coup d’état; takeover of power by 
the Free Officer’s Movement around 
Colonel Ghaddafi  
 
28.09.1969 General election in West Germany, 
resulting in an electoral victory of Brandt’s 
SPD; on the same evening, Brandt and 
Scheel agree in principle on forming of the 
social-liberal coalition.  
 
September/October 1969 Reports from West German delegation in 
Lebanon about possible plans for 
Palestinian attacks in West Germany 
 
30.10.1969 Announcement of the ‘Scheel doctrine’; 
Bonn asks international community to hold 
off with recognition of GDR until both 
Germanies have regulated their relations 
amongst themselves 
 





Meeting between Bouteflika and Brandt 









Workshop by the social-liberal coalition on 
the new government’s Middle Eastern 
policy 
 
10.02.1970 Palestinian attack on Israeli airplane at 
Riem airport  
 
11.02.1970 Meeting between Scheel and Bouteflika in 
Brussels 
 
22.02.1970 Meeting between a West German diplomat 
and Issam Sartawi, head of the AOLP, in 
Amman 
 
23./24.02.1970 Meetings between West German and 
Algerian delegation in Rome 
 
17.04.1970 Brandt and Scheel decide to put 
negotiations with Algiers about the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations on 
hold 
 
20.05.1970 Establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the GDR and Algeria 
 
06.09.1970 Start of Dawson’s Field Hijackings 
 
16.-27.09.1970 Main phase of Jordanian Civil War 
 
29.09.1970 West German cabinet votes to significantly 
increase oil reserves over a five-year period 
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Publication of the Davignon report 
 
19.11.1970 Inauguration of the EPC by the foreign 
ministers of the Six at Munich 
 






Tehran agreement signed, signaling a shift 
of power in global oil markets to producer 
countries  
 
20.10.1971 Willy Brandt receives the Nobel Peace 
Prize 
 
17.12.1971 Transit Agreement between FRG and GDR 
 
21.12.1971 Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
between FRG and Algeria 
 
23.12.1971 Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 





Arab League decision to allow every 
member state individually to decide on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with 
the FRG; effective revocation of the 1965 
ban on diplomatic relations between Arab 
states and West Germany 
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Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 




Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
between FRG and Oman 
 
17.05.1972 Establishment of diplomatic relations 
between FRG and Kuwait, Bahrain as well 
as the UAE 
 
07.06.1972 Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
between FRG and Egypt 
 
19.07.1972 Expulsion of Soviet military advisors from 
Egypt 
 
08.08.1972 West German ‘oil policy’ formulated by 
Auswärtiges Amt and economics ministry 
 
05.09.1972 Hostage crisis around Munich Olympics 
 
19.11.1972 General Election in West Germany; 
electoral victory for the social-liberal 
coalition and public affirmation of 
Ostpolitik 
 
21.-22.12.1972 State Secretary Frank in Tunisia and Libya 
to discuss Palestinian terrorism with 









Denmark, Ireland and the UK join the EEC, 
turning the Six into the Nine. 
 




Scheel in Jordan 
 
24.-25.05.1973 Scheel in Lebanon 
 
07.-11.06.1973 Brandt first German head of government to 
visit Israel 
 
23.08.1973 Brandt letter on the situation in the Middle 
East to UN Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim  
 
21.09.1973 Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the FRG and Saudi Arabia 
 
06.-24.10.1973 October War between Egypt, Syria and 
Israel 
 
16.10.1973 US ambassador Hillenbrandt informs 
Scheel about airlift of US weapons and 
material to Israel 
 
17.10.1973 OPEC countries cut production by 5% 
overnight; start of the oil crisis 
 
23.10.1973 State Secretary Frank requests from 
Hillenbrandt that the US no longer use 
bases in West Germany for airlift to Israel 
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West German newspapers report use of 





Brussels Declaration by the foreign 
ministers of the Nine on the situation in the 
Middle East; acknowledgment of 
“legitimate rights of the Palestinians” 
 





Start of the Washington Energy Conference 
 
26.02.1974 Re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
between FRG and Iraq 
 
19.-21.04.1974 Official visit of Brandt in Algiers 
 
21.-24.04.1974 Official visit of Brandt in Egypt; taken 
together, the two visits represent the first 
time that a German chancellor travelled in 
official capacity to an Arab country. 
 
31.07.1974 Inauguration of the EAD at a meeting 
between EEC and LAS representatives in 
Paris 
 
15.11.1974 International Energy Agency (IEA) 
established in Paris 
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The UN General Assembly adopts 
resolution 3236 acknowledging the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinians in a 
solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well 
as resolution 3237 granting the PLO 




Meeting of former West German foreign 
minister Gerhard Schröder (CDU) with 





The Nine agree on the Dublin Formula 
regarding the participation of individual 
Palestinian delegates at the EAD 
 
April 1975 Escalation of violence in Lebanon; Ayn al 
Rummaneh bus massacre marks beginning 
of civil war 
 
16.-19.12.1975 Conference on International Economic 





Establishment of PLO information office in 
Bonn 
 










General election in Germany; despite losses 
for the SPD the social-liberal coalition is 




London Declaration by the Nine, 
mentioning for the first time a “Palestinian 
national identity” 
05.09.1977 Kidnapping of Hans-Martin Schleyer by 
RAF 
13.-18.10.1977 Hijacking of Lufthansa airplane Landshut 
by PFLP-GC, ending in a successful raid of 
the airplane in Mogadishu by German 
special police forces 
 
19.11.1977 Visit by Anwar al-Sadat to Israel 
 
24.11.1977 Secret meeting of Wischnewski with 






First anti-government protests starting in 
Iran 
 
17.09.1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and 
Israel 
 
November 1978 Strikes bring Iranian oil production to a 










Shah leaves Iran 
 
26.03.1979 Separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 
 
18.-20.06.1979 Genscher in Libya 
 
23.-24.06.1979 Genscher in Saudi-Arabia 
 





Genscher in Syria 
 
28.08.1979 Genscher in Lebanon 
 
28.-31.08.1979 Genscher in Jordan 
 
31.08.-02.09.1979 Genscher in Egypt 
 





EEC summit in Venice; declaration stressing 
the need to involve the PLO in negotiations 
about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict    
 
